CHINA AND MYANMAR PEACE PROCESS

About the Report
This Special Report examines China’s role and interests in
Myanmar’s peace process. Funded by the United States
Institute of Peace (USIP) and integral to USIP’s Asia Center
programming, the report is based on more than eighty
interviews with officials in China and representatives from
ethnic armed groups in Myanmar.
About the Author
Yun Sun is a senior associate with the East Asia Program at
the Henry L. Stimson Center and a nonresident fellow at the
Brookings Institution.
2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063
Special Report 401 March 2017
© 2017 by the United States Institute of Peace.
All rights reserved.
Contents
Historical Sources of Tension 2
Chinese Diplomacy and the Myanmar Peace Process 3
Factors Shaping Chinese Policy 5
A Central-Provincial Disconnect? 7
Chinese Business Interests 8
Key Ethnic Armed Groups 10
Conclusion 13
Yun Sun
China and Myanmar’s
Peace Process
Summary
• China’s interest in the Myanmar peace process is focused on the armed ethnic groups
along the border in Kachin and Shan states—in particular, the Kachin Independence
Army, the United Wa State Army, and the Kokang Army. These organizations have
historical and cultural ties with ethnic groups across the border in China as well as
political and economic connections.
• China’s official position follows the principle of noninterference and its official policy
is “persuading for peace and facilitating dialogues.” In practice, its attitude has
been more ambiguous.
• Beijing does not necessarily believe that comprehensive peace is attainable for the
foreseeable future. Its priority is therefore to prepare for different uncertainties and
maximize its flexibility in the process.
• China’s role is complicated by the behavior of certain Chinese special interest groups
and individuals who have offered direct financial support for ethnic armed organiza-
tions in Myanmar.
• Under Myanmar’s new National League for Democracy government, ties with China
have improved significantly. China has played a positive role in persuading armed
groups to join the Union Peace Conference in 2016, but its future policy and role
will depend on the development of bilateral relations and the evolving definition of
China’s national interests.
Introduction
With the successful completion of its 2015 general elections and a smooth transition of
power to the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, Myanmar has embarked on
a long but positive path to political and economic reform. Reconciliation among the many
ethnic armed groups—ethnic armed organizations, as they are known in Myanmar—in the
north, including those still in active combat with the Myanmar Armed Forces, is unresolved
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SPECIAL REPORT

2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 401
and a source of conflict, however. Addressing this issue involves important questions of
majority-minority relations, central-local power distribution, and the role of the Myanmar
military. The peace process, launched by the former U Thein Sein government and continued
by the NLD government, represents the best efforts of the country to end the long ethnic
division of the state and achieve genuine reconciliation for the first time in decades.
As Myanmar’s largest neighbor, China has been and will remain a critical player in the
Myanmar peace process. Ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar share historical and
cultural linkages with ethnic groups across the border in China as well as political and eco-
nomic connections. China’s official position on the peace process adheres to the principle of
noninterference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. However, it is clear from the
ongoing debate in Chinese policy circles that this position is not necessarily based on impar-
tiality or disinterested altruism. Strong voices favor China’s active support for ethnic armed
groups in Myanmar, arguing that it will help temper the Myanmar government’s treatment
of China and Chinese business interests, something that has grown increasingly urgent as
Myanmar appears to make pro-West foreign policy adjustments.
China’s role in the peace process is further complicated by the behavior of special interest
groups and individuals in China who have offered direct financial support for ethnic armed
groups in Myanmar—which include the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), United Wa State
Army (UWSA), and the Kokang Army (MNDAA). These relationships have contributed materi-
ally to their ability to sustain their autonomous presence and, in some cases, armed conflict
with the Myanmar military. Although not sanctioned by Beijing, such private business
dealings have reinforced the perception of a duplicitous Chinese role in the peace process.
Seeing Myanmar’s ethnic issues as unlikely to be resolved in the near future, Beijing’s
immediate concern is to prevent instability on its borders. However, given the new NLD-led
government in Naypyidaw, China has been putting significant efforts into building a good
bilateral relationship. At the end of the day, how much it contributes to the Myanmar peace
process will depend on bilateral relations and whether Myanmar’s policies and actions are
aligned with or at least not contrary to China’s economic and strategic interests.
Historical Sources of Tension
Chinese involvement in northern Myanmar, especially in the regions controlled by ethnic
armed organizations, has always been a thorny bilateral issue. Historically, the boundary
treaty between the People’s Republic of China and the Union of Burma of 1960 ended with
China’s de facto acceptance of the 1941 line imposed by Great Britain and the resolution
of bilateral territorial disputes.1 However, the sense of grievance is significant among the
local Chinese and ethnic population, interviewees in Yunnan indicated, that the communist
government in Beijing abandoned China’s traditional territory in exchange for political
recognition and friendship. Especially in northern Kachin and Shan states, according to
interviewees there, many locals see the 1960 demarcation as recognition of the unfair and
unjust 1941 line that exploited China’s weak negotiating position during World War II. The
sense of being abandoned by China is strong, but so is that of ethnic affinity (in some cases
of belonging). This is exacerbated by the fact that many local residents do not even hold
Myanmar citizenship because their regions are not administered by the Myanmar central
government in Naypyidaw. Indeed, popular Burmese perceptions often do not see these
ethnic minorities as belonging to Myanmar either.
The demarcation permanently divided many ethnic groups into citizens of either one
country or the other. Many in northern Myanmar have the same ethnicity as those across
the border in China—the Burmese Kachin and the Chinese Jingpo, for example, and the Wa
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily
reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace,
which does not advocate specific policy positions.
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in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain
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USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 401 3
people on both sides. They speak the same languages, have the same cultural traditions and
customs, and maintain close communications and ties. The official border is not much of a
hindrance between them on an unofficial level.
Historical ties are further complicated by the legacy of the Communist Party of Burma
(CPB) presence in northern Myanmar during the Cultural Revolution, when China pursued a
foreign policy aimed at exporting revolution.2 China stopped supporting the CPB in the late
1980s, contributing to the CPB’s disintegration into separate ethnic armed organizations
such as the UWSA and the MNDAA, an assertion backed by local interviewees.3 These groups
have continued to maintain close unofficial ties with their contacts and supporters in China.
Chinese Diplomacy and the Myanmar Peace Process
China’s official policy on the Myanmar peace process, which predates Myanmar’s political
reform, is “persuading for peace and facilitating dialogues” (劝和促谈).4 Even before the
2010 elections, when Myanmar’s military government proposed transforming the ceasefire
ethnic groups into Border Guard Forces in 2008 and 2009, China had pursued the same
policy.5 In 2013, China appointed Wang Yingfan as the first special envoy for Asian affairs,
stipulating the sole mandate of mediating the armed conflict between the Myanmar central
government and ethnic armed groups.6 Shortly after this appointment, China organized
two rounds of dialogue between KIA and the Myanmar government in the Chinese border
town of Ruili.7 Since then, the Chinese special envoy has consistently participated in and
observed nationwide ceasefire dialogues with the UN special envoy and special adviser on
Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar. Ambassador Wang was replaced by Sun Guoxiang in 2015.8 In July
2016, Nambiar and Wang both attended the ethnic summit in Mai Ja Yang of Kachin state.9
The level of China’s intervention correlates directly with the intensity of the conflict
and its spillover effect on China. For example, the latest iteration of the Kachin conflict
between the KIA and the Burmese military—an independence movement dating from Brit-
ish colonial rule in the 1940s—has been ongoing since June 2011. China appointed Special
Envoy Wang only in early 2013, however, after the escalation of conflict in late 2012 led
the Burmese military to bomb Chinese territory and refugees to flee to China.10 Similarly,
MNDAA launched its military operations against the Myanmar Armed Forces as early as
November 2014, according to Kachin representatives interviewed in Yunnan. However, the
first statement of concern by the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry was issued
only in February 2015, after the Kokang assaults led to massive refugee flows into China.
The killing of five Chinese civilians in a Burmese military bombing in March 2015 escalated
the Chinese reaction: on March 14, the Chinese vice foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, urgently
summoned the Burmese ambassador to China to “lodge a solemn representation” and “con-
demn the bombing.”11 When the bombing resumed in May, China finally responded with its
own live fire drill in early June.
Sandwiched between domestic public pressure for the Chinese government to actively
support the Kokang and its desire to maintain good relations with the Thein Sein govern-
ment, China’s original hope was to remain aloof and guard its border. However, according
to local officials and scholars in Yunnan, when it became increasingly clear that the Myan-
mar Armed Forces had little regard for the Chinese border and Chinese security, Beijing’s
position toward MNDAA became more ambiguous and sympathetic. After MNDAA announced
a unilateral ceasefire, China ceased all public action in response to the Kokang conflict.
Since it assumed power in March 2016, the NLD government has been widely regarded—
compared with its predecessor—as improving the country’s relations with China. Aung San
Suu Kyi and the NLD faced a tough challenge regarding China when they were inaugurated
China’s intervention correlates
directly with the intensity of
the conflict and its spillover
effect.

in March 2016. Sino-Myanmar relations had deteriorated since 2011, when then president
Thein Sein suspended the Myitsone mega-dam—which activists and environmentalists
saw as a victory. The project was never popular in Myanmar but the Chinese nevertheless
saw themselves as the victim of a quasi-civilian government’s attempt to gain legitimacy,
popularity, and support from both the Myanmar people and the West. China’s grievance was
exacerbated by the Thein Sein government’s lukewarm attitude about Chinese economic
ambitions in the country, as manifested by the suspension of the Letpadaung copper mine,
the abandonment of the Sino-Myanmar railway, and the difficulties it encountered in the
bidding for the Kyaukpyu special economic zone. The sense of grievance peaked in 2015
when the major armed groups in northern Myanmar—including UWSA, KIA, and the Shan
State Army-North—refused to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October
along with the eight groups that did sign. Myanmar officials publicly accused China of under-
mining the peace process by blocking the participation of these groups in the NCA.12 The
Chinese government vehemently denies the accusation and lodged a formal protest with the
Myanmar authorities in Naypyidaw.
The new NLD government faced the choice of continuing to cater to anti-China sentiment
inside Myanmar and running the risk of losing China’s support for both the peace process
and Myanmar’s domestic economic agenda, or trying to improve relations with China and
enlisting Beijing’s help for Myanmar’s national priorities, including ethnic reconciliation. The
record of the NLD government thus far seems to suggest that Aung San Suu Kyi has selected
the second option and therefore recalibrated the country’s policy toward China. First is its
relatively detached and neutral position on the South China Sea disputes in July 2016.13
Second is its demonstrated willingness to negotiate a final resolution of the suspended
Myitsone dam project with China.14 Senior working-level visits by key government officials
between the two countries have increased. In April 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
was the first foreign guest Suu Kyi invited, and received, after the NLD government assumed
power. In July, Minister of State Security Geng Huichang paid a highly unusual visit to
Myanmar, during which he met with Suu Kyi. Given the Ministry of State Security’s unique
status and special mandate in China’s national security, the meeting was widely interpreted
by Chinese and Burmese observers as having focused on the issue of northern Myanmar,
including Sino-Myanmar cooperation on the peace process. One week before Suu Kyi’s visit
to Beijing in August, the chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party, Song Tao, visited Myanmar and met with a diverse group of
Myanmar political and military leaders.
During Suu Kyi’s visit to China, the issue of ethnic reconciliation was high on the agenda.
In the Joint Press Release Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar, published on August 20, 2016, the issue of border ethnic groups was
addressed three separate times, illustrating an unprecedented level of emphasis by both
sides. China committed to supporting Myanmar’s efforts to realize domestic peace and to
ensure national reconciliation through political dialogues, and Myanmar recognized that
China’s role and efforts in supporting Myanmar’s course of national reconciliation and peace
are positive and constructive. They also agreed to enhance cooperation to ensure peace and
stability, and strengthen law-based management in the border region.15 Two days after Suu
Kyi’s China visit, Chinese special envoy Sun Guoxiang visited UWSA and the National Demo-
cratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS) to ensure the two groups’ participation
in the Union Peace Conference.16
China’s positive change in attitude about the peace process is based on its observation
that the NLD is inclined to improving relations with China and on the hope that it might
induce NLD cooperation and goodwill. To build goodwill with Suu Kyi and the NLD govern-

ment early on, China provided unprecedented support of and cooperation on the nationwide
peace process and the Union Peace Conference in August 2016. Chinese financial contribu-
tions and political support for the Myanmar peace process have increased substantially since
March. Earlier this year, according to local officials interviewed in Yangon, China donated $3
million to the Joint Monitoring Committee, a scenario that would not have been considered
possible during the former Thein Sein government. China’s special envoy for Asian affairs,
Sun Guoxiang, attended the Mai Ja Yang summit for ethnic nationality groups, hosted by the
Kachin Independence Organization in late July, and publicly committed China’s continued
support to the peace process administered by the NLD government. He and other Chinese
officials have been so enthusiastic and persistent that some ethnic leaders have since com-
plained that the Chinese were lobbying for them to surrender to serve China’s bigger cause.
Factors Shaping Chinese Policy
In the Chinese policy lexicon, experts in China said, peace in Myanmar is desirable and
conducive to China’s national interests in terms of the peace and development in the bor-
der region. However, whether peace is realistically attainable is an entirely different issue.
Beijing’s bottom line in the peace process is ceasefire in the border region. Given the disrup-
tions due to the conflicts, including damages to China’s border security, Beijing prioritizes
suspension or elimination, or—at a minimum—containment and management of the active
armed conflicts along its border. This is China’s most basic security demand of Naypyidaw
and Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups.
In the Chinese view, at least three significant obstacles obstruct the prospect of real
peace in the foreseeable future. First is that, as a Chinese scholar in Yunnan explained in
an interview, “Burmese chauvinism is the fundamental cause of Myanmar’s ethnic conflict.”
Peace is not an empty slogan, but must be based on a mutually acceptable framework
between the central government in Naypyidaw and ethnic armed groups on the distribution
of political power and economic benefits at state and local levels. However, the prospect
that negotiations can be successfully concluded in the short term is scant. Second, the peace
process is subject to the delicate civil-military relations between the NLD government and
the Myanmar military, the latter of which perceives the separatist ethnic groups as a threat
to the nation and the battle against them as the inherent mission of the military. In other
words, if the military sees the NLD government as compromising the nation’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity, it is likely to object to or even undermine such an agreement. This,
though, touches on other sensitive issues of the military’s role and civil-military relations
in Myanmar’s domestic politics. A common perception in Myanmar, according to Burmese
officials in Yangon, is that the military is using the ethnic issue to defend its political power
and privileges, and therefore is unlikely to agree with any necessary compromises that the
NLD might accept. Last but not least, given the complicated relations between the Burmese
majority and ethnic minorities on the one hand and the civilian government and the Myan-
mar military on the other, peacemaking and nation-building are extended processes subject
to constant setbacks. Therefore, in the Chinese view, any agreement reached is bound to
be violated, intentionally or unintentionally, by either or both sides, interviewees in both
Beijing and Yunnan indicated, because the necessary trust is simply not there.
In this sense, China is not hopeful about Myanmar in the short term. The assessment of
Chinese officials is that the peace process will be full of obstacles and regressions in the
foreseeable future. In this context, a ceasefire is more probable than a comprehensive peace
agreement with all ethnic armed groups. Therefore, the reasoning continues, China needs to
prepare for a long process fraught with conflicts and the continued presence of autonomous

ethnic armed groups on the Sino-Myanmar border. The policy implications of this judgment
are twofold: first, Beijing can use its assistance in the peace process to sweeten relations
with Naypyidaw when it chooses; second, Beijing will not “abandon” the ethnic minorities
because they cannot be eliminated anyway and could even turn against China if China were
to push too hard. Most importantly, Beijing does not operate on the assumption that it must
pick a side between the central government in Naypyidaw and ethnic armed groups. Instead,
it maintains good relations with both, and each serves a distinct purpose.
At the geostrategic level, the ethnic conflicts in northern Myanmar are potential
obstacles to China’s grand strategic ambition, such as the One Belt One Road initiative or its
Indian Ocean strategy.17 China’s overall design is to build connectivity projects and transpor-
tation networks throughout Myanmar into South Asia and Southeast Asia. Projects such as
the Kyaukphyu special economic zone and deep-sea port could become a key post for China’s
Maritime Silk Road via the Indian Ocean.18 The ethnic conflicts therefore have two negative
effects that undermine China’s strategic ambitions. Directly, the ethnic conflicts act as a
roadblock to China’s strategic ambition along the border even before its projects can reach
the west coast of Myanmar. Indirectly, as long as the conflict continues, the thorny issue of
China’s relationship with armed ethnic groups damages Myanmar’s trust in China, hindering
the prospect of a close relationship.19
China’s security concerns in northern Myanmar are also shaped by a fear of Western and
particularly U.S. intervention in China’s immediate neighborhood, across a porous border
that can be easily infiltrated. For China, an open and active U.S. role in the peace process
would only further enhance the U.S. influence in Burmese politics and invite an American
presence on the Chinese border. Beijing has reacted strongly to the prospect of a U.S. role
in conflict resolution in northern Myanmar. In 2013, China’s top priority was to block the
attempted “internationalization of the Kachin issue,” demonstrated by a KIA proposal to
invite the United States, the UK, the United Nations, and China to be observers and wit-
nesses of the negotiation between the KIA and the central government.20 In 2015, accord-
ing to Burmese officials interviewed in Yangon that November, China’s ardent opposition
prevented the United States from becoming a witness to the signing of the NCA.
China’s strategy in the Myanmar peace process is shaped by concerns about U.S. involve-
ment in two seemingly contradictory ways. On one hand, a stagnant or stalled peace process
will compel either the ethnic minorities or the central government to seek outside support,
especially from the United States, as demonstrated by KIA’s case. In this sense, the desire to
keep the United States out motivates China to stay in and promote progress of the dialogue.
On the other hand, China also hopes to maintain its leverage—by keeping the issue alive and
shielding ethnic armed groups from destruction by the Myanmar military—should it decide
to pursue closer security ties with the United States.
Debate in China is ongoing as to whether the ethnic armed groups in Myanmar should
be treated as a strategic buffer and an asset that can be leveraged against the central
government in Naypyidaw.21 The foreign policy apparatus has long argued that China’s
noninterference principle prohibits any proxy war, but this position was challenged in the
course of the Thein Sein government, Chinese scholars in Beijing pointed out in interviews.
For Chinese technocrats concerned with military security, ethnic armed groups in Myanmar
are a natural asset, to be treated as a buffer against military campaigns against China that
might be launched from the southwest. The strategic school approaches the issue on the
basis of a strategic power equilibrium, arguing two points. First is that China needs to
increase its presence in the country in response to what has been observed as Myanmar’s
pro-West propensity since 2011.22 Second is that such influence should be strengthened—
including through proxies such as ethnic armed groups—to deter any Burmese policy that

could damage China’s interests.
China’s interests as a nation in the Myanmar peace process do not always align with those
of local and private Chinese actors. Although China as a nation wishes to follow (for the
most part) the principle of noninterference in Myanmar’s internal affairs, local and private
actors are often motivated by personal interests to support their ethnic brothers or business
partners in northern Myanmar. In deliberating China’s relations with ethnic armed groups in
Myanmar, the common argument is that the effectiveness of Chinese control to rein in their
behavior is undermined by two factors. Either the central government in Naypyidaw does not
have full capacity to control them, given the porous state of the border, or it is not willing
to restrain such support because the groups align with certain Chinese interests.
Testing either of these hypotheses is difficult given the opaqueness of Chinese policmak-
ing and the murky developments along the border. However, it is possible to form a basic
understanding of how the interests of certain Chinese actors align with or deviate from
those of Beijing. The first issue is the disconnect between central and provincial govern-
ments, popularly cited as having severely undermined Beijing’s policy toward Myanmar’s
ethnic reconciliation. The second is the support private Chinese actors provide to Myanmar
ethnic groups.
A Central-Provincial Disconnect?
The policies of the Chinese provincial government of Yunnan, which adjoins the Burmese
border, or the actions of the prefectures, counties, and cities in Yunnan are frequently cited
as a key independent variable undermining the effectiveness of Beijing’s policy toward
Myanmar. Local Yunnan companies have developed intricate business ties in northern Myan-
mar, including mining, logging, crop substitution, and other joint ventures. Because many
of these areas are controlled by ethnic armed groups, such business ties usually do not have
Naypyidaw’s approval.
This issue has been a sore spot between the two countries. In the 1990s, the Myanmar
military government complained to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the illegal
business activities in northern Myanmar that Yunnan companies had engaged ethnic groups
in, especially logging and mining.23 The most recent example of Myanmar’s frustration is
the case of the 150 illegal Chinese loggers from Yunnan arrested and sentenced in Kachin
state in 2015.24 The related frustration of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been
consistent. The ministry and the Yunnan provincial government have the same rank in the
Beijing bureaucracy, however, and thus neither has authority over the other.
Despite these historical dynamics, Beijing’s control of border affairs has in fact greatly
strengthened since the Kokang conflict in 2009, when the military government removed the
leadership of MNDAA and regained control of the Kokang region. The conflict caught Beijing
by surprise, Chinese officials explained in Washington, DC, and led to a policy review, which
determined that Yunnan’s monopoly of information and relations with ethnic armed groups
in northern Myanmar had fostered rampant corruption in border management and posed a
threat to China’s national security. As a result, Beijing began to strengthen its direct chan-
nel of communications with ethnic armed groups in Myanmar; to develop its independent
channels, sources, and private contacts; to shuffle the security officials and armed police
periodically; and to assign the People’s Liberation Army to key border guard posts.
President Xi’s anticorruption campaign has put further pressure on Yunnan bureaucrats.
In the three years between 2013 and 2016, eight senior officials in Yunnan were investigat-
ed or arrested, including former Communist Party provincial secretaries Qin Guangrong and
Bai Enpei; former Communist Party deputy secretary Qiu He; former Yunnan vice governor

Shen Peiping; former Communist Party secretaries of Kunming city Gao Jinsong and Zhang
Tianxin; Kunming executive deputy mayor Li Xi; and Kunming deputy mayor Xie Xinsong.25
Among all the provinces in China, Yunnan has the highest number of officials (904) dismissed
for corruption between 2014 and March 2016.26 The massive purge in Yunnan may not have a
direct impact on the province’s relations with the ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar.
However, it does warn local officials about the consequences of acting against the central
government. One local official interviewed in Yunnan remarked, “Under President Xi, acting
against the central government is not just political suicide, but literally suicide.”
Given Xi’s absolute authority in Chinese domestic politics and the tight leash he has put
on local governments, Yunnan has become much more careful and obedient in its liaison role
between Beijing and Myanmar. Some private citizens in Yunnan are still sympathetic to the
ethnic armed groups and provide assistance to them, but local government actors are far less
inclined to knowingly and deliberately ignore Beijing’s specific orders because doing so is
too risky politically. Analysts should be more vigilant when ambiguity arises about Yunnan’s
assistance to the armed groups. They should at least question whether Yunnan is in fact
acting against Beijing or is merely an easy scapegoat. This misconception is convenient for
Beijing because it offers easy deniability.
Chinese Business Interests
Economically, China’s interests in northern Myanmar are most immediately associated with
investment in Kachin and Shan states. China has significant hydropower investments in
each, including the controversial $3.6 billion Myitsone dam and the planned $6 billion Mong
Ton hydropower facility. China’s strategic oil and gas pipeline project, built by the China
National Petroleum Company, passes through Shan state, and is located close to the conflict
zones in southeastern Kachin and northwestern Shan states.27 The Dapein dam was forced
to shut down in 2011 for more than two years because of the Kachin conflict.28 Chinese
investment in natural resource industries affects distribution of economic benefits in ethnic
states between the ethnic groups and the central government. That most projects were
negotiated with Naypyidaw amplifies ethnic grievances and fuels the ongoing conflict. Many
ethnic armed groups have been the de facto administrators of their territories for decades,
and the legitimacy of the central government on their land has been contested for more
than sixty years.
Beyond official investments, private, unofficial, and sometimes illicit economic and social
ties between armed groups in northern Myanmar and private companies in China are exten-
sive. Mining and logging are the most common joint ventures. In some cases, the Chinese
companies are owned and operated by coethnics, such as the Yunnan Jingcheng Group.29
After the Myitsone fiasco, Chinese state-owned enterprises became increasingly con-
cerned with being blamed for the deterioration of Sino-Myanmar relations and have since
complied more with central government’s policies in Myanmar. State-owned enterprise cau-
tion, however, has not discouraged or stopped private companies and citizens from providing
substantive support to ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar. It is difficult to assess the
extent to which ethnic minorities and locals in China have provided ethnic armed groups in
northern Myanmar with material support, though rumors run rampant. During the Kachin
and Kokang conflicts, interviewees in Yunnan reported, private Chinese citizens assisted
ethnic armed groups in passing through Chinese territories and hosted them in China when
they were in tactical retreat. Although such actions are widely interpreted as “China’s sup-
port” of the rebels, those providing access to Chinese territory were likely not operating with
Beijing’s blessing or knowledge in most cases—such actions are too easy to be caught by

satellite or local witnesses and offer no deniability. However, private business supports are
much less culpable and much more important. The case of the Yucheng Group and its large
financial support to these groups in 2015 is a prime example.
Yucheng Group, currently under criminal investigation, is a private Chinese financial
company founded by Ding Ning, a thirty-four-year-old Chinese citizen from Anhui province.
Established as a technology company, Yucheng launched its private equity firm in 2012 and
merged all subsidiaries in 2013 to become the Yucheng Group. Its most famous financial
product, EZuBao, an online financial trading platform, was launched in 2014 and rapidly
became one of the largest online asset-to-peer operations in China.30 EZuBao is essentially
a Ponzi scheme, offering exceedingly high interest rates for money raised from private inves-
tors. Between its launch in July 2014 and the criminal investigation beginning in December
2015, EZuBao raised more than RMB 50 billion (about $7.5 billion) from more than nine
hundred thousand private investors.31
Yucheng Group became involved in the northern Myanmar conflict in early 2015 after
MNDAA began its appeal for Chinese all over the world to support the armed struggle of a
Han diaspora group in Myanmar persecuted by the Burmese government. Ding Ning, who
had accumulated vast financial assets since the launch of EZuBao in 2014, became person-
ally interested in the Kokang’s cause and is said by local representatives in Shan state to
have made a one-time donation of RMB 10 million to MNDAA without asking for anything
in return. According to Chinese observers and local ethnic representatives in northern
Myanmar, through MNDAA, Ding Ning rapidly established relations with all six armed ethnic
groups and provided funding to all of them.
Yucheng Group’s most significant relationship in northern Myanmar was with UWSA.
According to UWSA leaders, the investment and contribution the group received from
Yucheng in 2015 was unprecedented in its history. Financially, according to Yucheng Group’s
statement in 2015, its overseas subsidiary company reached an agreement with UWSA to
establish a Yucheng Southeast Asia Free Trade Zone in the Wa area with a total investment
goal of RMB 40 billion as well as a specialized commercial bank there—the Southeast Asia
Union Bank.32 UWSA leaders confirmed these two operations in private interviews but com-
mented that they have been suspended since the criminal investigation of the Yucheng
Group began in December 2015. Although most of the illegal revenue—some RMB 50 bil-
lion—has disappeared from Yucheng’s accounts in China, highly respected Chinese media
sources, such as Caixin, have cited “informed sources in China” that most of Yucheng Group’s
funding has gone to Myanmar, though the exact amount is unknown.33 According to multiple
interviewees, Yucheng also arranged arms sales and mercenaries for UWSA.
Yucheng Group claims that its financial investment in UWSA was in support of the Chi-
nese government’s Belt and Road Initiative, the sole purpose of which was turning the Wa
area into another hub of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.34 However, the more widely
shared consensus, as pointed out by the authoritative Caixin magazine, is that Yucheng
Group was in fact using ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar to money launder the
illegal funding it had accumulated in China.35 UWSA’s most developed laundering channels
run through Thailand and Singapore. That most of Yucheng Group’s illegal funding has yet to
be discovered or retrieved supports the theory that the money had been funneled through
ethnic armed groups, including UWSA, to overseas destinations. It also explains Yucheng’s
interests in providing not only funding but also arms and mercenaries—because its assets
required protection. According to conservative estimates, financial support from Yucheng
was in the tens of millions of dollars.
Yucheng’s operations in northern Myanmar offer the strongest explanation for the
perception of a heightened support from China to ethnic armed groups in 2015. Whether

Yucheng was operating under the approval or, at a minimum, with the knowledge of the
Chinese government is unclear. After all, before the criminal investigation began, Yucheng
was lauded as a champion for financial innovation in China and its commercials were widely
broadcast by CCTV, China’s official central television network. According to Yucheng, the
agreements it reached with UWSA over the free trade zone and the Southeast Asia Union
Bank were approved by “related government agencies” in China. Similarly, the Yucheng Group
established its own People’s Armed Division in 2015 and the opening ceremony was attended
by the local People’s Liberation Army offices in Bengbu, Anhui province, as well as local
government officials.36 Of course, these government agencies and officials do not represent
the entire Chinese government and have instigated bureaucratic infight over Yucheng’s
activities, which eventually led to its demise.
Key Ethnic Armed Groups
China’s interest in the peace process is clearly focused on the groups located along the
Sino-Myanmar border in Kachin and Stan states. Much less attention has been paid to the
ethnic groups in lower Myanmar, such as the Karen, the Chin, or the Mon. Among the groups
in northern Myanmar, KIA and UWSA seem to be China’s priorities, given the sizes of their
armed forces and their geographical proximity to and ethnic affinity with China. Simply put,
they have the greatest capacity to create turbulence along the border. Among other groups,
the Mongla Army (or National Democratic Alliance Army–Eastern Shan State, NDAA-ESS), is
traditionally seen as a proxy of the much stronger UWSA and aligns its political and military
strategies with the Wa. The three groups previously excluded from the NCA—MNDAA, the
Arakan Army, and the Ta’ang Liberation Army—are also closely watched by China because
of Kokang’s ethnic ties with China, all three groups’ relationships with KIA and UWSA, and
their abilities to disrupt the peace process and general peace and stability. Other than these
six groups, the Shan State Army-North and Shan State Army-South—also known as the
Restoration Council of Shan State—also matter to China even though they are farther south
from the border in the Shan state. They matter because their political positions, especially
whether to accept the NCA and cooperate with the government military, nevertheless affect
the unity and politics of ethnic armed groups.37
KIA
As the leader of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), KIA has been a key player in
northern Myanmar. KIA territory primarily borders Ruili and Baoshan prefectures in Yunnan,
China, and its headquarters in Laiza sits right across the Sino-Myanmar border from China’s
Yingjiang county. The Kachin in Myanmar have close ethnic ties with the Chinese Kachin
(Jingpo) people. The political and financial support KIA enjoys from their Chinese Kachin
brothers is perhaps the strongest among all ethnic armed groups. Such strong support carries
important political sway in China, because the local governments are keen to pacify ethnic
minority groups for the sake of social stability. Kachin state boasts rich natural resources,
especially jade, timber, hydropower, and mineral resources, leading to numerous joint ven-
tures with Chinese entities on resources development. This inevitably boosts the incentive
of Chinese local and private interest groups to support and protect KIA. For these reasons,
China has maintained close communications with KIA to mediate the ongoing fighting and
coordinate on negotiations.
However, among the six groups, Chinese reservations are also highest about KIA.
Although Beijing acknowledges KIA’s leadership status at UNFC and its indispensable role in
Whether Yucheng was
operating under the approval
or, at a minimum, with the
knowledge of the Chinese
government is unclear.

the peace process, its attitude toward KIA is colored by several factors. KIA has not always
been supportive of Chinese investment in Kachin state. Citing “Kachin people’s concerns,”
KIA has opposed the Chinese Myitsone dam project.38 The Kachin community and KIA
maintain close ties with Western countries and organizations, on the basis of their Christian
identity, the Kachin diaspora in the West, and their history of cooperating with the United
States and UK during World War II against the Japanese occupation.39
China also has concerns about Kachin’s ties with the United States, concerns that have
grown over the past several years as Kachin delegations have visited Washington to seek
American support for their cause. The most famous such visit was by Major General Sumlut
Gun Maw, KIA’s vice chief of staff, in April 2014, when he met with senior U.S. government
officials.40 In 2013, KIA proposed including the United States as an observer, along with
the United Nations, the UK, and China, in its negotiations with the Myanmar government—a
privilege that China saw as reserved for itself and the United Nations.41 According to the
Chinese perception, the proposal was a direct attempt to “internationalize the Kachin issue”
and introduce an American presence to China’s borderland. Understanding China’s concern
about U.S. involvement, KIA later tried to portray the United States as working with the
Myanmar military against KIA in order to alienate China’s relationship with the Myanmar
military and increase Chinese support of KIA.42 China sees such inconsistency and manipula-
tions as evidence of KIA’s unreliability.
The internal split within KIA on the peace process also disturbs China. KIA has both a
moderate group willing to negotiate with the government and make necessary compromises,
and radical hard-liners for whom “independence” or self-determination is the ultimate goal.
This position may simply be part of KIA’s negotiation strategy, interviews suggest, but it
does not fare well with China given the Tibetan and Uyghur separatist threats that Beijing
faces. The split contributed to KIA’s inconsistent position in the negotiations for the NCA
in 2014 and 2015, Burmese officials in Yangon report, which frequently undermined the
authority and negotiation power of General Gun Maw, KIA’s chief negotiator to the govern-
ment. To China, this makes it seem less likely that KIA has a consistent commitment to the
peace process and agreements.
In the view of many Chinese observers in Beijing and Yunnan, under the leadership of
KIA, the UNFC has demonstrated a habit of stalling the peace process. It is seen as having
genuine grievances given the ongoing major attacks by the Myanmar military and an overall
lack of trust. However, Chinese officials question the extent to which these groups—includ-
ing KIA—are genuinely interested in pursuing the peace process, which inevitably requires
political and economic compromise. For China, the ambivalence in KIA’s position confirms
the judgment discussed earlier of the unattainability of comprehensive peace in the near
future. Therefore, although China has no strong incentives to push KIA and the UNFC to
compromise, suspicion about the fickleness and ultimate intentions is deeply engrained.
UWSA
UWSA does not seek independence but does pursue three tangible political and territorial
goals: a high level of autonomy, the northern and southern territories currently under its
control, and an upgrade of its status from Self-Administered Division to that of an ethnic
state.43 UWSA did not sign onto the NCA because it interpreted the term ceasefire as not
applying to it because it had not engaged in active conflict with the government since
1989, interviewees in Wa reported. Moreover, UWSA prefers the three-level bilateral peace
agreement it had been negotiating with the Thein Sein government in 2011, before the NCA
was proposed. Because it has completed the first two levels of peace agreements (state and
union), UWSA believes that rejoining a ceasefire dialogue would be a regression. Hard-liners

within the UWSA have little faith that the central government in Naypyidaw would not again
abandon any future agreement under negotiation.
In fact, among all the ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, UWSA perhaps has the closest
ties with and elicits the most sympathy from China, to the extent that some local officials in
China regard UWSA as China’s “illegitimate child.” The creation of the autonomous Wa state
by current UWSA commander Bao Youxiang can be traced to the late 1960s, when his guer-
rilla forces joined the Burmese Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution and fought
to establish the UWSA.44 UWSA leaders still enjoy the freedom to travel to the capital city of
Yunnan province for medical treatment without advanced approval from Beijing, a privilege
that none of the other groups share.
China supports UWSA’s position about remaining part of Myanmar. UWSA has no intention
of becoming Chinese territory and surrendering its autonomy to what it sees as stringent
Chinese laws and regulations. China does not wish to see a conflict between UWSA and the
government, and has pressed both sides—despite the occasional skirmish—to refrain from
such a disastrous scenario. China will not push UWSA to quit the peace process; however,
neither will it push UWSA to embrace any settlement it is unwilling to accept. In the view
of both China and UWSA, such an imposed settlement would be fragile, unsustainable, and
only likely to cause greater instability in the future.
China supports the tacit leadership role of UWSA among the ethnic armed groups in
northern Myanmar. UWSA enjoys a traditional, de facto alliance with the Eastern Shan state
wing of the Kokang Army given its geographic proximity and historical affinity. The two
closely coordinate their positions on many issues, including the peace process. Both have
supported the three armed groups previously excluded from the NCA: MNDAA, the Ta’ang
Liberation Army, and the Arakan Army. UWSA has hosted three ethnic summits in Panghsang
since May 2015, rallying support for its leadership authority among the ethnic armed groups.
The result is the perceived emergence of a competing camp to the KIA-led UNFC. KIA is
perhaps the only group that sees UWSA as a peer. Although neither group acknowledges it
publicly, KIA and UWSA view each other both as partners and competitors. UWSA sometimes
criticizes certain factions inside KIA as too compromising, and some in KIA regard UWSA as
too content with the status quo. Many Kachin see UWSA’s struggle as lacking ideology rela-
tive to their own long fight for freedom, and are discomforted by UWSA’s desire to become
a formal ethnic state in Myanmar.
Whether the Chinese government has provided military support to UWSA is a key ques-
tion for many observers. UWSA includes many Chinese mercenaries. However, such partici-
pation is not an organized scheme by any Chinese authority, but instead motivated by the
higher salary that UWSA offers over the average income in Yunnan, Chinese mercenaries in
Wa explained. Many of UWSA’s light weapons, such as shotguns, resemble Chinese firearms.
However, UWSA has at least two weapons factories producing light weapons based on Chi-
nese models. Although it is theoretically plausible that China provided them to UWSA, no
evidence supports the claim.
Unlike Kachin state, UWSA territories are not rich in natural resources. The growth of
the nascent tin mining industry has been hampered by a drop in the price of tin, local rep-
resentatives in Wa explained. UWSA has traditionally relied on an illicit economy, including
drug trafficking and casinos, for revenue. These activities cater to the Chinese market and
consumers, which has created tremendous transboundary criminal issues for Beijing. How-
ever, the Chinese authorities seem to tolerate Wa’s actions and instead pursue tighter law
enforcement within China to combat the crimes.
China’s political support of UWSA is strong, but its precise nature and scale are hard to
quantify. A conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces and UWSA is not inconceivable,
Although neither group
acknowledges it publicly, KIA
and UWSA view each other both
as partners and competitors.

but the likelihood is small in the foreseeable future, because of both China’s opposition and
UWSA’s strength. China sees no reason to persuade UWSA to abandon its cause for autono-
mous status and regards UWSA as the most loyal supporter among ethnic armed groups in
Myanmar of China’s national interests.
Kokang Army
Among these groups, the Kokang has created the most controversies in China. The Kokang
people are the descendants of Han refugees from the Ming dynasty who fled to the Kokang
area when the Qing dynasty took over Kunming in 1659.45 Unlike the Kachin and the Wa,
the Kokang’s ethnic tie with China is with the majority ethnic group—the Han people. The
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army is under the leadership of Peng Jiasheng, who
was born in Kokang in 1931 and was an active member of the Communist Party of Burma
during the Cultural Revolution. After the CPB disintegrated in 1989, Peng signed a ceasefire
agreement with the Myanmar government and became the chairman of the First Special
Region of northern Shan state. The 2009 Kokang incident resulted in Peng’s loss of control
in the region and his exile for the following five years in Thailand, China, and Mongla con-
trolled by NDAA-ESS. In late 2014 and early 2015, Peng launched offensives in the Kokang
region against the Myanmar Armed Forces with assistance from KIA and UWSA. After major
disturbances along the Chinese border, MNDAA announced a unilateral ceasefire on June
11, 2015.46
During the early stages of the Kokang offensive, according to Chinese officials inter-
viewed in February 2015, Peng’s actions greatly angered Beijing. It saw Peng’s attempts
as motivated by his narrow personal interests in gaining political capital rather than any
consideration of China’s national interests. Peng’s strategic choice to instigate war and send
sixty thousand refugees to China just before the Chinese New Year was a calculated move to
force Beijing to push the Myanmar government to deflate the tensions.47 Under this plan,
the Myanmar military’s retreat would allow Peng to reestablish his control of the Kokang
area, position himself as a legitimate representative and leader of the Kokang minorities,
and insert himself in the peace process. Peng’s media and online appeal for support from the
“Chinese Kokang people” invoked great sympathy among the Chinese public.
However, in the context of Myanmar military’s bombing of Chinese territory during the
Kokang conflict and a clear willingness of the Thein Sein government to dampen relations
with China, China’s attitude toward Peng became much more ambiguous after March 2015.
Reliable reports, privately acknowledged by Chinese officials in interviews, indicate that
China allowed Peng’s troops to use Chinese territory to outflank the Burmese military. In an
even bolder gesture, Chinese authorities allowed MNDAA to open a bank account in Beijing
to collect donations from the Chinese public.48 According to Chinese scholars and officials
interviewed in Yunnan and Beijing, Peng and his associates were allowed to visit China mul-
tiple times in 2015 to meet with Chinese officials and government-affiliated organizations.
China’s official attitude toward MNDAA’s accession to the peace dialogue has also grown
from noncommittal to tacitly supportive.
Conclusion
For multiple historical, ethnic, geographic, political, and economic reasons, China has been
and will remain an integral player in Myanmar’s peace process, particularly regarding the
ethnic armed groups in the northern part of that country. Despite its proclaimed noninter-
ference policy, China uses its involvement in that peace process as both a carrot to induce

more cooperation from Myanmar and a stick when Myanmar appears to be deviating from
the policy course that China desires.
Over the past five years, although China officially has maintained its principle of non-
interference, in practice its attitude has been more ambiguous. Chinese officials argue, as
one said in a Beijing interview, that “China cannot and should not remain aloof on an issue
that has such direct and serious implications for its national security.” However, whether
this will translate into an official policy change will depend on President Xi Jinping. Chinese
Myanmar experts in Kunming explain the ambiguity of China’s stance so far due to the
absence of determination from the top leadership. That said, after the Burmese attacks on
Chinese territory during the 2015 Kokang conflict, China’s top leaders began to lean increas-
ingly toward a more active role for China by exercising its leverage on Myanmar through
ethnic armed groups.
China supports peace in Myanmar, but it does not necessarily believe that comprehensive
peace is attainable in the foreseeable future. Therefore, for China, the priority is to prepare
for different uncertainties and maximize its flexibility in the process. China’s role is further
blurred by the widely assumed but ambiguous central-local disparity and the activities
of private Chinese actors, such as the Yucheng Group’s support of ethnic armed groups in
Myanmar. In these cases, Beijing enjoys easy deniability and shifts any accusations about
China’s culpability onto these actors.
Although China has supported the peace process, its continued relations with the ethnic
armed groups are seen by many as providing the life support to the groups’ survival and
armed struggle. Most importantly, the revenues generated through mining, logging, and
other illicit economic activities directly fuel the war economy and prolong the conflict.
Although China exonerates itself by denying ties with or knowledge of private Chinese enti-
ties involved, Burmese officials in Yangon explained, many in Myanmar nevertheless see
China as the largest obstacle to the success of the peace process.
This raises the question of what more constructive role China could play in the peace
process beyond persuading for peace and facilitating dialogues. Some armed groups, and
even some Chinese observers, have suggested the role of an external guarantor for any
potential peace agreement. However, within the framework of noninterference, Beijing does
not seem inclined to take on such a complicated job and intricate responsibilities. Accord-
ing to a Chinese government analyst interviewed in Yunnan, “Even the wisest official can’t
determine the messy internal affairs of a family. To entangle ourselves in the messy quibbles
between the Myanmar government and the ethnic groups on who did what when and where
is just not going to work, or be worth it. We cannot assume such a role.”
China’s relations with Myanmar have improved significantly under the NLD government.
That they have has contributed to China’s enhanced effort to shepherd Myanmar’s ethnic
armed groups to the dialogue and negotiation process. Looking ahead, although China may
not believe that the UPC will necessarily achieve peace and ethnic reconciliation, participa-
tion by all key groups in the conference itself is a breakthrough. China has played a positive
role in persuading the ethnic armed groups to join the conference, but it is only the first
step of a long journey. China’s policy and role will depend on the development of bilateral
relations and the evolving definition of China’s national interests.
Notes
1. “International Boundary Studies: Burma-China Boundary,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, November 30, 1964.
2. Xu Yan, “The Rise and Fall of the Burmese Communist Party and Its Lessons” [in Chinese], WenShiCanKao,
September 13, 2010, www.people.com.cn/GB/198221/198819/198859/12706724.html.
Despite its proclaimed non-
interference policy, China
uses its involvement in that
peace process as both a carrot
to induce more cooperation
from Myanmar and a stick
when Myanmar appears to be
deviating from the policy course
that China desires.

3. Ibid.
4. “Li Keqiang Met with Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi” [in Chinese], Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
August 18, 2016, www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/chn/zgwj/t1390098.htm.
5. “China’s Myanmar Strategy: Elections, Ethnic Politics and Economics,” International Crisis Group, September 20,
2010, www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/china-s-myanmar-strategy-elections-ethnic-politics
-and-economics.
6. “Beijing’s First Special Envoy for Asia to Focus on Myanmar,” South China Morning Post, March 12, 2013, www
.scmp.com/news/china/article/1188814/beijings-first-special-envoy-asia-focus-myanmar.
7. Yun Sun, “China’s Intervention in the Kachin Conflict,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, February 20, 2013, www
.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb200_0.pdf.
8. “Special Envoy H.E. Sun Guoxiang Arrived at Myanmar to Observe General Election,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
November 3, 2015, http://mm.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1311805.htm.
9. Lun Min Mang, “Ethnic Unity Urged as Summit Kicks off in KIA-held Mai Ja Yang,” Myanmar Times, July 27,
2016, www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/21583-ethnic-unity-urged-as-summit-kicks-off-in-kia-held
-mai-ja-yang.html.
10. Thomas Fuller and Edward Wong, “Myanmar Announces a Ceasefire in Assault Against Kachin Rebels,” New York
Times, January 18, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/world/asia/kachin-refugees-reported-to-flee-myanmar
-to-china.html.
11. “Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin Urgently Summons Ambassador of Myanmar to China to Lodge Solemn
Representations over the Casualties of Chinese Civilians Caused by Bombs from Myanmar’s Airforce Jet,” Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, March 14, 2016, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1246178.shtml.
12. Sui-Lee Wee, “Myanmar Official accuses China of Meddling in Rebel Peace Talks,” Reuters, October 15, 2015, www
.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-china-idUSKCN0S22VT20151008.
13. “Myanmar’s Statement on the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea under Annexure VII of
UNCLOS,” Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2016, www.mofa.gov.mm/wp-content/uploads/2016/07
/Press-Releases.pdf.
14. Yun Sun, “A Fourth Option for Myitsone: China’s View,” Frontier Myanmar, August 16, 2016, http
://frontiermyanmar.net/en/a-fourth-option-for-myitsone-chinas-view.
15. “Joint Press Release Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,” Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 20, 2016, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1390889.shtml.
16. Sean Gleeson, “Beijing Reps Meet with Border Armed Groups as Peace Conference Nears,” Frontier Myanmar,
August 29, 2016, http://frontiermyanmar.net/en/news/beijing-reps-meet-with-border-armed-groups-as-peace
-conference-nears.
17. “One Belt and One Road,” or the Belt and Road initiative, is a development strategy and framework proposed
by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 that focuses on connectivity and cooperation between China and the
rest of Eurasia. See “Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative,” State Council of China, March 30, 2015, http
://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm.
18. Atul Aneja, “All Is Not Smooth on the Silk Road,” The Hindu, August 22, 2015, www.thehindu.com/opinion
/columns/all-is-not-smooth-on-the-silk-road/article7562232.ece.
19. Sun, “China’s Intervention in the Kachin Conflict.”
20. Yun Sun, “China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict,” Stimson Center Issue Brief No. 2, January 2014,
www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Myanmar_Issue_Brief_No_2_Jan_2014_WEB_3_1.pdf.
21. Yun Sun, “Has China Lost Myanmar?” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/15
/has-china-lost-myanmar/.
22. Ibid.
23. “China’s Myanmar Dilemma,” International Crisis Group report, September 20, 2009, www.crisisgroup.org/asia
/north-east-asia/china/china-s-myanmar-dilemma.
24. “Myanmar Sentences 153 Chinese Nationals to Life in Prison for Illegal Logging,” Australian Broadcasting
Company, July 23, 2015, www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-23/myanmar-sentences-chinese-nationals-to
-life-for-illegal-logging/6643646.
25. “Senior Officials Dismissed in Large Numbers, Yunnan Party Secretary Uses Tang Poems to Express His
Commitment” [in Chinese], Tengxun News, March 8, 2016, http://news.qq.com/a/20160308/040657.htm.
26. “Yunnan Province Sacks 904 Corrupted Officials” [in Chinese], Sohu News, March 18, 2016, http://mt.sohu
.com/20160318/n441022362.shtml.
27. “Myanmar Section of the Myanmar-China Oil Pipelines Starts Trial Operation,” CNPC, February 4, 2015, www.cnpc
.com.cn/en/nr2015/201502/2cea6be48e4e43e7a4bcfa77080d8314.shtml.
28. Jonathan Watts, “Dozens Killed in Burma amid Clashes over Chinese Dams,” The Guardian, June 16, 2011, www
.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/16/china-burma-hydropower-clashes; Wang Hongping, “Dapein Hydropower
Project: Protected in the War” [in Chinese], China Datang Group, March 19, 2014, www.china-cdt.com/dtwz
/indexAction.ndo?action=showDoc&d=85EA6B46-A3C9-BE60-25C9-0BF7B803D9C9&t=index_news.
29. Yunnan Jingcheng Group, founded by Jingpo businessman Dong Lecheng in 1990, is one of the largest private
companies in Yunnan. Its hotel was the venue for negotiation between KIA and the Myanmar government in
2013.
30. “Discovering Yucheng Group’s Ponzi Scheme and Its Capital Chain” [in Chinese], 21st Century Jingji Baodao,
January 31, 2016, http://money.163.com/16/0131/22/BEMKGA0S00251LKI.html.
31. “Truth about EZuBao’s Illegal Fundraising Case” [in Chinese], Xinhua News, January 31, 2016, http://news
.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-01/31/c_1117948306.htm.
32. “EZuBao Under Investigation, Yucheng Group’s Business Map Discovered” [in Chinese], Caixin, December 17,
2015, http://finance.caixin.com/2015-12-17/100889447.html.
33. Ibid.

34. “Yucheng Model Assists Belt and Road Strategy” [in Chinese], Xinhua News, September 22, 2015, http://news
.xinhuanet.com/city/2015-09/22/c_128255651.htm. As a strategic partner of the China-ASEAN Exposition in
2015, Yucheng Group held a special session to promote its work in northern Myanmar.
35. “EZuBao Under Investigation.”
36. Ibid.
37. For example, RCSS has been engaged in active combat with TNLA since 2015, even after RCSS signed the NCA.
The common speculation, according to local leaders interviewed in Kachin and Shan states, is that RCSS has
been working with the government military to battle the Ta’ang Liberation Army, a proxy of KIA and UWSA for
its own political gains.
38. Fan Shiyun, “Myitsone Hydropower Project Suspended for Four Years: Who Are Against It?” [in Chinese], The
Paper, November 8, 2011, www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1394261.
39. C. H. Briscoe, “Kachin Rangers: Allied Guerrillas in World War II Burma,” Kachin Net, May 11, 2015, http
://kachinnet.net/archives/951.
40. “General Gun Mao Visits the Lincoln Memorial, Meets Local Communities,” Kachin Land News, April 21, 2014,
http://kachinlandnews.com/?p=24338.
41. Sun, “China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict.”
42. Yun Sun, “The Conflict in Northern Myanmar: Another American Anti-China Conspiracy?” Asia Pacific Bulletin,
February 20, 2015, www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb302_0.pdf.
43. UWSA currently holds two pieces of territory: the traditional northern base centered around Panghsang, adjacent
to China, and the 171 Military Region, UWSA’s southern base borders Thailand and has only been occupied by
UWSA since mid-1990s after it defeated Shan drug lord Khun Sa in cooperation with the Myanmar army. The 2008
Constitution stipulates that the Wa Self-Administered Division only consist of six townships in the north, leaving
the status of the 171 Military Region in question. UWSA sees the south base as a compensation by the military
government for its hard-fought battles against Khun Sa. Unless the government generously compensates UWSA
with new territory in the north, UWSA will not willingly relinquish its southern territory.
44. Shi Lei, Protecting the Golden Triangle (Yunnan: Tianma Publishing House, 2012), 53. Lei currently serves as the
vice minister of UWSA’s Department of External Relations.
45. “Han Descendants from Ming Dynasty in Myanmar: The Kokang People” [in Chinese], People’s Daily, January 27,
2015, http://history.people.com.cn/n/2015/0127/c372326-26458099.html.
46. “Ethnic Kokang Rebels Declare Unilateral Ceasefire in Myanmar,” Voice of America, June 11, 2015, www.voanews
.com/a/ap-ethnic-kokang-rebels-declare-unilateral-ceasefire-in-myanmar/2816941.html.
47. Yun Sun, “The Kokang Conflict: How Will China Respond?” The Irrawaddy, February 18, 2015, www.irrawaddy.com
/contributor/kokang-conflict-will-china-respond.html.
48. According to the Chinese blog of the Kokang, the official account was opened in April 2015 at the Bank of Beijing
(http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_9ce88e820102vey2.html).
Of Related Interest
• China’s Kashmir Policies and Crisis Management in South Asia by I-wei Jennifer Chang (Peace
Brief, February 2017)
• China’s Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping by Courtney J. Fung (Peace Brief, July 2016)
• China and the Responsibility to Protect: From Opposition to Advocacy by Courtney J. Fung
(Peace Brief, June 2016)
• Overcoming Barriers to U.S.-China Cooperation by Maral Noori, Daniel Jasper, and Jason Tower
(Peace Brief, August 2015)
• Myanmar: Anatomy of a Political Transition by Priscilla A. Clapp (Special Report, April 2015)
ISBN: 978-1-60127-648-3
An online edition of this and related
reports can be found on our website
(www.usip.org), together with additional
information on the subject.
United States
Institute of Peace
2301 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
www.usip.org
@usip

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL
CHANGE IN BURMA
DRAFT
MARCH 20, 2012
This publication was produced by Management Systems International (MSI) for review by
the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Dr. Christina
Fink for MSI.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA
DRAFT
Contracted under IQC # AID-OAA-I-10-00002; Order # AID-OAA-TO-11-00051
Analytic, Strategic and Information Support - AME
This report was prepared by Dr. Christina Fink, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the
Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University in Washington, DC.
Professor Fink has a PhD in anthropology and specializes in development issues in Southeast Asia.
DISCLAIMER
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency
for International Development or the United States Government.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA i
CONTENTS
Acronyms .................................................................................................................................ii
Map showing approximate ceasefire and non-ceasefire areas in Kachin, Shan, and
Karenni States in 2009 ...........................................................................................................iii
Militarization in Eastern Burma in 2008 .............................................................................iv
Key Dates in Burma’s Ethnic Politics.................................................................................... v
Executive Summary ...............................................................................................................vi
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
2. Historical Background........................................................................................................ 2
3. Key Armed Ethnic Groups................................................................................................. 3
4. Dynamics Moving the Key Stakeholders towards Ceasefires.......................................... 6
6. The Views of Other Key Actors ...................................................................................... 11
7. Challenges to Resolving the Ethnic Conflict................................................................... 16
8. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 20

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA ii
ACRONYMS
CNF Chin National Front
KIO Kachin Independence Organization
KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party
KNU Karen National Union
MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
NDAA National Democratic Alliance Army
NLD National League for Democracy
NMSP New Mon State Party
SSA-North Shan State Army - North
SSA-South Shan State Army - South
UNFC United Nationalities Federal Council
UNLD United Nationalities League for Democracy
USDP Union State Development Party
UWSA United Wa State Army
UWSP United Wa State Party

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA iii
MAP SHOWING APPROXIMATE CEASEFIRE AND
NON-CEASEFIRE AREAS IN KACHIN, SHAN,AND
KARENNI STATES IN 2009
Source: Transnational Institute

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA iv
MILITARIZATION IN EASTERN BURMA IN 2008
Source: Thai-Burma Border Consortium

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA v
KEY DATES IN BURMA’S ETHNIC POLITICS
1886-1948 Burma proper under direct British rule, frontier areas under indirect rule
Feb 1947 Panglong Agreement signed by General Aung San and several ethnic leaders establishes
the principles of a federal union and the right of secession after 10 years
Sept 1947 Constitution approved – federal in name, but power primarily lies with the central
government
1948 Burma gains independence, Communist armed struggle begins
1949 Karen armed struggle begins, other ethnic armed movements form
1961-2 Prime Minister U Nu encourages the passage of a law making Buddhism the state
religion; U Nu allows high level discussion of federalism
1961 The Kachin Independence Organization/Army forms, in part in reaction to the push to
make Buddhism the state religion (most Kachin are Christian)
1962 General Ne Win stages a coup and seizes power, claiming to prevent the country from
falling apart; the 1947 constitution is abrogated and all power is centralized
1988 Nationwide pro-democracy uprising; citizens of all ethnicities in government-held areas
participate; ethnic armed groups stay out
1990 Multiparty election held; pro-democracy and ethnic-based political parties contest, but
the regime does not allow the winning parties to take power
1989-1995 The military intelligence branch of the army makes ceasefire agreements with many of
the armed ethnic groups – they can hold their weapons and territory and engage in
business
1993-2007 The National Convention to write a new constitution meets infrequently, most delegates
are handpicked by the regime, ethnic politicians’ demands are ignored
May 2008 A new constitution is approved in a national referendum marred by intimidation and
fraud; the constitution enshrines the military’s leading role in politics, 25% of seats in
parliament and regional/state assemblies reserved for the military, and the right to take
power if deemed necessary
April 2009 Military government orders ethnic armed groups to transform into Border Guard Forces
integrated into the tatmadaw; many refuse
Nov 2010 Multiparty elections are held on Nov 7 but marred by intimidation and fraud; Aung San
Suu Kyi released from house arrest 6 days later
Mar-Jun 2011 The tatmadaw breaks longstanding ceasefires with the Shan State Army-North and the
Kachin Independence Army
2011-12 President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi both state that stopping the civil war is a
top priority, government-initiated peace talks with numerous ethnic groups

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Enabling a durable peace in the ethnic areas will be one of the most difficult challenges to
ensuring irreversible political reform in Burma. This is because of the distance in positions
between the tatmadaw (the Burmese armed forces) and the armed ethnic resistance groups
regarding the devolution of power and the integration of ethnic resistance armies into the national
army. Complicating the issue further are the large number of resistance armies and militias with
varying agendas, the multitude of licit and illicit business interests in the ethnic states, and the
continuing threats to human security for civilians in the areas where the state and non-state armed
groups operate.
The Thein Sein government has surprised everyone by making peace-making a priority since
coming to office in April 2011. As of mid-March 2012, all the significant ethnic armed
organizations, except for the Kachin Independence Organization, had agreed to initial ceasefires.
The government negotiators promised that peace talks would follow in the coming months,
although it is not clear if the government and tatmadaw will be willing to make any significant
concessions on political demands or whether the former and current military leaders will continue
to assume that promoting economic development in the ethnic areas will be sufficient to resolve
the conflict.
When considering political reform in Burma today, it is important to keep in mind that many of
the armed ethnic resistance movements began during Burma’s democratic period from 1948-
1962. Thus, restoring democracy alone is an insufficient condition for guaranteeing peace. Most
of the armed ethnic resistance groups have been weakened in the last two decades, but together
the number of soldiers under their command is over 40,000, and many non-Burman citizens
identify with the causes for which they are fighting if not always the means.
If the government refuses to grant greater autonomy to the ethnic states, or if those groups
engaged in illicit businesses feel that new political and military arrangements will unduly threaten
their activities, they may become spoilers. The tatmadaw, or sections of it, also has the potential
to become a spoiler and disrupt the peace process by attacking the ethnic armed groups and
civilians in the ethnic states.
Other issues that could derail the peace process are a lack of agreement regarding the integration
of ethnic nationalist troops into the tatmadaw, conflicts over the control of natural resource
extraction and large scale economic development projects in the ethnic states, and tensions
between various non-state armed groups. Another worry is that the tatmadaw will continue to
commit widespread human rights abuses in the ethnic states, causing local populations to turn
against the peace process.
Nevertheless, people in Burma are increasingly realizing that the civil war must end for the
country to move forward politically and economically. Aung San Suu Kyi and other key players
in the pro-democracy movement have emphasized the urgent need for a political resolution to the
conflict.
For the peace process to be successful, several steps must be taken.
First, trust needs to be built between the ethnic armed groups, the government, and the tatmadaw.
The tatmadaw will need to implement accords made between government negotiators and the
ethnic armed groups in good faith. Then, there must be reasonably speedy progress toward
political talks at the central government level.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA vii
The ethnic armed groups must disavow secession in return for the institution of power-sharing
arrangements between various levels of government. As the political talks begin to tackle the
substantive issues, there should be guidance from advisors well-versed in federalism and
constitution-drafting so that a variety of viable options can be considered.
Pro-democracy politicians should also participate in the peace-making process to ensure that the
process is inclusive and to generate popular support for any agreement that is reached. Respected
civilian ethnic leaders should be given an opportunity to play a key role in the peace-making
process in order to help build trust and solve problems as they arise. In addition, civil society
organizations need to be brought into the process in order to ensure that the agreements that are
made are not viewed as merely representing the interests of elite players and that all important
issues are considered.
As soon as it is safe, all refugees and internally displaced people must be allowed to return home
where possible. Where not, they should be permitted to resettle, with financial support and
ideally, access to land, in areas where they feel secure. Demining must be carried out, so that
land in former conflict areas becomes habitable again.
A number of soldiers in the ethnic armies and the tatmadaw should be demobilized, while the
remaining members of the ethnic armies should be integrated into the tatmadaw. However, there
must be proper sequencing of political agreements and the demobilization/integration of military
forces. The ethnic armed groups need to know that their ethnic rights are guaranteed in the
constitution and will be implemented before they will agree to demobilize/integrate. However,
agreements could be made in advance, in which the ethnic armies pledge to demobilize/integrate
their troops when the specified conditions are met.
Finally, the ethnic minorities must see real benefits from the peace process. Along with greater
physical security, ethnic minorities want to be able to learn their languages and practice their
religions and cultures freely. A rapid expansion of health and education services and the creation
of economic opportunities for ordinary citizens in the ethnic states is also critical so that residents
of the former conflict areas do not feel they are being ignored or left behind yet again.
There seems to be a greater impetus to establish genuine peace today than there has been for
decades, but it will require great sensitivity, patience, and creativity.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BURMA 1
1. INTRODUCTION
Enabling a durable peace in the ethnic areas will be one of the most difficult challenges to
ensuring irreversible political reform in Burma. This is because of the distance in positions
between the tatmadaw (the national armed forces) and the armed ethnic resistance groups
regarding the devolution of power and the integration of ethnic resistance armies into the national
army. Complicating the issue further are the large number of resistance armies and militias with
varying agendas, the multitude of licit and illicit business interests in the ethnic states, and the
continuing threats to human security for civilians in areas where the tatmadaw and non-state
armed groups operate.
Although the Thein Sein government has engaged in a peace offensive since coming to office in
April 2011, it is not clear if the government and tatmadaw will be willing to make any significant
concessions on political demands or whether the former and current military leaders will continue
to assume that promoting language rights and economic development in the ethnic areas will be
sufficient to resolve the conflict.
When considering political reform in Burma today, it is important to keep in mind that many of
the armed ethnic resistance movements began during Burma’s democratic period from 1948-
1962. Thus, restoring democracy alone is an insufficient condition for guaranteeing peace. The
ethnic states comprise 60 percent of the territory of Burma, and the population that identifies
itself as belonging to an ethnic group other than Burman is more than one-third.1
Most of the
armed ethnic resistance groups have been weakened in the last two decades, but together the
number of soldiers under their command is over 40,000, and many non-Burman citizens identify
with the causes for which they are fighting if not always the means.2
While in some ways the ethnic nationalists and the majority Burman population have come closer
together, in other ways, the divide has widened. Few members of the ethnic nationalist armies
now talk about secession or independence, the issue that the tatmadaw and population at large has
been most worried about. However, the long years of civil war, during which the civilian
population in the conflict areas has been brutalized by the tatmadaw, has embittered many ethnic
minority residents in the ethnic states. As tatmadaw troops have moved into the ethnic states in
ever greater numbers, human rights abuses have been widespread and will likely continue as long
as the tatmadaw remains and is allowed to act with impunity.
Resource exploitation, privatization and the influx of foreign investment in the ethnic states are
bringing about new challenges as the military seeks to gain control of areas for both strategic and
economic benefit and Burman businessmen and workers have moved into former conflict areas.
In northern Burma, Chinese businessmen and workers have also arrived in great numbers. Land
confiscation for both military use and private enterprises is rife and the local populations are
resentful that they have lost their land benefitted little. Resolving all the issues in a way which a
multitude of stakeholders can accept will require great sensitivity, patience, and creativity.
1
Because no nationwide census has been carried out since 1935, the number of citizens identifying with
each ethnic group is not exactly known. Many people are also of mixed ethnicity.
2
The number of troops in each non-state army can only be estimated, as the various armies do not
regularly report their numbers and they cannot be independently verified.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Burma is a colonial creation and the mountainous areas that ring the plains were never under the
direct control of Burman kings in the past. The British divided the territory that now comprises
Burma into two areas: Ministerial Burma (or Burma Proper) and the Frontier Areas. Ministerial
Burma was ruled directly and included lowland areas where Burmans were the majority, lowland
areas with large Karen populations, and areas that today constitute Arakan and Mon State. The
mountainous Frontier Areas were ruled indirectly, with local princes and chiefs allowed to
continue to govern in return for loyalty to the Crown.
After World War II, the Burmese nationalist movement mounted strong resistance to a reassertion
of British rule. The British agreed to grant independence to Burma on the condition that the
nationalists could persuade the ethnic leaders to form a political union. Thus, General Aung San,
pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, organized a conference in the town of
Panglong, Shan State to discuss the idea of a union with representatives of the Chin, Kachin, and
Shan ethnic groups. General Aung San was able to win over many of the ethnic leaders with his
straight-forward manner and promise of equal rights. The Panglong Agreement was signed,
stating that a union would be formed with “full autonomy in internal administration for the
Frontier Areas.” Unfortunately, General Aung San was assassinated five months later, and other
Burman politicians did not follow through on General Aung San’s promises.
The Panglong Agreement formed the basis for the establishment of a federal constitution in 1947,
and some of the ethnic states were accorded the right to secede after 10 years if they were not
content with being part of the union. But the constitution in effect created a state in which the
balance of power was heavily tilted toward the central government. Many ethnic nationalist
leaders have attributed the ethnic crisis in Burma to the faulty constitution combined with
Burman chauvinism. Ethnic nationalist groups have continued to call for a new Panglong
Conference and a revival of the Panglong spirit. However, such demands were anethma to
previous military regimes which found fault with the 1947 constitution for their own reason:
because it legally allowed secession.
After independence was declared in January 1948, civil war broke out with both armed leftist
groups and ethnic groups fighting the government. The government had to divert much of its
attention and financial resources to reasserting control. In the first few years, large swathes of
central Burma were affected, but later, the armed groups were driven into the mountains, where
they had the advantage.
In 1962, General Ne Win seized power, claiming the country was on the verge of disintegration.
Prime Minister U Nu had permitted ethnic leaders to hold conferences on federalism, in which the
army was criticized and some speakers called for greater autonomy for the ethnic states. After
the coup, the 1947 constitution was abrogated, power centralized, and businesses nationalized.
Chinese and Indian business people were encouraged to leave. Meanwhile, the civil war
continued until the pro-democracy uprising in 1988 without any major breakthroughs. Ethnic
armed groups administered their own areas and generally sought to defend their territory rather
than stage attacks in government-controlled areas.
In 1988, large numbers of ethnic minority civilians participated together with Burmans in the pro-
democracy movement. Numerous ethnic-based political parties formed and campaigned for
democracy and ethnic rights, but the ethnic armed groups did not get involved. Some ethnic
leaders felt that it was really a Burman affair, so there was no reason to join in; others worried

that their involvement could harm the pro-democracy cause by creating a justification for the
tatmadaw to attack the movement.
After the regime refused to cede power, ethnic political parties and a number of elected MPs from
the National League for Democracy (a party founded by Aung San Suu Kyi in 1988 with former
military officers disaffected with military rule and leftist intellectuals, which won the 1990
elections by a landslide) continued to call for a restoration of democracy and ended up in prison
or had to flee the country. In September 1988, the head of military intelligence, Lt. General Khin
Nyunt, began reaching out to ethnic armed organizations to make ceasefires. With the
government beginning to allow private enterprise and foreign investment in the country, ceasefire
groups were also permitted to engage in business and make deals with foreign companies
(particularly from China).
Between 1989 and 1995, 17 ceasefire agreements, or military truces, were concluded, but the
regime refused to move on to a discussion of political rights, claiming that they were merely a
transitional government. As a result, ceasefire groups and the populations in their areas lived in a
state of limbo which was far better than war but not genuine peace either. Although the worst
human rights abuses came to an end, many of the displaced could return home, and some
economic development took place, the tatmadaw’s goal was to weaken the ethnic armed groups
rather than to address their demands. They hoped that as members of the armed groups became
involved in business enterprises, their will to fight would diminish, the armed organizations
would become divided, and they would ultimately have to accept living in a centralized, unified
state in which the tatmadaw had sovereignty over the entire country.
Throughout the period of military rule, successive regimes promoted Burmanization, by
inhibiting the teaching of non-Burman languages and frequently placing restrictions on the
promotion of non-Buddhist faiths while encouraging the spread of Buddhism. Although these
policies were not implemented consistently, ethnic minorities felt that their languages and
cultures were not respected and that they were discriminated against in the education system as
well as in hiring and promotions in the civil service and the military.
3. KEY ARMED ETHNIC GROUPS
Dozens of armed ethnic groups in Burma have been able to establish themselves and survive, due
to the availability of weapons, the protection afforded by mountainous terrain, and the
opportunities for income generation through taxation (of border trade and of local populations),
drug trafficking, and the sale of natural resources. To simplify a very complicated picture, the
armed ethnic resistance groups can be broadly divided into three categories: armed groups with
ethnic nationalist agendas, armed groups with territorial demands and significant business
interests, and smaller armed groups which the regime treats as militias or border guard forces.3
I will discuss each category in turn, with descriptions of the key armed groups in the first two
categories. Most groups have nominally separate political and armed wings, with different names
3
For more information on ethnic grievances, the various non-state armed groups, and the challenges with
the ceasefires to date see: International Crisis Group, Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, Brussels,
November 2011; Tom Kramer, Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle? – Prospects for Ethnic Peace, Transnational
Institute, the Netherlands, February 2012, and Paul Keenan, An Uneasy Peace: The Problems of Conflict
During the Peace Process in Burma, Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies, Thailand, February 2012.

for each. However, some are known primarily by one name or the other, as indicated in bold
below.
Armed groups with ethnic nationalist agendas. All of these organizations see themselves
as representing ethnic populations which have deeply-felt grievances against the government and
the tatmadaw. The larger armed groups have been fighting for over four decades and have armies
that currently range in size from a couple of thousand to several thousand troops. They have also
established administrative departments running health, education, forestry, agriculture, and other
programs in territories under their control. Most are based in eastern Burma and have funded
themselves through the sale of natural resources and the taxation of border trade with neighboring
countries. However, groups in Shan State and Kachin State have relied on income from the drug
trade as well. The ethnic nationalist groups have formed a number of military and political
alliances over the years. Their common demand is for a genuine federal union.
• The Karen National Union (KNU), and its military wing, the Karen National
Liberation Army (KNLA), was the first ethnic nationalist group to take up arms and has
engaged in armed struggle since 1949. The KNU originally demanded the creation of a
Karen state that would encompass parts of central Burma where most Karen reside.
However, since large numbers of Burmans and others also lived in these areas, the central
government was categorically opposed. The leadership of the KNU is primarily
Christian, and the organization was weakened in the mid 1990s when a large number of
Buddhist Karen soldiers broke away to form the Democratic Buddhist Karen Army,
with the encouragement of the tatmadaw. The KNU is based along the Thai-Burma
border in Karen State but also operates farther inland and farther south. They never
agreed to a ceasefire until 2012.
• The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and its military wing, the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA), were founded in 1961 after the government announced its
intention to make Buddhism the state religion. Most Kachin are Christian, and they
feared religious intolerance. They were also frustrated with the central government’s lack
of attention to development in their areas. In 1994, they broke with the alliance of ethnic
nationalist armed groups to make a separate ceasefire, with the hope that they could
achieve their objectives through participation in the national constitution drafting process.
However, the regime refused to consider any of their demands. In 2009, the KIO was
ordered to transform into a border guard force but refused. The tatmadaw broke the
ceasefire in June 2011 and fighting has continued ever since. They operate in Kachin
State and northwest Shan State.
• The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) has been the most steadfast in calling
for independence, due to a treaty between the British and Burman king in the 1850s
which recognized the Karenni hills as independent. The 1947 constitution also granted
Karenni State the right to secede after 10 years. However, the army is small and has been
weakened by splits, and Karenni State is remote and poor, so most leaders recognize that
independence is not viable.
• The New Mon State Party is a relatively small group that has focused on ethnic rights
and Mon-language education. Under pressure from the Thai military and their own
population, they made a ceasefire with the regime in 1995 but continued to maintain
relations with non-ceasefire groups. In 2011 and early 2012, they tried to hold out for
nationwide ceasefire talks, but finally agreed to negotiate separately after other groups
had done so.

• The Shan State Army-South (SSA-South) and its political wing, the Restoration
Council of Shan State (which is less well known than the army) uses the term “south” to
distinguish itself from the Shan State Army-North. The SSA-South was formed by Shan
fighters in a previous Shan army (the Mong Tai Army) after the head of that army, a drug
dealer named Khun Sa, surrendered to the government in 1996. Since then, the Shan
State Army-South has tried to clear its name as a drug army while also maintaining
informal links with the Shan State Army-North.
• The Shan State Army-North, and its political wing, the Shan State Progressive Party,
are based in central and northern Shan State and made a ceasefire agreement with the
military regime in 1989. Some battalions of the Shan State Army-North refused to
transform themselves into border guard forces in 2009, and they were attacked by the
tatmadaw in March 2011. Although a ceasefire agreement was made in late 2011,
fighting has continued to break out.
• The Chin National Front is a small armed organization with a few hundred soldiers
formed after the military seized power again following the 1988 pro-democracy
demonstrations. It is based in western Burma, bordering India, and made a ceasefire for
the first time in late 2011.
Armed groups with territorial demands and a mix of licit and illicit business interests.
There are three allied armed groups based in northern Shan State along the China border which
split off from the Communist Party of Burma after a mutiny in 1989. All three were quick to
make ceasefires with the military regime in 1989. Originally engaged in opium production and
heroin trafficking, they came under heavy pressure from China to stop the cultivation of opium
and have largely done so. Chinese businessmen, with Chinese government subsidies, have
established extensive rubber, tea, and fruit plantations in these areas, resulting in widespread
displacement of the civilian population.4
After opium production moved to other areas of Shan
State, the three organizations have continued to be involved in heroin trafficking and have also
engaged in the production and trafficking of amphetamine type stimulants to neighboring
countries, particularly Thailand.5
At the same time, they have established a range of legal
businesses in central Burma, including in the banking and transport sectors, which has enabled
them to launder their drug money. All three have mixed leaderships including ethnic Chinese
from China. The ethnic nationalist organizations have not had close relations with them. All
three refused to transform into border guard forces in 2009.
• The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the political wing, the United Wa State
Party (UWSP) is the largest of the armed groups, with an estimated 15,000-20,000
soldiers.6
The tatmadaw allowed the UWSA to move down into Southern Shan State in
return for assistance in fighting Khun Sa’s Mong Tai (Shan) Army. After establishing
military positions, the UWSA moved between 50,000-100,000 villagers down into this
4
Tom Kramer and Kevin Woods, Financing Dispossession: China’s Opium Substitution Programme in Northern
Burma, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, February 2012.
5
See Phil Thornton, “Myanmar’s Rising Drug Trade,” Bangkok Post. February 12, 2012. and Joshua
Kurlantzick, “As Burma reforms, its narcotics trade might be worsening,” The Atlantic, February 18, 2012.
Both argue that the 1989 ceasefires facilitated the spread of drug trafficking in Shan State and that the
tatmadaw is also extensively involved.
6
Tom Kramer, The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party, East-West Center:
Washington D.C., 2007, p. 45.

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