The Origins of War in Neorealist TheoryAuthor(s) Kenneth N..docx

The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory
Author(s): Kenneth N. Waltz
Source: Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The
Origin and Prevention of
Major Wars (Spring, 1988), pp. 615-628
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/204817
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Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xvIII:4 (Spring 1988), 615-
628.
Kenneth N. Waltz
The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory Like
most historians, many students of international politics have
been
skeptical about the possibility of creating a theory that might
help
one to understand and explain the international events that
interest
us. Thus Morgenthau, foremost among traditional realists, was
fond of repeating Blaise Pascal's remark that "the history of the
world would have been different had Cleopatra's nose been a bit
shorter" and then asking "How do you systemize that?"1 His
appreciation of the role of the accidental and the occurrence of
the unexpected in politics dampened his theoretical ambition.
The response of neorealists is that, although difficulties

abound, some of the obstacles that seem most daunting lie in
misapprehensions about theory. Theory obviously cannot
explain
the accidental or account for unexpected events; it deals in
regu-
larities and repetitions and is possible only if these can be
identi-
fied. A further difficulty is found in the failure of realists to
conceive of international politics as a distinct domain about
which
theories can be fashioned. Morgenthau, for example, insisted on
"the autonomy of politics," but he failed to apply the concept to
international politics. A theory is a depiction of the
organization
of a domain and of the connections among its parts. A theory
indicates that some factors are more important than others and
specifies relations among them. In reality, everything is related
to
everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from
others.
But theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal
with
it intellectually. By defining the structure of international
political
Kenneth N. Waltz is Ford Professor of Political Science at the
University of California,
Berkeley. He is the author of The Spread of Nuclear Weapons
(London, 1981). He is currently
the President of the American Political Science Association.
The author thanks David Schleicher, who was most helpful in
the completion of this

article.
? I988 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
editors of The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History.
I Hans J. Morgenthau, "International Relations: Quantitative
and Qualitative Ap-
proaches," in Norman D. Palmer (ed.), A Design for
International Relations Research: Scope,
Theory, Methods, and Relevance (Philadelphia, 1970), 78.
616 KENNETH N. WALTZ
systems, neorealism establishes the autonomy of international
pol-
itics and thus makes a theory about it possible.2
In developing a theory of international politics, neorealism
retains the main tenets of realpolitik, but means and ends are
viewed differently, as are causes and effects. Morgenthau, for
example, thought of the "rational" statesman as ever striving to
accumulate more and more power. He viewed power as an end
in itself. Although he acknowledged that nations at times act out
of considerations other than power, Morgenthau insisted that,
when they do so, their actions are not "of a political nature."3
In
contrast, neorealism sees power as a possibly useful means,
with
states running risks if they have either too little or too much of
it. Excessive weakness may invite an attack that greater strength
would have dissuaded an adversary from launching. Excessive

strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and pool
their efforts against the dominant state. Because power is a pos-
sibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an
appropriate
amount of it. In crucial situations, however, the ultimate
concern
of states is not for power but for security. This revision is an
important one.
An even more important revision is found in a shift of causal
relations. The infinite materials of any realm can be organized
in
endlessly different ways. Realism thinks of causes as moving in
only one direction, from the interactions of individuals and
states
to the outcomes that their acts and interactions produce. Mor-
genthau recognized that, when there is competition for scarce
goods and no one to serve as arbiter, a struggle for power will
ensue among the competitors and that consequently the struggle
for power can be explained without reference to the evil born in
men. The struggle for power arises simply because men want
things, not because of the evil in their desires. He labeled man's
desire for scarce goods as one of the two roots of conflict, but,
even while discussing it, he seemed to pull toward the "other
root
2 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York, 1973; 5th
ed.), I . Ludwig Boltzman
(trans. Rudolf Weingartner), "Theories as Representations,"
excerpted in Arthur Danto

and Sidney Morgenbesser (eds.), Philosophy of Science
(Cleveland, 1960), 245-252. Neo-
realism is sometimes dubbed structural realism. I use the terms
interchangeably and,
throughout this article, refer to my own formulation of
neorealist theory. See Waltz,
Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass., I979); Robert
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism
and its Critics (New York, I986).
3 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 27.
WAR IN NEOREALIST THEORY 617
of conflict and concomitant evil"-"the animus dominandi, the
de-
sire for power." He often considered that man's drive for power
is more basic than the chance conditions under which struggles
for power occur. This attitude is seen in his statement that "in a
world where power counts, no nation pursuing a rational policy
has a choice between renouncing and wanting power; and, if it
could, the lust for power for the individual's sake would still
confront us with its less spectacular yet no less pressing moral
defects. "4
Students of international politics have typically inferred out-
comes from salient attributes of the actors producing them.
Thus
Marxists, like liberals, have linked the outbreak of war or the
prevalence of peace to the internal qualities of states. Govern-
mental forms, economic systems, social institutions, political
ideologies-these are but a few examples of where the causes of
war have been found. Yet, although causes are specifically as-

signed, we know that states with widely divergent economic
institutions, social customs, and political ideologies have all
fought wars. More striking still, many different sorts of organi-
zations fight wars, whether those organizations be tribes, petty
principalities, empires, nations, or street gangs. If an identified
condition seems to have caused a given war, one must wonder
why wars occur repeatedly even though their causes vary. Vari-
ations in the characteristics of the states are not linked directly
to
the outcomes that their behaviors produce, nor are variations in
their patterns of interaction. Many historians, for example, have
claimed that World War I was caused by the interaction of two
opposed and closely balanced coalitions. But then many have
claimed that World War II was caused by the failure of some
states
to combine forces in an effort to right an imbalance of power
created by an existing alliance.
Neorealism contends that international politics can be under-
stood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level
explanations of traditional realism. By emphasizing how struc-
tures affect actions and outcomes, neorealism rejects the
assump-
tion that man's innate lust for power constitutes a sufficient
cause
of war in the absence of any other. It reconceives the causal link
between interacting units and international outcomes. According
4 Idem, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago, I946), 192,
200. Italics added.

6I8 KENNETH N. WALTZ
to the logic of international politics, one must believe that some
causes of international outcomes are the result of interactions at
the unit level, and, since variations in presumed causes do not
correspond very closely to variations in observed outcomes, one
must also assume that others are located at the structural level.
Causes at the level of units interact with those at the level of
structure, and, because they do so, explanation at the unit level
alone is bound to be misleading. If an approach allows the con-
sideration of both unit-level and structural-level causes, then it
can cope with both the changes and the continuities that occur
in
a system.
Structural realism presents a systemic portrait of international
politics depicting component units according to the manner of
their arrangement. For the purpose of developing a theory,
states
are cast as unitary actors wanting at least to survive, and are
taken
to be the system's constituent units. The essential structural
qual-
ity of the system is anarchy-the absence of a central monopoly
of legitimate force. Changes of structure and hence of system
occur with variations in the number of great powers. The range
of expected outcomes is inferred from the assumed motivation
of
the units and the structure of the system in which they act.
A systems theory of international politics deals with forces
at the international, and not at the national, level. With both
systems-level and unit-level forces in play, how can one

construct
a theory of international politics without simultaneously con-
structing a theory of foreign policy? An international-political
theory does not imply or require a theory of foreign policy any
more than a market theory implies or requires a theory of the
firm. Systems theories, whether political or economic, are theo-
ries that explain how the organization of a realm acts as a con-
straining and disposing force on the interacting units within it.
Such theories tell us about the forces to which the units are
subjected. From them, we can draw some inferences about the
expected behavior and fate of the units: namely, how they will
have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to
survive and flourish. To the extent that the dynamics of a
system
limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes
of
their behavior become predictable. How do we expect firms to
respond to differently structured markets, and states to
differently
structured international-political systems? These theoretical
ques-
tions require us to take firms as firms, and states as states,
without
paying attention to differences among them. The questions are
then answered by reference to the placement of the units in their

system and not by reference to the internal qualities of the
units.
Systems theories explain why different units behave similarly
and,
despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within ex-
pected ranges. Conversely, theories at the unit level tell us why
different units behave differently despite their similar
placement
in a system. A theory about foreign policy is a theory at the
national level. It leads to expectations about the responses that
dissimilar polities will make to external pressures. A theory of
international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations al-
though it claims to explain only certain aspects of them. It can
tell us what international conditions national policies have to
cope
with.
From the vantage point of neorealist theory, competition and
conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life
under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must
provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to
their security abound. Preoccupation with identifying dangers
and
counteracting them become a way of life. Relations remain
tense;
the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile even though
by
nature they may not be given to suspicion and hostility. Individ-
ually, states may only be doing what they can to bolster their

security. Their individual intentions aside, collectively their ac-
tions yield arms races and alliances. The uneasy state of affairs
is
exacerbated by the familiar "security dilemma," wherein
measures
that enhance one state's security typically diminish that of
others.5
In an anarchic domain, the source of one's own comfort is the
source of another's worry. Hence a state that is amassing instru-
ments of war, even for its own defensive, is cast by others as a
threat requiring response. The response itself then serves to
con-
firm the first state's belief that it had reason to worry. Similarly
an alliance that in the interest of defense moves to increase
cohe-
sion among its members and add to its ranks inadvertently im-
perils an opposing alliance and provokes countermeasures.
Some states may hunger for power for power's sake. Neo-
realist theory, however, shows that it is not necessary to assume
5 See John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security
Dilemma," World Politics,
II (I950), I57-I80.
an innate lust for power in order to account for the sometimes
fierce competition that marks the international arena. In an an-
archic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for power.
But so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to
ensure
their own safety.

Although neorealist theory does not explain why particular
wars are fought, it does explain war's dismal recurrence through
the millennia. Neorealists point not to the ambitions or the in-
trigues that punctuate the outbreak of individual conflicts but
instead to the existing structure within which events, whether
by
design or accident, can precipitate open clashes of arms. The
origins of hot wars lie in cold wars, and the origins of cold wars
are found in the anarchic ordering of the international arena.
The recurrence of war is explained by the structure of the
international system. Theorists explain what historians know:
War is normal. Any given war is explained not by looking at the
structure of the international-political system but by looking at
the particularities within it: the situations, the characters, and
the
interactions of states. Although particular explanations are
found
at the unit level, general explanations are also needed. Wars
vary
in frequency, and in other ways as well. A central question for a
structural theory is this: How do changes of the system affect
the
expected frequency of war?
KEEPING WARS COLD: THE STRUCTURAL LEVEL In an
anarchic
realm, peace is fragile. The prolongation of peace requires that
potentially destabilizing developments elicit the interest and the
calculated response of some or all of the system's principal
actors.

In the anarchy of states, the price of inattention or
miscalculation
is often paid in blood. An important issue for a structural theory
to address is whether destabilizing conditions and events are
man-
aged better in multipolar or bipolar systems.
In a system of, say, five great powers, the politics of power
turns on the diplomacy by which alliances are made,
maintained,
and disrupted. Flexibility of alignment means both that the
coun-
try one is wooing may prefer another suitor and that one's
present
alliance partner may defect. Flexibility of alignment limits a
state's
options because, ideally, its strategy must please potential allies
and satisfy present partners. Alliances are made by states that
have
some but not all of their interests in common. The common
interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states. Diver-
gence comes when positive interests are at issue. In alliances
among near equals, strategies are always the product of compro-
mise since the interests of allies and their notions of how to
secure
them are never identical.

If competing blocs are seen to be closely balanced, and if
competition turns on important matters, then to let one's side
down risks one's own destruction. In a moment of crisis the
weaker or the more adventurous party is likely to determine its
side's policy. Its partners can afford neither to let the weaker
member be defeated nor to advertise their disunity by failing to
back a venture even while deploring its risks.
The prelude to World War I provides striking examples of
such a situation. The approximate equality of partners in both
the
Triple Alliance and Triple Entente made them closely
interdepen-
dent. This interdependence, combined with the keen competition
between the two camps, meant that, although any country could
commit its associates, no one country on either side could
exercise
control. If Austria-Hungary marched, Germany had to follow;
the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have left
Germany alone in the middle of Europe. If France marched,
Russia had to follow; a German victory over France would be a
defeat for Russia. And so the vicious circle continued. Because
the defeat or the defection of a major ally would have shaken
the
balance, each state was constrained to adjust its strategy and the
use of its forces to the aims and fears of its partners.
In alliances among equals, the defection of one member
threatens the security of the others. In alliances among
unequals,
the contributions of the lesser members are at once wanted and
of relatively small importance. In alliances among unequals,

alli-
ance leaders need worry little about the faithfulness of their fol-
lowers, who usually have little choice anyway. Contrast the sit-
uation in I914 with that of the United States and Britain and
France in I956. The United States could dissociate itself from
the
Suez adventure of its two principal allies and subject one of
them
to heavy financial pressure. Like Austria-Hungary in 1914,
Britain
and France tried to commit or at least immobilize their ally by
presenting a fait accompli. Enjoying a position of
predominance,
the United States could continue to focus its attention on the
major adversary while disciplining its two allies. Opposing Brit-
ain and France endangered neither the United States nor the
alli-
ance because the security of Britain and France depended much
more heavily on us than our security depended on them. The
ability of the United States, and the inability of Germany, to
pay
a price measured in intra-alliance terms is striking.
In balance-of-power politics old style, flexibility of alignment
led to rigidity of strategy or the limitation of freedom of
decision.
In balance-of-power politics new style, the obverse is true: Rig-
idity of alignment in a two-power world results in more
flexibility

of strategy and greater freedom of decision. In a multipolar
world,
roughly equal parties engaged in cooperative endeavors must
look
for the common denominator of their policies. They risk finding
the lowest one and easily end up in the worst of all possible
worlds. In a bipolar world, alliance leaders can design strategies
primarily to advance their own interests and to cope with their
main adversary and less to satisfy their own allies.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has to seek
the approval of other states, but each has to cope with the other.
In the great-power politics of a multipolar world, who is a
danger
to whom and who can be expected to deal with threats and
problems are matters of uncertainty. In the great-power politics
of a bipolar world, who is a danger to whom is never in doubt.
Any event in the world that involves the fortunes of either of
the
great powers automatically elicits the interest of the other. Pres-
ident Harry S. Truman, at the time of the Korean invasion,
could
not very well echo Neville Chamberlain's words in the Czecho-
slovakian crisis by claiming that the Americans knew nothing
about the Koreans, a people living far away in the east of Asia.
We had to know about them or quickly find out.
In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to
be a gain for the other. As a result, the powers in a bipolar
world
promptly respond to unsettling events. In a multipolar world,
dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definitions of

vital interests easily obscured. Where a number of states are in
balance, the skillful foreign policy of a forward power is
designed
to gain an advantage without antagonizing other states and
fright-
ening them into united action. At times in modern Europe, the
benefits of possible gains have seemed to outweigh the risks of
likely losses. Statesmen have hoped to push an issue to the limit
without causing all of the potential opponents to unite. When
WAR IN NEOREALIST THEORY | 623
there are several possible enemies, unity of action among them
is
difficult to achieve. National leaders could therefore think-or
desperately hope, as did Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and
Adolf Hitler before two world wars-that a united opposition
would not form.
If interests and ambitions conflict, the absence of crises is
more worrisome than their presence. Crises are produced by the
determination of a state to resist a change that another state
tries
to make. As the leaders in a bipolar system, the United States
and the Soviet Union are disposed to do the resisting, for in
important matters they cannot hope that their allies will do it
for
them. Political action in the postwar world has reflected this
condition. Communist guerrillas operating in Greece prompted
the Truman Doctrine. The tightening of Soviet control over the
states of Eastern Europe led to the Marshall Plan and the
Atlantic

Defense Treaty, and these in turn gave rise to the Cominform
and the Warsaw Pact. The plan to create a West German govern-
ment produced the Berlin blockade. During the past four
decades,
our responses have been geared to the Soviet Union's actions,
and theirs to ours.
Miscalculation by some or all of the great powers is a source
of danger in a multipolar world; overreaction by either or both
of the great powers is a source of danger in a bipolar world.
Which is worse: miscalculation or overreaction? Miscalculation
is
the greater evil because it is more likely to permit an unfolding
of events that finally threatens the status quo and brings the
powers to war. Overreaction is the lesser evil because at worst
it
costs only money for unnecessary arms and possibly the
fighting
of limited wars. The dynamics of a bipolar system, moreover,
provide a measure of correction. In a world in which two states
united in their mutual antagonism overshadow any others, the
benefits of a calculated response stand out most clearly, and the
sanctions against irresponsible behavior achieve their greatest
force. Thus two states, isolationist by tradition, untutored in the
ways of international politics, and famed for impulsive
behavior,
have shown themselves-not always and everywhere, but always
in crucial cases-to be wary, alert, cautious, flexible, and for-
bearing.
Moreover, the economies of the great powers in a bipolar
world are less interdependent than those of the great powers of
a

multipolar one. The size of great powers tends to increase as
their
numbers fall, and the larger a state is, the greater the variety of
its resources. States of continental size do proportionately less
of
their business abroad than, for example, Britain, France, and
Germany did in their heydays. Never before in modern history
have the great powers depended so little on the outside world,
and been so uninvolved in one another's economic affairs, as the
United States and the Soviet Union have been since the war.
The
separation of their interests reduces the occasions for dispute
and
permits them, if they wish, to leave each other alone even
though
each defines its security interests largely in terms of the other.
Interdependence of parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion
of responses: These are the characteristics of great-power
politics
in a multipolar world. Self-dependence of parties, clarity of
dan-
gers, certainty about who has to face them: These are the char-
acteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar world.
KEEPING WARS COLD: THE UNIT LEVEL A major reason
for the
prolongation of the postwar peace is the destruction of the old
multipolar world in World War II and its replacement by a

bipolar
one. In a bipolar world, we expect competition to be keen, yet
manageable. But to believe that bipolarity alone accounts for
the
"long peace" between the United States and the Soviet Union is
difficult. Given the depth and extent of the distrust felt by both
parties, one may easily believe that one or another of the crises
that they have experienced would, in earlier times, have drawn
them into war. For a fuller explanation of why that did not
happen, we must look to that other great force for peace:
nuclear
weapons.
States continue to coexist in an anarchic order. Self-help is
the principle of action in such an order, and the most important
way in which states must help themselves is by providing for
their own security. Therefore, in weighing the chances of peace,
the first questions to ask are questions about the ends for which
states use force and about the strategies and weapons they
employ.
The chances of peace rise if states can achieve their most
important
ends without actively using force. War becomes less likely as
the
costs of war rise in relation to the possible gains. Realist
theory,
old and new alike, draws attention to the crucial role of military

technology and strategy among the forces that fix the fate of
states
and their systems.
Nuclear weapons dissuade states from going to war much
more surely than conventional weapons do. In a conventional
world, states can believe both that they may win and that,
should
they lose, the price of defeat will be bearable, although World
Wars I and II called the latter belief into question even before
atomic bombs were dropped. If the United States and the Soviet
Union were now armed only with conventional weapons, the
lessons of those wars would be clearly remembered, especially
by
the Soviet Union, which suffered more in war than the United
States. Had the atom never been split, those two nations would
still have much to fear from each other. Armed with
increasingly
destructive conventional weapons, they would be constrained to
strive earnestly to avoid war. Yet, in a conventional world, even
sad and strong lessons like those of the two world wars have
proved exceedingly difficult for states to learn. Throughout
mod-
ern history, one great power or another has looked as though it
might become dangerously strong: for example, France under
Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte, and Germany under Wil-
helm II and Hitler. In each case, an opposing coalition formed
and turned the expansive state back. The lessons of history
would
seem to be clear: In international politics, success leads to
failure.
The excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition
of

states elicits the opposition of others. The leaders of
expansionist
states have nevertheless been able to persuade themselves that
skillful diplomacy and clever strategy would enable them to
tran-
scend the normal processes of balance-of-power politics.
The experience of World War II, bipolarity, and the increased
destructiveness of conventional weapons would make World
War
III more difficult to start than earlier wars were; and the
presence
of nuclear weapons dramatically increases that difficulty.
Nuclear
weapons reverse or negate many of the conventional causes of
war. Wars can be fought in the face of nuclear weapons, but the
higher the stakes and the closer a country comes to winning
them,
the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own
destruction. The accumulation of significant power through con-
quest, even if only conventional weapons are used, is no longer
possible in the world of nuclear powers. Those individuals who
believe that the Soviet Union's leaders are so bent on world
domination that they may be willing to run catastrophic risks
for
problematic gains fail to understand how governments behave.
Do we expect to lose one city or two? Two cities or ten? When
these are the pertinent questions, political leaders stop thinking

about running risks and start worrying about how to avoid them.
Deterrence is more easily achieved than most military strat-
egists would have us believe. In a conventional world, a country
can sensibly attack if it believes that success is probable. In a
nuclear world, a country cannot sensibly attack unless it
believes
that success is assured. A nation will be deterred from attacking
even if it believes that there is only a possibility that its
adversary
will retaliate. Uncertainty of response, not certainty, is required
for deterrence because, if retaliation occurs, one risks losing all.
As Clausewitz wrote: If war approaches the absolute, it becomes
imperative "not to take the first step without thinking what may
be the last."6
Nuclear weapons make the implications even of victory too
horrible to contemplate. The problem that the nuclear powers
must solve is how to perpetuate peace when it is not possible to
eliminate all of the causes of war. The structure of international
politics has not been transformed; it remains anarchic in form.
Nuclear states continue to compete militarily. With each state
striving to ensure its own security, war remains constantly pos-
sible. In the anarchy of states, improving the means of defense
and deterrence relative to the means of offense increases the
chances of peace. Weapons and strategies that make defense and
deterrence easier, and offensive strikes harder to mount,
decrease
the likelihood of war.7
Although the possibility of war remains, the probability of
a war involving states with nuclear weapons has been

drastically
reduced. Over the centuries great powers have fought more wars
than minor states, and the frequency of war has correlated more
closely with a structural characteristic-their international stand-
ing-than with unit-level attributes. Yet, because of a change in
military technology, a change at the unit level, waging war has
6 Karl von Clausewitz (ed. Anatol Rapaport; trans. J. J.
Graham), On War (Hammond-
sworth, I968), V, 374.
7 See Malcolm W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," in
Morton A. Kaplan (ed.),
The Revolution in World Politics (New York, 1962), 388-4IO;
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation
under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, XXX (I978), I67-
214.
WAR IN NEOREALIST THEORY | 627
increasingly become the privilege of poor and weak states. Nu-
clear weapons have banished war from the center of
international
politics. A unit-level change has dramatically reduced a
structural
effect.
The probability of major war among states having nuclear
weapons approaches zero. But the "real war" may, as James
claimed, lie in the preparations for waging it. The logic of a
deterrent strategy, if it is followed, also circumscribes the
causes

of "real wars."8 In a conventional world, the structure of inter-
national politics encourages states to arm competitively. In a
nu-
clear world, deterrent strategies offer the possibility of
dampening
the competition. Conventional weapons are relative. With con-
ventionl weapons, competing countries must constantly compare
their strengths. How secure a country is depends on how it
compares to others in the quantity and quality of its weaponry,
the suitability of its strategy, the resilience of its society and
economy, and the skill of its leaders.
Nuclear weapons are not relative but absolute weapons.9
They make it possible for a state to limit the size of its strategic
forces so long as other states are unable to achieve disarming
first-
strike capabilities by improving their forces. If no state can
launch
a disarming attack with high confidence, comparing the size of
strategic forces becomes irrelevant. For deterrence, one asks
how
much is enough, and enough is defined as a second-strike capa-
bility. This interpretation does not imply that a deterrent force
can deter everything, but rather that, beyond a certain level,
additional forces provide no additional security for one party
and
pose no additional threat to others. The two principal powers in
the system have long had second-strike forces, with neither able
to launch a disarming strike against the other. That both never-
theless continue to pile weapon upon unneeded weapon is a
puzzle
whose solution can be found only within the United States and

the Soviet Union.
WARS, HOT AND COLD Wars, hot and cold, originate in the
structure of the international political system. Most Americans
8 William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in Leon
Bramson and George W.
Goethals (eds.), War: Studiesfrom Psychology, Sociology, and
Anthropology (New York, I968;
rev. ed.), 23.
9 Cf. Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and
World Order (New York,
1946), 75-76.
blame the Soviet Union for creating the Cold War, by the
actions
that follow necessarily from the nature of its society and
govern-
ment. Revisionist historians, attacking the dominant view,
assign
blame to the United States. Some American error, or sinister
interest, or faulty assumption about Soviet aims, they argue, is
what started the Cold War. Either way, the main point is lost. In
a bipolar world, each of the two great powers is bound to focus
its fears on the other, to distrust its motives, and to impute
offensive intentions to defensive measures. The proper question
is what, not who, started the Cold War. Although its content and
virulence vary as unit-level forces change and interact, the Cold
War continues. It is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar
international politics, and will last as long as that structure en-
dures.
In any closely competitive system, it may seem that one is

either paranoid or a loser. The many Americans who ascribe
paranoia to the Soviet Union are saying little about its political
elite and much about the international-political system. Yet, in
the presence of nuclear weapons, the Cold War has not become
a hot one, a raging war among major states. Constraints on
fighting big wars have bound the major nuclear states into a
system of uneasy peace. Hot wars originate in the structure of
international politics. So does the Cold War, with its
temperature
kept low by the presence of nuclear weapons.
Article
Contentsp.[615]p.616p.617p.618p.619p.620p.621p.622p.623p.6
24p.625p.626p.627p.628Issue Table of ContentsJournal of
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring, 1988Volume
InformationFront Matter [pp.850-892]Old Wars and Future
Wars: Causation and Prevention [pp.581-590]The Origins of
War: Structural TheoriesThe Theory of Hegemonic War
[pp.591-613]The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory [pp.615-
628]The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study
of International Conflict [pp.629-652]The Origins of War:
Explanation of Non-Rational CausalityDomestic Politics and
War [pp.653-673]War and Misperception [pp.675-700]Crises
and the Unexpected [pp.701-719]Lessons and Analogies from
Early Major WarsIdeology and Conflict: The Wars of the
Ottoman Empire, 1453-1606 [pp.721-747]The Origins of the
Thirty Years' War [pp.749-770]The Origins, Causes, and
Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon
[pp.771-793]Lessons and Analogies from the World WarsThe
Origins of World War I [pp.795-818]Wargames: 1914-1919
[pp.819-849]The Origins of World War II in Europe: British
Deterrence Failure and German Expansionism [pp.851-891]The
Origins of the Pacific War [pp.893-922]Back Matter
Business Plan[Your Name], Owner

Purdue Global
BUSINESS PLAN
Date
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Product
1.2 Customers
1.3 What Drives Us
2. COMPANY DESCRIPTION
2.1 Mission and Vision Statements
2.2 Principal Members at Startup (In Unit 7 you will expand on
this section to include medium and long term personnel plans
for all team members, including the line staff.)
2.2.1 Using chapter 10 of your text, write the plan, using the
section in Chapter 10 that shows how to introduce each team
member and describe their background and responsibilities. You
will start with the leaders and managers, then discuss other
employees as needed for your company to grow.
2.2.2 Use this spreadsheet to show the planning
Leaders/managers (unit 1)
When needed (number of months/years after opening)
Outside Services Needed
Key Functions

2.3 Legal Structure
3. MARKET RESEARCH
3.1 Industry (from SBA, Business Guides by Industry, and
Bureau of Labor Statistics)
3.1.1 Industry description
3.2.1 Resources used
3.2 Customers (from SBA site fill in worksheet, then use text
for spreadsheets and follow-up explanations)
Add SBA part here:
Then, fill in spreadsheet using this example from the text:
Housewife:
Married Couple:
Age:
35–65
Age:
35–55
Income:
Fixed
Income:
Medium to high
Sex:

Female
Sex:
Male or Female
Family:
Children living at home
Family:
0 to 2 children
Geographic:
Suburban
Geographic:
Suburban
Occupation:
Housewife
Occupation:
Varies
Attitude:
Security minded
Attitude:
Security minded, energy conscious
Older Couple:
Elderly:
Age:
55–75
Age:
70+
Income:
High or fixed
Income:
Fixed
Sex:
Male or Female
Sex:
Male or Female
Family:
Empty nest
Family:

Empty nest
Geographic:
Suburban
Geographic:
Suburban
Occupation:
White-collar or retired
Occupation:
Retired
Attitude:
Attitude:
Explain who you are targeting and where they are located.
Insert information here using these guidelines:
Information About Your Target Market – Narrow your target
market to a manageable size. Many businesses make the mistake
of trying to appeal to too many target markets. Research and
include the following information about your market:
Distinguishing characteristics – What are the critical needs of
your potential customers? Are those needs being met? What are
the demographics of the group and where are they located? Are
there any seasonal or cyclical purchasing trends that may impact
your business?
Size of the primary target market – In addition to the size of
your market, what data can you include about the annual
purchases your market makes in your industry? What is the
forecasted market growth for this group? For more information,
see the market research guide for tips and free government
resources that can help you build a market profile.
How much market share can you gain? – What is the market
share percentage and number of customers you expect to obtain
in a defined geographic area? Explain the logic behind your
calculation.

3.3 Competitors (from SBA site fill in worksheet, then use text
for spreadsheets and follow-up explanation)
Then:
Fill in spreadsheet using this example from the text:
Estimated Market Share
Competition 60%
Home Improvements Inc. 30%
Product Line
4
5
Quality
4
5
Technology
4
5
Advertising
2
5
Sales Force
3
5
Distribution
3
4
Price
4
4
Installation
4
5
Ease of Use
4
5

Appearance
3
5
Design
4
5
Useful Life
4
4
Responsiveness
3
5
Availability
1
5
Technical Expertise
4
5
Repair Service
3
5
Efficiency
3
5
Guarantee/Warranty
5
5
On Time Capability
4
5
Industry Reputation
3
5

Write an explanation of your findings using information from
the spreadsheet using these guidelines:
· Market share
· Strengths and weaknesses
· How important is your target market to your competitors?
· Are there any barriers that may hinder you as you enter the
market?
· What is your window of opportunity to enter the market?
· Are there any indirect or secondary competitors who may
impact your success?
· What barriers to market are there (e.g., changing technology,
high investment cost, lack of quality personnel)?3.4
Competitive Advantage
Read: Sustainable competitive advantage or temporary
competitive advantage: Improving understanding of an
important strategy construct.
3.5 Regulation (use SBA site to fill in blanks, and use SBA
regulations as a resource)
4. PRODUCT/SERVICE LINE
4.1 Product or Service
4.2 Pricing Structure4.3 Product/Service Life Cycle4.4
Intellectual Property Rights
4.5 Research & Development
5. MARKETING and SALES
5.1 Growth Strategy
· A market penetration strategy.

· A growth strategy. This strategy for building your business
might include: an internal strategy such as how to increase your
human resources, an acquisition strategy such as buying another
business, a franchise strategy for branching out, a horizontal
strategy where you would provide the same type of products to
different users, or a vertical strategy where you would continue
providing the same products but would offer them at different
levels of the distribution chain.
· Channels of distribution strategy. Choices for distribution
channels could include original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs), an internal sales force, distributors, or retailers.
· Communication strategy. How are you going to reach your
customers? Usually a combination of the following tactics
works the best: promotions, advertising, public relations,
personal selling, and printed materials such as brochures,
catalogs, flyers, etc.
After you have developed a comprehensive marketing strategy,
you can then define your sales strategy. This covers how you
plan to actually sell your product.
5.2 Your overall sales strategy should include two primary
elements:
· A sales force strategy. If you are going to have a sales force,
do you plan to use internal or independent representatives? How
many salespeople will you recruit for your sales force? What
type of recruitment strategies will you use? How will you train
your sales force? What about compensation for your sales
force?
· Your sales activities. When you are defining your sales
strategy, it is important that you break it down into activities.
For instance, you need to identify your prospects. Once you
have made a list of your prospects, you need to prioritize the
contacts, selecting the leads with the highest potential to buy
first. Next, identify the number of sales calls you will make
over a certain period of time. From there, you need to determine
the average number of sales calls you will need to make per
sale, the average dollar size per sale, and the average dollar size

per vendor.5.3 Communication Strategy
5.3.1 Internet Strategy (from the text)
5.3.1 Tracking ROI form website
5.3.2 Discuss how you will assure ethical practices are being
used in your marketing and selling. 6. FINANCIAL
PROJECTIONS6.1 Profit & Loss6.1 Profit & Loss
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Sales
Costs/Goods Sold
GROSS PROFIT
OPERATING EXPENSES
Salary (Office & Overhead)
Payroll (taxes, etc.)
Outside Services
Supplies (Office & Operation)

Repairs & Maintenance
Advertising
Car, Delivery & Travel
Accounting & Legal
Rent
Telephone
Utilities
Insurance
Taxes (Real Estate, etc.)

Interest
Depreciation
Other Expenses
TOTAL EXPENSES
NET PROFIT BEFORE TAXES
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Income Taxes
NET PROFIT AFTER TAX
Owner Draw/Dividends

ADJUSTED TO RETAINED
6.2 Cash Flow Complete section 6.3 of your business plan
outline
Cash Flow
Pre-Startup
ESTIMATE
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Cash on Hand
CASH RECEIPTS
Cash Sales

Collections from CR Accounts
Loan/Cash Injection
TOTAL CASH RECEIPTS
TOTAL CASH AVAILABLE
CASH PAID OUT
Purchases
Gross Wages

Outside Services
Supplies
Advertising
Accounting & Legal
Rent

Telephone
Utilities
Insurance
Taxes (Real Estate, etc.)
Interest
Other Expenses
SUBTOTAL

Loan Principal Payment
Capital Purchase
Other Startup Costs
Reserve and/or Escrow
Others Withdrawal
TOTAL CASH PAID OUT
CASH POSITION

6.3 Balance Sheet
Assets
Start Date:
End Date:
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash in Bank
Accounts Receivable
Inventory
Prepaid Expenses
Other Current Assets
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS
FIXED ASSETS
Machinery & Equipment
Furniture & Fixtures

Leaseholder Improvements
Land & Buildings
Other Fixed Assets
TOTAL FIXED ASSETS
(net of depreciation)
OTHER ASSETS
Intangibles
Deposits
Other
TOTAL OTHER ASSETS
TOTAL ASSETS

Liabilities & Equity
Start Date
End Date
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Accounts Payable
Interest Payable
Taxes Payable
Notes, Short Term (due in 12 months)
Current Part, Long-Term Debt
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES
LONG TERM DEBT
Bank Loans Payable
Notes Payable to Stockholders
LESS: Short-Term Portion

Other Long-Term Debt
TOTAL LONG-TERM DEBT
TOTAL LIABILITIES
OWNER'S EQUITY
Invested Capital
Retained Earnings
TOTAL OWNERS EQUITY
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY
6.4 Break-Even Analysis
DIRECT COSTS
Fixed Costs ($)
Variable Costs (%)

Cost of Goods Sold
Inventory
Raw Materials
Direct Labor
INDIRECT COSTS
Salaries
Supplies
Advertising
Rent
Telephone

Utilities
Insurance
Taxes
Interest
Depreciation
Other Costs
Total Fixed Costs
Total Variable Costs
BREAK-EVEN SALES LEVEL:
6.5 Financial Assumptions
6.5.1 Assumptions for Profit and Loss Projections
6.5.2 Assumptions for Cash Flow Analysis6.5.3 Assumptions
for Balance Sheet6.5.4 Assumptions for Break-Even Analysis
Assignment Details

In this Assignment, you will write the personnel plan for your
company, focusing on the short, medium, and longer terms.
Think carefully about your company’s growth when devising
your personnel needs.
Assignment checklist:
i. Finish the chart started in Unit 1 (Section 2.2.2 of your
business plan outline) to include additional managers and line
staff.
ii. Write the management and personnel plan as outlined in
Chapter 10 of the text. The writing will focus on the
responsibilities of each member of the team in the short,
medium, and long terms.
Access the rubric.
Submit your Assignment to the Dropbox.
1
Unit 1 Assignment
MT499
Chad Dent
3/3/19
Kaplan University

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The company known by the name is Little Ones Day care
will make for a really great care center for starting children out
with learning from an early age. It will allow for children ages
newborn up until 12. We will be providing a safe place for
children and also be very encouraging foe everyone involved.
Here children will be able to grow and learn by means of a ton
of different interactions socially speaking. It will be
coordinated by Chad Dent along with other providers who are
certified.
1.1 Product
Little Ones Day care is going to be offering a place that is
always safe and very stable for the caring of children when
parents are off at work or out for the day. Children will be able
to learn via activities, interactions with others and socially. Our
focus will be to bring forth growth and encouragement by
emotional, physical; and social which will allow for the
children to grow and be ready for the future they are going to
face.
1.2 Customers
Our target market would be working parents who have
children that are 12 years of age and younger. My plan for the
subgroup will be the parents that commute, they will stand for
around 70% and then we will look at parents who do other jobs
totaling up to 30%. These numbers may shift in summer and fall
times. Comment by Stephen Griffith: Income level?
Comment by Stephen Griffith: Why do you care if they
commute?
1.3 What Drives Us
The values that we are looking for will be all of the
children themselves along with the care we will be giving them.
Our drive is to ensure that we are giving the children the best
care and learning possibilities ever.

2. COMPANY DESCRIPTION
We are looking to be a not only a child care service but
also a place that children can start to learn. On staff we will
have a registered. A few different care providers, someone to
cook some office staff and the owner. We will have hours that
will be accommodating to parents. We are also going to be
giving out at least 3 meals a day to the children along with
snacks and nap time each day. Comment by Stephen
Griffith: ?Comment by Stephen Griffith: You can offer healthy
menus as a feature.
2.1 Mission and Vision Statements
Mission Statement- “We exist to provide an environment that is
safe and secure for children”.
Vision Statement- to make sure that all parents have that peace
of mind when they drop their child off with us. We will always
hold meetings and such to ensure we are always up to par and
on track with all we have to offer. Where do you want the
businesss to be in five years?
2.2 Principal Members at Startup
The owner of the day care center has around 25 years’
experience with childcare and is certified. He has business
management degree and has a lot of accounting skills that can
aid in making smart decisions for the business. Managers for
financing and social media marketing has around 5 years of
experience in the field. Everyone involved with caring for the
children will have at 5 teas years experience and all be certified
in CPR. There will perhaps be room for more employees as the
company expands.
Leaders/managers
Functions
When needed
Owner
Take care of business
start
Secretary
Make and take calls. Sign children out, contact parents.

start
Care provider
Provide care and learning
start
Nurse
Care for children medically speaking
start
Cook
Prepare meals that are safe for all children pertaining to their
allergies
start
Marketer/IT
Create and maintain social media sites and website for the
company
start Comment by Stephen Griffith: Why not use an outside
person for this on a contract to keep expenses low?
2.3 Legal Structure
We will be known as a sole Proprietorship. The site for the
facility has been purchased by the owner. In the future with
growth, we may become a Limited Liability Company. Deciding
to be a sole proprietorship will make for there to be fewer
issues within keeping records and will make for there to be
mistakes with the records. The owner will be the one
responsible for any debts that incur. Comment by Stephen
Griffith: Be sure to check the local and state regs. In Ohio, you
have to have sprinklers and, if you have more than a certain
number of kids, a bigger system. You also need to make sure
you have adequate fire exits, etc. Comment by Stephen
Griffith: I would talk to an accountant and lawyer about doing
this sooner to protect yourself from liability.
MT 499 Assignment 1 Rubric
Possible Points
Awarded Points
Executive Summary

Product
8
8
Customers
8
8
Values
10
10
Vision Statement
4
3
Ensure Staff Support
4
4
Mission Statement
8
8
Personnel Plan Explanation
8
7
Personnel Plan Table
10
9
Legal Structure
8
8
Writing, Spelling, Grammar
7
6
Total
75
71

Unit 6 Assignment
MT499
Chad Dent
4/7/19
Purdue Global University
5.1 Growth Strategy
For this we will be focusing on a marketing penetration strategy
relying a lot of advertisements along with some strategic
alliances. Our growth strategy will be somewhere along the
lines a vertical one. We would like to offer our services as
would any other place like ours but at a much lower reasonable
price and include more than what the average place has to offer.
A growth strategy. This strategy for building your business
might include: an internal strategy such as how to increase your
human resources, an acquisition strategy such as buying another
business, a franchise strategy for branching out, a horizontal
strategy where you would provide the same type of products to
different users, or a vertical strategy where you would continue
providing the same products but would offer them at different
levels of the distribution chain. For the Channels of distribution
strategy, we will be looking at an internal sales force because I
feel it would best fit into the daycare center and all it has to
purchase.

5.2 Sales Strategy
Looking at our sakes strategy we will be doing a lot of
advertisements online and also word of mouth. There are a lot
of parents that work and need daycare within our choice of
business and this will work out just fine. We will also look at
the sales strategy that our competitors are using and really take
it from there.
5.3 Communication Strategy
This will be a vital part of our business is what will aid in
creating a lot of potential clients. Here we will be creating a
really great website for the daycare center. It will be very user
friendly and also include everything a parent should know about
or school. We have listings of all staff and also list each of their
skills and qualifications. For a thing such as assuring that there
are ethical practices that are used for our marketing and selling
efforts, we will ensure we use only the best people ever. We
will have open communications and ensure that there is trust
amongst anyone we choose to come in contact with. We will
also have some sort of code of conduct in place.
Running head: MARKET RESEARCH 1
MARKET RESEARCH 7
Unit 2 Assignment
MT499
Chad Dent
3/11/19
Kaplan University

3.1 INDUSTRY
3.1.1 Industry description
Industry
This industry that I have chosen known as childcare is
really one that has been around for a long time. It is no real
stranger in our times of today. It seems to be taking on an
expansion and growing where they are popping up all over
which is good because parents can go to work and have that
peace of mind that their children are okay and are in safe hands.
In the city where I reside in numbers show us that there has
been an increase where two parents are working and the growth
in employment has risen to more than 18% (DATAUSA, 2017).
With this growth comes the need as to why we should have
more day care centers available. There are around 32.1% of our
growing population which are in the target market of being ages
18-55. More than 78% of these individuals have children.
Commuters have been increasing a lot with employment within
the sector that is non-farming at around a 4.3%. the seasonal
workers at a high because of higher prices in income resulting
from minimum wage being high (Bureau of Labor and Statistics,
2017).
Competition
We have very little competition within the area of choice.
Basically, there is the YMCA. There are other small facilities in
the area that operate from an in-home environment and nothing
like I am planning to create.
Strengths
There is a whole lot of great abilities for advertising
within social media and with that we will have a great amount
of participation from customers. Because we will have an
educational platform, this company will be far higher than any
competition out there. Another strength we can look at with this
daycare facility is the fact that we will be giving hours that are
flexible along with having staff on hand to be there while we
have seasonal work going on.
Weaknesses

There has been an increase within childcare cost and this is
said by the United States Census Bureau. We also see that there
is also an increase within minimum wage. The cos of living has
gone up and will continue to go up. (United States Census
Bureau, 2017).
3.2.1 Resources used
Bureau of Labor and Statistics, (2019). Economic News
Release. Retrieved from
https://www.bls.gov/bls/newsrels.htm#OEP
Childcare Center, (2019). Child Care Resources. Retrieved from
http://childcarecenter.us/washington/99033_childcare
DATAUSA, (2019).https://datausa.io/
United States Census Bureau, (2019). Child Care
Costs. Retrieved from:
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-
62.html
3.2 Customers
Customer Data
The SBA shows that there is a percentage change that is said to
be unadjusted within what a household is spending for childcare
from the years of 2018 and 2019. It is at a 3% and the change
for the seasonal is at a 1%. We can view this as being an
increase nationally due to a rise in childcare needs (SBA, 2017).
Single Parent: Part-time
Married Couple: Commuters/Fulltime
Age:
18–45
Age:
22–50
Income:
Fixed, State assistance-$25,000
Income:
Low to Median, $45,000-$70,000
Sex:
Both
Sex:

Both
Family:
1-4
Family:
1 to 3
Geographic:
Rural
Geographic:
Rural
Occupation:
Can Vary
Occupation:
Farming
Attitude:
Safety and Care
Attitude:
Educational, being safe giving care.
Single Parent: Full-Time
Married Couple: Farming/ Seasonal
Age:
18-50
Age:
22-50
Income:
Low - $20,000-$45,000
Income:
$30,000-$50,000
Sex:
both
Sex:
both
Family:
1-4
Family:
1-4
Geographic:

Rural
Geographic:
Rural
Occupation:
Varies
Occupation:
Farming, Trucking, Agriculture
Attitude:
Great care, enjoyable having a flexibility in pay
Attitude:
High quality Care, scheduling that is flexible
Target Customers
The customers we are trying to target would be parents
that are married and single in the age range of Our target market
includes single and married parents ages 18-50 who have
children aged 12 and below. The earnings for an average
household are at $20,000-$50,000 yearly. The household size of
one adult and 1-4 children ranging between 0-12 years of age
(DATAUSA, 2017). It would be for a rural area.
The parents that are married do farming or they commute,
and their household is set at $30,000-$70,000 yearly while
having an income that is duel (DATAUSA, 2017). This market
type wants to have quality childcare along with a schedule that
can be flexible and educational at the same time. They want a
good price.
Basically, the needs here would be to have a flexibility
within the schedule that can take care of families who are
seasonal workers or commuters. There is a need within care that
is consistence at all times. This is a rural area and with that the
families spend a great deal of time in outside so the facility has
to have this set in somehow.
The primary targets size is big. The estimated percentage
for the market share will be at an average because we will take
the annual $22,631 per family and further break it up upon the
other facilities who are also accredited. With that we could look

to gain around 2% additionally speaking of the, market share in
the event we expand or open more locations.

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