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Malware Threats in our
    Cyber Infrastructure


              13th April 2013
  Hotel Royal Ambarukmo Yogyakarta
         Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Charles Lim, Msc., ECSA, ECSP, ECIH, CEH, CEI
AGENDA

   About me
   Malware History
   Malware Current Attack
   Malware Profiles
   Botnet
   Botnet Takedown
   Summary



Faculty of Engineering and IT      2
Malware History
   What is Malware?
         Stand for Malicious Software
   Early Days
         Viruses or Trojan
   Today
         Viruses, worms, backdoors, Trojans, keyloggers,
         password stealers, script viruses, rootkits, macro
         viruses, spyware or even adware.




Faculty of Engineering and IT          3
Malware History




    1970’s
          Experimental replicating program (Creeper &Reaper)


Faculty of Engineering and IT          4
Malware History




    Early 1980’s
          From thesis to real virus …



Faculty of Engineering and IT          5
Malware History




    Late 1980’s
          From Apple II virus to First Internet Worm …
Faculty of Engineering and IT          6
Malware History




    Early 1990’s
          Polymorphic Viruses to First Macro viruses
Faculty of Engineering and IT          7
Malware History




    Late 1990’s
          DOS 16-bit viruses to Melissa Worm …

Faculty of Engineering and IT          8
Malware History




    Early 2000’s
          I LOVE YOU virus to MyDOOM (fastest spreading
          worm)
Faculty of Engineering and IT          9
Malware History




    Late 2000’s
          First ever Mac OS X malware to rogue AV to
          conficker worm
Faculty of Engineering and IT          10
Malware History




    2010 – now
          Stuxnet to Banking Trojan to Android Malware

Faculty of Engineering and IT          11
Malware History




    From 2004 till now …
          From Symbian based malware to Android Malware


Faculty of Engineering and IT          12
Recent Malware Attack
   South Korean TV Broadcaster and Banks
   attack




Faculty of Engineering and IT             13
Recent Malware Attack
   The Attack Process




Faculty of Engineering and IT             14
Recent Malware Attack
   Attack started on 20 March 2013 at 2:20 pm

         Three broadcaster KBS, MBC and YTN hit


         Three banks (제주은행) Jeju, (농협생명) Nonghyup
         (Bank and Insurance) and (신한은행) Shinhan hit


         knocked offline after PCs were infected by data-
         deleting malware (from server update in the network)




Faculty of Engineering and IT             15
Recent Malware Attack
                                    Check for existing remote
                                    management tools




Faculty of Engineering and IT             16
Recent Malware Attack




                                          Target:
                                               To corrupt the Master Boot
                                               Record (MBR) as well as
                                               the Volume Boot Record
                                               (VMR)
                                               Kills 2 popular anti virus
                                               software
                                               Reboot      system
                                               unusable

Faculty of Engineering and IT             17
Recent Malware Attack




                                          Target:
                                               To corrupt the Master Boot
                                               Record (MBR) as well as
                                               the Volume Boot Record
                                               (VMR)
                                               Check time
                                               Kills 2 popular anti virus
                                               software
                                               Reboot       system
                                               unusable
Faculty of Engineering and IT             18
Recent Malware Attack
   Malware involved:
         File Name: ApcRunCmd_DB4BBDC36A78A8807AD9B15A562515C4.exe
         MD5: db4bbdc36a78a8807ad9b15a562515c4
         File Type: Win32 EXE


         File Name: OthDown.exe
         MD5: 5fcd6e1dace6b0599429d913850f0364
         File Type: Win32 EXE


         File Name: AmAgent.exe
         MD5: 5fcd6e1dace6b0599429d913850f0364
         File Type: Win32 EXE


         File Name: vti-rescan.exe
         MD5: 9263e40d9823aecf9388b64de34eae54
         File Type: Win32 EXE


   Malware Samples: http://contagiodump.blogspot.nl/2013/03/darkseoul-jokra-mbr-
   wiper-samples.html


Faculty of Engineering and IT                    19
Recent Malware Attack
   According to Mcafee (refer to reference), the
   malware samples used the existing malware
   found in August and October 2012 in the wild
   as a template to develop new malware
   It has a new capability:
         MBR-killing
         2 Popular Anti Virus-killing




                 NEW sample                         OLD sample

Faculty of Engineering and IT             20
BOTNET




Faculty of Engineering and IT      21
Botnet – What is it?
   What is Botnet?




Faculty of Engineering and IT             22
Botnet – What is it?
   What is Botnet?




Faculty of Engineering and IT             23
Botnet – What is it?
   What is Botnet?




Faculty of Engineering and IT             24
Botnet – Stats
   What is Botnet?




                                Source: 2013 GLOBAL THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT (GTIR)

Faculty of Engineering and IT                   25
Botnet – Underground
   Botnet Underground




                                                  Source: http://goo.gl/Vq30r

Faculty of Engineering and IT             26
Botnet – Underground
   Botnet Underground




                                                  Source: FireEye on Botnet Grum

Faculty of Engineering and IT             27
Botnet Evolution

                  • Centralized C & C Server
     1st          • IRC-based communication

                  • P2P C & C Server
    2nd           • IRC C & C server

                  • HTTP-based C & C
    3rd           • P2P C & C Server

                  • Encrypted communication
     4th          • P2P C & C


Faculty of Engineering and IT           28
Botnet C&C Evolution

   Two most common method of C&C:
         Central control C&C
         P2P Network
   Central C&C Server




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Botnet C&C Evolution (cont.)

   P2P network
         E.g. Kelihos Botnet




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Botnet C&C Evolution (cont.)

   Kelihos infections




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Botnet C&C Evolution (cont.)

   TOR-based C&C




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Botnet Evolution & Takedown




Faculty of Engineering and IT    33
Botnet Evolution & Takedown




Faculty of Engineering and IT    34
Declining Botnets




Faculty of Engineering and IT           35   Source: Mcafee Q4 2012 Report
Botnets Alive Today




                                              Source: Mcafee Q4 2012 Report



Faculty of Engineering and IT            36
New Botnets




Faculty of Engineering and IT        37
Botnet – Some stats




Faculty of Engineering and IT            38
Third Larget Botnet Takedown

   Code name: Grum Botnet
   Impact Size: 18% SPAM volumes (18
   billion SPAM a day)
   C & C: Panama & Netherland


   Takedown: Tuesday, 12 July 2012
   Alive again: Thursday, 14 July 2012
   (C&C: Russia)
   Difficulty of takedown: 2 (1 to 5)

Faculty of Engineering and IT
Grum Botnet Characteristics

   C&C Servers:
         Primary C&C for configuration files and initial
         registration
         Secondary C&C for spam related activities
   Hard-coded IP Addresses (instead of domain
   names)
   Infected machines segmented into different
   C&C
   No fall back mechanism if Primary and
   Secondary C&C down


Faculty of Engineering and IT
Grum Botnet Characteristics




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Grum Botnet (cont.)




Conversation with Primary C&C

Faculty of Engineering and IT
Grum Botnet (cont.)




Conversation with Secondary C&C

Faculty of Engineering and IT
Grum Botnet (cont.)
 IP address         Type         Geo Location   Status (as of
                                                July 6 2012)
190.123.46.91      Master          PANAMA          Active


190.123.46.92      Master          PANAMA       Suspended or
                                                 abandoned
91.239.24.251      Master          RUSSIAN         Active
                                 FEDERATION
94.102.51.226    Secondary       NETHERLANDS       Active


94.102.51.227    Secondary       NETHERLANDS       Active


94.102.51.228    Secondary       NETHERLANDS Suspended or
                                              abandoned

94.102.51.229    Secondary       NETHERLANDS Suspended or
                                              abandoned

94.102.51.230    Secondary       NETHERLANDS Suspended or
                                              abandoned




 Faculty of Engineering and IT
Grum Botnet - Lesson Learned

   Strong Points:
         C&C Servers are located at the countries where government
         are reluctant to care for abuse notification historically
         Servers are scattered across multiple data centers
         Botnet divided into segments (Bad part: unless all C&C dead,
         botnet is still alive)
   Weak Points:
         No Fallback mechanism           C&C dead, no connection
         possible
         Handful of hard-coded IP addresses
         Data centers easily identified (easy to deal with)
         Small segments, easily dead for some segments

Faculty of Engineering and IT
Grum Botnet - Lesson Learned

   Summarized Strategy to takedown
   botnet
         Research which C&C Architecture they are using
         Intelligence on real-time traffic
         Takedown Methodology
         24/7 Surveillance
         Actual Takedown
         Surprise will com – be prepared
         Post takedown activities




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Bamital – Botnet Takedown

   Method: Click Fraud




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Bamital – Botnet Takedown

   User search Pornographic web site
   Then users are directed to these web
   site:




   Downloaded Bamital Trojan
Faculty of Engineering and IT
Bamital – Botnet Takedown

   These “random” web sites (pseudo-
   random generated) that serve the exploit
   packs:




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Summary
   We have seen how malware evolved with
   more and more advanced and sophisticated
   methods


   The Tasks are very challenging …


   Research in Malware is in huge demand …


   We need to work together …


Faculty of Engineering and IT
Other Security Events
   13-15 May 2013                      ACAD-CSIRT in Bali


   19-20 June 2013  Honeynet Indonesia
   Chapter Workshop 2013, Jakarta


   18 Sept 2013   Cloud Security Alliance
   Summit, Jakarta




Faculty of Engineering and IT
References
   http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/an-
   overview-of-messaging-botnets
   http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/botnet-
   activities-research/2012/07/grum-botnet-no-
   longer-safe-havens.html
   http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/pu
   shdo.htm
   http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/200
   9/06/ftc_sues_shuts_down_n_calif_we.html
   http://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/botnet
   -command-server-hidden-in-tor.html
   http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193438/FA
   Q_Disabling_the_new_Hlux_Kelihos_Botnet
   https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/7451/53071

Faculty of Engineering and IT
References
   http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/it-
   security-data-protection/cyber-security/south-
   korean-attack-malware-analysis/
   http://download.bitdefender.com/resources/fil
   es/Main/file/Malware_History.pdf
   http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/south-
   korean-banks-media-companies-targeted-by-
   destructive-malware




Faculty of Engineering and IT
References
   http://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-
   center/threat-monitoring/malware-
   dashboard.aspx
   http://www.mcafee.com/us/mcafee-
   labs/threat-intelligence.aspx
   http://www.virusradar.com/




Faculty of Engineering and IT
Thank You

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Malware threats in our cyber infrastructure

  • 1. Malware Threats in our Cyber Infrastructure 13th April 2013 Hotel Royal Ambarukmo Yogyakarta Yogyakarta, Indonesia Charles Lim, Msc., ECSA, ECSP, ECIH, CEH, CEI
  • 2. AGENDA About me Malware History Malware Current Attack Malware Profiles Botnet Botnet Takedown Summary Faculty of Engineering and IT 2
  • 3. Malware History What is Malware? Stand for Malicious Software Early Days Viruses or Trojan Today Viruses, worms, backdoors, Trojans, keyloggers, password stealers, script viruses, rootkits, macro viruses, spyware or even adware. Faculty of Engineering and IT 3
  • 4. Malware History 1970’s Experimental replicating program (Creeper &Reaper) Faculty of Engineering and IT 4
  • 5. Malware History Early 1980’s From thesis to real virus … Faculty of Engineering and IT 5
  • 6. Malware History Late 1980’s From Apple II virus to First Internet Worm … Faculty of Engineering and IT 6
  • 7. Malware History Early 1990’s Polymorphic Viruses to First Macro viruses Faculty of Engineering and IT 7
  • 8. Malware History Late 1990’s DOS 16-bit viruses to Melissa Worm … Faculty of Engineering and IT 8
  • 9. Malware History Early 2000’s I LOVE YOU virus to MyDOOM (fastest spreading worm) Faculty of Engineering and IT 9
  • 10. Malware History Late 2000’s First ever Mac OS X malware to rogue AV to conficker worm Faculty of Engineering and IT 10
  • 11. Malware History 2010 – now Stuxnet to Banking Trojan to Android Malware Faculty of Engineering and IT 11
  • 12. Malware History From 2004 till now … From Symbian based malware to Android Malware Faculty of Engineering and IT 12
  • 13. Recent Malware Attack South Korean TV Broadcaster and Banks attack Faculty of Engineering and IT 13
  • 14. Recent Malware Attack The Attack Process Faculty of Engineering and IT 14
  • 15. Recent Malware Attack Attack started on 20 March 2013 at 2:20 pm Three broadcaster KBS, MBC and YTN hit Three banks (제주은행) Jeju, (농협생명) Nonghyup (Bank and Insurance) and (신한은행) Shinhan hit knocked offline after PCs were infected by data- deleting malware (from server update in the network) Faculty of Engineering and IT 15
  • 16. Recent Malware Attack Check for existing remote management tools Faculty of Engineering and IT 16
  • 17. Recent Malware Attack Target: To corrupt the Master Boot Record (MBR) as well as the Volume Boot Record (VMR) Kills 2 popular anti virus software Reboot system unusable Faculty of Engineering and IT 17
  • 18. Recent Malware Attack Target: To corrupt the Master Boot Record (MBR) as well as the Volume Boot Record (VMR) Check time Kills 2 popular anti virus software Reboot system unusable Faculty of Engineering and IT 18
  • 19. Recent Malware Attack Malware involved: File Name: ApcRunCmd_DB4BBDC36A78A8807AD9B15A562515C4.exe MD5: db4bbdc36a78a8807ad9b15a562515c4 File Type: Win32 EXE File Name: OthDown.exe MD5: 5fcd6e1dace6b0599429d913850f0364 File Type: Win32 EXE File Name: AmAgent.exe MD5: 5fcd6e1dace6b0599429d913850f0364 File Type: Win32 EXE File Name: vti-rescan.exe MD5: 9263e40d9823aecf9388b64de34eae54 File Type: Win32 EXE Malware Samples: http://contagiodump.blogspot.nl/2013/03/darkseoul-jokra-mbr- wiper-samples.html Faculty of Engineering and IT 19
  • 20. Recent Malware Attack According to Mcafee (refer to reference), the malware samples used the existing malware found in August and October 2012 in the wild as a template to develop new malware It has a new capability: MBR-killing 2 Popular Anti Virus-killing NEW sample OLD sample Faculty of Engineering and IT 20
  • 22. Botnet – What is it? What is Botnet? Faculty of Engineering and IT 22
  • 23. Botnet – What is it? What is Botnet? Faculty of Engineering and IT 23
  • 24. Botnet – What is it? What is Botnet? Faculty of Engineering and IT 24
  • 25. Botnet – Stats What is Botnet? Source: 2013 GLOBAL THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT (GTIR) Faculty of Engineering and IT 25
  • 26. Botnet – Underground Botnet Underground Source: http://goo.gl/Vq30r Faculty of Engineering and IT 26
  • 27. Botnet – Underground Botnet Underground Source: FireEye on Botnet Grum Faculty of Engineering and IT 27
  • 28. Botnet Evolution • Centralized C & C Server 1st • IRC-based communication • P2P C & C Server 2nd • IRC C & C server • HTTP-based C & C 3rd • P2P C & C Server • Encrypted communication 4th • P2P C & C Faculty of Engineering and IT 28
  • 29. Botnet C&C Evolution Two most common method of C&C: Central control C&C P2P Network Central C&C Server Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 30. Botnet C&C Evolution (cont.) P2P network E.g. Kelihos Botnet Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 31. Botnet C&C Evolution (cont.) Kelihos infections Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 32. Botnet C&C Evolution (cont.) TOR-based C&C Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 33. Botnet Evolution & Takedown Faculty of Engineering and IT 33
  • 34. Botnet Evolution & Takedown Faculty of Engineering and IT 34
  • 35. Declining Botnets Faculty of Engineering and IT 35 Source: Mcafee Q4 2012 Report
  • 36. Botnets Alive Today Source: Mcafee Q4 2012 Report Faculty of Engineering and IT 36
  • 37. New Botnets Faculty of Engineering and IT 37
  • 38. Botnet – Some stats Faculty of Engineering and IT 38
  • 39. Third Larget Botnet Takedown Code name: Grum Botnet Impact Size: 18% SPAM volumes (18 billion SPAM a day) C & C: Panama & Netherland Takedown: Tuesday, 12 July 2012 Alive again: Thursday, 14 July 2012 (C&C: Russia) Difficulty of takedown: 2 (1 to 5) Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 40. Grum Botnet Characteristics C&C Servers: Primary C&C for configuration files and initial registration Secondary C&C for spam related activities Hard-coded IP Addresses (instead of domain names) Infected machines segmented into different C&C No fall back mechanism if Primary and Secondary C&C down Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 41. Grum Botnet Characteristics Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 42. Grum Botnet (cont.) Conversation with Primary C&C Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 43. Grum Botnet (cont.) Conversation with Secondary C&C Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 44. Grum Botnet (cont.) IP address Type Geo Location Status (as of July 6 2012) 190.123.46.91 Master PANAMA Active 190.123.46.92 Master PANAMA Suspended or abandoned 91.239.24.251 Master RUSSIAN Active FEDERATION 94.102.51.226 Secondary NETHERLANDS Active 94.102.51.227 Secondary NETHERLANDS Active 94.102.51.228 Secondary NETHERLANDS Suspended or abandoned 94.102.51.229 Secondary NETHERLANDS Suspended or abandoned 94.102.51.230 Secondary NETHERLANDS Suspended or abandoned Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 45. Grum Botnet - Lesson Learned Strong Points: C&C Servers are located at the countries where government are reluctant to care for abuse notification historically Servers are scattered across multiple data centers Botnet divided into segments (Bad part: unless all C&C dead, botnet is still alive) Weak Points: No Fallback mechanism C&C dead, no connection possible Handful of hard-coded IP addresses Data centers easily identified (easy to deal with) Small segments, easily dead for some segments Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 46. Grum Botnet - Lesson Learned Summarized Strategy to takedown botnet Research which C&C Architecture they are using Intelligence on real-time traffic Takedown Methodology 24/7 Surveillance Actual Takedown Surprise will com – be prepared Post takedown activities Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 47. Bamital – Botnet Takedown Method: Click Fraud Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 48. Bamital – Botnet Takedown User search Pornographic web site Then users are directed to these web site: Downloaded Bamital Trojan Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 49. Bamital – Botnet Takedown These “random” web sites (pseudo- random generated) that serve the exploit packs: Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 50. Summary We have seen how malware evolved with more and more advanced and sophisticated methods The Tasks are very challenging … Research in Malware is in huge demand … We need to work together … Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 51. Other Security Events 13-15 May 2013 ACAD-CSIRT in Bali 19-20 June 2013 Honeynet Indonesia Chapter Workshop 2013, Jakarta 18 Sept 2013 Cloud Security Alliance Summit, Jakarta Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 52. References http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/an- overview-of-messaging-botnets http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/botnet- activities-research/2012/07/grum-botnet-no- longer-safe-havens.html http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/pu shdo.htm http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/200 9/06/ftc_sues_shuts_down_n_calif_we.html http://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/botnet -command-server-hidden-in-tor.html http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193438/FA Q_Disabling_the_new_Hlux_Kelihos_Botnet https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/7451/53071 Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 53. References http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/it- security-data-protection/cyber-security/south- korean-attack-malware-analysis/ http://download.bitdefender.com/resources/fil es/Main/file/Malware_History.pdf http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/south- korean-banks-media-companies-targeted-by- destructive-malware Faculty of Engineering and IT
  • 54. References http://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat- center/threat-monitoring/malware- dashboard.aspx http://www.mcafee.com/us/mcafee- labs/threat-intelligence.aspx http://www.virusradar.com/ Faculty of Engineering and IT