Weitere ähnliche Inhalte Mehr von Ange Albertini (20) Kürzlich hochgeladen (20) Messing with binary formats (live)26. Structure
1. start
○ PE Signature
■ %PDF + fake obj start
■ HTML comment start
2. next
○ PE (next)
○ HTML
○ PDF (next)
3. bottom
○ ZIP
39. %PDF*****
1 0 obj
<<
/Size 2
/W[[]1/]
/Root 1 0 R
/Pages<<
/Kids[<<
/Contents<<>>
stream
BT{99
Tf{Td(Inlined PDF)'
endstream
>>]
>>
>>
stream
*
endstream
startxref%*******
40. %PDF-1.1
1 0 obj
<<
%
/Type /Catalog
...
>>
endobj
2 0 obj
<<
/Type /Pages
...
>>
endobj
3 0 obj
<<
/Type /Page
/Resources <<
/Font <<
/F1 <<
/Type /Font
/Subtype
/Type1
...
>>
>>
>>
>>
endobj
4 0 obj
<< /Length 47>>
stream
...
xref
01
0000000000 65535 f
0000000010 00000 n
...
52. Weaknesses
● evasion
○ filters → exfiltration
○ same origin policy
○ detection
■ ex: clean PE but malicious PDF/HTML/...
■ exhaust checks
■ pretend to be corrupt
● DoS
54. Conclusion
● type confusion is bad
○ succinct docs too
○ lazy softwares as well
● go beyond the specs
○ Adobe: good
● suggestions
○ more extensions checks
○ isolate downloaded files
○ enforce magic signature at offset 0