SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 21
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Abusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malware
From router to end-user
Evgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky Lab
CNCERT/CC 2011 Annual Conference
What is DNS?What is DNS?
And why can it be abused?
What is DNS?
DNS – Domain Name System
DNS translates domain names
meaningful to humans into the
numerical identifiers associated
with networking equipment for
the purpose of locating and
addressing these devicesaddressing these devices
worldwide
DNS is a "phone book"
for the Internet
Examples:
kaspersky.com -> 91.103.64.6
google.com -> 209.85.149.104
Why can DNS be abused?
• Technical side
• Open, distributed design
• Lots of nodes
• Everybody can start one
• Usage of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
• Unreliable (no concept of acknowledgment, retransmission or timeout)
• Not ordered (if two messages are sent to the same recipient, the order in which they
arrive cannot be predicted)arrive cannot be predicted)
• Human factor
• Not well-qualified network administrators
• Network security holes
• Default hardware configurations
• etc.
• End-users themselves
• The most easy object to abuse!
How can DNS be abused?How can DNS be abused?
Real-world examples
How can DNS be abused?
Instead of going into cool theoretical stuff about techniques of exploiting
DNS itself, I would rather show some real-world examples of attacks and
malicious programs related to DNS.
Abusing DNS
Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using ‘hosts’ file
That’s how normal ‘hosts’ file looks like
And that’s an infected example
Abusing DNS
Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using relocated ‘hosts’ file
That’s where ‘hosts’ file should be located
But it can be relocated and infected
And original ‘hosts’ file remains unchanged
Abusing DNS
Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using network registry settings
That’s how ‘NameServer’ option should look like
But it can be manually changed..But it can be manually changed..
And immediately updated
Abusing DNS
More advanced example: Rorpian case
• First of all, malware gets on user’s PC via removable media
• Then, the magic begins
• Malware configures user’s system as DHCP server and starts listening to the
local network
• If the system is already infected, manually sets the DNS server to Google’s
one (8.8.8.8)
• When a DHCP request from another computer arrives, malicious DHCP
Malware infection from any visited resource!
• When a DHCP request from another computer arrives, malicious DHCP
server attempts to answer before official one
• If the attempt was successful, another computer’s DNS will be changed to malicious
one
• Which leads to..
Abusing DNS
More high-level threat: hacking the routers
• Main security issues
• weak default passwords or no password change enforcement
• insecure default configuration
• firmware vulnerabilities & services implementation errors
• lack of awareness
Abusing DNS
How to hack million of routers?
Overhyped?
PAGE 12 | Kaspersky Powerpoint template – Overview | January 24 2011
Not at all.
Abusing DNS
Example: 2Wire case
Abusing DNS
Example: D-Link & Tsunami case
Malware goes even inside the router itself!Malware goes even inside the router itself!
Abusing DNS
Examples: it’s only the beginning
Abusing DNS
Even more high-level threat: hacking the DNS servers
PAGE 16 | Kaspersky Powerpoint template – Overview | January 24 2011
Abusing DNS
Last example: mysterious google-analytics.com case
• Several months ago by Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) we received tons of
notifications of javascript Iframer malware planted on http://google-
analytics.com/ga.js
• ga.js downloaded from google-analytics.com was clean
• But when we got some file from users.. It was infected!
It seems like something is wrong with the local DNS
• First version redirects user to domain name quehduid.com, which wasn’t even
registered!
• But still, we received notifications about exploits downloaded using this domain
• Analyzed tons of malware which could be connected to this case
• Found nothing common to DNS poisoning/hijacking
• But found some interesting geographic pattern between versions
It seems like something is wrong with the local DNS
in these countries, isn’t it?
ConclusionsConclusions
Conclusions
Summing it up
• DNS can be is hijacked/poisoned on every layer of network organization
structure
• Users
• Routers
• DNS servers
• DNS was not originally designed with security in mind
• Thus has number of security issues• Thus has number of security issues
• There are some technical things that can make it more secure
• Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) - cryptographically signed
responses
• OpenDNS - misspelling correction, phishing protection, content filtering, blocks bad
IPs, stops bots from 'phoning home'
• Google Public DNS - basic validity checking, adding entropy to requests, removing
duplicate queries, rate-limiting queries
Conclusions
Summing it up
• From user side, more things can be done
• Again and again, strong passwords
• Hardening default hardware settings
• Systematic updates of both firmware and software
• Remote control through VPN
• From hardware vendors side
• Unique default passwords for devices
• Secure default settings (disable or limit remote access!)
• Emphasis on firmware security
• From security vendors side
• Miscellaneous checking for security (passwords, default settings,
vulnerabilities etc.)
• Inform user on possible security holes
Thank YouThank You
Evgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky LabEvgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky Lab
CNCERT/CC 2011 Annual Conference

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Denial of service attack
Denial of service attackDenial of service attack
Denial of service attack
Kaustubh Padwad
 
Introduction to Windows Dictionary Attacks
Introduction to Windows Dictionary AttacksIntroduction to Windows Dictionary Attacks
Introduction to Windows Dictionary Attacks
NetSPI
 

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Denial of service attack
Denial of service attackDenial of service attack
Denial of service attack
 
Session 4.1 Roy Arends
Session 4.1 Roy ArendsSession 4.1 Roy Arends
Session 4.1 Roy Arends
 
Introduction to Windows Dictionary Attacks
Introduction to Windows Dictionary AttacksIntroduction to Windows Dictionary Attacks
Introduction to Windows Dictionary Attacks
 
From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...
From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...
From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...
 
Destributed denial of service attack ppt
Destributed denial of service attack pptDestributed denial of service attack ppt
Destributed denial of service attack ppt
 
Applied Detection and Analysis Using Flow Data - MIRCon 2014
Applied Detection and Analysis Using Flow Data - MIRCon 2014Applied Detection and Analysis Using Flow Data - MIRCon 2014
Applied Detection and Analysis Using Flow Data - MIRCon 2014
 
Exploiting appliances presentation v1.1-vids-removed
Exploiting appliances   presentation  v1.1-vids-removedExploiting appliances   presentation  v1.1-vids-removed
Exploiting appliances presentation v1.1-vids-removed
 
Denail of Service
Denail of ServiceDenail of Service
Denail of Service
 
Dos attack
Dos attackDos attack
Dos attack
 
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptx
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptxDdos and mitigation methods.pptx
Ddos and mitigation methods.pptx
 
Datafoucs 2014 on line digital forensic investigations damir delija 2
Datafoucs 2014 on line digital forensic investigations damir delija 2Datafoucs 2014 on line digital forensic investigations damir delija 2
Datafoucs 2014 on line digital forensic investigations damir delija 2
 
5 Ways To Fight A DDoS Attack
5 Ways To Fight A DDoS Attack5 Ways To Fight A DDoS Attack
5 Ways To Fight A DDoS Attack
 
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruptionCNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
 
DNS Security WebTitan Web Filter - Stop Malware
DNS Security WebTitan Web Filter - Stop Malware DNS Security WebTitan Web Filter - Stop Malware
DNS Security WebTitan Web Filter - Stop Malware
 
Malware and Modern Propagation Techniques
Malware and Modern Propagation TechniquesMalware and Modern Propagation Techniques
Malware and Modern Propagation Techniques
 
Computer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili Saghafi
Computer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili SaghafiComputer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili Saghafi
Computer Security Cyber Security DOS_DDOS Attacks By: Professor Lili Saghafi
 
Digital Immunity -The Myths and Reality
Digital Immunity -The Myths and RealityDigital Immunity -The Myths and Reality
Digital Immunity -The Myths and Reality
 
EnCase Enterprise Basic File Collection
EnCase Enterprise Basic File Collection EnCase Enterprise Basic File Collection
EnCase Enterprise Basic File Collection
 
Forensic Analysis - Empower Tech Days 2013
Forensic Analysis - Empower Tech Days 2013Forensic Analysis - Empower Tech Days 2013
Forensic Analysis - Empower Tech Days 2013
 
Ddos- distributed denial of service
Ddos- distributed denial of service Ddos- distributed denial of service
Ddos- distributed denial of service
 

Andere mochten auch

Andere mochten auch (7)

The Art of the Pitching
The Art of the PitchingThe Art of the Pitching
The Art of the Pitching
 
5 (Ridiculously) Simple Steps to Creating Your Employment Brand | CAREEREALISM
5 (Ridiculously) Simple Steps to Creating Your Employment Brand | CAREEREALISM5 (Ridiculously) Simple Steps to Creating Your Employment Brand | CAREEREALISM
5 (Ridiculously) Simple Steps to Creating Your Employment Brand | CAREEREALISM
 
Pitch Deck Templates for Startups
Pitch Deck Templates for StartupsPitch Deck Templates for Startups
Pitch Deck Templates for Startups
 
Recruitment: Candidate Experience and Storytelling Lessons from Hollywood
Recruitment: Candidate Experience and Storytelling Lessons from HollywoodRecruitment: Candidate Experience and Storytelling Lessons from Hollywood
Recruitment: Candidate Experience and Storytelling Lessons from Hollywood
 
Smart city
Smart citySmart city
Smart city
 
10 Project Proposal Writing
10 Project Proposal Writing10 Project Proposal Writing
10 Project Proposal Writing
 
UX, ethnography and possibilities: for Libraries, Museums and Archives
UX, ethnography and possibilities: for Libraries, Museums and ArchivesUX, ethnography and possibilities: for Libraries, Museums and Archives
UX, ethnography and possibilities: for Libraries, Museums and Archives
 

Ähnlich wie abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-卡巴斯基实验室资深病毒分析师 evgeny aseev

Infoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid Them
Infoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid ThemInfoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid Them
Infoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid Them
Jennifer Nichols
 

Ähnlich wie abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-卡巴斯基实验室资深病毒分析师 evgeny aseev (20)

Grey H@t - DNS Cache Poisoning
Grey H@t - DNS Cache PoisoningGrey H@t - DNS Cache Poisoning
Grey H@t - DNS Cache Poisoning
 
Dns firewalls null-may2020
Dns firewalls null-may2020Dns firewalls null-may2020
Dns firewalls null-may2020
 
DNS Security
DNS SecurityDNS Security
DNS Security
 
THOTCON - The War over your DNS Queries
THOTCON - The War over your DNS QueriesTHOTCON - The War over your DNS Queries
THOTCON - The War over your DNS Queries
 
Day 2 Dns Cert 4c Malicious Use
Day 2   Dns Cert 4c Malicious UseDay 2   Dns Cert 4c Malicious Use
Day 2 Dns Cert 4c Malicious Use
 
Dmk bo2 k8_ccc
Dmk bo2 k8_cccDmk bo2 k8_ccc
Dmk bo2 k8_ccc
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
 
DNS in IR: Collection, Analysis and Response
DNS in IR: Collection, Analysis and ResponseDNS in IR: Collection, Analysis and Response
DNS in IR: Collection, Analysis and Response
 
Distributed Sensor Data Contextualization for Threat Intelligence Analysis
Distributed Sensor Data Contextualization for Threat Intelligence AnalysisDistributed Sensor Data Contextualization for Threat Intelligence Analysis
Distributed Sensor Data Contextualization for Threat Intelligence Analysis
 
@dtmsecurity Mitre ATT&CKcon - Playing Devil's Advocate to Security Initiativ...
@dtmsecurity Mitre ATT&CKcon - Playing Devil's Advocate to Security Initiativ...@dtmsecurity Mitre ATT&CKcon - Playing Devil's Advocate to Security Initiativ...
@dtmsecurity Mitre ATT&CKcon - Playing Devil's Advocate to Security Initiativ...
 
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
 
Botnets Attacks.pptx
Botnets Attacks.pptxBotnets Attacks.pptx
Botnets Attacks.pptx
 
NANOG 84: DNS Openness
NANOG 84: DNS OpennessNANOG 84: DNS Openness
NANOG 84: DNS Openness
 
DNS Security, is it enough?
DNS Security, is it enough? DNS Security, is it enough?
DNS Security, is it enough?
 
DNS – Strategies for Reducing Data Leakage & Protecting Online Privacy – Hack...
DNS – Strategies for Reducing Data Leakage & Protecting Online Privacy – Hack...DNS – Strategies for Reducing Data Leakage & Protecting Online Privacy – Hack...
DNS – Strategies for Reducing Data Leakage & Protecting Online Privacy – Hack...
 
Using GreyNoise to Quantify Response Time of Cloud Provider Abuse Teams
Using GreyNoise to Quantify Response Time of Cloud Provider Abuse TeamsUsing GreyNoise to Quantify Response Time of Cloud Provider Abuse Teams
Using GreyNoise to Quantify Response Time of Cloud Provider Abuse Teams
 
DNS Advanced Attacks and Analysis
DNS Advanced Attacks and AnalysisDNS Advanced Attacks and Analysis
DNS Advanced Attacks and Analysis
 
Types of Attack in Information and Network Security
Types of Attack in Information and Network SecurityTypes of Attack in Information and Network Security
Types of Attack in Information and Network Security
 
OFFENSIVE: Exploiting DNS servers changes BlackHat Asia 2014
OFFENSIVE: Exploiting DNS servers changes BlackHat Asia 2014OFFENSIVE: Exploiting DNS servers changes BlackHat Asia 2014
OFFENSIVE: Exploiting DNS servers changes BlackHat Asia 2014
 
Infoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid Them
Infoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid ThemInfoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid Them
Infoblox White Paper - Top Five DNS Security Attack Risks and How to Avoid Them
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
?#DUbAI#??##{{(☎️+971_581248768%)**%*]'#abortion pills for sale in dubai@
 
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FMECloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Safe Software
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...
Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...
Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...
 
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : UncertaintyArtificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, AdobeApidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
 
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt RobisonData Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
Data Cloud, More than a CDP by Matt Robison
 
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdfGenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
GenAI Risks & Security Meetup 01052024.pdf
 
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectorsMS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
 
Emergent Methods: Multi-lingual narrative tracking in the news - real-time ex...
Emergent Methods: Multi-lingual narrative tracking in the news - real-time ex...Emergent Methods: Multi-lingual narrative tracking in the news - real-time ex...
Emergent Methods: Multi-lingual narrative tracking in the news - real-time ex...
 
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
 
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWEREMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
 
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FMECloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
 
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
 
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone ProcessorsExploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
 
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Modernizing Securities Finance by Madhu Subbu
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Modernizing Securities Finance by Madhu SubbuApidays Singapore 2024 - Modernizing Securities Finance by Madhu Subbu
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Modernizing Securities Finance by Madhu Subbu
 
Manulife - Insurer Transformation Award 2024
Manulife - Insurer Transformation Award 2024Manulife - Insurer Transformation Award 2024
Manulife - Insurer Transformation Award 2024
 

abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-卡巴斯基实验室资深病毒分析师 evgeny aseev

  • 1. Abusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malwareAbusing DNS to spread malware From router to end-user Evgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky Lab CNCERT/CC 2011 Annual Conference
  • 2. What is DNS?What is DNS? And why can it be abused?
  • 3. What is DNS? DNS – Domain Name System DNS translates domain names meaningful to humans into the numerical identifiers associated with networking equipment for the purpose of locating and addressing these devicesaddressing these devices worldwide DNS is a "phone book" for the Internet Examples: kaspersky.com -> 91.103.64.6 google.com -> 209.85.149.104
  • 4. Why can DNS be abused? • Technical side • Open, distributed design • Lots of nodes • Everybody can start one • Usage of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) • Unreliable (no concept of acknowledgment, retransmission or timeout) • Not ordered (if two messages are sent to the same recipient, the order in which they arrive cannot be predicted)arrive cannot be predicted) • Human factor • Not well-qualified network administrators • Network security holes • Default hardware configurations • etc. • End-users themselves • The most easy object to abuse!
  • 5. How can DNS be abused?How can DNS be abused? Real-world examples
  • 6. How can DNS be abused? Instead of going into cool theoretical stuff about techniques of exploiting DNS itself, I would rather show some real-world examples of attacks and malicious programs related to DNS.
  • 7. Abusing DNS Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using ‘hosts’ file That’s how normal ‘hosts’ file looks like And that’s an infected example
  • 8. Abusing DNS Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using relocated ‘hosts’ file That’s where ‘hosts’ file should be located But it can be relocated and infected And original ‘hosts’ file remains unchanged
  • 9. Abusing DNS Simple example: changing user’s DNS settings using network registry settings That’s how ‘NameServer’ option should look like But it can be manually changed..But it can be manually changed.. And immediately updated
  • 10. Abusing DNS More advanced example: Rorpian case • First of all, malware gets on user’s PC via removable media • Then, the magic begins • Malware configures user’s system as DHCP server and starts listening to the local network • If the system is already infected, manually sets the DNS server to Google’s one (8.8.8.8) • When a DHCP request from another computer arrives, malicious DHCP Malware infection from any visited resource! • When a DHCP request from another computer arrives, malicious DHCP server attempts to answer before official one • If the attempt was successful, another computer’s DNS will be changed to malicious one • Which leads to..
  • 11. Abusing DNS More high-level threat: hacking the routers • Main security issues • weak default passwords or no password change enforcement • insecure default configuration • firmware vulnerabilities & services implementation errors • lack of awareness
  • 12. Abusing DNS How to hack million of routers? Overhyped? PAGE 12 | Kaspersky Powerpoint template – Overview | January 24 2011 Not at all.
  • 14. Abusing DNS Example: D-Link & Tsunami case Malware goes even inside the router itself!Malware goes even inside the router itself!
  • 15. Abusing DNS Examples: it’s only the beginning
  • 16. Abusing DNS Even more high-level threat: hacking the DNS servers PAGE 16 | Kaspersky Powerpoint template – Overview | January 24 2011
  • 17. Abusing DNS Last example: mysterious google-analytics.com case • Several months ago by Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) we received tons of notifications of javascript Iframer malware planted on http://google- analytics.com/ga.js • ga.js downloaded from google-analytics.com was clean • But when we got some file from users.. It was infected! It seems like something is wrong with the local DNS • First version redirects user to domain name quehduid.com, which wasn’t even registered! • But still, we received notifications about exploits downloaded using this domain • Analyzed tons of malware which could be connected to this case • Found nothing common to DNS poisoning/hijacking • But found some interesting geographic pattern between versions It seems like something is wrong with the local DNS in these countries, isn’t it?
  • 19. Conclusions Summing it up • DNS can be is hijacked/poisoned on every layer of network organization structure • Users • Routers • DNS servers • DNS was not originally designed with security in mind • Thus has number of security issues• Thus has number of security issues • There are some technical things that can make it more secure • Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) - cryptographically signed responses • OpenDNS - misspelling correction, phishing protection, content filtering, blocks bad IPs, stops bots from 'phoning home' • Google Public DNS - basic validity checking, adding entropy to requests, removing duplicate queries, rate-limiting queries
  • 20. Conclusions Summing it up • From user side, more things can be done • Again and again, strong passwords • Hardening default hardware settings • Systematic updates of both firmware and software • Remote control through VPN • From hardware vendors side • Unique default passwords for devices • Secure default settings (disable or limit remote access!) • Emphasis on firmware security • From security vendors side • Miscellaneous checking for security (passwords, default settings, vulnerabilities etc.) • Inform user on possible security holes
  • 21. Thank YouThank You Evgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky LabEvgeny Aseev, Senior Malware Analyst, Kaspersky Lab CNCERT/CC 2011 Annual Conference