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1
DDoS Threat
Landscape
Challenges Faced by Network Operators
2
WISR 2016 Survey Highlights
•  The Arbor Networks’ eleventh annual Worldwide Infrastructure
Security Report (WISR) is released in Jan.
•  Incident Response times are improving, as are investments in
technology to speed up the process.
•  Advanced threats are top concern for enterprise organizations
–  Loss of personal information and/or disruption of business processes
perceived as top business risks from advanced threat.
•  Largest reported attack jumps to 500Gbps
–  Over 60X increase from 8Gbps eleven years ago!
•  Application-layer attacks monitored by nearly all service providers
–  56 percent saw multi-vector attacks, up from 42 percent last year.
•  Existing infrastructure, such as firewall and IPS devices, continue to
be targeted by DDoS attacks
–  Over half of enterprises report these devices failing as a result of a DDoS
attack - up significantly from one third last year
•  Data center operators continue to struggle with the rise in
volumetric attacks
–  Over half of data center operators saw DDoS attacks which exhausted their
Internet bandwidth - up from 33 percent last year
3
Survey Demographics
•  Respondents represent 354 network operators from around the
world - up from 287 last year
•  Nearly half represent Enterprise, Government, and Education
(EGE)
•  United States and Canada lead regional participation, Europe a
close second
•  APAC, LATAM, Middle East and Africa about one-third
4
DDoS – Complexity Increases
•  Media focuses volumetric attacks but more stealthy application-layer attacks
haven’t gone away
–  93% of respondents see application layer attacks, up from 90 percent last year and 86
percent in 2013.
•  DNS is now top application layer target, over-taking HTTP
–  Strong growth in respondents seeing attacks targeting SIP / VoIP services, up from 9% to
19%
•  Significant increase in multi-vector attacks, up to 56 percent from 42 percent
last year
5
DDoS - Business Impact
•  Operational expenses
top business impact
•  1/3 of Data Centers
operators see revenue
loss
•  36% of EGE see
reputation / brand
damage.
•  Over half had Firewall/
IPS device fail or
contribute to outage
during a DDoS attack
6
DDoS - Targets
•  Service providers see their customers as the top target for DDoS attacks.
•  Finance, government and hosting are the top targeted business verticals.
–  E-commerce moves down to third place.
•  Continued growth in attacks targeting cloud services
–  33% of respondents see attacks, up from 29% last year and 19% in 2013
•  Big increase in proportion of respondents seeing attacks against IPv6
services
–  9%, from 2% last year
7
DDoS - Motivations
•  Top perceived motivations include ‘criminals demonstrating
attack capabilities’ and ‘criminal extortion attempts’
•  DDoS attacks being used as a distraction for either malware
infiltration or data exfiltration on the rise
8
DDoS - Attack Frequency
•  44% of service provider respondents
have seen more than 21 attacks/month,
up from 38% last year
•  28% of EGE respondents indicated they
suffered more than 10 attacks per month
•  9% of data center operators seeing in >
50 attacks/month – none at this level last
year
9
DDoS - Growth Continues
•  Largest attack reported was 500 Gbps with other respondents
reporting attacks of 450 Gbps, 425 Gbps, and 337 Gbps.
•  Another five respondents reported 200+ Gbps attacks.
•  Nearly one quarter of respondents reports peak attacks over
100Gbps
•  Over half of EGE and Data-Centre respondents (respectively) saw
attacks that completely saturated their Internet connectivity
10
DDoS – Reflection Amplification
•  Reflection amplification attacks are still a key issue.
–  WISR respondents see DNS as most common protocol, closely followed
by NTP.
–  Significant use of SSDP, SNMP and Chargen also reported.
11
DDoS Growth, ATLAS Perspective
•  Peak monitored, verified attack at 334Gbps
•  223 attacks over 100Gbps monitored, 16 of those over 200Gbps
–  2013 saw 39 attacks over 100Gbps, 159 seen in 2014
•  Upward trend in 2-50 Gbps attack frequency throughout 2015
•  However, 84% of events still less than 1Gbps in size
12
Attack Frequency, ATLAS Perspective
•  Upward trend in
frequency for 2-50 Gbps
throughout the year
•  No specific pattern/trend
for larger attacks,
probably related to
specific attack campaigns
or bad actor groups
13
Attack duration & Target ports – ATLAS
Perspective
•  91% of events lasted less than one hour
•  Average attack duration was ~ 58
minutes
•  Similar to last year
•  Top target service was again HTTP (port
80)
•  Port 3074 (Xbox) & port 25565
(Minecraft) among the top 10 targets
14
Reflection Amplification Attacks, ATLAS
Perspective
•  Reflection Amplification DDoS activities continuous increase in size and
frequency
•  Largest reflection amplification attack tracked in 2015 was an SSDP
reflection attack at 252.64 Gbps
•  Average size of reflection amplification attacks was around 1.97 Gbps,
significantly above the more general average attack size.
15
Reflection Amplification Attacks – ATLAS
Perspective
•  NTP, SSDP and DNS are most commonly used protocols
•  More than 50K SSDP attacks tracked per month in Q1
•  More than 55K NTP attacks in Sept / Oct ’15
•  Increase in the average size of attacks utilizing Chargen, SSDP and DNS
16
APAC DDoS attacks summary
334.2	
  
94.1	
  
62.8	
  
133	
  
146.5	
  
144.9	
  
110.8	
  
138.8	
  
62.2	
  
111.4	
  
133.4	
  
233.7	
  
0	
  
50	
  
100	
  
150	
  
200	
  
250	
  
300	
  
350	
  
400	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
APAC	
  2015	
  Peak	
  a,ack	
  size	
  (Gbps)	
  
Q1	
  14	
   Q2	
  14	
   Q3	
  14	
   Q4	
  14	
   Q1	
  15	
   Q2	
  15	
   Q3	
  15	
   Q4	
  15	
  
235Gbps/
63Mpps	
  to	
  
India,	
  NTP	
  
reflecMon	
  
aNack,	
  21	
  
min	
  23	
  sec	
  
127Gbps/
34Mpps	
  to	
  
Malaysia	
  ,	
  
NTP	
  
reflecMon	
  
aNack,	
  29	
  
min	
  
99Gbps/
26Mpps	
  to	
  
India,	
  NTP	
  
reflecMon	
  
aNack,	
  31	
  
min	
  
117Gbps/
31Mpps	
  to	
  
India,	
  NTP	
  
reflecMon	
  
aNack,	
  15	
  
min	
  37	
  sec	
  
334.22Gbps
/29.13Mpps	
  
to	
  India,	
  
reflecMon	
  
aNack,	
  6	
  
min	
  45	
  sec	
  
146.5Gbps/
12.5Mpps	
  to	
  
Korea,	
  UDP	
  
flooding	
  
aNack,	
  9	
  min	
  
26	
  sec	
  
139Gbps	
  /	
  
12.2Mpps	
  to	
  
Laos,	
  mixed	
  
reflecMon	
  
aNacks,	
  1	
  hr	
  
39	
  min	
  
233Gbps	
  /	
  
66.4Mpps	
  to	
  
Korea,	
  NTP	
  
reflecMon	
  
aNack,	
  28	
  
min	
  39	
  sec	
  	
  
17
APAC DDoS attacks summary
558.8	
  
480	
   479.1	
  
562.8	
  
576.9	
  
656.5	
  
534	
  
479.5	
  
684.4	
  
1050	
  
695.8	
  
572.7	
  
0	
  
200	
  
400	
  
600	
  
800	
  
1000	
  
1200	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
APAC	
  2015	
  mean	
  a,ack	
  sizes	
  (Mbps)	
  
177072	
  
128800	
  
121406	
  
141618	
  
100165	
  
115677	
  
121758	
  
130906	
   127236	
  
161377	
  
116056	
  
154141	
  
0	
  
20000	
  
40000	
  
60000	
  
80000	
  
100000	
  
120000	
  
140000	
  
160000	
  
180000	
  
200000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
APAC	
  2015	
  no	
  of	
  DDoS	
  a,acks	
  
18
APAC DDoS attacks summary
2336	
  
3568	
  
3242	
  
2985	
  
2660	
  
2374	
   2359	
   2190	
  
2395	
  
2164	
  
2864	
   2859	
  
0	
  
500	
  
1000	
  
1500	
  
2000	
  
2500	
  
3000	
  
3500	
  
4000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
APAC	
  2015	
  a,acks	
  duraCon	
  (sec)	
  
35.63%	
  
21.2%	
  
12.4%	
  
9.5%	
  
6.7%	
  
2.7%	
  
2.1%	
  
2.0%	
  
1.9%	
  
1.3%	
  
CN	
  
KR	
  
MY	
  
AU	
  
HK	
  
NZ	
  
TH	
  
LA	
  
TW	
  
IN	
  
0	
   5	
   10	
   15	
   20	
   25	
   30	
   35	
   40	
  
APAC	
  2015	
  Top	
  10	
  DDoS	
  target	
  countries	
  
19
APAC Reflection Amplification attacks
•  NTP reflection attacks spike in Jan & Oct, > 14,000 attacks
•  NTP reflection attacks most seen in APAC
•  SSDP reflection attacks drop from Aug, and DNS reflection attacks increase
•  Attackers vary the attack pattern
0	
  
2000	
  
4000	
  
6000	
  
8000	
  
10000	
  
12000	
  
14000	
  
16000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,ack	
  by	
  Protocol	
  over	
  Cme	
  
MSSQL	
   Chargen	
   DNS	
   NTP	
   Portmap	
   SNMP	
   SSDP	
  
20
APAC Reflection Amplification attacks
Jan	
   Feb	
  	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
Peak	
  (Gbps)	
   71.4	
   47	
   44.7	
   65.8	
   120.3	
   144.9	
   60.8	
   138.8	
   62.2	
   66.2	
   59.9	
   233.7	
  
Types	
   NTP	
   NTP	
   DNS	
   NTP	
   DNS	
   SSDP	
   NTP	
   DNS	
   DNS	
   NTP	
   NTP	
   NTP	
  
0.00	
  
50000.00	
  
100000.00	
  
150000.00	
  
200000.00	
  
250000.00	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,acks	
  by	
  Protocol,	
  Peak	
  Mbps	
  over	
  Cme	
  	
  
MSSQL	
   Chargen	
   DNS	
   NTP	
   Portmap	
   SNMP	
   SSDP	
  
21
APAC Reflection Amplification attacks
•  Average attack size over 1 Gbps
•  Average attack size of all types of DDoS attacks (APAC) : ~ 500-600 Mbps
0	
  
500	
  
1000	
  
1500	
  
2000	
  
2500	
  
3000	
  
3500	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,ack	
  by	
  Protocol,	
  mean	
  Mbps	
  over	
  Cme	
  
MSSQL	
   Chargen	
   DNS	
   NTP	
   Portmap	
   SNMP	
   SSDP	
  
22
NZ 2015 – DDoS attacks summary
16.18	
  
10.76	
  
26.21	
  
28.16	
  
9.22	
  
16.69	
  
47.87	
  
35.25	
  
38.13	
  
50.16	
  
51.22	
  
53.19	
  
0	
  
10	
  
20	
  
30	
  
40	
  
50	
  
60	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
NZ	
  2015	
  DDoS	
  peak	
  a,ack	
  size,	
  Gbps	
  
NZ	
   APAC	
  	
  
Peak	
  a,ack	
  size	
   53.19	
  Gbps	
   334.22	
  Gbps	
  
Average	
  a,ack	
  size	
   1.61	
  Gbps	
   617.53	
  Mbps	
  
Average	
  duraCon	
   20	
  min	
  58	
  sec	
   44	
  min	
  11	
  sec	
  
A,ack	
  dest	
  port	
   Port	
  80	
   Port	
  80	
  
Top	
  reflecCon	
  a,ack	
  type	
   NTP	
   NTP	
  
23
NZ 2015 – DDoS attacks summary
439.12	
   414.32	
  
354.02	
  
601.33	
  
956.85	
  
1408	
  
1828	
  
2329	
  
2616	
  
2153	
  
1764	
  
2490	
  
0	
  
500	
  
1000	
  
1500	
  
2000	
  
2500	
  
3000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
NZ	
  2015	
  DDoS	
  average	
  a,ack	
  size,	
  Mbps	
  
3912	
  
3568	
  
2293	
   2156	
  
1694	
  
3254	
  
4725	
  
4305	
  
5084	
  
5998	
  
4985	
  
2576	
  
0	
  
1000	
  
2000	
  
3000	
  
4000	
  
5000	
  
6000	
  
7000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
NZ	
  2015	
  no	
  of	
  DDoS	
  a,acks	
  	
  	
  
24
NZ 2015 - Reflection attacks
0	
  
200	
  
400	
  
600	
  
800	
  
1000	
  
1200	
  
1400	
  
1600	
  
1800	
  
2000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,ck	
  over	
  Cme,	
  by	
  Protocol	
  
NTP	
   DNS	
   SSDP	
   Chargen	
   Portmap	
   SNMP	
  
25
NZ 2015 - Reflection attacks
0	
  
10000	
  
20000	
  
30000	
  
40000	
  
50000	
  
60000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,ack	
  by	
  Protocol,	
  max	
  Mbps	
  over	
  Cme	
  
NTP	
   SSDP	
   DNS	
   Portmap	
   SNMP	
   Chargen	
  
0	
  
1000	
  
2000	
  
3000	
  
4000	
  
5000	
  
6000	
  
7000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,acks	
  by	
  Protocol,	
  mean	
  Mbps	
  over	
  Cme	
  	
  
NTP	
   SSDP	
   DNS	
   Chargen	
   SNMP	
   Portmap	
  
26
AU 2015 – DDoS attacks summary
51.77	
  
74.12	
  
33.7	
  
136.91	
  
20.76	
  
39.55	
  
33.12	
  
31.03	
  
27.4	
  
111.4	
  
35.6	
  
39.3	
  
0	
  
20	
  
40	
  
60	
  
80	
  
100	
  
120	
  
140	
  
160	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
AU	
  2015	
  DDoS	
  peak	
  a,ack	
  size,	
  Gbps	
  
AU	
   APAC	
  	
  
Peak	
  a,ack	
  size	
   136.91	
  Gbps	
   334.22	
  Gbps	
  
Average	
  a,ack	
  size	
   1.16	
  Gbps	
   617.53	
  Mbps	
  
Average	
  duraCon	
   40	
  min	
  57	
  sec	
   44	
  min	
  11	
  sec	
  
A,ack	
  dest	
  port	
   Port	
  80	
   Port	
  80	
  
Top	
  reflecCon	
  a,ack	
  type	
   SSDP	
   NTP	
  
27
AU 2015 – DDoS attacks summary
1226	
   1127	
  
833.6	
  
1471	
  
1224	
  
1427	
  
1165	
  
917.1	
  
601.6	
  
1428	
  
1112	
  
1096	
  
0	
  
500	
  
1000	
  
1500	
  
2000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
AU	
  2015	
  DDoS	
  average	
  a,ack	
  size,	
  Mbps	
  
12336	
  
10486	
  
12905	
   13189	
  
11085	
  
13330	
  
10085	
  
7690	
  
10432	
  
18679	
  
17250	
  
15850	
  
0	
  
2000	
  
4000	
  
6000	
  
8000	
  
10000	
  
12000	
  
14000	
  
16000	
  
18000	
  
20000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
AU	
  2015	
  no	
  of	
  DDoS	
  a,acks	
  	
  
28
AU 2015 - Reflection attacks
0	
  
500	
  
1000	
  
1500	
  
2000	
  
2500	
  
3000	
  
3500	
  
4000	
  
4500	
  
5000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,ack	
  over	
  Cme,	
  by	
  Protocol	
  
NTP	
   DNS	
   SSDP	
   Chargen	
   Portmap	
   SNMP	
   MSSQL	
  
29
AU 2015 - Reflection attacks
0	
  
1000	
  
2000	
  
3000	
  
4000	
  
5000	
  
6000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,ack	
  by	
  Protocol,	
  mean	
  Mbps	
  over	
  Cme	
  
NTP	
   SSDP	
   DNS	
   Chargen	
   SNMP	
   Portmap	
   MSSQL	
  
0	
  
10000	
  
20000	
  
30000	
  
40000	
  
50000	
  
60000	
  
Jan	
   Feb	
   Mar	
   Apr	
   May	
   Jun	
   Jul	
   Aug	
   Sep	
   Oct	
   Nov	
   Dec	
  
ReflecCon	
  a,ack	
  by	
  Protocol,	
  max	
  Mbps	
  over	
  Cme	
  
NTP	
   SSDP	
   DNS	
   Portmap	
   SNMP	
   Chargen	
   MSSQL	
  
30
Threats Detection Tool
0.0	
   10.0	
   20.0	
   30.0	
   40.0	
   50.0	
   60.0	
   70.0	
   80.0	
   90.0	
  
Flow-­‐based	
  analyzers	
  
Firewall	
  logs	
  
SNMP-­‐based	
  tools	
  
IDS/IPS	
  
Performance	
  Mgmt	
  system	
  
Helpdesk	
  Ticket	
  
In-­‐house	
  scripts/tools	
  
IDMS	
  
SIEM	
  
Other	
  
Tools	
  to	
  detect	
  Threats	
  
•  Netflow analyzers are the most commonly used tools
•  Netflow analyzers also the most effective way to detect threat
•  Firewall logs are 2nd in terms of deployment, but only ranked 6th in
terms of effectiveness
31
Organizational Security Practices
•  Implementation of anti-spoofing filters among service provider
respondents is up to 44 percent this year, from 37 percent last year
–  Progress, but still less than half.
•  Practice makes perfect
–  31 percent of service providers (up from 21%) and 24% of EGE respondents
now run DDoS incident rehearsals at least on a quarterly basis
•  The proportion of service providers monitoring for route hijacks has
also increased, up to 54 percent this year from 40 percent last year.
32
Outbound DDoS & Anti-Spoofing
•  41% of SP respondents do not detect
outbound DDoS
•  More than 80% of Data Centre
Operator respondents plan to
deploy anti-spoofing filters
33
Security Practices
•  46% of SP respondents carry out DDoS
defense simulation, up from 34% (2014)
•  31% on a quarterly basis
•  “Not enough time” being the major
reason for not participating
•  20% of respondents not in OPSEC
groups because of “Legal concern”
•  Sharing data within closed communities
is highly effective for security purpose
34
Industry Best Current Practices (BCPs)
•  BCPs are industry best practices for locking down a
network
•  Deploy these as policy to limit the exposure of your
network
–  Separation of control plane from data plane
–  Interface ACLs (iACLs)
–  Source based remote triggered blackhole S/RTBH
–  Destination based remote triggered blackhole D/RTBH
–  Flowspec
–  Deploy antispoofing at all network edges.
•  uRPF Loose-Mode at the peering edge
•  uRPF Strict Mode at customer aggregation edge
•  DHCP Snooping and IP Source Verify at LAN access edge
DDoS Threat Landscape - Challenges faced by Network Operators

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DDoS Threat Landscape - Challenges faced by Network Operators

  • 2. 2 WISR 2016 Survey Highlights •  The Arbor Networks’ eleventh annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report (WISR) is released in Jan. •  Incident Response times are improving, as are investments in technology to speed up the process. •  Advanced threats are top concern for enterprise organizations –  Loss of personal information and/or disruption of business processes perceived as top business risks from advanced threat. •  Largest reported attack jumps to 500Gbps –  Over 60X increase from 8Gbps eleven years ago! •  Application-layer attacks monitored by nearly all service providers –  56 percent saw multi-vector attacks, up from 42 percent last year. •  Existing infrastructure, such as firewall and IPS devices, continue to be targeted by DDoS attacks –  Over half of enterprises report these devices failing as a result of a DDoS attack - up significantly from one third last year •  Data center operators continue to struggle with the rise in volumetric attacks –  Over half of data center operators saw DDoS attacks which exhausted their Internet bandwidth - up from 33 percent last year
  • 3. 3 Survey Demographics •  Respondents represent 354 network operators from around the world - up from 287 last year •  Nearly half represent Enterprise, Government, and Education (EGE) •  United States and Canada lead regional participation, Europe a close second •  APAC, LATAM, Middle East and Africa about one-third
  • 4. 4 DDoS – Complexity Increases •  Media focuses volumetric attacks but more stealthy application-layer attacks haven’t gone away –  93% of respondents see application layer attacks, up from 90 percent last year and 86 percent in 2013. •  DNS is now top application layer target, over-taking HTTP –  Strong growth in respondents seeing attacks targeting SIP / VoIP services, up from 9% to 19% •  Significant increase in multi-vector attacks, up to 56 percent from 42 percent last year
  • 5. 5 DDoS - Business Impact •  Operational expenses top business impact •  1/3 of Data Centers operators see revenue loss •  36% of EGE see reputation / brand damage. •  Over half had Firewall/ IPS device fail or contribute to outage during a DDoS attack
  • 6. 6 DDoS - Targets •  Service providers see their customers as the top target for DDoS attacks. •  Finance, government and hosting are the top targeted business verticals. –  E-commerce moves down to third place. •  Continued growth in attacks targeting cloud services –  33% of respondents see attacks, up from 29% last year and 19% in 2013 •  Big increase in proportion of respondents seeing attacks against IPv6 services –  9%, from 2% last year
  • 7. 7 DDoS - Motivations •  Top perceived motivations include ‘criminals demonstrating attack capabilities’ and ‘criminal extortion attempts’ •  DDoS attacks being used as a distraction for either malware infiltration or data exfiltration on the rise
  • 8. 8 DDoS - Attack Frequency •  44% of service provider respondents have seen more than 21 attacks/month, up from 38% last year •  28% of EGE respondents indicated they suffered more than 10 attacks per month •  9% of data center operators seeing in > 50 attacks/month – none at this level last year
  • 9. 9 DDoS - Growth Continues •  Largest attack reported was 500 Gbps with other respondents reporting attacks of 450 Gbps, 425 Gbps, and 337 Gbps. •  Another five respondents reported 200+ Gbps attacks. •  Nearly one quarter of respondents reports peak attacks over 100Gbps •  Over half of EGE and Data-Centre respondents (respectively) saw attacks that completely saturated their Internet connectivity
  • 10. 10 DDoS – Reflection Amplification •  Reflection amplification attacks are still a key issue. –  WISR respondents see DNS as most common protocol, closely followed by NTP. –  Significant use of SSDP, SNMP and Chargen also reported.
  • 11. 11 DDoS Growth, ATLAS Perspective •  Peak monitored, verified attack at 334Gbps •  223 attacks over 100Gbps monitored, 16 of those over 200Gbps –  2013 saw 39 attacks over 100Gbps, 159 seen in 2014 •  Upward trend in 2-50 Gbps attack frequency throughout 2015 •  However, 84% of events still less than 1Gbps in size
  • 12. 12 Attack Frequency, ATLAS Perspective •  Upward trend in frequency for 2-50 Gbps throughout the year •  No specific pattern/trend for larger attacks, probably related to specific attack campaigns or bad actor groups
  • 13. 13 Attack duration & Target ports – ATLAS Perspective •  91% of events lasted less than one hour •  Average attack duration was ~ 58 minutes •  Similar to last year •  Top target service was again HTTP (port 80) •  Port 3074 (Xbox) & port 25565 (Minecraft) among the top 10 targets
  • 14. 14 Reflection Amplification Attacks, ATLAS Perspective •  Reflection Amplification DDoS activities continuous increase in size and frequency •  Largest reflection amplification attack tracked in 2015 was an SSDP reflection attack at 252.64 Gbps •  Average size of reflection amplification attacks was around 1.97 Gbps, significantly above the more general average attack size.
  • 15. 15 Reflection Amplification Attacks – ATLAS Perspective •  NTP, SSDP and DNS are most commonly used protocols •  More than 50K SSDP attacks tracked per month in Q1 •  More than 55K NTP attacks in Sept / Oct ’15 •  Increase in the average size of attacks utilizing Chargen, SSDP and DNS
  • 16. 16 APAC DDoS attacks summary 334.2   94.1   62.8   133   146.5   144.9   110.8   138.8   62.2   111.4   133.4   233.7   0   50   100   150   200   250   300   350   400   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   APAC  2015  Peak  a,ack  size  (Gbps)   Q1  14   Q2  14   Q3  14   Q4  14   Q1  15   Q2  15   Q3  15   Q4  15   235Gbps/ 63Mpps  to   India,  NTP   reflecMon   aNack,  21   min  23  sec   127Gbps/ 34Mpps  to   Malaysia  ,   NTP   reflecMon   aNack,  29   min   99Gbps/ 26Mpps  to   India,  NTP   reflecMon   aNack,  31   min   117Gbps/ 31Mpps  to   India,  NTP   reflecMon   aNack,  15   min  37  sec   334.22Gbps /29.13Mpps   to  India,   reflecMon   aNack,  6   min  45  sec   146.5Gbps/ 12.5Mpps  to   Korea,  UDP   flooding   aNack,  9  min   26  sec   139Gbps  /   12.2Mpps  to   Laos,  mixed   reflecMon   aNacks,  1  hr   39  min   233Gbps  /   66.4Mpps  to   Korea,  NTP   reflecMon   aNack,  28   min  39  sec    
  • 17. 17 APAC DDoS attacks summary 558.8   480   479.1   562.8   576.9   656.5   534   479.5   684.4   1050   695.8   572.7   0   200   400   600   800   1000   1200   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   APAC  2015  mean  a,ack  sizes  (Mbps)   177072   128800   121406   141618   100165   115677   121758   130906   127236   161377   116056   154141   0   20000   40000   60000   80000   100000   120000   140000   160000   180000   200000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   APAC  2015  no  of  DDoS  a,acks  
  • 18. 18 APAC DDoS attacks summary 2336   3568   3242   2985   2660   2374   2359   2190   2395   2164   2864   2859   0   500   1000   1500   2000   2500   3000   3500   4000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   APAC  2015  a,acks  duraCon  (sec)   35.63%   21.2%   12.4%   9.5%   6.7%   2.7%   2.1%   2.0%   1.9%   1.3%   CN   KR   MY   AU   HK   NZ   TH   LA   TW   IN   0   5   10   15   20   25   30   35   40   APAC  2015  Top  10  DDoS  target  countries  
  • 19. 19 APAC Reflection Amplification attacks •  NTP reflection attacks spike in Jan & Oct, > 14,000 attacks •  NTP reflection attacks most seen in APAC •  SSDP reflection attacks drop from Aug, and DNS reflection attacks increase •  Attackers vary the attack pattern 0   2000   4000   6000   8000   10000   12000   14000   16000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,ack  by  Protocol  over  Cme   MSSQL   Chargen   DNS   NTP   Portmap   SNMP   SSDP  
  • 20. 20 APAC Reflection Amplification attacks Jan   Feb     Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   Peak  (Gbps)   71.4   47   44.7   65.8   120.3   144.9   60.8   138.8   62.2   66.2   59.9   233.7   Types   NTP   NTP   DNS   NTP   DNS   SSDP   NTP   DNS   DNS   NTP   NTP   NTP   0.00   50000.00   100000.00   150000.00   200000.00   250000.00   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,acks  by  Protocol,  Peak  Mbps  over  Cme     MSSQL   Chargen   DNS   NTP   Portmap   SNMP   SSDP  
  • 21. 21 APAC Reflection Amplification attacks •  Average attack size over 1 Gbps •  Average attack size of all types of DDoS attacks (APAC) : ~ 500-600 Mbps 0   500   1000   1500   2000   2500   3000   3500   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,ack  by  Protocol,  mean  Mbps  over  Cme   MSSQL   Chargen   DNS   NTP   Portmap   SNMP   SSDP  
  • 22. 22 NZ 2015 – DDoS attacks summary 16.18   10.76   26.21   28.16   9.22   16.69   47.87   35.25   38.13   50.16   51.22   53.19   0   10   20   30   40   50   60   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   NZ  2015  DDoS  peak  a,ack  size,  Gbps   NZ   APAC     Peak  a,ack  size   53.19  Gbps   334.22  Gbps   Average  a,ack  size   1.61  Gbps   617.53  Mbps   Average  duraCon   20  min  58  sec   44  min  11  sec   A,ack  dest  port   Port  80   Port  80   Top  reflecCon  a,ack  type   NTP   NTP  
  • 23. 23 NZ 2015 – DDoS attacks summary 439.12   414.32   354.02   601.33   956.85   1408   1828   2329   2616   2153   1764   2490   0   500   1000   1500   2000   2500   3000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   NZ  2015  DDoS  average  a,ack  size,  Mbps   3912   3568   2293   2156   1694   3254   4725   4305   5084   5998   4985   2576   0   1000   2000   3000   4000   5000   6000   7000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   NZ  2015  no  of  DDoS  a,acks      
  • 24. 24 NZ 2015 - Reflection attacks 0   200   400   600   800   1000   1200   1400   1600   1800   2000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,ck  over  Cme,  by  Protocol   NTP   DNS   SSDP   Chargen   Portmap   SNMP  
  • 25. 25 NZ 2015 - Reflection attacks 0   10000   20000   30000   40000   50000   60000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,ack  by  Protocol,  max  Mbps  over  Cme   NTP   SSDP   DNS   Portmap   SNMP   Chargen   0   1000   2000   3000   4000   5000   6000   7000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,acks  by  Protocol,  mean  Mbps  over  Cme     NTP   SSDP   DNS   Chargen   SNMP   Portmap  
  • 26. 26 AU 2015 – DDoS attacks summary 51.77   74.12   33.7   136.91   20.76   39.55   33.12   31.03   27.4   111.4   35.6   39.3   0   20   40   60   80   100   120   140   160   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   AU  2015  DDoS  peak  a,ack  size,  Gbps   AU   APAC     Peak  a,ack  size   136.91  Gbps   334.22  Gbps   Average  a,ack  size   1.16  Gbps   617.53  Mbps   Average  duraCon   40  min  57  sec   44  min  11  sec   A,ack  dest  port   Port  80   Port  80   Top  reflecCon  a,ack  type   SSDP   NTP  
  • 27. 27 AU 2015 – DDoS attacks summary 1226   1127   833.6   1471   1224   1427   1165   917.1   601.6   1428   1112   1096   0   500   1000   1500   2000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   AU  2015  DDoS  average  a,ack  size,  Mbps   12336   10486   12905   13189   11085   13330   10085   7690   10432   18679   17250   15850   0   2000   4000   6000   8000   10000   12000   14000   16000   18000   20000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   AU  2015  no  of  DDoS  a,acks    
  • 28. 28 AU 2015 - Reflection attacks 0   500   1000   1500   2000   2500   3000   3500   4000   4500   5000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,ack  over  Cme,  by  Protocol   NTP   DNS   SSDP   Chargen   Portmap   SNMP   MSSQL  
  • 29. 29 AU 2015 - Reflection attacks 0   1000   2000   3000   4000   5000   6000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,ack  by  Protocol,  mean  Mbps  over  Cme   NTP   SSDP   DNS   Chargen   SNMP   Portmap   MSSQL   0   10000   20000   30000   40000   50000   60000   Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug   Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   ReflecCon  a,ack  by  Protocol,  max  Mbps  over  Cme   NTP   SSDP   DNS   Portmap   SNMP   Chargen   MSSQL  
  • 30. 30 Threats Detection Tool 0.0   10.0   20.0   30.0   40.0   50.0   60.0   70.0   80.0   90.0   Flow-­‐based  analyzers   Firewall  logs   SNMP-­‐based  tools   IDS/IPS   Performance  Mgmt  system   Helpdesk  Ticket   In-­‐house  scripts/tools   IDMS   SIEM   Other   Tools  to  detect  Threats   •  Netflow analyzers are the most commonly used tools •  Netflow analyzers also the most effective way to detect threat •  Firewall logs are 2nd in terms of deployment, but only ranked 6th in terms of effectiveness
  • 31. 31 Organizational Security Practices •  Implementation of anti-spoofing filters among service provider respondents is up to 44 percent this year, from 37 percent last year –  Progress, but still less than half. •  Practice makes perfect –  31 percent of service providers (up from 21%) and 24% of EGE respondents now run DDoS incident rehearsals at least on a quarterly basis •  The proportion of service providers monitoring for route hijacks has also increased, up to 54 percent this year from 40 percent last year.
  • 32. 32 Outbound DDoS & Anti-Spoofing •  41% of SP respondents do not detect outbound DDoS •  More than 80% of Data Centre Operator respondents plan to deploy anti-spoofing filters
  • 33. 33 Security Practices •  46% of SP respondents carry out DDoS defense simulation, up from 34% (2014) •  31% on a quarterly basis •  “Not enough time” being the major reason for not participating •  20% of respondents not in OPSEC groups because of “Legal concern” •  Sharing data within closed communities is highly effective for security purpose
  • 34. 34 Industry Best Current Practices (BCPs) •  BCPs are industry best practices for locking down a network •  Deploy these as policy to limit the exposure of your network –  Separation of control plane from data plane –  Interface ACLs (iACLs) –  Source based remote triggered blackhole S/RTBH –  Destination based remote triggered blackhole D/RTBH –  Flowspec –  Deploy antispoofing at all network edges. •  uRPF Loose-Mode at the peering edge •  uRPF Strict Mode at customer aggregation edge •  DHCP Snooping and IP Source Verify at LAN access edge