1. Russia under Stalin
Joseph Stalin. Born the son of a Georgian cobbler, he was named Ioseb Dzhugashvilli
(Georgian) or Josef Vissarionovich (Russian). He studied in a church school in Gori,
but was expelled for Marxist activity. He continued with his activities, writing Marxist
essays in a Georgian newspaper. He was an enthusiastic defender of Lenin and the
Marxist exiles who published the socialist paper Iskra.
In Georgia he led many Marxist revolutionary movements and joined the Bolsheviks.
He was part of the Central Committee and was put in charge of the revolutionary
newspaper Pravda. He took on the name of "Stalin", which means "Man of Steel" in
Russian.
After defeating Trotsky and ridding the party of all his rivals, Stalin began to build up
Russia. As he said, "Other countries are 50 years ahead of Russia. We must make this
up in 10 years." As such, he had two main aims: (i)a centrally-planned economy
called a command economy; (ii)a totalitarian system of government.
A Centrally-Planned Economy
Stalin's Economic Aims
Stalin wanted the USSR to modernise at such a fast rate that it could make up the 50-
year gap in 10 years. The industry had to be devoloped to such an extent that the
country, which had all along depended mostly on agriculture or farming, had to be
changed such that it now depended on industry more. Although Russia was recovering
from war, its production from heavy industries was still low compared to other
countries. Stalin felt that this needed to be improved if they were to survive any
possible attack that might come from the capitalist West attempting to destroy
Communist Russia. The USSR needed to invest in materials like coal, iron, steel and
power to defend itself properly. Rapid industrialisation was also needed for defence as
the USSR was surrounded, as Stalin said, by governments that hated Communism:
Romania, Iran, Finland and Poland.
In order to become a strong industrial economy, the agricultural sector had to be
modernised and made more efficient so it could produce enough food to meet the
needs of the workforce. It would also be able to raise money needed for
industrialisation. Surplus had to be exported and money used to buy machinery and
such. Fewer workers could then be used on the farms and industrialisation could take

2. place more rapidly by transferring more workers from the countryside to the factories.
Unfortunately, Lenin's NEP was not achieving the results that they wanted. Stalin
dubbed the NEP as an impedement to communism and had to be scrapped. This rapid
industrialisation would also bring about two political results : (i)Communist support
would increase as the workers were the Communists' greatest supporters;
(ii)remaining opposition would be eliminated, in particular the class of rich peasants,
the kulaks.
Main Features of a Centrally-Planned (Command) Economy
During this period, Russia's economy was completely transformed. The state planned
the entire economy through the State Planning Commission, or Gosplan. They issued
instructions and orders, commands that were then passed down to factories,
businesses or farms. They drew up a series or plans which Stalin dubbed, the Five
Year Plans. The three Five-Year Plans were set targets and goals that the industry and
agriculture had to achieve. In practice, the emphasis was on achieving more than the
set targets rather than meeting them. Such a system greatly discouraged individual
initiative. For example, a factory manager received his commands and just carried
them out to the letter.
The government controlled the resources it needed to achieve the economic targets.
Factories, mines, transport and farms were owned by the state. The government
exercised tight control over the labour force. Ordinary workers were harshly
disciplined and poor workmanship and absence made things worse. Millionis of
peasants were directed into the towns and cities to work in factories and mines. These
and other heavy industries were given high priority in the first Five Year Plan.
Consumer industries were neglected and agriculture was reorganised to suit this.
The First Five Year Plan
The First Five Year Plan was aimed at expanding and modernising existing industries,
establish new ones, and relocate those in the west further to the east, so that they
would be more secure and protected by the vast amounts of land if Russia were to be
attacked by the West.
Many targets which the workers had to meet were set - and most were unrealistic. For
example, there was to be a 250% increase in total industrial output and a 350%
increase in heavy industries. The people were given no leave and absenteeism was
treated as treason. Many workers had to slog for 11 hours! However, none of them
revolted, as they knew their wages were paid in food rations, which meant they would
DEFINITELY not eat if they did not work. Propaganda was used. Brochures,
pamphlets and posters were distributed all over to boost the people's morale. Human

3. examples were used. One man was said to be working at a rate 500% more productive
than the average worker. Of course, most of these figures were exaggerated and the
people were killed by jealous workers.
The Russian heavy industries were far below average, and Stalin felt that devloping
these industries were important. The factories would be able to churn out machinery
for farming, which would increase productivity and allow more workers to join the
urban working force. Not only that, these factories would be able to change their
products into war machinery. Tanks, weapons and airplanes could be produced at
these factories if ever required. The large supplies of iron and steel, for example,
which would otherwise have been used to make machinery meant for agricultural
uses, could then be used for war machinery manufacturing. This would be a sufficient
backup for machines to defend Russia if the West decided to attack.
The agricultural sector was not neglected. Rapid industrialisation could only be
achieved if agriculture was made more efficient, as sufficient food had to be produced
to feed the workforce. Surplus food could then be sold for money to boost the
industrial sector. Stalin introduced a new method of farming - collectivisation.
Collectivisation basically encompassed grouping small, scattered farms in an area
together in a collective, or Kolkhozy. These peasants pooled their animals, tools and
labour to work for the benefit of the whole community. The collectives had to sell
most of their produce at low prices to the government. Any profits and surplus were
theirs to keep.
Agriculture was also subjected to state planning. The First Five Year Plan was aimed
at raising agricultural output by 130%. Major grain-producing areas were to be
collectivised by early 1931 followed by the other regions in the following year. Each
colelctive had a quota of grain it had to deliver to the state by a set date.
Collectivisation was implemented in 1928 and supposed to be on a purely voluntary
basis, and at a moderate pace. Of course, as with all theories, it never happened in
practice. In 1929 Stalin sped up the process because peasants refused to share their
labour and would rather burn their crops and kill their animals instead of selling food
to the government. The government had to apply force to make them join the
collectives. Those who resisted were severely dealt with. At the same time, Stalin
dealt with the rich class of peasants, the kulaks. As Communism preached equality
among all men, these peasants of "higher class" had to be eliminated. Stalin ordered
these kulaks to hand over their land, houses and property to the government. Their
crops, labour and machinery were to be distributed among the collectives. They were,
however, not allowed to join the collectives and millions if these peasants were sent to
labour camps or executed. Most kulaks resisted and destroyed their property,

4. machinery, crops and animals so that the government would not be able to use it. In a
bid to increase collective membership, peasants were granted incentives to join the
collectives in 1930. Stalin introduced the machine tractor station in Russia, where
collectives could borrow machinery and increase their productivity in return for
payment in the form of crops.
Results of the First Five Year Plan
Even though the official government figures were greatly exaggerated, there is no
denying the fact that it was a great success. The plan was achieved in four years, and
not five as scheduled. There was a huge expansion of energy production as new
factories and towns needed power. Dams were created and other major projects also
led to the improvement of Russia. Roads, railways and canals were constructed.
Russia was able to increase manufacturing and thus make more ample preparations for
war in future.
However, the Five Year Plan was not all that successful if we talk in terms of the
social aspects present in Russia at that time. The enormous demands placed on the
workers meant that millions of them lived in harsh conditions, working on the vast
projects in the interior of Russia. The state tightened its control on the workers.
Absenteeism was treated extremely harshly. The large emphasis on heavy industries
meant that consumer goods were high in demand. Shops were empty, clothing was in
short supply and many household items were unavailable. THe lack of consumer
products was one example of the fall in the standard of living. Because of the huge
influx of people going into the cities from the countryside, there were insufficient
medical facilities, houses and schools. Workers were poorly paid.
Collectivisation was also part of the Five Year Plan, but it was less successful than
industrialisation. It did not fulfil its targets udner the Plan and grain production even
declined from 1928 to 1932. This caused widespread famine later on. Even though up
to 7 milliong peasants died, the government still hoarded grain to sell to other
countries to earn foreign currency to be used for investment in industry. Grain
production recovered a lot, but the lifestock took till 1953 to regain its 1928 level due
to all the killings earlier. Collectivisation was a huge success as it made Russia's
agriculture more efficient. The huge amount of mechanisation involved, the efficiency
meant that many peasants left their farms and went to work in the industrial labour
sector.
According to Stalin, the Plan was also a success because they were able to rid
themselves of the kulaks and move towards communism. Also, collectivisation put an
end to private ownership of land. Land was nationalised and allowed peasants to own

5. a small plot of land as a concession, to win their support. The state could now exercise
more control over the peasants with the collectives.
The Other Five Year Plans
Basically the following five-year plans focused on a more balanced economy after
that, with increasing emphasis on other stages of industrialisation, moving into the
light industry and so on.
The second Five-Year Plan (1933-37) continued and expanded the first. The third plan
(1938-42) was interrupted by World War II. The fourth covered the years 1946-50,
the fifth 1951-55. The sixth plan (1956-60) was discarded in 1957, primarily because
it overcommitted available resources and could not be fulfilled. It was replaced by a
Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), which fell far short of estimated increases in agricultural
(especially wheat) production. The Seven-Year Plan was considered the start of a
longer period (20 years) devoted to the establishment of the material and technical
basis of a Communist society. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw increased emphasis
placed on consumer goods, and the 9th Five-Year Plan (1971-75) for the first time
gave priority to light industry rather than heavy industry. The agricultural sector still
grew far less than projected in the 10th (1976-80) and 11th (1981-85) Five-Year
Plans, and overall economic performance was poor. The 12th and final Five-Year Plan
(1986-90) projected increases in consumer goods and energy savings, but the
economy began to slide, shrinking by 4% in 1990. The dissolution of the Soviet Union
made the formation of a 13th Five-Year Plan a moot point.
A Totalitarian Government
A totalitarian government is one where there is only one party allowed - the ruling
party. In Stalin's Russia this meant that the Communist Party was supreme. All
criticism and opposition is eliminated. The people are expected to be totally loyal to
the state and to the person at the head of the government. Stalin ruled as a dictator,
commanding his people with absolute power. He conducted many purges against his
rivals and introduced a new constitution which reinforced his power. The secret police
and even a cult helped to build up his image and keep him in power.
Reasons for the Purges
Under Stalin's totalitarian government of the 1930s, many purges were held, killing
millions.

6. The main reason for the purges was because Stalin felt insecure. People were
questioning his leadership, his methods and his policies. Many people were unhappy
with the harshness of his Five Year Plans. He also faced criticism from within the
party. Politicians who were overly critical of Stalin were at risk, but a few took their
chances.
Sergei Kirov was one such man. He had been one of Stalin's closest supporters on the
Politburo and was, in 1934, the party boss of Leningrad. At the 1934 Party Congress,
Kirov switched sides and began criticising Stalin and his harsh policies. Fearless ones
warmly applauded Kirov as they agreed, while other less daring ones remained silent.
Stalin's position in the Central Committee was under siege, as Kirov pulled in the
highest number of votes while Stalin got the lowest. He only managed to stay in as
there were just as many vacancies as there were candidates. As such, Stalin decided to
take action against Kirov who was emerging as a potential rival for leadership of the
Party. On 1st December 1934, Stalin had Kirov assassinated. On the same day, Stalin
passed a law that ordered anyone accused of terrorism and plots against the
government was to be arrested and executed immediately after conviction. This law
gave Stalin the chance to carry out the Great Purges properly and easily without any
resistance.
The Great Purges
Stalin used this 1934 law to launch a massive purge of all the people, including
Communist Party members and top government officials, who were potential rivals or
threats to him, those who criticised his policies and even the innocent few. Stalin held
show trials for those party members who opposed him. These trials were meant for the
people to see and serve as a warning to any people planning to oppose Stalin. They
were held in Moscow and were filmed at times to show in other parts of Russia, so
that the people in those places would also receive the same precautionary warning.
In the "Trial of the Sixteen", in 1936, Zinoniev, Kamenev and 14 other prominent
members of the party who had questioned Stalin and his actions before were put on
trial. They were charged with being part of a conspiracy to assassinate leading
Communists, and they were found guilty and executed promptly.
The "Trial of the Seventeen" in 1937 saw Radek and 16 other members charged with a
variety of crimes such as sabotage and treason. 13 of them were executed while the
other 4 were brought to labour camps.
In 1938 the "Trial of the Twenty-One" was held. Bukharin, Rykov and 19 others were
charged with an even greater assortment of crimes. As in the earlier trials, the secret
police tortured the accused and extracted confessions of guilt.

7. By 1937 the purging had spread to the armed forces. Russia's most famous general
Tuchachevsky and other generals were arrested and killed. By 1939, 3 out of 5
marshals and about half of the military officials had been purged.
The Great Purges had affected Russians all over as they lived in constant fear that
they would be arrested and jailed, tortured or shot. It was common for ordinary
citizens to accuse their neighbours or even family members of criticising Stalin so as
to project a patriotic and loyal image of themselves in the hope that they would not be
killed. In this way, all sectors of society were affected. People of every profession and
background were purged. Over 10 million people were sent to labour camps where
they often died, while a million were executed.
Effects of the Purges
The most important political effect was, naturally, that Stalin became even more
powerful than before. He had got rid of his political rivals and nobody dared to
challenge his authority. Even when Russia was doing badly in World War II, his
leadership was not challenged. He introduced a new constitution called the Stalin
Constitution. This placed him firmly in control of the USSR.
A serious military effect was that the purges severely weakened the armed forces by
removing many capable leaders who had to be replaced by inexperienced officers.
This contributed greatly to the slow start that the Russians made in World War II.
In economic terms, the purges slowed down economic development, what with all the
internal squabbling and fear in the country. Many industrial workers and high-end
employees were killed, thus affecting worker morale and productivity.
Lastly, the purges made life extremely difficult for the people - the millions of
citizens. Everyone lived in fear and terror, with the secret police patrolling the area.
Apart from those sent to the labour camps where conditions were appalling and most
people died or disappeared, the family and friends that they left behind suffered
because they did not know what had happened to their loved ones.
The Stalin Constitution
Stalin claimed this constitution was the fairest in the world. Everyone over 18 was
allowed to vote every four years for a national assembly called the Supreme Soviet.
This assembly met for two weeks a year. It elected a smaller body, the Praesidium, to
act on its behalf. It also chose a Council of Ministers responsible for running the
country. Stalin, as Secretary or leader of the Communist Party, led this cabinet.

8. Only members of the Communist Party could be elected to the various posts. Stalin
controlled party membership, and thus chose those people who liked and supported
him and his position. Although the constitution was supposed to be democratic, it is
obvious that Stalin had the real power. Stalin and the Communist Party tried to make
themselves look good by recognising the rights of the people to free medical care, to
work, to education and political rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of
press. However, all these "freedoms" had to be expressed according to Stalin's and the
party's wishes.
The Cult of Stalin
Throughout the 1930s propaganda was used to build up Stalin's image. Like a
religious worship, a cult of Stalin was formed. Stalin was like a godlike leader to the
people, praised in the newspapers, books and in films and posters. Poems published in
Pravda praised his deeds, speeches exalting his skills, his modesty, his wisdom and his
brilliance. People who attended these meetings were careful to applaud long and
loudly, and the person who stopped first would most likely be arrested as it showed
great disrespect and disloyalty to Stalin.
Social and Cultural Policies
Education was closely regulated. It was free and compulsory, and tended to be
indoctrinated as it sought to mould people into the Communist way of thinking. The
secret police ensured that Communist ideology was taught.
The arts were controlled by the state which used them for propaganda purposes.
Pressure was put on writers to write novels about the glorious achievements of the
government. Musicians, artists and film-makers who refused to follow the state's
direction were persecuted or purged.
The Russian Orthodox Church was also persecuted by Stalin. The totalitarian
government could not tolerate people being loyal to other influential institutions such
as the Church. Churches were closed down and religiouis leaders were persecuted.
However, the Church continued to survive.
The 1930s was a period of terror and fear. Stalin and the Communist Party ruled the
USSR with an iron fist and as a dictatorship. They may have ovethrown the Tsar, but
this government was in little way different.
Stalin's Legacy

9. The task of confronting unpleasant historical episodes is difficult for any country, even long-established
democracies. It took more than two decades after World War II before the majority of Germans truly
acknowledged the full horror and magnitude of Nazi Germany's crimes. In France today, many citizens are
still reluctant to look closely at the Vichy period and the widespread collaboration that occurred. In Austria,
many people still pretend that their country was a victim of Nazi aggression rather than an enthusiastic
participant in the Third Reich and its atrocities. In Japan, political leaders still frequently downplay the
abominations perpetrated by Japanese troops in China, Korea, and Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s. In
the United States, too, many tragic aspects of history—the enslavement of blacks, the many decades of
violent racial segregation that followed the Civil War, the campaigns against American Indians, and the
internment of Japanese-Americans at the start of World War II—have often been glossed over.
Difficult as the process of historical reckoning may be for these Western countries, it is even more onerous
in Russia, where far too little has been done to come to terms with Stalin's legacy. In a mass survey in
2005, a majority of Russians chose Stalin as the "greatest leader" in Russia's history. Follow up surveys
revealed similar results and widespread public misperceptions of the Stalin era. The majority of Russians in
these surveys were either ambivalent or favorable in their assessment of Stalin, and roughly 25 percent said
they would definitely vote for Stalin if he were to come back to life and run for the Russian presidency.
Part of the problem in Russia in coming to terms with Stalin's legacy is the continued presence of officials
who served in high-level posts in the Communist Party, the government, and the security forces during the
Soviet period. These officials have been averse to harsh reassessments of the past and have sought to
prevent the release of sensitive documents that would show the Soviet regime's activities in a sinister light.
President Vladimir Putin, for example, has repeatedly said that he profoundly regrets the demise of the
Soviet Union, describing it as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century." This
description is astounding if one bears in mind that the twentieth century witnessed many genuine
catastrophes, perhaps most significantly, the Holocaust. Although Putin has acknowledged that excesses
occurred under Stalin, he has frequently lauded the monumental accomplishments of the Soviet regime,
including the accomplishments of Stalin. Putin also often speaks proudly of the Soviet KGB, the notorious
state security agency for which he worked in the 1970s and 1980s, carrying on the efforts of agents who
served Stalin’s regime.
True to form, Putin has brought back some of the trappings and symbols used by Stalin, and he has
appointed a large number of former KGB officials to senior posts in his government. In early May 2000,
Putin authorized the Russian Central Bank to issue 500 special silver coins bearing Stalin's portrait,
ostensibly to commemorate the Soviet Union's role in World War II. A few days later, at a ceremony
marking the 55th anniversary of the end of the war, Putin unveiled a plaque honoring "Generalissimo Josef
Vissarionovich Stalin" for his heroic leadership. Putin also approved the placement of a bust of Stalin at the
Poklonnaya Gora war memorial. Several months later, in December 2000, Putin pushed for legislation to
bring back the old Soviet national anthem, which had been commissioned by Stalin in 1943 and replaced by
Yeltsin in late 1991. The anthem was formally restored as of January 2001, an event that Putin marked with
great solemnity. When Putin was asked in an interview how he could justify the revival of such a blatant
symbol of Stalinist repression, he conceded that many people associate the anthem with the horrors of
Stalin's prison camps. But Putin vigorously disagreed with this view, arguing that the anthem should instead
be linked with the many achievements of the Soviet period in which people can take pride. Putin has
returned to this theme many times since then, especially during the numerous ceremonies in 2005
commemorating the 60th anniversary of the end of the war against Germany. Stalin's portrait was widely
displayed and was prominently featured in newspapers during those celebrations.
These developments and Putin's rationalizations are deeply troubling. It would be as if German leaders after
1945 had claimed that they were bringing back the swastika to remind everyone of the proud achievements
of the Nazi regime. Adolf Hitler, after all, took a demoralized and economically desperate country and turned
it into a daunting military power in well under a decade. No doubt, if historians were to look hard enough we
could find positive things that occurred in Germany from 1933 to 1945, but this progress would hardly
warrant a revival of the swastika. The atrocious evil of the Holocaust, as Germans are well aware, precludes
any notion of celebrating the Nazi regime's accomplishments.
The same should apply to Stalin's regime. Although Putin would like to focus exclusively on the allied victory
in World War II and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower, none of this focus gets around the
fact that Stalin presided over one of the bloodiest and most abominable regimes in history. The restoration
of conspicuous symbols of the Stalinist regime inevitably mitigates and blurs over the regime's monstrous

10. crimes. The continued celebration of Soviet holidays, particularly the "Day of the Security Organs" on
December 20th, conveys appalling disregard for the millions who fell victim to the Soviet security apparatus.
Rather than harkening back to the symbols and institutions of the Soviet regime, the Russian government
should be doing its best to overcome that terrible legacy. Boris Yeltsin had an opportunity early in his
administration to promote a thorough historical accounting, but he squandered it. Although he allowed some
of the former Soviet archives to be partly opened, he limited the release of documents and kept the most
important archives tightly sealed. Yeltsin failed to ensure the systematic removal of statues of Lenin and of
other monuments glorifying the Soviet regime, and he was unwilling to disband the sprawling state security
organs, which were just as symbolic of Stalinist repression as the SS was of Nazi atrocities. Although the
KGB was reorganized in late 1991, the agency's repressive apparatus was preserved essentially intact under
the main successor organization in Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB), which regards itself as
proudly carrying on the KGB’s work.
The lack of a thorough reckoning with the past has had negative effects on the Russian population. Russians
who proudly display portraits of Stalin on the streets of Moscow or who lay flowers before symbols of the
Stalinist regime are never chided for condoning mass murder. On the contrary, the admirers of Stalin can
now purchase silver coins with his image from the Russian government itself. This may help explain why a
large number of Russians regard Stalin as the greatest leader in their country's history. It is inconceivable
that a majority of Germans today would think of Hitler in similar terms. It is also inconceivable that Germans
today would tolerate any suggestion of reviving the Hitler Youth. In Russia, by contrast, there has been no
outcry at all over the growing power and size of youth indoctrination organizations like Nashi and Young
Guard. These groups are akin to the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization that indoctrinated and
prepared millions of Soviet young people for service to Stalin’s regime.
So long as the symbols and institutions of Stalinist repression are still flourishing in Russia, the prospects for
democracy will be dim. The former Communist countries that have done the most to encourage a thorough
reckoning with the Communist period have enjoyed much greater stability than the countries that have gone
about the process selectively or halfheartedly. Deep and lasting democratization in the former East-bloc
states has made the most headway when the iniquities of the Communist period have been exposed to
public light.
Courageous groups in Russia like Memorial and the Democracy Foundation have done invaluable work in
documenting the extent of the Stalinist repressions, but a full reckoning with the Stalinist past must
encompass the whole society. The passing of generations will help, but the task of facing up to the horrors
of Stalin's rule will also require integrity on the part of public officials – officials who take no pride in the
Stalinist regime's "monumental achievements" and are instead committed to overcoming the Stalinist legacy
once and for all.