Dr Hamid's 2019 commissioned paper for the Commission for Countering Extremism in the UK which was not published. It is published here for the sake of academic freedom.

1. 1
A Mapping of Islamist Trends in the U.K 1
Dr Sadek Hamid
1. Introduction
Transnational, theo-political movements originating in the Middle East and Indian
subcontinent have exercised considerable influence across Muslim-majority societies
and also in the West. In Britain, this has taken place through the legacies of
Ikhwani/Jama’ati inspired groups which formed institutions and mosques networks
across the country.2 This paper provides an empirically grounded overview of these
Islamist trends in the UK from my ongoing research of intra-religious diversity among
British Muslim communities. I begin by highlighting internal community diversity and
provide an overview of Islamism as a political project, its emergence, establishment
and evolution in Britain. I then outline organisational narratives, consider how
Islamists can be recognised and make an assessment of groups closest to
mainstream public life and those closer to the violent fringe. New hybridisations
between Islamists and Salafi orientations are explored as well as the opportunities
provided by digital technologies, the role of social media influencers and networks
that have been influenced or sympathise with Islamist causes while not overtly
defining themselves as such. I also evaluate the size and reach of these trends and
place them within the context of an increasingly variegated activist landscape and
conclude with a reflection generated from preparing this study.

2. 2
2. British Muslim Diversity
Muslims in Britain constitute one of the most diverse heterogeneous faith
communities in Western Europe. As many scholars have noted ‘there is no single,
clearly defined perception of British Muslim identity; on the contrary, the notion is
complex, diverse and equivocal’.3 While many would hold:
…an aspirational rhetoric of belonging to one, undivided, world-wide
community – the ummah and identify which the hyphenated self-descriptor of
“British Muslim,” it would be a mistake to assume that this eclipses racial,
ethnic, class, linguistic or political allegiances that would be shared with their
fellow, non-Muslim citizens. 4
British Muslims, as an umbrella term, also masks complex internal differences on the
basis of migratory and settlement patterns, kinship networks and levels of faith
observance. There are many religious orientations that describe themselves as
‘Islamic’ and like other faith groups, Islam in Britain, possesses a spectrum of
adherents who describe themselves as either; orthodox, traditionalist, Islamist,
reformist, liberal, secular or even atheists who are culturally Muslim. 5
Most British Muslims originate from South Asia and are from the Sunni theological
backgrounds and generally subscribe to the Hanafi legal tradition.6 In terms of
numerical and institutional representation, four major religious traditions
predominate; (1) the devotionalist Barelwi Sufi tradition, (2) textually oriented
Deobandis (3) Islamist Jama’ati-Islami inspired institutions, and (4) literalist
Ahl al-Hadith (people of Prophetic narrations) mosque network.7
In addition to these, there are other important Islamic trends with constituencies that
are not well known outside their sectarian or ethnic membership base. These include
for instance, Shi’a, Dawoodi Bohra, and Ismaili communities and groups of Muslims
that coalesce around religious figures such as the largely convert community in
Norwich led by Shaykh Abdul Qadir Murabit. There are also organisations inspired
by the Turkish Muslim scholar Fethullah Gulen and a variety of African and South
East Asian Islamic associations active in their localities. As a result, there a

3. 3
numerous organisations with competing claims to represent Islam and Muslims in
Britain.
3. Organising Muslims
Muslim minorities in Europe have historically formed three main types of
organisational infrastructure.8 These include:
i. groups set up as extensions of organisations or movements from their country
of origin
ii. groups set up by governments or government-related agencies to engage
with them and national civil society
iii. groups which arose from local communities in terms of service provision and
anti-discrimination
The first was theological and ideological trends that sought to establish themselves
in the West by developing mosques and centres to promote their cause. The second
was funded by foreign governments that catered for their communities in their new
host countries and also represented their interests in European states in what
became dubbed “Embassy Islam.”9 The third resulted from the maturation of
communities that organised to represent Muslim concerns to government and wider
society.
The creation of religious organisations helped to consolidate and perpetuate
religious identity formation. In Britain the first category of transnational movements
were particularly successful at institution building and were instrumental in
developing youth organisations intended to re-Islamise second generation Muslim
young people. Some of the most effective are described as “Islamists.”10
4. Islamism(s)
Journalists, policymakers and even academics often use terms such as “Militant
Islam”, “Radical Islam,” “Political Islam” and “Islamism” as interchangeable concepts
without nuance.11 Martin and Barzegar have argued that Islamism ‘connotes for
most people who employ it, stridently antagonistic Muslim attitudes towards the

4. 4
West, socially conservative and patriarchal attitudes, intolerance toward non-
Muslims, and perhaps most fearfully for outsiders to Islamist causes, the ambition to
establish Islamic law, Sharia, as a normative political goal.’12
Islamist is a loaded term that ‘has become shorthand for “Muslims we don't like.’ 13
This is occurs frequently in media and policymaking circles where politically vocal
Muslim organisations or individuals who take oppositional stances towards
government are labelled as Islamists. There is also a tendency to view Islamist
movements in a monolithic manner. While they share family resemblances, they are
a diverse ideological phenomenon that has manifested in divergent ways at different
times and places, with varying interpretive approaches to towards scripture,
theology, spirituality, organisational structures, and political strategy.14
The ideas of the founders of the Al-khwan al-Muslimin (MB) and Jama’ati-Islami (JI)
Islamist movements –Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi and thinkers
such as Sayyid Qutb and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have permeated Muslim communities
in both majority and minority contexts. Islamism is distinct from other religiously
inspired revival movements for its primary aim of seeking to reorder Muslim societies
according to Islamic values, implement shariah centric laws and pursue some form
of caliphate.15 Most Islamists are non-violent, and adhere to democratic norms and
advocate political gradualism, while others use violence to capture state power. As
one researcher suggests:
The phenomenon is also commonly described as ‘an Islamic revival’, ‘political
Islam’ or ‘an Islamic awakening’; their Arabic equivalents include an-Nahda al-
Islamiya or al-Sahwa al-Islamiya. This activist or revivalist form of Islam has
also been given prefixes such as ‘radical’, ‘extreme’, ‘militant’, ‘political’ and
‘revolutionary’, or has been termed ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. Inevitably the
more pejorative descriptions tend to be applied by commentators outside the
movement and especially by those who perceive it to be a threat to their own
political interests.16
Not all Islamists agree with being described as such –some preferring to be called
“Islamic activists” or Muslims engaged in politics. They also disagree widely among
themselves at an international level and often within the same country. For early

5. 5
twentieth century Islamists, religion was mobilised as anti-colonial, ideological
challenge to Western “man-made”, political models such as; capitalism,
communism and socialism. Islam was ideologised as an attempt to counter the
appeal of Western influenced nationalist movements emerging in postcolonial states
such as Kemalism in Turkey, Nasserism in Egypt, and Baathism in Iraq.
While Muslim societies in the past have fused faith and politics to various degrees –
the recasting of Islam as a political ideology is a thoroughly modern project,
articulated differently by various movements over the last ninety years.17 Islamism as
a political project retains an appeal among many people in Muslim majority societies
as it appears to offer hope of a better way of life. While some movements have
remained loyal to classical Islamist discourses -others have been forced to adapt to
local conditions in both majority and minority Muslim contexts. The UK is an
important example of this gradual adaptation.
5. Establishment of British Islamist Trends
British Islamist groups drew intellectual inspiration from the aforementioned twentieth
century revivalist thinkers which travelled with them as they settled in the UK in the
1960s. The works of Mawdudi and Qutb in particular, theorised the interconnectivity
between personal faith and practical life. Islamist institutions created a network of
like-minded activist organisations that would cater for the first-generation settlers and
transient overseas students. JI-inspired institutions included the UK Islamic Mission
(UKIM), Muslim Education Trust (MET), Dawatul Islam and The Islamic Foundation.
The Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) and Muslim Student Societies
(MSS) were instrumental in promoting MB perspectives. These institutions are ‘best
understood as loose affiliates rather than as formal branches of the Muslim
Brotherhood.’18
As religious revivalist organisations and transnational trends, they were able to train
a second generation of British born recruits to engage other Muslim young people
through various Islamic youth organisations such Young Muslims UK, originally the
youth wing of the UKIM, the radical transnational movement Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and
Salafi oriented, JIMAS organisation. These youth movements also acted as feeders

6. 6
to other ‘adult’ organisations, so that people involved in Young Muslims UK and
FOSIS often graduated into the ISB, IFE, and MCB or joined the Muslim charity
sector. Even though they had relatively low levels of formal membership, these
movements were able to exercise disproportionate influence by shaping debates
within Muslim communities and acted as interlocutors with the state.
6. Organisational Narratives
These groups rationalised their activities and mobilised followers by framing certain
priorities for British Muslim communities. These included; religious reform and
revival, the urgency of supporting pan-Islamic causes, youth (re)Islamisation and
dawah (preaching) to non-Muslim society and securing Muslim rights in the public
sphere. The framing process had the effect of influencing what specific issues
Muslim activists should be thinking about and how the narratives could be used to
recruit people their organisations.
Many were able to capitalise on a series of international crisis events in the 1990s,
beginning with the first Gulf War in 1991, the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia
mid-1990s, persecution of Muslims in Chechnya (1994-1995) and Kosovo (1998-
1999). This heightened awareness of transnational Muslim consciousness and a
created a need to “defend Islam” and helped to fuel socio-political activism. The
intended effect of these narratives was to create an internationalist Islamist identity,
reform lapsed Muslims, create a vanguard that would provide religious leadership
and invite non-Muslims to Islam, in the hope that the Britain would eventually
become a Muslim society.

7. 7
Islamist Inspired Organisations in the UK (1960s- early 2000s)
7. Evolution and Decline
By the end of the 1990s, it became clear that these groups could no longer be
understood by reference to the original vision of Islamist “founding fathers”— such as
al-Banna or Mawdudi. Mirroring similar developments abroad, a newer British born
generation questioned received wisdom and became critical of basic concepts, ethos
and struggled with the challenges of reconciling their faith inspired activism in a
secular, non-Muslim society. Many started broaching controversial and difficult topics
and attempted to rethink the merits of Islamist approaches to religious reform.19 A
Late 19th Century and
early 20th Century
Reformist Thought
Jama'ati -Islami
UKIM Islamic
Foundation
Al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimin
Muslim
Student Society
FOSIS
Hizb ut-Tahrir
Dawatul-
Islam
Islamic Forum
Europe (IFE)
Muslim
Association of
Britain (MAB)
Young
Muslims UK
Young
Muslim
Organisation
(YMO)
Cordoba
Institute
British Muslim
Initiative
Islamic
Society of
Britain (ISB)
Muslim
Welfare House

8. 8
couple of cases illustrate this dilemma. The Director of the New Horizons, project,
Dilwar Hussain, was a committed Islamist in his youth and previously an executive
member of Young Muslims UK and President of ISB, stated that:
I would like to suggest–perhaps counter-intuitively that it is actually an
indication of the demise of Islamism; at least old-style, traditional Islamism of
the type that sought to create and ‘Islamic state,’ an Islamic version of a
Hobbesian Leviathan to govern society.20
Similarly Inayat Bunglawala, an executive member of the Young Muslims UK during
the 1990s, and former spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain, wrote in his
blog:
When I was younger I was taught by many senior Muslim leaders in the UK
and elsewhere that secularism was akin to atheism and that only a truly
Islamic state which enforced the Shariah would provide the real answer to
humanity’s problems. Looking back, I just shake my head and can’t believe I
actually swallowed that argument for so long. It is just so embarrassing.21
The 2000s became a transitional decade as internal centripetal and external
centrifugal forces imposed changes upon these trends, pressuring them to make a
number of adaptive changes to their objectives, organisational structures and modes
of operation. The post 9/11 and 7/7 climate transformed socio-political environment
in which these organisations operated, how they engaged with Muslim communities,
the state and wider society.22 For some it was pragmatic, while many others came to
the realisation that Islamism had no future in the U.K. Most jettisoned their
ideological rhetoric and were gradually displaced by a younger generation of Islamic
activists.
Today, the first generation Islamist organisations established in the 1960s and
1970s have given up on their founding missions of ‘establishing Islam in Britain’ as
they have been compelled to come terms with realities of living in minority context.
As a result, they are integrationist in outlook and have opted to find ways of
practising their faith in a secular, liberal democracy and instead focus on a mixture of
religious education, charity and inter-faith projects. 23 Those established later such as
the MAB which is loosely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, appear to have taken

9. 9
the Tunisian, An-Nahda path of co-operation with a diversity of groups that include
secular and non-Muslim organisations. While some critical observers argued that
this represented a tactical alliance building with the Leftist groups that shared the
MAB’s anti-war positions against the invasion of Iraq in 2003, insiders at leadership
level within the MAB believe that working closely with non-Muslim groups broadened
their horizons and led to organisational rethinking and redirection of their original
objectives.
While some members of the MAB and other formerly avowedly Islamist oriented
organisations such as the IFE, DI and UKIM, remain personally sympathetic to
Islamism, they have conceded that Islamist objectives are not realistically achievable
in Britain. Among these groups, only HT has openly retained a consistent ideological
commitment to its vision of a establishing a caliphate, though as an organisation it is
has become a minor player on the current activist scene.24
8. New Millennium Activist Organisations and Platforms
The impulse to reform lapsed Muslim youth and proselytise to wider society has
been taken up by a new British born generation of organisational actors that includes
prominent converts in a new complex revivalist landscape. Today, first generation
organisations and their offshoots coexist alongside new cultural trends, public
engagement forums, social enterprises, e-activists and service-based agencies. The
groups that have become the most successful are those that seek to represent the
needs and aspirations of Muslim communities at the grassroots.
In this space, Islamic education projects, Muslim cultural entrepreneurs and
advocacy organisations are three of the most visible types of religious activism.
Islamic proselytisation continues at local level and national levels by organisations
such as iREA and ongoing reformist movements like the Tablighi-Jamaat. In terms,
of socio-political activism, a cluster of networked activist that include; Cage, MEND
and 5 Pillars, have accrued a substantial following among younger activists,
which has been described by some as ‘Salafi-Islamist’. This moniker is rejected by
the people it is directed at. As one Muslim researcher explained:

10. 10
Salafi-Islamism is problematic because it includes groups and individuals who
have never been associated with British Salafism. Al-Muhajiroun was
considered a Salafi-Islamist and Salafi-Jihadi group but only adopted the
name around 2010 - after they were banned - otherwise it is well known that
they were vocally anti-Salafi up to this point.25
At the very least, one could argue that there are shared interests between this
loose network of individuals and some of them privately have Salafi
theological leanings and hold Islamist political sympathies. In the last
decade, ultra conservative Salafi forms of religiosity have drawn the attention of
media and policy makers and are accused of providing the theo-political ideology
that rationalises terrorist violence. Salafism as a creedal tendency refers to a
religious reform stream within Sunni Muslims that foregrounds theological purity and
proximity to the beliefs and practices of the first three generations of Muslims.
Salafism is a highly fissiparous phenomenon with both activist and quietist
orientations and is globally in competition with Islamists movements.26 Salafism as a
religious paradigm is constantly adapting and there are various splinter groups and
factions that draw inspiration and direction form scholars in the Middle East. Unlike
Islamists, Salafis do not organise themselves into hierarchical organisations, but
function through networks of scholars, students and followers. In Britain, most shun
public activism in favour of religious education and community building, while other
more pragmatic British Salafis are becoming increasingly visible in public debates.27
British Muslim socio-political activism has grown immeasurably as digital
technologies have enabled the emergence of an ever growing number online
platforms and self-styled “Social Media Shaykhs.” It is difficult to precisely pinpoint
their theological/ideological orientations, but most of these religious influencers are
young men with little formal religious training or academic expertise, and like most
YouTubers, appear to be interested in gaining followers and monetising their online
presence. Their messages are a mix of proselytising, crude inter-faith debates or
focus on critiquing other Muslims.28 They appeal to younger Muslims who prefer to
express their particular religious values on digital advocacy platforms and in network
hubs rather than formal, hierarchical movements. A large degree of British Muslim
activism is co-ordinated online in the social media feeds of Twitter, Facebook and

11. 11
WhatsApp, and is manifested offline in public spaces that are popular among young
people.
9. Who are the British “Islamists” Today?
A number of the aforementioned second generation, organisations have been
accused of promoting divisive or extreme ideas.29 Their critical opposition to aspects
of British foreign policy and domestic counter-terrorism strategies have resulted in
them being labelled as Islamists. Examining their literature and activities, it becomes
clear that they have no interest in pursuing the themes associated with traditional
Islamist groups even though they appear to resemble some of their characteristics.
This is unsurprising as vigorous public activism is central to both classical Islamist
groups and contemporary Muslim activism.30 Most are concerned with addressing
the pressing issues facing British Muslims but are not trying to Islamise the U.K.
Asked whether vocal advocacy organisations should be described as Islamist, one
young Imam argued that:
It is not useful to call Muslim activist groups Islamist, as the term is either
conflated with Islam by those who lack religious literacy or is used to make
lazy generalisations about politically active Muslims. Also, it is used as a
cover by Islamophobes to express their hate against Muslims.31
Today’s activist groups are interested in mainstream civic engagement projecting a
confident Muslim public identity, securing religious rights and offering strident
critiques of government policies judged to be harmful to Muslim communities. The
current generation of activists have little knowledge or interest in the agendas of
transnational Islamist trends. This makes continued use of the term Islamist to
describe these groups unhelpful and inaccurate. A female leader of one Muslim civil
society organisation argues:
Islamism unfortunately is at the current time and for perhaps almost two
decades, a pejorative term that conveys simply negative associations with
regard to Muslims and their beliefs. There is no actual descriptive content to

12. 12
the term but is levelled as a term of demonisation. It means whatever the
user wants it to mean, thus is useless to understand Muslims.32
While some individuals from Muslim activist groups espouse highly conservative
Muslim religious values and produce exclusionary, supremacist apologetics that
appear to be incompatible with liberal secular British values –the same could be said
about a number of other conservative, faith groups. Similarly, the fact that some
Muslim groups robustly oppose specific state policies is hardly unique, as vigorous
disagreement takes place every day between political parties, secular, non-Muslim
lobby groups, human rights agencies and mainstream media commentators that
would not be considered as subversive or extreme.
Activists groups such as Cage, IHRC, MEND and similar groups share a narratives
committed to supporting what they consider as “Muslim rights issues” - focusing on
challenging Islamophobia, representing Muslims in the mainstream media, critiquing
the Prevent policy and British foreign policy and engaging policymakers. They share
overlapping narratives about these issues, but this does not mean that they are anti-
integrationist or ‘non-violent gateway organisations’ that route people on a linear
progression to supporting violent movements.
British Muslim activist groups have been accused by some analysts of political
entryism into mainstream public institutions.33 This assessment confuses
participation for infiltration. Many former Muslim activists wanting to participate in
British public life have become accomplished professionals in various fields and
continued their faith based activism by setting up their own entities or joining
mainstream NGOs and civil society organisations like Liberty, Human Rights Watch
or have became members of the main three political parties to represent Muslims
and serve broader society.

13. 13
10.Size and Reach of Activist Groups
The groups identified above operate largely online and hold regular events that are
usually well attended but rarely surpass a few hundred people. They are nationally
and internationally networked, possess significant online followings on Facebook and
Twitter and have an active presence in some of the cities and towns with significant
Muslim populations.
Their menu of campaign issues resonate with socially conscious young people who
feel strongly about issues affecting British Muslims and see these organisations as
speaking up against Islamophobia and discriminatory state policies.
11.Jihadists: The Violent Minority
At first glance, Jihadists committing terrorist atrocities appear to share some
overlapping concerns with mainstream Islamists; however, the vast majority of
Islamists do not espouse violence as a political strategy. Put succinctly, all jihadists
are Islamists but not all Islamists are jihadists. As one researcher of Islamism argues
‘referring to both ISIL and the AKP as “Islamist”, is akin to referring to the KKK and
the Church of England as both Christian. While technically accurate, for those who
are not familiar with the nuances involved, it is unhelpful and even
counterproductive.’34
The modern jihadist movement can be traced to 1960s Egypt. A crackdown on the
Al-khwan al-Muslimin, beginning in the 1950s led to the emergence of radical
splinters inspired by the writings of MB ideologue, Sayyid Qutb. The mainstream of
the movement distanced itself from Qutb’s views, but these lived on in the splinters
that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and mutated into groups like Islamic Jihad and
Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya.35 One scholar of political violence notes:
The jihadi label is indicative of a recognizable movement in modern Sunni
Islam— “the jihadi movement.”…jihadis in fact describe themselves not only
as mujahideen but as jihadis. They are, in their own words, “the jihadis”

14. 14
(al-jihadiyyun) and their movement is “the jihadi current” (al-tayyar al-jihadi),
“the jihadi movement” (al-haraka al-jihadiyya), or simply “jihadism” (al-
jihadiyya).’ 36
Jihadist thinking presumes a binary division of the world into belief and non-belief. In
this dichotomous perspective, the world is in a state of jahiliyya (ignorance), Muslim
and non-Muslim states are in a permanent state of war until Islam attains global
supremacy. Governments in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, are judged
to be apostate, corrupt pawns of American and Western cultural and economic
hegemony. In light of these conditions, jihad is interpreted as an obligation on all
Muslims.
Jihadist discourses migrated to the UK with the arrival of the exiled ideologues and
nomadic former Mujahideen in the early 1990s. Exiled preachers and scholars such
as Abu Basir al-Tartusi , Muhammad al-Surur and Abu Qatada who focused
predominately on British Arabs while Abu Hamza, Abdullah el-Faisal and Omar
Bakri promoted jihadist ideas among young British Muslims They laid the
groundwork for the jihadist networks that proliferated in the mid-2000s.37 Today this
stream of Muslim activism is represented by Al-Muhajiroun and its successor groups
who have openly identified with and supported Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-
Shahbbab and other terrorist groups. This theo-political approach has been called
“Takfirism,” “Neo-Khawarij” or “Salafi-Jihadism.”38
Salafi-Jihadism is particularly modern fusion of ultra-conservative Salafi theology
with political ideology. It has been theorised by ideologues such as Abu Mus'ab al-
Suri, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Ayman al-Zawahri, who have attempted to
stretch pre-modern consensual precedents associated with the operationalisation of
jihad in the new situations created by modernity, particularly to American global geo-
strategic hegemony. They are recognisable for their insistence on justifying suicide
bombing as tactic of asymmetric warfare and condone the killing of innocents,
including other Muslims as collateral damage.39
This stands in contrast to mainstream Islamist thinkers that argue classical
conceptualisations of jihad are restricted the use of violence to military combatants.40

15. 15
Salafi-Jihadis also accuse mainstream Islamists of being theologically and politically
compromised and judge them to be heretics. It is important to stress that there is
an incomparable distinction between the activist groups highlighted in this paper
and the jihadist likes of Al-Muhajiroun who have not only helped to send some British
Muslims to join ISIS but have engaged in violent confrontations with members of
activist organisations.
12.Concluding Remarks
The British Muslim activist scene is incredibly divergent and will continue to diversify
on the basis of theological, political, ethnic, gender, class interests.41 Very few
organisations like HT still openly espouse a politicised vision of Islam as most British
Islamist inspired movements have evolved to such as degree that they no longer can
be classed as such –the Young Muslims UK and ISB being obvious examples.
Islamism a political project in Britain has failed, with a number of organisations barely
surviving various internal crises during the mid-1990s and has been in decline since
the beginning of the 2000s. They were unable to adapt successfully to the U.K
context due to a number of factors that include ideological inflexibility, generational
change and a generally inability to be relevant to second and third generation British
Muslims.42
While some contemporary Muslim activist groups appear to display similarities with
Islamist movements, they clearly do not share the aims, objectives or modus
operandi of the founding organisations of the settler generation. Simplistic attempts
to categorise current activist organisations into ‘Islamist/extremist’ and ‘moderate’
or ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ Western, are not only analytical unsustainable, they do not help
advance the serious work of challenging violent radicalisation. Even if individuals
may hold a personal affinity towards internationalist Islamist politics – this is not
necessary translate into the organisations that they work with. And while some
individuals associated with groups like Cage and iERA have vocalised inflammatory
rhetoric and appear to hold illiberal, conservative religious values and are fiercely
critical of government policies –that in of itself does not mean that they should be
labelled as “Islamists” or be linked to the rejectionist discourse of Takfiri jihadist
extremists.43

16. 16
Taking an adversarial position against British government foreign and domestic
security policies does not mean that politically assertive Muslim activist groups ally
themselves with transnational Islamist movements otherwise, large numbers of
secular human rights groups, pressure groups other faith organisations could also be
said to hold Islamist sympathies. State and non-state actors interested in
understanding Muslim theo-political extremism need to be able to distinguish
between groups interested in religious revival, faith based advocacy, sympathisers
of non-violent transnational movements and the dangerous extremists who
encourage social division and condone violence. Engagement does not mean
agreement. While it may result in difficult conversations, it is an undeniable fact that
many of the activist organisations highlighted in this paper represent the concerns of
a substantial cross-section of Britain’s diverse Muslim communities and should be
engaged.44 Addressing the issue of theo-political inspired violence necessitates
openness to dialogue with critical voices that may have something of value to share
in tackling the difficult issue of extremism.
END NOTES:
1 A Note on Methodology: I have relied on existing scholarly literature on Islamism, government and
think-tank reports and analysis of material produced by activist groups. I also conducted face to face
and email interviews with several well known activist organisations and individuals not associated with
these groups. This included leadership figures from the East London Mosque, MAB, MCB, Ramadhan
Foundation, MEND, IHRC, iERA, CAGE and academics from the British Islamic activist scene such as
Dr Abdul Haqq Baker and Dr Abdullah Al-Faliq.
2 The Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (est. 1928, Egypt) and Jama’ati-Islami (est.1941, India) are considered
as the two founding movements to have inspired Islamist socio-political reform organisations around
the world. For well authoritative introductions see; Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in

17. 17
Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–1994. Ithaca Press, New York. 1996 and
Brigette Marechal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse. Brill, Leiden. 2008. On the
Jama’ati-Islami, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi & The Making of Islamic Revivalism, Oxford
University Press. Oxford.1997, and his The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: Jama’at Islami
of Pakistan. I.B.Tauris, London. 2002.
3 Humayun Ansari, The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain Since 1800. C Hurst & Co Publishers,
London. 2004, p.34.
4 Philip Lewis, Young, British and Muslim. Continuum, London, 2007, p.200.
5 For authoritative surveys of British Muslim communities see Ansari, op.cit, Sophie Gilliat-Ray
Muslims in Britain: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
6 The Hanafi school is named after the influential scholar Abu Ḥanifa an-Nu'man ibn Thabit (d. 767)
and is one of the four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence that is followed in many parts of South
Asia, Central Asia and Turkey.
7 Barelwis derive their inspiration from nineteenth century Indian Sufi reformer Ahmed Riza Khan. The
Deobandis are named after their seminary in Deoband India and are known for their strict adherence
to the Hanafi jurisprudence. The Jama’ati-Islami was founded as a religious revivalist movement and
later became a major political party in Pakistan. The Ahl al-Hadith is another reformist movement also
founded in mid- nineteenth century India and is recognised for its strict textual literalism and is often
thought of as ‘Salafi’ in its approach to religion.
8 Jørgen Nielsen. Muslims in Western Europe. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2004, p.121.
9 Jonathan Laurence. The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The States Role in minority Integration.
Princeton University Press. New York. 2012.
10 For an extended treatment of the dynamics of how revivalist organisations competed with each
other to define religious identity in Britain, see my Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground
of British Islamic Activism. I. B Tauris. London. 2018.
11 There is a vast literature on the subject of Islamism, for a sophisticated examination see, Richard
C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar (eds), Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam, Stanford
University Press, 2009. Other important works include Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of
Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, University of Michigan Press, 2011,

18. 18
Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, Princeton
University Press. 2009.
12 Op.cit, Martin and Barzegar, p.9.
13 This has been recognised in some media outlets and language updated as a result, see for
example: Steven Nelson. The Associated Press Revises Another Politically Charged Term. Stylebook
entry for 'Islamist' revised two days after 'illegal immigrant' dropped. April 4, 2013:
https://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/04/04/the-associated-press-revises-islamist-
another-politically-charged-term
14 The FCO has noted that ‘Islamism can include overtly extremist views, opposition to democracy,
and attitudes that are fundamentally hostile to the West and liberal, progressive societies. Written
evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (ISL0047). Foreign and Commonwealth Office
policy towards Political Islam:
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-
committee/political-islam/written/33360.html
15 For more on the historical centrality of the Caliphate within Sunni Muslim thought, see Reza
Pankhurst. The Inevitable Caliphate? A History of the Struggle for Global Islamic Union, 1924 to the
Present, C Hurst & Company. London. 2014.
16 Email exchange with Dr Abdullah Al-Faliq, 8th April 2019
17 See for example, Shadi Hamid and Will McCants, Rethinking Islamist Politics, Rethinking Political
Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
18 Peter Mandeville, et al, Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe. Pew Forum on
Religion & Public Life. September 2010, p. 22.
19 These included ‘the relationship between party (hizb) and movement (haraka), internal
organizational structures (tanzim), the nature of the state, the use of violence, and the centrality
elections to the Islamist project’ cited in Shadi Hamid and Will McCants, Rethinking Islamist Politics,
Rethinking Political Islam,p.3.
20 Sufis, Salafis and Islamists, p.119.
21 Ibid, p.119-20.

19. 19
22 One striking example was in 2009 when the Islamic Foundation renamed the halls from Islamist
ideologues such as Mawdudi and Al-Banna to Conference Hall, the IF Seminar Room and so on.
23 Some researchers have suggested that these movements are not ‘so much Islamists aspiring for an
Islamic state but are concerned with institutionalising an Islamic worldview and moral framework
throughout society.’ Damon L Perry. The Global Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: A Social Movement?
PhD Thesis. War Studies. Kings College. 2016: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-global-
muslim-brotherhood-in-britain(05f199f6-23d4-40c6-b0c6-a7cc0d54a3d7).html
24 HT lost its position as influential British Islamist movement in the late 1990s, for further information
see Sufis, Salafis and Islamists.
25 Email exchange with author on 8th April 2019.
26 For more background, see Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement.
C Hurst & Co Publishers, London. 2009.
27 A prominent example, is the Islam21c website, which does not formally identify its Salafi leanings:
https://www.islam21c.com/
28 See for example; see the YouTube accounts of ‘Dawah Man’
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4RAPKTimwYGWPXONABby6w ) ‘Ali Dawah’
(https://www.youtube.com/user/TheDawowProject ) Mohammed Hijab
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHDFNoOk8WOXtHo8DIc8efQ ). For further analysis of British
Muslim online cultures see Hussein Kesvani, Follow Me, Akhi: The Online World of British Muslims.
C Hurst & Co Publishers. London 2019.
29 For example, the recent Tony Blair Institute for Global Change Report on Narratives of
Division: The Spectrum of Islamist Worldviews in the UK: https://institute.global/news/narratives-
division-islamist-worldviews
30 It is necessary to point out that Muslim public activism is also performed by individuals and groups
who would not normally be considered as Islamists. This includes oppositional politics by those who
are thought to be apolitical such as various Sufi groups and people from various traditionally quietist
Deobandi backgrounds and even self-identifying secular Muslims, who are equally critical of
government counter-terrorism strategies and British foreign policy and certainly would not describe
themselves as supporters of political Islam.
31 Email exchange with author, 8th April 2019

20. 20
32 Email exchange with author, 8th April 2019
33 This is evident in the reports and publications of think-tanks such as the Henry Jackson Society,
Policy Exchange and Quilliam Foundation.
34 See written evidence from Usaama al-Azami. (ISL0048):
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-
committee/political-islam/written/34160.html
35 For an insider’s account see, Abdullah Anas (with Tam Hussein) To The Mountains: My Life in
Jihad from Algeria to Afghanistan. Hurst & Co Publishers. London. 2019.
36 Cole Bunzel. Jihadism on Its Own Terms Understanding a Movement. Hoover Institute. Stanford
University. 2017.
37 In fact pre-11 September extremist discourses were tolerated as ‘an annoying, containable
irrelevance by most British Muslims, and were the subject of tacit “covenant of security” between such
groups and the intelligence services, the police and the government.’ Yahya Birt, The Radical Nineties
in Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World, (eds) M, Al-Rasheed &
M, Shertin. Hurst & Co Publishers, pp. 105-110.
38 For a good overview of this trend see Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, The History of an Idea,
C Hurst & Company, London. 2016.
39 Jihadists instrumentalise violence in the name of Islam to engender socio-political change and
include a spectrum of movements inspired by Al- Qaeda and ISIS. For detailed discussion see Jarret
Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice. Routledge, London. 2008.
40 For an in depth treatment of the distinctions between normative understandings of Jihad and
Jihadism, see El Saied M. A. Amen, Reclaiming Jihad: A Quranic Critique of Terrorism. Islamic
Foundation. Leciester.2014, and Asma Afsaruddin, Striving in The Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom
in Islamic Thought. University Press, Oxford. 2013.
41 For more background, see Philip Lewis and Sadek Hamid, British Muslims; New Directions in
Islamic Thought, Creativity and Activism. Edinburgh University Press. Edinburgh. 2018.

21. 21
42 This sense of crisis and future uncertainty has been acknowledged to the author by several senior
members of former Islamist orientated organisations. For further detail, see Sufis, Salafis and
Islamists.
43 Cage is linked to several controversies, see for example; "Amnesty International considers cutting
links with pressure group Cage," The Guardian. 2 March 2015, iERA has been criticised for various
shortcomings in the Inquiry Report, Islamic Education and Research Academy (iERA), Charity
Commission for England and Wales, 4 November 2016, p. 9.
44 The government has engaged with Islamist movements at the international level, see the written
evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Op.cit:
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-
committee/political-islam/written/33360.html