A look at how Atletico de Madrid defended against Juve's renowned 3-5-2 system of play in a Champions League Group Stage match back in 2014/15 season. Atletico went on to win the match 1-0. Note: I could not find footage of the second half, so the analysis is based off the 1st Half of the match.

1. Atletico de Madrid
vs Juventus

2. Key Points
• How did Atletico neutralise Juventus’ renowned 3-5-2 system?
• Juventus no longer had Antonio Conte, the mastermind of this
sophisticated system and style of play, as their manager- instead, Max
Allegri, but the idea’s as well as quality of player remained.
• This was a Champions League (2014/15) Group Stage fixture.
Atletico won the match 1-0.
• Juventus were missing Andrea Pirlo, whilst Atleti were without their
Captain, Gabi.

4. Lineups
Atletico: 4-5-1
GK: Moya
RB: Juanfran
RCB: Miranda
LCB: Godin
LB: Ansaldi
RM: Raul Garcia
RCM: Koke
CM: Tiago
LCM: Saul
LM: Arda Turan
ST: Manduzkic
Juventus: 3-5-2
GK: Buffon
RCB: Cáceres
CB: Bonucci
LCB: Chiellini
DM: Marchisio
RWB: Lichtsteiner
RCM: Pereyra
LCM: Pogba
LWB: Evra
ST: Llorente
ST: Tevez

5. Juve Attacking Threats:
i) Numerical advantage during build up ii) Forward runs from advanced CM’s.

6. iii) Exploiting open passing lanes to play into
Strikers who combine.
iv) When there is no pressure on the ball the
CB’s or DM look to play long passes in behind
the opposition back line to meet the run of a ST.

7. Atletico: Pressing vs 3-5-2
• There were different situations where Atleti would engage Juve:
- High defensive block (in opponents half)
- Medium defensive block (at half way line)
- Low defensive block (in their own half, below centre circle)
• The various areas on the pitch that Atletico chose to press would dictate how they did so,
what structure they would use defensively.

8. When did they press?
• When Atletico chose to engage Juventus
was based on a number of pressing
triggers:
- Back passes.
- Poor control from a defender.
- Setting pressing traps (wide areas)
- Restarts (Goal kicks, throw in’s).
Lets look at an example of a trigger; back passes:
Red = Line of confrontation

9. Firstly, when Atletico were in a lower defensive block,
how did they force this ‘back pass’ trigger?
• Compactness was the first key. Their ‘midfield chain’ was extremely narrow and would slide
across quickly from side to side as Juventus circulated the ball. The midfield unit provided a chain-
like efficiency in its coverage of space (between each player).
• When the ball was played into the Wing Back, who was left as the free man, Atleti would move
across to block forward passes. This would invite square passes inside- a trigger to press. The trap
would then be sprung.

10. Example: i)

11. Example: ii) The Sideline Trap (Garcia doubling up on Evra)

12. Once Atletico sprung their trap and pressed, this was their shape. This is taken from a number of situations that occurred from
a trap started on the left hand side of the pitch.
Man marking in open play is not often talked about in coaching anymore. We talk a lot about zonal marking, protecting space
etc, but Atletico employ man marking very effectively in a lot of aspects of their defensive play under Simeone. In situations
where they press, and the trigger has been identified and
the ball is heading into a wide area they quickly go man to
man in an effort to cancel out any possible options to
recycle the ball or even combine. This is a huge part of
what makes their traps so effective.
Here we can see how it is effectively a 4-3-3 shape, or a
5-2-3 if you consider Koke dropping in behind Juanfran.

13. _____________________________________________
• As the back pass is made, each unit must move up; retain distances between the
lines, get within pressing distance of opponent.
- This allows the Full Back’s to press the Wing Backs.
• Manduzkic (ST), R.Garcia (RW), Turan (LW) press 3v3 vs Juve’s CB’s. When doing this
they stay compact (‘arrowhead’) as a 3 to block off central passes (into CM’s &
Pivot).
• Curve pressing runs in order to block off passing options and force play into wide
areas; 2nd (covering) defender, look to ‘narrow off’ angle between you and pressing
player so prevent penetrative pass inside.
• Travel as the ball is played (i.e. Juanfran).
• Once the ball is with the Wing Back, go man to man marking.
Key Points on back pass pressing trigger:

14. Dealing with 3rd man runners from midfield
This was a common, and effective attacking tactic of
the Juventus 3-5-2.
• With the use of either Pogba or Peyrera, Juve would look to
find the run of the free/3rd man in between the opposition
nearside Full Back and Centre Back.
• This was done by positioning the Wing Back in
lower position in order to draw out the opponent Full Back
(in this case Juanfran or Ansaldi) and play the ball in behind.
• The problem that this caused was with Juventus possessing
two Strikers it made it an extremely risky situation for the
nearside Centre Back to engage the attacking midfielder
in the channel as it could leave a Striker free.
• It is an intelligent move to get attacking players
into 1v1 positions and provide good crossing opportunities.
• Here, we will take a look at how Simeone’s
tactics stopped this from being effective.

15. • In this example, the Wing Back (Lichtsteiner) is positioned high up the pitch, but as it is a situation where Atletico have
had to shift across quickly, he has received unopposed and has the chance to make a forward pass.
- Pereyra makes a diagonal run in between Ansaldi and Godin (circled space) to receive the ball. If he receives the ball
and can quickly cross it, there could potentially be a 3v3 opportunity for Juventus in Atletico’s penalty area.
• To counter this situation Saul (LCM) tracks the run, whilst Godin comes out wide to ensure it’s a 2v1 situation in Atleti’s
favour- eliminating chances of a cross from a 1v1 situation.
- Reacting to this, the rest of Atletico’s midfield line (3 players) drop into the box to restore a numerical advantage.

16. • On the opposite side the same movements would occur, with Koke tracking the midfield
runner (Pogba) and Raul Garcia looking to quickly restore a position behind the ball in order to
prevent a forward pass and to block passing lanes.

17. • When the Wing Back (Lichtsteiner) has dropped to a lower position, the aim of Juventus was to create a large space in
behind the back line to exploit. A potentially successful combination would have more space to exploit behind the high
Atletico backline.
Drawing the Full Back out….

18. • How Los Rojiblancos defended this situation was assigning the nearest CM (Saul) to track the runner, whilst the Full Back
(Ansaldi) would move out of the backline but only in a position that allowed him to create a 2v1/covering situation for Saul
should Pereyra receive. Turan (LM) falls back and gets behind the ball.
This is key for them as it prevents a potential pass into the space that Pereyra’s run created by dragging Saul away. By
getting behind the ball the passing lanes are closed off, Atleti are marking tightly, have created numerical superiority, and
force play backwards.

19. • At times the compactness of Los Rojiblancos and their management of space in behind made it very
hard for this tactic to succeed, and sometimes forced the Juve CM’s into dropping out of the defensive
block and looked to receive in front of the Atletico Madrid midfield.
• As we can see, the threat both between the lines and the potential Wing-Back combination is
now temporarily nullified, as Pereyra (circled) has become frustrated and dropped deep to collect
the ball. If he receives, the play is easier to defend being in front of their defensive block.

20. Key Points on defending the 3rd man from midfield
Wing Back positioned high:
- Full Back must be quick out to close down (travel with the ball).
- Nearside CB must anticipate ball into the channel.
- The nearside CM must look to get goal-side and track the midfield runner.
- Distances between the units; so midfielder’s can compensate for CB out of position.
Wing Back positioned low:
- Ideally, the Winger should recover and get behind the ball, leaving the Full Back in a covering position.
- Cut off the angle down the sideline, and screen a forward passing opportunity.
- The nearside CM must look to get goal-side and track the midfield runner.
- Remaining players in the midfield unit should shift across.
- Back line, be prepared to defend the space in behind as the line will be higher.

21. Preventing Striker’s from combining
• The Striking combination of Fernando Llorente and Carlos Tevez were
prolific for this Juventus side of 2014/15. They were a key part of La
Vecchia Signora winning the Scudetto and finishing as Champions
League Runners-up.
Movements
- Tevez liked to drop off in between the lines to try and receive the ball;
either straight into feet or by being skipped out and combining as the 3rd
man with Llorente. The following is an example:

23. • In the previous example, Atletico’s pressing was dis-jointed, with too
much space in between the units- allowing Marchisio (the pivot) to
receive free and break their lines. This was the risk of Ateltico
pressing high; by applying a lower line of engagement the space
between defence and midfield would be compressed.
• Simeone decided to employ five in midfield, looking to provide
support- numerically- to the back four as Juventus possessed a strong
ability to break lines and find their Strikers.
• To counter this the ‘midfield chain’ was used; screening, compressing
spaces, and covering the 1st defender all contributed to minimising
this threat from La Juve.

24. Preventing access to the Strikers…
• Only very seldom were Juve able to access Tevez & Llorente.
• Due to playing with 5 narrow midfielders, Atleti could cope with both attempted wide overloads and the threat of
central penetration.
How did they do it?
- Below is an example of how well Atleti’s midfield line was to deny access:
- Here we can see how ‘the chain’ has
shifted Across to allow for sufficient
pressure on the ball, whilst the central
players take up excellent screening positions.
- Tiago and Saul are positioned brilliantly,
compressing the spaces between the lines &
offering double marking solutions to any
potential long ball into Llorente.
- Manduzkic does some great work by dropping
back onto Marchisio, meaning Koke/Tiago don’t
need to get drawn out of position to press.

25. • At times, a Juventus CB would look to carry the ball into the Atletico half in order to try to draw midfielders out and
create chances for penetration.
- However, excellent positioning and recovery from the CM’s of Atleti prevented this being successful. Below is an example:
• In the picture on the left, we can see the passing options (blue lines) that Cáceres could have had without Atletico
closing the space. If Saul doesn’t step out then there is a danger that the ST’s will try and receive in behind with a lofted
pass that Juve were so good at performing.
• Tiago performs a crucial recovery run to cover Saul, who has stepped out, and blocks off pass to Tevez who has dropped
off in between the lines.

26. - The passing lanes are closed due to the immaculate positioning of Raul Garcia and Koke.
- R.Garcia, Koke, and Tiago all perform effective screening roles, forcing Chiellini to look for options
in wide areas (here, he chooses to switch the play).

27. Key points in preventing
combination play between the
Strikers
____________________________________
• Horizontal compactness as a team- closure
of passing lanes
• Vertical compactness of a team- no space
between the lines
• Excellent screening positions
• Quality positioning- cover (2nd defender)-
no penetration when pressing.
• Manduzkic dropping back onto the pivot
to allow for midfield to retain numerical
advantage.

28. How did Atletico deal with the threat ‘in
behind’?
• A potent weapon of Juve’s was, when a deep-lying player (usually
pivot or CB) had the ball with no pressure on him, a lofted pass over
the backline of the opposition to one of their Striker’s.
• Tevez in particular was effective at spinning off his marker and getting
free in behind.
• Simeone used a couple of important details that helped neutralise
this threat.

29. Positioning of Miranda and Godin….
• The positioning of Simeone’s Centre Back’s was of great importance to this.
-They never let Tevez or Llorente play blindside to them.
- This way, they were never able to peel off and make diagonal runs in behind their marker.
- The CB’s ensure the ST’s were
always in their line of sight.

30. • In this example, there are a couple of details worth noting:
- Both Strikers are in the eyeline of the CB’s
- If Juanfran were to be tempted out of position to press Evra (LWB), it would leave space for a ball over the top.
This would drag Miranda out and leave Atleti’s backline vulnerable and unbalanced.
• Miranda & Godin marked Llorente & Tevez tightly throughout the match, even if it meant creating a greater
distance than normal between the two CB’s. However, the positions they assumed in order to mark effectively
(always staying goalside) allowed them to track any runs- in behind or in front of the back four.

31. - If Tevez drops off, Godin can step out and prevent the turn (within pressing distance). Miranda can then get
into a covering positon.
Or
- If the ball is played over the top of Godin for a diagonal run from Llorente, Miranda can track this run whilst
being able to see the man and the ball the whole time. Godin can then wrap around and cover.

32. Prepared to drop….
• Triggers for the back line to prepare to drop off (and close space in behind them) to defend a long pass:
- There was no pressure on the ball.
- Pivot or CB got his head up.
- CB travelled forward with the ball.

33. Key points for
defending passes in behind
__________________________________
• Tight marking of Striker’s so that:
- Striker’s must always be visible to CB
- Goal-side of Striker
• Be prepared to drop off if there is
no pressure on the ball
• Keep Full Back’s in the line whenever
possible, so not to over-stretch the line.

34. Summary

35. • Switching from their prolific 4-4-2 to a 4-5-1 allowed for greater coverage of the pitch, and in particular the
central areas for Atletico.
• With Juventus’ idea to commit midfielders beyond the last line, the extra man in midfield allowed for the
tracking of runs whilst the midfield line retained balance. If a Pogba run took Koke out of position, Tiago
would be the extra man screening.
• The 3+1 numerical advantage for Juve in the build up phase was dealt with by ceding possession to the away
side, with Manduzkic dropping back to mark Marchisio, the pivot.
• Atletico set highly organised pressing traps that left the 3 CB’s free until:
- The ball was played into wide areas and Atletico were organised to press.
- When the ball went back to the CB’s from these areas Turan & Garcia would follow Mandzukic and create a
3v3 when pressing. The Full Back would press the Wing Back, and CM’s would man mark.
• When the ball was central they left the Wing Back’s free, helping them compact the centre- marking spaces,
players, and screening. This essentially led to a lack of penetration from La Juve and ultimately the creation
of pressing traps.
• The team were very disciplined towards the pressing triggers.
• Atletico denied Juventus a high line to exploit- an area where their Strikers thrived- with a low line of
confrontation.

36. Thanks for reading!
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