Prof Sarah Birch's lecture at the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur on July 1, 2014.

1. Ukraine and European
Security
Sarah Birch
University of Glasgow
1 July 2014

3. Ukraine as buffer between East and West
• Ukraine lies at the geographical heart of Europe
• But it is also lies on the border between the eastern and western
halves of the continent
• This is reflected in the name ‘U-kraïna’, which etymologically means
‘on the edge’
• This ‘edge’ can be seen in positive terms as a bridge; yet Ukraine has
often been a battleground between rival forces vying for control of
Europe.

4. A brief history of Ukraine
• Between the world wars, the Ukrainian lands were divided into eastern
Soviet Ukraine and western Ukraine controlled by Poland, Czechoslovakia
and Romania.
• During the 20th century, heavy industry was built up in Soviet Ukraine (coal,
steel), attracting ethnic Russians to settle, especially in the far east
• In 1944, the Soviet Union occupied and annexed western Ukraine, western
Belarus and the Baltic republics.
• At this point, Crimea was part of Soviet Russia.
• Following the Second World War, Stalin deported most of the Crimean
Tatars to Siberia, and their homes were seized by ethnic Russians, who
settled in great numbers in Crimea during the 10-year period between
1945 and 1954.
• In 1954 Crimea was transferred from Soviet Russia to Soviet Ukraine.

5. Ukrainian institutions
• In 1991-1992, the territory of Soviet Ukraine became an independent
state, as did the other 14 Soviet republics.
• Ukraine has a semi-presidential executive, with a president and a
prime minister
• The most recent parliamentary election was conducted under a
mixed-member (half PR, half FPTP) electoral system
• Ukraine is divided into 25 regions plus the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea. The regions have very little power, however.
• This institutional set-up means that whoever controls the presidency
has considerable control

6. Ethnicity in Ukraine
• Approximately 80% of citizens define themselves as ethnic Ukrainians
• Ethnic Russians are the largest minority (15%).
• Most Ukrainians are bilingual, though a substantial minority speak
Russian as their language of preference.
• Regional divisions define Ukrainian politics. There is a pro-Russian and
largely Russian-speaking east, a pro-European largely Ukrainian-
speaking west, with a large area in the middle that has ill-defined
identities and language use.
• Ethnic identity in Ukraine thus forms a continuum, which prevents
Ukraine from dividing politically along clear lines.

7. National identification, first weeks of 2014
(Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme Robertson)

8. Regionalism and institutional centralisation: a
toxic mix
• Ukraine’s centralised institutions have given considerable power to
the president
• Regional political divides mean that party politics is dominated by
east-west divisions
• This means that one region is bound always to feel under-represented
in state institutions
• This gives an incentives to people from that region to use protest and
other extra-institutional means to voice their concerns

9. Corruption
• Corruption is one of the most significant political issues in Ukraine
• Ukraine became very corrupt in the post-Soviet period, as state assets
were privatised via dubious means.
• Anti-corruption sentiment has been behind a number of protest
movements since independence, including the movement that
culminated in the so-called Orange Revolution of 2004, when
egregious electoral fraud sparked mass popular demonstration which
led the election to be re-run.

10. Viktor Yanukovych
• Viktor Yanukovych, of the eastern-based Party of Regions, was the
(ultimately) unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2004.
• Yanukovych won a relatively fair election in 2010, however.
• His period in office was characterised by a marked increase in
corruption, with members of Yanukovych’s immediate family as
beneficiaries.
• Yanukovych wavered between pro-Western and pro-Russian policies.
• In 2013, a wave of protest was mounted against Yanukovych’s last-
minute decision to abandon plans for an association agreement with
the European Union, following intense pressure from Russia.

11. The ‘Euromaidan’
• Following European tradition, the demonstrators camped out in Kiev’s
central Independence Square. Their encampment was largely non-
violent.
• Like most protests movements the ‘Euromaidan’ protest included
small numbers of more radical elements with undemocratic views.
• The protesters’ demands were initially focused on the EU Association
agreement, but they soon widened to include other aspects of
Yanukovych’s rule, including most prominently corruption

12. The Euromaidan

13. The protest turns violent
• Promised negotiations over the protestors’ demands did not materialise
• A law was introduced effectively banning demonstration by the opposition
• The protestors became radicalised and some of them decided to resort to
violence, which resulted in violent retaliation from the police, who killed 5
protestors on 22 January
• 18-20 February: Yanukovych sent in the riot police to clear the Maidan; the
protestors resisted with improvised weapons and burning barricades.
• The police and the protestors clashed repeatedly, leaving 88 dead
(including 16 policemen).

14. Burning barricades on the Euromaidan

15. Yanukovych flees following agreement
• On 21 February Yanukovych tried unsuccessfully to mobilise the army
to act against the protests.
• The foreign ministers of Poland, France and Germany brokered a
compromise on under which there would be early elections,
constitutional reforms and a temporary coalition government.
• Yanukovych had 48 hours in which to implement the agreement,
however, on the very night it was signed, he fled Kiev.
• He failed to make contact with members of the Ukrainian parliament
or government and the result was a leadership vacuum.

16. Parliament confirms new government
• The following evening, the Ukrainian parliament invoked a provision
in the constitution under which if a president is unable to fulfil his
duties, he can be replaced by an acting president.
• This was done peacefully by a two-thirds majority.
• Acting president Oleksandr Turchinov was appointed and presidential
elections called for May. The Party of the Regions disowned
Yanukovych.
• The government was replaced by a coalition government made up of
centrist and right-wing parties.

17. The aftermath of the revolution
• There was mass euphoria at the downfall of Yanukovych, whose
regime was unpopular throughout the country due to its excessive
corruption.
• Ukraine came out of this revolution far stronger, as it was for the first
time united, with the exception of Crimea and the partial exception of
Eastern Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s high level of centralisation and the centralising institution of
the president meant that almost all power was now in control of a
government with which many in the east felt little affinity.

18. The Russian reaction
• The new government was perceived by Russia as a threat to its vision
of Ukraine as a strategic buffer.
• The Russian economy has suffered in recent years, and President
Putin has been threatened with mass protests.
• Putin’s control over Russia and Russia’s role as a regional power have
thus both been under strain recently.
• Russian’s actions in Ukraine can be seen as a defensive move by Putin
to shore up his flagging strength and slow Russia’s decline as a world
power.

19. Russia occupies Crimea
• Russia occupied Crimea in contravention of the 1994 Budapest accords, in
which Ukraine agreed to renounce its nuclear weapons in exchange for
Russian guarantees that it would respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
• The seizure of Crimea could quite well not have been Putin’s plan. Crimea
lacks its own water supply. Crimea was also heavily subsidised by the
government in Kiev.
• The occupation of Crimea has alienated Russia from the West and drawn
Ukraine closer to Western powers.
• The Russian economy has, by contrast, suffered considerably.
• The only positive outcome for Putin of the occupation of Crimea was that
Putin’s own popularity ratings rose.

20. Russian efforts to destabilise eastern Ukraine
• Following the occupation of Crimea, Russia began to destabilise
eastern Ukraine, sending undercover members of its military
intelligence, mercenaries and other volunteers to foment unrest.
• This has led so far to 300+ deaths.
• Ukrainian efforts to quell the unrest are ongoing, though there are
still some areas of the east that are under the control of insurgents.
• Following the election of president Petro Poroshenko on 25 May on
55% of the vote, the new Ukrainian government is beginning to
consolidate its grip on power and bring order to the country.

21. Assessment of the revolution and its
aftermath
• Russia may have won the battle in Crimea, but it has lost this war, as
it has lost the hearts and minds of virtually all the Ukrainian
population, and it has not achieved any of its initial goals.
• In many ways, Ukraine is in a stronger situation, having asserted its
sovereignty and autonomy, having reaffirmed its identity and having
established considerable support and ties with the West, including
the association agreement which began this episode last autumn.
• The ongoing insurgency in the east remains a geopolitical problem,
however

22. Ukraine and European security
• Ukraine is now far more democratic and far more pro-Western than it has
been since it gained independence in 1991, bolstering European security.
• Russia’s aggression and disregard for international law has given NATO a
new lease on life and caused it to move back toward its initial purpose.
• The confrontation has left the European Union somewhat divided and has
put question marks over the possibility of a real European security policy.
• The confrontation has divided the non-Western world: many people across
the globe are glad to see a state stand up to the West; at the same time,
many smaller states are also dismayed at the erosion of international rule
of law, and by Russia’s blatant disregard for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

23. Question marks over state integrity?
• It is unclear that other European states are at greater risk of breaking
up as a result of recent events in Ukraine, as the threats to Ukraine’s
territorial integrity are external
• Russia is unlikely to invade many European states in the way that it
has invaded Ukraine. Russia already controls parts of Moldova and
Georgia, but it is unlikely to seek to extend its control, as there is
little to be gained in doing so.
• No other European powers would emulate Russian aggression
• Secessionist movements in Catalonia and Scotland have a very
different character, as they have a wide domestic support base.