FINAL - A Hazard analysis and vulnerability assessment for the Philadelphia Center City Rail Tunnel 10-28-09

Hazard Analysis 1
Hazard analysis and vulnerability assessment for the
Philadelphia Center City Rail Tunnel
Vincent P. Mulray

Hazard Analysis 2
Certification Statement
I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of
others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where
I have used the language, ideas, expressions, or writings of another.
Signed:

Hazard Analysis 3
Abstract
The problem is that the Philadelphia Fire Department has not analyzed a terrorist
threat to the Center City Rail Tunnel. The purpose of this research is to analyze
characteristics that would affect emergency operations at a center city rail incident that
was caused by a terrorist event or man made disaster and identify strategies that could
improve the performance of fire department operations. Descriptive research was used to
answer the following questions: (a) What is the experience of other communities?
(b) What is the risk to Center City Philadelphia? (c) What characteristics would help or
hinder fire department operations? and (d) What recommendations could be made to
improve fire department operations? Literature review, personal observation and
interviews were conducted, with the results being to recommend that the current
operational procedure for railroads be updated. Preplans of all railroad facilities are
conducted by the fire department. That training is enhanced to include familiarization of
the characteristics of a railroad, along with awareness of suicide bombing incidents.
On duty field Fire Battalion Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs to be part of the Alert Philadelphia
Emergency Communications Network or similar system in order to have real time, up to
date information of emergencies in their areas of responsibility.

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Table of Contents
Abstract……………………………………………………………….…….....…page 3
Table of Contents………………………………………………….…………......page 4
Appendices...............................................................................…..........................page 4
Introduction……………………………………………………………………....page 5
Background and Significance…………………...………………………….…….page 6
Literature Review………………………………………………………………...page 9
Procedure………………………………………………………………………....page 22
Results………………………………………………………………..………......page 28
Discussion………………………………………………………………….….....page 29
Recommendations……………………………………………………..…………page 40
Reference List……………………………………………………...………….....page 42
Appendices
Appendix A: Philadelphia Fire Department,…………………………………..page 47
Operational Procedure #12
March 1998, Subject: Railroads

Hazard Analysis 5
Hazard Analysis
Introduction
Since the first railroad came to the United States 175 years ago, there have been
deaths and injuries attributed to it. As they say on the railroad, “the rulebook is written in
blood.” The first part of this study will describe and analyze three major railroad
passenger train accidents. The carriers include four major railroad companies serving the
eastern part of the United States. These three incidents all occurred in a pre-911 world.
The second part of the project will focus on incidents that involved explosives placed on
passenger trains. This will examine several recent incidents involving passenger train
bombings. I will attempt to look at these incidents in a post 911 environment to identify
factors that will have a positive or negative effect on future events. The problem is that
the fire department has not analyzed a terrorist threat to the Center City Rail Tunnel.
The purpose of this research is to analyze characteristics that would affect emergency
operations at a Center City Philadelphia rail incident and identify strategies that could
improve the performance of fire department operations. This study will use descriptive
research methodology by conducting interviews, personal observation and a literature
review. This research was conducted to answer the following questions: (a) What is the
experience of other communities? (b) What is the risk to Center City Philadelphia?
(c) What characteristics would help or hinder fire department operations?
(d) What recommendation could be made to improve fire department operations?
The goal of this paper is to prepare responders in Philadelphia to the challenges that will
be faced at rail emergencies in order to reduce the magnitude and severity of casualties to
the public.

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Background and Significance
William Penn first established the City of Philadelphia in 1688 (Hike Out 1999). Penn
laid out the city in a block plan or grid system that he thought would reduce the effects of
fire. Large parks placed throughout the city would serve as firebreaks and bricks were
used to construct houses because of their fire resistive characteristics (Hike Out 1999).
From its inception in 1688 until March 15, 1871, the fire service in Philadelphia was all-
volunteer. Due to rivalry between companies and an attempt to make the department
more professional, the 100 volunteer companies were organized into a paid department
consisting of 22 engine and five truck companies on March 15, 1871 (Hike Out 1999).
The City of Philadelphia has a population of 1,517,550 people and serves an area of
approximately 142 square miles (United States Census Bureau [USCB], 2000). Within
the city limits are two airports, a refinery, several major railroad lines and approximately
350 high-rise buildings. For the calendar year ending 2008, the department reported that
its 60 engine companies, 30 ladder companies and 50 medic units responded to 425,515
emergency responses. Approximately 23% of the total responses were for fire
emergencies and 77% of all responses were for medical emergencies (PFD General
Memo #09-22, February 20, 2009).
The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter of 1956 authorizes the Philadelphia Fire
Department (PFD). The department‟s budget for fiscal year 2004 was $179,335,635 with
an authorized strength of 2,300 personnel (PFD 2004). The Fire Commissioner is the
highest-ranking uniformed position in the department. Two deputy commissioners assist
him, and the Mayor of the city appoints all three. The Deputy Commissioner for
Administrative Services is responsible for management information, fiscal, warehouse

Hazard Analysis 7
and all department facilities (PFD 2004). The Deputy Commissioner for Operations is
charged with the day-to-day activities of the fire academy, safety office, emergency
medical services, aviation unit, special operations command and all firefighting forces
(PFD 2004). To assist the Deputy Commissioner of Operations the city is divided
geographically into two halves. A deputy chief, who responds to working fires of a large
magnitude in their geographic area and all extra alarm fires, commands each half. The
city is further broken down into 11 battalions, with each battalion chief being responsible
for 4 to 7 stations consisting of as many as 10 different apparatus. Each company has a
minimum manning requirement of an officer and three firefighters; every ladder company
is staffed with an officer and four firefighters (City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Fire
Fighters‟ Union, IAFF Local 22 [2005-2008]).
Every recruit firefighter starts their career at the Philadelphia Fire Academy. The
academy is staffed with a director (deputy chief), deputy director (battalion chief),
operations captain and five staff lieutenants as instructors. All recruits are required to
pass the sixteen-week academy (PFD 2004). Upon graduation, the cadet enters service as
a probationary firefighter qualified as a Pennsylvania Certified Emergency Medical
Technician and since 2007, Pennsylvania State Firefighter II certified to the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) #1001 level.
The area studied for this project covered is approximately three square miles and
includes the 1.7-mile long center city commuter rail tunnel. The center city district
forms a “corridor for hospitality, destination retail, office and high-density, mixed-used
development with easy connections at 30th
Street to the Northeast Corridor and to
Philadelphia International Airport” (Center City District, 2009). A survey conducted by

Hazard Analysis 8
the Center City District found that 77% of respondents felt that the area was safe.
The community risk and capability assessment referenced in the Executive Analysis of
Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management identified three general areas that
planners should be concerned with. Natural threats that include the effects of nature,
human-caused that would comprise the most common threat, from operators and
controllers errors (train crashes) and terrorism and other national security threats (train
bombings). These general categories represent a wide perspective of hazards that affect
the life safety of the public (National Fire Academy 2009). Rather than look at each type
of incident separately, an all hazard approach was taken to identify similar characteristics
that would affect any incident. Former Department of Homeland Security Secretary
Thomas Ridge stated that (Roberts 2009):
The greatest national threat is a growing sense of complacency – and an eroding
sense of urgency – to be mindful of the kind of world we are living in. The
further we get away from 9/11, the more concerned I am. It‟s not the emergency
management professionals: the first responders, our fire chiefs, our police chiefs.
It‟s the general public who has become a bit more apathetic then we had hoped.
The goal of the Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency
Management Course is to give senior fire service leaders the tools “to manage the
operational component of a fire department” and develop a comprehensive approach to
address the multi-hazard environment we work and live in (National Fire Academy
2009).
This hazard analysis and vulnerability assessment for the Philadelphia Center City
Rail Tunnel is directly related to the United States Fire Academy goals and objectives to

Hazard Analysis 9
promote within communities a comprehensive, multihazard risk reduction plan led by the
fire service organization and to respond appropriately in a timely manner to emerging
issues (National Fire Academy, 2005 p. II2).
Literature Review
Railroad accidents have been part of our society since the early 1800‟s. Adams states
that the first accidents were the “result of ill-conceived mechanical devices or poorly-
designed rail beds” (Adams, 1992, p.9). As the years passed, greed and mismanagement
contributed to the increasing number, and severity of accidents (Adams). Adams also
states that “elements of human error and human frailty” lurked behind the cause of rail
accidents (Adams).
Kimball & Stambaugh state, “few modes of transportation are as safe and familiar to
most Americans as that of rail”. “But when a passenger rail emergency occurs it can
present one of the most challenging types of incidents to emergency responders”
(Kimball & Stambaugh 2003).
The following case studies will identify similar problems such as access to passengers,
location of the incident and the number of casualties involved.
The first incident reviewed, the worst in Amtrak's history, occurred on January 4,
1987. Amtrak's Colonial #94 collided with Conrail freight ENS-121. Of the 616
passengers and crew on board, 184 were injured and sixteen killed. At approximately
1:30 P.M. on Sunday, January 4, 1987 Conrail's ENS-121 and Amtrak train #94, the
Colonial, filled with holiday travelers, collided in Chase, Maryland causing the worst
accident in Amtrak's history (NTSB, 1988).

Hazard Analysis 10
The weather for January 4, 1987 was bright sunshine to hazy sunlight according to
witnesses and members of the Conrail crew. The National Weather Service recorded the
temperature at thirty-eight degrees with sunshine and surface visibility at ten miles at the
time of the incident (NTSB, 1988).
The crash took place at a location named Gunpow in Amtrak‟s Northeast Corridor
Employee Timetable, seventy-nine miles south of Philadelphia. Gunpow is a remote
controlled interlocking that uses an arrangement of signals and appliances interconnected
at the merging of tracks to control the movement of trains (Amtrak, 1988; 1-3).
The interlocking merged Amtrak's Northeast Corridors three high speed tracks,
capable of carrying trains up to one hundred and twenty-five miles per hour, into two
tracks, to cross the Gunpowder River Bridge.
The area around the crash site was made up of residential neighborhoods divided by
undeveloped lots and bogs (NTSB, 1988). Two, two-lane paved roads bordered the site
with limited access. South of the crash site were rows of single-family dwellings
bordering the main access road and backing up to the railroad. The closest fire station
was located 1.4 miles south of the crash site (NTSB, 1988).
The first dispatched units consisted of fire apparatus with a hazardous materials unit.
As additional information was received at the dispatch center, the assignment was
upgraded. Also dispatched was a multiple casualty response with a medical group
consisting of four medic units, an emergency medical services supervisor, engine
company and a battalion chief (Ferrall, 1988; 42). Before this incident was under control,
approximately one hundred and forty-three pieces of apparatus with over five hundred
personnel responded (Banister, 1987; 54).

Hazard Analysis 11
First arriving units were met with a diesel fuel-fed fire that covered an area of fifty
feet by one hundred and fifty feet and threatened the Conrail locomotives and three
passenger cars. Besides the fire, it was observed that all twelve cars of the Amtrak train
had derailed and the first three passenger cars were stacked on top of each other. Initial
estimates were that between one hundred and two hundred passengers were injured
(Ferral, 1988; 42). The Incident Command System was activated and Amtrak command
was established. A quick knock down of the involved fire-impinged passenger cars was
accomplished by the first due Engine Company using AFFF foam (54). As this was
under way, a size-up indicated the need for additional medical units. Three additional
medical groups were requested, bringing sixteen ambulances on the initial dispatch.
The Incident Command System was used to divide the incident into seven sectors to
adapt to the large number of injured passengers covering a large area. Two sectors were
identified for primary triage, treatment and transportation, one for the east end and one
for the west end of the incident (Farrell, 1988; 44). This was needed because the incident
was linear in nature with cars spread out over a large area.
A staging area was established to keep the crash site free of apparatus. Most of the
resources needed came in the way of personnel needed to lift and move the injured.
An extrication sector met the demands required to free the many-trapped passengers.
Rescuers found out early that their techniques and tools normally used for automobiles
were ineffective in displacing the metal of a forty-ton passenger car (45). Some rescuers
worked eight to ten hours to free one passenger (46). The last living passenger was freed
at 12:30 A.M. on January 5, 1987, some eleven hours after the crash (Marshall, 1987;
52).

Hazard Analysis 12
The last sector to be instituted was a "clearing point for passengers who refused
service" (Ferrell, 1988; 44). Of the 674 passengers and crew on board both trains, 484
passengers received no injuries at all. One hundred and sixty one patients were treated
for injuries ranging from minor to serious and fifteen passengers and one engineer were
killed (NTSB, 1988).
Besides the Fire Department command post, the state and local police set up two
additional command posts. All three command posts were near each other to allow, "face
to face communications" (Banister 56). One of the first priorities for the police was to
cordon off the crash site and restrict access of civilian bystanders to keep the narrow
roads clear for emergency vehicles.
The second case study involved two New Jersey Transit trains. On February 9, 1996,
in Jersey City, New Jersey two commuter trains with a combined passenger count of 750
people, hit, causing 121 to be transported, eighteen critical with three deaths (NTSB
1996). At 8:40 A.M. Friday, an eastbound commuter train en-route to Hoboken, New
Jersey with approximately 650 passengers failed to stop at a controlled signal.
Simultaneously a westbound train with between 50-100 passengers on the main line
struck the eastbound train. The crash resulted in three deaths and 121 passengers
transported to area hospitals, with eighteen in critical condition (NTSB 1996).
The weather for February 9, 1996 was a mild forty-two degrees with cloudy skies and
a calm wind (NTSB, 1996), a drastic contrast to the freezing temperatures and heavy
snowfall of a week earlier (McNulty, 1996).
This incident occurred at a location on the railroad named Bergen Junction.

Hazard Analysis 13
At Bergen Junction, the Bergen Line merges with the Main Line. A dispatcher in
Hoboken, New Jersey remotely controls all the signals and switches at this location.
Access to the south of these two lines was by a narrow dirt service road used by railroad
maintenance personnel. This road was inadequate to handle the large emergency vehicles
responding. To the west of the crash site was Croxton Yard. Croxton Yard is a high
security rail yard. A twelve feet high fence topped with razor wire surrounds the yard.
Once you entered the yard, egress was not possible due to beds of spikes, which allowed
you to go in, but not out (McNulty, 1996).
The first report of a train crash came from a passenger using a cellular phone. At first
the dispatcher doubted the authenticity of the call because there were no cries or calls for
help, and the caller did not know his cellular phone number. After a second cellular call
was received and additional information gathered, emergency units were dispatched
(McNulty, 1996).
At 0855 hours, four engines, two ladders, a rescue and a battalion chief from the
Jersey City Fire Department was dispatched to Croxton Yard. With the first-in chief
having prior knowledge of the security features and accessibility problems for the area
from previous responses, he opted to stage his companies outside the yard and investigate
with the first engine and ladder companies (McNulty, 1996). The chief's investigation
revealed that the accident was outside the rail yard. He immediately radioed dispatch of
what he saw and redirected staged companies to the incident while he made his way out
of the yard (McNulty, 1996).
First arriving units made a size-up of the incident, established command, and reported
to dispatch and the first in battalion chief the severity of the incident.

Hazard Analysis 14
They observed that two commuter trains had collided and several cars had derailed.
The primary search revealed several dead with scores of walking wounded. It was also
seen that the first car of the eastbound train was listing with the possibility that it could
roll over, and take with it the other five cars in a domino effect. Due to the numerous
injured, help was requested, and a second alarm was struck (McNulty). Due to the very
limited access to the accident scene, all but a few of the responders had to walk into the
incident. The nearest paved road was three quarters to one mile from the scene.
The resources of the first alarm companies were divided between the two trains.
Each train was considered as a separate sector with a battalion chief assigned to each
train. Most of the rescue activities consisted of removing, packaging and transporting
injured patients. The engineer of the westbound train was the first death encountered.
The engineer of the eastbound train was found trapped in the front of his cab car.
Extrication of the eastbound engineer and passengers were made more difficult due to the
listing of the car. The number of rescuers working in this car was restricted to keep it
from rolling over. Later in the incident, a front-end loader was brought in and its bucket
placed against the leaning train to stabilize it. The fire department contacted New Jersey
Transit and Conrail to stop all train traffic in the area, and that electrical power be shut
down to the rail system (McNulty).
Accountability of passengers at this crash was a major concern to the incident
commander. Unlike the airlines, the railroads do not know who is on their trains.
With accountability in mind, a secondary search of both trains and the surrounding area
was made. The area around the crash site consisted of marshes and open fields.
The marshes were searched for passengers who might have wandered away.

Hazard Analysis 15
The secondary search also revealed that the locomotive of the westbound train had a
quarter inch tear in its fuel tank. At that time a Jersey City Fire Department hazardous
material team was dispatched. The hazardous materials team plugged the leak in the
2500-gallon tank with approximately 100 gallons of diesel fuel leaking on the right of
way (NTSB, 1996).
To keep the scene clear of emergency vehicles, a staging sector was established.
All incoming units reported to the staging area approximately one mile from the incident.
When a company's services were required, they had to walk into the scene on the dirt
road carrying all tools and equipment necessary for their task (McNulty, 1996).
Due to the large number of injured, two triage and treatment sectors were established,
one for the east and one for the west ends of the incident. In addition to the two primary
triage areas, a secondary triage and treatment sector was established in close proximity to
the staging sector (McNulty).
Local and state police responded to this incident. They were used to secure the scene
so that curious onlookers and the public could not access the site. They also took control
of keeping traffic clear in the area to keep emergency vehicles moving. The police were
also used to guide and direct the ninety units responding. Thirty-one medic units
responded, some coming from as far as thirty-five miles away. The police met incoming
squads at the Vince Lombardi Service Plaza on the New Jersey Turn Pike and escorted
them ten at a time to the incident. Once the ambulances were loaded, some with three or
four patients, the police would secure a route from the accident scene to the hospital so
that medic units from outside the area knew where they were going (McNulty).
In order to move the large numbers of patients and non-injured passengers,

Hazard Analysis 16
New Jersey Transit brought in two rescue trains. Patients on spine boards and those in
need of immediate transport were placed in the first car. This aided ambulance crews in
off-loading patients once they reached the roadway. The use of rescue trains was a slow
and time-consuming operation due to the large numbers of passengers and rescuers in the
area. Coordination and communications was maintained with the rescue trains by
assigning a fire department member with a portable radio to it (McNulty).
The third incident occurred on February 16, 1996 in Silver Spring, Maryland.
Amtrak's Capitol Limited and a Maryland Commuter Rail (MARC) train smashed
together, causing a fiery derailment. Twenty-six passengers were injured and eleven
were killed. At approximately 5:40 P.M. Amtrak‟s Capitol Limited and a Maryland
Commuter Rail (MARC) train collided, causing a fiery derailment (NTSB 1996).
At the time of the crash the temperature was a cool 17 degrees Fahrenheit with snow
falling. Visibility was limited due to the time of day, dusk, and a driving snow (NTSB).
The Silver Springs area received a record accumulation of 10 inches of snow for that day
(Flinn, 1996; 57).
The crash occurred on the Brunswick line just outside of Washington D.C. The
location on the railroad is named George Town Junction. George Town Junction is a
controlled crossover that can route trains between the two tracks (NTSB, 1996). CSX
train dispatchers in Jacksonville, Florida control this interlocking (Gillis, 1996; B.5).
The area around the crash site consisted of “heavily wooded, snow covered hills” (Flinn,
1996; 57).
Civilians using cellular phones to the 911 system called in the first report of the crash.
The reports indicated that there was a train derailment with a fire. At that time, the

Hazard Analysis 17
Emergency Communications Center dispatched a structural box alarm consisting of four
engines, two ladders, and one-rescue squad and support units. With additional calls
coming in, the assignment was upgraded, and three more engines, an aerial tower,
five ambulances, three mobile intensive care units and a hazardous material unit were
dispatched (Flinn, 1996; 57).
First arriving units climbed down the 100 foot steep snow covered hill to find the
“scattered and shallered wreckage” of the two trains. It was observed that the two trains
were burning furiously and were separated by several hundred feet of destruction (57).
The first arriving fire officer reported that the first car in the MARC train “was fully
engulfed in fire” (Wald, 1996; 1). With the reports of numerous injuries, a second alarm
was requested (Flinn, 1996; 57).
To combat the raging passenger car fires, several hundred feet of hose line had to be
stretched to the burning cars. This arduous task took firefighters through chain link
fences and down the wooded snow covered hill (Flinn, 1996; 59).
Due to the problems accessing the accident site, a third alarm was requested. In
addition to the third alarm, a rarely used EMS box alarm was dispatched due to the
numerous injuries (Flinn, 1996; 59). By the time this incident was under control, over
200 personnel with 18 engines, 9 ladders, 6 rescue squads, 17 medic units, 9 ALS units
and other support vehicles responded.
The Amtrak train was being operated in the pull mode with the engine at the front of
the train. The MARC train was in the push mode with the engineer operating his train
from the cab car. While the Amtrak train was crossing from track two to track one, it
collided head on with the MARC train (Wald, 1996; 1). The impact tore the diesel fuel

Hazard Analysis 18
tank on the Amtrak train open and opened up the lead car of the MARC train. The
fireball that followed killed eleven passengers in the lead two cars (Janofsky, 1996; 1).
Twenty-six passengers were injured and required transport to area hospitals (Flinn, 1996;
59). Passengers in the lead car “described a scene of terror, with orange flames spewing
from a fire fed by diesel fuel and lapping at the car, as thick black smoke spread inside”
(Janofsky, 1996; 22). Inside the burning car, people were screaming in a panic, looking
for a way out. Electric operated doors were disabled due to the crash. “Passengers would
have needed a coin, ideally a quarter to open the doors” (Gillis, 1996; B.1).
At a 2009 rail accident, the deadliest in the Washington D.C. Metro‟s history, a Red
Line metro train slammed into the rear of a stopped train causing nine deaths and injuring
76 (Firehouse.com 2009). Preliminary investigation revealed that the striking train
operator applied the emergency brake when visual contact was made, even though the
train was being operated in the automatic mode (Msnbc.com 2009). This accident and
other similar ones “exemplify an automation paradox”; where the operators rely on
automation instead of human thinking (Vedantam 2009). Vedantam (2009) found that
the “real problem often lies in the relationship between humans and their automated
systems.” A false sense of security or a reliance on automation can cause an operator to
trust a machine over their good judgment.
The second part of this literature review will examine several incidents involving
terrorist passenger train bombings. I will attempt to look at these incidents to identify
critical factors that will have a positive or negative effect on fire department operations.
My goal is to anticipate some of the challenges that will affect the Philadelphia Fire

Hazard Analysis 19
Department if a similar incident were to occur in Philadelphia, and to demonstrate why
planning is so important.
These incidents were chosen for several reasons. First, the passenger train bombings
received national media coverage, as each was a high profile disaster. Second, in
Philadelphia and across the United States, we are vulnerable to the terrorist suicide
bomber. We are free to travel as we please with little or no restrictions. Our rail lines,
trains and train stations are easily accessed. A terrorist commuter could easily board a
train, leave a bomb-laden backpack or brief case in the overhead compartment or under
the seat, and disembark at the next station undetected. The third reason this topic was
chosen comes from the opinion of the law enforcement community. Thomas Seamon‟s
2008 presentation on security issues at St. Josephs‟ University identified explosives to be
a high priority threat (T. Seamon, personal communications, May, 2008). The
Philadelphia Police Department also considers bombs to be the choice weapons device of
mass destruction. Low-tech bombs are easy to make, store and transport as compared to
more sophisticated biological and nuclear devices. Lieutenant Thomas Fitzpatrick,
Commanding Officer of the Philadelphia Police Bomb Unit, identified targets of
terrorism to be “choke points for masses of people” and our rail system has this
characteristic at all three Center City Stations. Lt. Fitzpatrick also stated “imitation by
other groups is inevitable” (T. Fitzpatrick, personal communications, July 11, 2009). The
RAND Corporation, a nonprofit company that provides objective analysis to government
and the private sector “found that the most prevalent terrorist threat to rail systems comes
from bombings” (Wilson et al., 2007).

Hazard Analysis 20
On March 11, 2004, three years and six months to the day following the World Trade
Center disaster, a coordinated attack on Spain‟s commuter rail system occurred. Thirteen
backpacks and gym bags packed with as much as twenty-five pounds of high explosives
were left on crowded commuter trains. Ten of the bombs exploded when terrorists used
cell phones as the detonators to unleash their reign of terror. Four separate trains were
targeted with multiple bombs (Ghosh, 2004).
The results caused over two hundred deaths and 1,500 civilians injured (Dickey, 2004;
27). The remote detonation was referenced in the Al-Qaeda terrorist manual entitled
Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants. “Explosives are believed to be the
safest weapons… they allow holy warriors to get away from the enemy and to avoid
being arrested”. “Explosives don‟t leave any evidence of traces at the operating site and
strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright” (Bin Laden, 2000). The terrorists intended
to detonate their bombs at crowded train stations, but due to the trains being delayed, they
exploded in tunnels that made emergency services access more challenging, but reduced
the number of dead and injured.
Temporary hospitals were set up at a sports stadium near the Atocha Station to treat
the hundreds of injured commuters (Anderson, 2004). In addition, separate hospitals
were established at each incident. Other issues that Spanish officials faced for the city of
over three million people were a shortage of blood, overcrowded roads hampering
responding ambulances and the fear of additional explosions. This fear, the same that
grounded the U.S. commercial air service after 9/11, also shut down the passenger rail
service in Madrid, Spain.

Hazard Analysis 21
On Thursday, July 7, 2005 in London England, suicide bombers targeted the Tube,
London‟s railway system. The Tube is a system of 275 stations. The system carries
approximately 150,000 passengers an hour, with 45% of the system underground. The
attacks resulted in 52 civilians killed and over 700 injured (BBC News, 2005). At 8:51
am the first of four blasts occurred on train #311 near the Russell Square Station. The
train was in a tunnel 70 ft. below street level. The train was also 850‟ from the station.
Eyewitnesses described the scene as “Smokey, very hot and everybody panicked” as
passengers self-evacuated through the tunnel (Thomas, 2005). The second bomb
exploded at about the same time as the first. Train #204 was in the Aldgate Station when
a bomb placed on the floor in the rear of the second car exploded. The third explosion
took place on train # 216 just as it left the Edgware Road Station. Passengers described
the blast as a large flash of light (BBC News, 2005).
Six civilians were killed and over 120 were injured. The last bomb exploded at 9:47 am
on the # 30 double-decker bus near Tavistock Square (Thomas, 2005). The bus was
diverted from its regular route due to the tube bombings earlier in the morning. Ten
pounds of explosives were placed on the second level and the blast tore off the bus‟s roof
and killed 13 civilians. The investigation revealed that the bombers made practice runs
on the rail system, another indication that the attacks were well planned (BBC News,
2005). The suspects all were “lily white” with no past history or background of criminal
activity (Thomas, 2005).
Procedure
Descriptive research was used for this report. The procedures used to conduct this
Applied Research Project (ARP) included a literature review, personal observation of the

Hazard Analysis 22
rail system, and interviews of public safety professional in order to gain knowledge of the
prevention and response aspects of rail emergencies.
The literature review was started at the National Fire Academy‟s Learning Resource
Center while at the NFA in May of 2009. Additional searches were conducted at Holy
Family University Library in Philadelphia PA, and with the author‟s personal library
between May and October 2009. The literature review focused on case studies of rail
passenger accidents, passenger train bombings and publications related to security of the
United States passenger rail system in order to gain a base of knowledge on the subject
matter.
The personal observation component of the ARP was conducted by riding the South
Eastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) Regional Rail Train. The R7
train, which runs from Trenton N.J. to Chestnut Hill East via Center City Philadelphia
was boarded at the Torresdale Station. This station was chosen because it resembled the
outlying stations that the terrorists chose to launch their attacks from in London, England
and Madrid, Spain.
The observation started in the parking lot of the train station and continued for the
entire ride into Center City Philadelphia. Once in Philadelphia, 30th
Street, Suburban and
Market East Stations were surveyed. The direct observation was compared to base line
security measures for rail systems provided by the RAND Corporation (Wilson et al.,
2007). These baseline measures were developed for a hypothetical rail system.
Some of the deficiencies noted include the lack of surveillance systems at parking lots,
station platforms and entrances to rail stations. In walking the entire center city
concourse area that included train platforms, the presence of uniformed police patrols

Hazard Analysis 23
was limited to non-existent. A survey of trash and recycling containers at Market East
and Suburban Station revealed that they were constructed of ordinary material and not the
blast-resistant material recommended by the Rand Corporation (Wilson et al., 2007).
A limited number of cameras were observed on the track boarding level, but no one
responded when the author wandered into restricted areas or entered stored, empty trains.
The one station that had a noticeable level of safety and security was Amtrak‟s 30th
Street Station. Both SEPTA on the upper level and Amtrak on the lower level share this
station. In the main Amtrak North waiting room armed guards patrolled, surveillance
cameras were observed at numerous locations, and a camera is focused on every entrance
to the track boarding area. Passengers are not permitted to enter the train platform area
until directed by a train loader. Trash receptacles in this area appeared to be constructed
of heavy steel that could contain a blast. Passengers are reminded that police may
confiscate unattended bags. Access to the upper floors of the station is controlled with
keypad controls at the elevator lobby.
While waiting for the train at the Torresdale Station a random interview was
conducted with a waiting passenger. After some small talk I informed her of my research
and asked her if she felt safe riding on the train? She replied:
From a SEPTA rail/conductor standpoint, I do, but from a terrorist standpoint, I
don‟t. There are no cameras at my station (Torresdale) or the parking lot. The
center city stations are open for passengers and cars to freely enter. SEPTA has
been poor to communicate with the public when there was a delay or the reported
bomb threat (M. Marvel, personal communications, September 25, 2009).

Hazard Analysis 24
This personal observation was conducted on September 25, 2009, by riding the 10:01am
SEPTA R-7 train from Torresdale Station and concluded with a return trip ending at
3:28pm. Observations were recorded during the entire day and all components of the
system were photographed in order to capture a record of the day‟s observations.
A second day of direct observation was conducted on October 5, 2009 using the
author‟s personal vehicle. Each of the three center city stations were observed from the
exterior for access points, close circuit surveillance systems and uniformed security
patrols. Access to the underground service tunnel, a former bus terminal that serves three
of the 11 high-rise office buildings was made with no restrictions. The tunnel transverses
a full three city blocks underground and terminates at 16th & John F. Kennedy Boulevard
adjacent to the concourse station and track area. The 12‟- 6” high roadway is protected
by a sign that reads, “This area monitored by CCTV for security purposes and warns,
“No Tractor-Trailers Permitted in Tunnel.” While in the tunnel, multiple vehicles were
observed parked in areas that are posted “no parking loading zone 15 minute limit”.
On both occasions that I observed this area, the same vehicles were seen along with
multiple stake body and delivery trucks. Numerous cameras protected this area, but no
one challenged my presence whether in my vehicle or as a pedestrian.
Telephone interviews were conducted by calling the PFD Technical Support unit
head, the Office of Emergency Management and the SEPTA Police Department.
Interviewees were selected for their experience and expertise in the center city commuter
tunnel and fire department operations. Limitations in this study were challenges in
contacting key personnel that would answer a telephone interview. Most of the calls
involved messages left with receptionists or voice mail; cooperation was enhanced if I

Hazard Analysis 25
had previous contact with the interviewee or a referral from an associate. Several
interviews generated limited information and are not included in this section.
Interview #1: Deputy Chief Joseph McGraw, Technical Support Unit, PFD.
Telephone interview conducted on September 21, 2009.
Q. 1, Has the fire department analyzed a terrorist threat to the center city rail tunnel?
R. Not from a terrorist standpoint. The fire department has toured the tunnel area
annually since it opened in 1984. Operational Procedure #12 (Appendix A) addresses
guidelines for Philadelphia Fire Department operations at railroad incidents.
Q. 2, Do you sit on any committees that focus on this tunnel area?
R. I do not personally, but the Hazmat Materials Administration Unit (HMAU) interacts
with outside agencies, such as the F.B.I. on an as needed basic (D.C. McGraw previously
served as the unit leader for the HMAU).
Q. 3, On September 18, 2009 the FBI and counter terrorism officials warned mass transit
systems to step up patrols for backpack bombs, has the PFD been warned of this?
R. The fire department usually does not get this type of information police get the
intelligence.
Q. 4, Has a hazard vulnerability analysis been conducted for the center city rail tunnel?
R. Not to my knowledge, O.P. #12 addresses specific characteristics for fire department
operations on railroad property.
Q. 5, Are fire department officials part of the ALERT system? (Alert Philadelphia is an
emergency communication network that provides real time information to public safety
officials and private industry in the center city district).
R. Fire Department upper level leaders and key unit heads are notified of emergencies by

Hazard Analysis 26
a similar system called RSAN.
Q. 6, Since 911, is terrorism something that your unit addresses regularly?
R. Eight years later the need and the urgency have tapered off, other issues have come
up.
Q. 7, Is there anything on the drawing board to address the terrorism issue?
R. Philadelphia is in the process of opening a fusion center to share information and
intelligence. Our current Emergency Operations Center was built on the premise of a
natural disaster, the fusion center focuses on future terror events, and it hinges on
intelligence.
Interview #2: Lieutenant Charles Lawson, Special Operations Unit, SEPTA Police.
Telephone interview conducted on October 6, 2009.
Q. 1, Does SEPTA have a written emergency preparedness plan approved by the
Federal Railroad Administration under the procedures of the Code of Federal
Regulations, section 239.201?
R. SEPTA Police do not participate in this process; a security review board that
covers the entire SEPTA system handles this.
Q. 2, Does SEPTA have a liaison contact with the Philadelphia Fire Department?
R. To my knowledge, one is not established.
Q. 3, Are there any known threats to the center city rail tunnel?
R. Nothing known, nothing specific.

Hazard Analysis 27
Q. 4, Has a hazard vulnerability analysis been conducted for the center city rail
tunnel?
R. A threat and vulnerability analysis has been conducted for the rail tunnel. Most of
the information is security sensitive, but the Market East and Suburban Stations
have been identified as high threat/attractive targets.
Q. 5, On September 18, 2009 the FBI and counter terrorism officials warned mass
transit systems to step up patrols for backpack bombs, has the SEPTA police force
been warned of this?
R. Yes.
Q. 6, Are SEPTA police and train officials part of the Alert Philadelphia emergency
communications system?
R. My Supervisor, the Captain of SEPTA Police participates in the Alert
Philadelphia System.
Q. 7, There are a limited number of cameras on the train platform and vehicle tunnel
of Suburban Station, but when I tested the limits of authorized access in these
areas I was not challenged. Do you know why?
R. The cameras in these areas are recorders; no one is monitoring the track level
cameras.
Q. 8, Are there any security improvements on the drawing board for this area?
R. Within the next two years SEPTA will be installing 40 new cameras in the
Suburban and Market /East Stations. These stations will be part of a smart station
system.

Hazard Analysis 28
Results
Descriptive research was used to review the topic of rail emergencies in the Center
City Rail Tunnel, and to identify strategies that could improve the performance of fire
department operations. Interviews were conducted with experts in the field of public
safety. This author found an abundance of information during the literature review that
was used to answer the following questions:
Question #1-What is the experience of other communities?
The literature review produced hundreds of rail incidents from around the world.
Some of the similarities that can be found in each include: Each incident, whether it was
caused from a manmade or terrorist event, overwhelmed the capabilities and resources of
the fire department. Each incident was managed with a unified command system
consisting of agencies from the federal, state and county levels. Experience has shown
that any rail incident will be faced with challenging terrain, extrication issues and
extensive medical demands.
Question #2-What is the risk to Center City Philadelphia?
In most situations, risk comes from a definite threat. Even though there is no specific
threat to the rail system, this topic is operations sensitive and is centered within the law
enforcement community. The risk to all rail systems in the United States comes from the
open system we enjoy, living in a free society where we can travel unimpeded. This
freedom contributes to the inherently vulnerable rail system we have. A second risk
category we face comes from automation. As society continues to rely on an automation
to operate and control trains the challenge will be for operators and train controllers to
process information. Most accident and injury investigations focus on mechanical or

Hazard Analysis 29
human error. A relatively new theory focuses on “the relationship between humans and
automated systems (Vedantam 2009).” The risk from mechanical or human error will
always be a factor at rail incidents.
Question #3-What characteristics would help or hinder fire department operations?
Characteristics that would help or hinder fire department operations focus on the
physical characteristics of the railroad. For the most part we know what the rolling stock
of our local rail companies consist of. We know the general locations and lay out of
railroad right of way and stations. This information is critical for preplanning an all
hazard event at a rail line or station. One of the most valuable assets would be the
railroad company. Expertise and equipment would be critical at any incident. By
including railroad companies in the preplanning stage, critical people, procedures and
equipment could be identified.
Question #4-What recommendations could be made to improve fire department
operations?
Each incident reviewed had common challenges that highlighted the need for critical
information to be relayed to the first responders and commanders. The need for a unified
command system would enhance the coordination of multiple agencies that would
respond to an incident of this magnitude. Joint training exercises prior to an incident
would facilitate command and control issues. The need to inform the public of where to
go to check on loved ones or information is critical to manage a scene.
Discussion
By analyzing the critical factors present in these incidents, I was able to identify
factors that must be addressed in order to mitigate incidents of this magnitude.

Hazard Analysis 30
As any real estate agent will tell you, location is paramount in selling a property.
Just as in real estate, location of the incident and accessibility to the scene is the number
one factor in determining the amount of apparatus, personnel and equipment that will be
needed to bring the accident to a close. In addition to location, the extent of the incident
will dictate the type and amount of resources needed.
In each incident the remote locations and narrow roads challenged the responders.
In the Chase incident, the narrow residential roads provided the best access in comparison
to the other incidents. The two lane roads along the railroad were a challenge to keep
open. In Jersey City, the remoteness of the incident taxed the fire department, with
responders walking over one mile to the incident. In this incident, scene security
benefitted from the remoteness. Police could easily restrict access to the area. In Silver
Springs, responders were faced with a trek through chain link fences and down a 100-foot
snow covered hill to access the scene.
The Chase incident was the most deadly, involving 616 passengers with 16 deaths.
The Jersey City trains carried 750 people; of them there were three fatalities. In the
Silver Springs crash,
with over 200 on board, 11 perished due to fire. The key elements that link the Chase
incident and the Silver Springs incident are fire and death. Both incidents involved a
large volume of fire fed by the locomotives diesel fuel tanks. Both incidents resulted in
double-digit death counts.
The weather affected the passengers and rescuers alike. The temperatures for the
three accidents ranged from 38 degrees in Chase to 17 degrees in Silver Springs. Most
passengers have been on the train for several hours and would have removed their coats.

Hazard Analysis 31
The unexpecting shift from train passenger to accident victim would have subjected many
to the elements. Injured patients and those requiring extrication would have been
severely affected. The temperatures in a shaded exposed train car would have been much
lower than those recorded. Responders would have to provide shelter for the walking
wounded, and blankets for the injured waiting to be transported to prevent hypothermia
from setting in. In the Jersey City incident, the mild weather turned the single narrow
access road into mud. In Silver Spring the subfreezing temperatures, coupled with ten
inches of falling snow, hampered rescue efforts.
The large area each incident occupied mandated the need to call for help early in the
incident. In each incident, the first in company or incident commander requested
additional resources in the form of extra alarms. With the average length of a passenger
car being approximately 85 feet long, two trains end to end would cover an area of
several thousand feet. This large area would require that the incident be broken down
into manageable sections. The incident command system would be used to sector the
incident. Each sector would have a person in charge coordinating activities and
maintaining communications with the incident commander. In the Chase and Jersey City
incidents multiple triage treatment and transportation sectors were needed due to the large
area that the incident occupied.
The time of day was a factor in every incident. The Chase incident was affected the
least by the time of day. 1:30 P.M. on a Sunday in January would have kept most people
at home watching football. The Jersey City incident occurred at 8:40 A.M. on a Friday.
This incident was affected by a delayed response due to traffic congestion from the
morning rush hour. The Silver Springs incident was also impacted by rush hour traffic.

Hazard Analysis 32
On a busy Friday evening at dusk, responders were faced with traffic-choked streets and
diminished visibility that increased response time.
As a veteran safety chief once stated, “communications is the essence of safety” (M.
Kucowski, personal communications, October 14, 2009). Communications were used to
request resources and coordinate activities among sectors. One communication problem
that surfaced at every incident was inter-agency communications. Railroad, state and
local police, along with mutual aid fire departments responded to all accidents. Each
responding agency operated on a different radio frequency that handicapped effective
communications among them.
The construction of modern rail passenger cars can both help and hinder emergency
operations. The major hazard of diesel-powered locomotives is the saddle type fuel
tanks, exposed on the sides of the engines. These tanks have a capacity to hold up to
5,000 gallons of diesel fuel. One characteristic of a modern passenger rail car that will
assist emergency responders is its crash survivability. It is a rare occurrence when the
structural integrity of the car is compromised. The undercarriage is made up of steel
I-beams and the outside skin is wrapped with stainless steel. The windows on a
passenger train car are made of lexan and this glass will not break. If access through the
windows must be made, the rubber molding zip strip must be removed and the glass
taken out in one piece. Due to the size and strength of the materials used in rail cars,
techniques and tools normally used for automobiles may not be effective.
Establishing and maintaining an adequate water supply was a critical factor in each
incident. Railroads were built before domestic water lines were laid in most cities.
Characteristics of a modern domestic water supply have hydrants adjacent to the railroad

Hazard Analysis 33
being fed by dead end mains. These mains are often the smallest in the distribution
system and are limited to the amount of water they can supply. In the Chase incident,
first arriving engine companies hooked up to hydrants from the residential neighborhood
in close proximity to the incident. In Jersey City, with no fire present, water supply
consisted of tank water from the first in Engine Company. Had the need for more water
been present, a relay operation would have had to been set up to the nearest hydrant
approximately one mile away. In Silver Springs, water lines were stretched several
hundred feet through snow-covered woods to reach the crash site. Due to the railroads‟
inaccessibility and remoteness, water supply will be a challenge at almost any rail
incident.
The knowledge and experience of railroad personnel will afford the incident
commander with a wealth of knowledge of the intricacies of railroad equipment.
Special matters in railroad passenger train crashes are varied and numerous.
Special matters are related to special people. Police are responders who fit into this
category. In every incident police were used to maintain the flow of emergency traffic to
and from the incident. This was done by blocking intersections to restrict civilian access.
The perimeter in the Chase incident was expanded several miles to the nearest interstate.
In addition to police, hazardous materials teams are needed for railroad accidents.
Diesel locomotives can carry up to 5,000 gallons of fuel and 450 gallons of lubricating
oils (Ryczkowski, 1993; 14). In the three incidents described, leaking diesel fuel was a
critical factor.
The highest levels of public safety in the city have identified critical infrastructures as
potential sites of concern. Potential “soft targets” include shopping malls and

Hazard Analysis 34
transportation systems. Personal observation identifies potential sites of hazards such as
high-rise offices and apartments, expressways and historical sites, but none of these is
more vulnerable to a terrorist attack than the rail transit system in Philadelphia. The
subway and trolley systems are underground in Center City Philadelphia. The regional
rail lines are approximately 75% underground while in the city. Since I have been
researching this project, I have found articles and news reports, almost daily, warning of
terrorists‟ attacks. As we wait for federal money to improve rail security, we must plan
now. U.S. officials are warning of highly credible information of “terrorists planning
major attacks” (Anderson, 2005).
Concerned groups such as the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen
have asked for a security alert to the public to “increase awareness when traveling on and
around Pennsylvania trains” (BLET, 2004). Tom Ridge, former U.S. Home Land
Security Secretary, was quoted in a visit to Philadelphia as saying, “if terrorists were
looking to disrupt things, they might take a look at our rail system” (PA). Pipe bombs
have been found in and around rail tracks in Philadelphia. Although the bombs were not
officially linked to terrorist activity, one has to wonder if these small incidents are a
primer to see how the emergency response community will react to a larger event. The
Philadelphia Daily News also reported that in 2000 and 2001, 20 devices were found in
the Philadelphia area, no suspects have been found, and no apprehensions made
(Weickselbaum, 2004). As recent as September, 2009 federal officials have arrested an
Afghan immigrant with ties to Al Qaeda and charged him in a plot to bomb the New
York City transit system (Meyer, 2009).

Hazard Analysis 35
The fire service is in the consequence business, unlike our counterparts in the police
department. Terrorism, bombs, mass casualties, medical services, and incident command
all have an effect on our mission to protect and serve. My research has shed a lot of light
on previous incidents and the capabilities of other public safety professionals, but due to
security reasons, whether from the fire or the many police organizations that serve
Philadelphia, information is confidential. The response I received was that the plans are
in the works, but are not public information. One has to wonder if we really do have a
plan, or is it a way for the political system to calm the public‟s fear. After an incident,
finger pointing will always take place, but rarely will you see a mayor or high-ranking
official step down.
Intelligent reports warn of an impending attack. We are vulnerable, but what are we to
do? In light of the Madrid and London bombings, train stations in the United States will
now screen passengers and luggage for explosives. Pilot programs are underway at the
New Carrollton, Maryland Amtrak Station. Passengers are screened as they walk through
a tunnel to board the train. A device that looks like a metal detector puffs samples of the
air to detect the presence of an explosive (Wald, 2004). In Massachusetts, the Bay
Transportation Authority will start inspecting passenger bags on trains. This will be the
first transit agency in the nation to do this. The inspections will be done physically and
with the help of bomb-sniffing dogs. The feelings of the public have been mixed thus far.
Some are concerned it will slow them down, or will turn into a form of racial profiling
(Lewis, 2004). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Massachusetts has
expressed concerns that the “U.S. Constitution‟s ban on unreasonable search and seizure
may be violated” (Lewis, 2004).

Hazard Analysis 36
The first line of defense in our society will be the train crews, local police and first
responders. As Craig Samtmann, Supervisory Special Agent for the F.B.I. stated, the
awareness and training of our first responders is critical. His terrorism quick reference
card outlines factors to consider: A.L.E.R.T.- alone and nervous, loose clothes, exposed
wires, rigid mid-section and tightened hands all are potential indicators of a possible
suicide bomber (C. Samtmann, personal communications, July 2009). The mass transit
community has also taken on the training of its employees to protect the public. The
National Transit Institute, in cooperation with Rutgers University and the U.S.
Department of Transportation, has produced a training video and employee guide to
system security. The guide “observe and report” identifies suspicious behaviors related
to people, packages, suspicious substances and threat at an incident response.
Our next rail disaster, whether caused by an accident or terrorism, will challenge the
emergency response community. We will be faced with an incident that is hard to access
with numerous injuries and death. We will face communication and logistics issues, but
will overcome these with preplanning and training. As Bill Jenaway once said, “Take a
good hard look at your operation and satisfy your own mind whether or not you can
improve your pre-planning activities.”(W. Jenaway, personal communications, May 20,
2009).
Anticipating where a bombing would most likely occur can change one‟s thought
process from being task level to a conceptual one. One of the best ways of assessing our
Center City district is by studying a map of the area. As outlined in Deputy Police
Commissioner Brennan‟s presentation on Information Systems at St. Josephs University,
maps are a valuable, critical tool for disaster management. (J. Brennan, personal

Hazard Analysis 37
communications, June, 2008). I requested and promptly received several large planning
maps with key infrastructure features such as hospitals, parks and highway locations.
The area of Center City is approximately 2 miles wide from the Schuylkill to the
Delaware River. Any major incident would affect the entire downtown area and at least a
mile to the north and south. Any incident on railroad property would be difficult to
access due to grade level changes, overhead wires and limited access because most of
Center City‟s rail is underground. The three major stations, 30th
Street, Suburban Station
and Market East all have unique characteristics. 30th
Street Station is the second busiest
station in the country and is a vital link in Amtrak‟s North East Corridor. Every Amtrak
and S.E.P.T.A. train must pass through this station. 30th
Street Station could be
considered the „Achilles heel‟ of Philadelphia‟s rail transit system. Suburban Station,
with its concourse level shopping and high-rise offices above, is the hub for four out of
the five SEPTA rail lines. According to Stacy Irving, Senior Director, Crime Prevention
Services for the Center City District, The Suburban Station Concourse system is
interconnected with 11 high-rise office buildings (S. Irving, personal communications,
September 25, 2009). The law enforcement community has also identified Suburban
Station as an area of concern. The Market East Station also is located below high-rise
office buildings and is attached to the largest Center City shopping mall.
Any incident, whether it was a fire, explosion or accident would be a major mass-
casualty event. At a major mass casualty incident, the fire department would be the lead
response agency as outlined in annex J, City of Philadelphia Health and Mass Casualty
Plan. The standard Incident Command System would form the framework for our plan.
On a local level, the City of Philadelphia would handle the entire incident. On a larger

Hazard Analysis 38
scale, terrorism or a catastrophic national event, the federal government has issued
“Recommendations for American‟s Fire and Emergency Services based on the events of
September 11, 2001, and other similar incidents”. This plan relies on the local
municipality to run the incident for up to 72 hours without federal assistance.
As with any incident, identifying and accessing the location is a critical first step.
A good initial report identifying the location and severity (size-up) sets the system in
motion. Police responsibilities would include crowd control, scene security and
establishing “law enforcement managed perimeters around the incident” (F.E.M.A). The
ability to keep access roads open for responders and departing medical units is critical.
On the suppression side, once the threat of fire is abated, the injured and trapped would
be the next priority. As in any mass casualty incident, key sectors of Triage, Treatment,
and Casualty collection and transport would all be instituted. Each sector would use a
team concept with a chief officer leading the group. At a recent airport drill (EPEX
2007) at the Philadelphia International Airport, a Captain, Lieutenant, two firefighters
and a paramedic supported the Casualty Transportation Officer (B.C.). At the Madrid
bombings, a separate field hospital was setup at each incident. Depending on the location
of the incident, city maps with key features would be used to identify parks, schools and
hospitals to use in the management of patient care. A medium to large-scale event could
take from several hours to several days to bring under control. “The triplication principle
decrees that if you need “X” number of officers and men to cope with a major disaster on
the first day of operation, you should have three times that number in order to provide
relief when the emergency extends into the second and third day of continuous operation”

Hazard Analysis 39
(Kramer, 1992). Few departments would have the personnel to carry on an extended
operation without outside assistance.
With any bomb incident, a secondary device with the intent to maim and kill
emergency responders must be anticipated. A secondary function of the Police
Department would be to secure the area of the incident and establish a safe buffer zone.
In Israel, where suicide bombings are almost a daily event, emergency responders are
kept out of an area involved until it is checked for other bombs. Medic units limit their
time at an incident and transport shortly after arriving at a scene.
On September 11, 2001, while the World Trade Towers were burning, Center City
Philadelphia and other major cities in the United States were being evacuated. No orders
were given, but businesses closed and the flight response in people‟s minds caused rush
hour traffic conditions at 11:00 am. By 3:00 pm, Center City Philadelphia was a ghost
town. If an explosion were to happen in Center City, the people who work and visit the
city would be drastically reduced. According to data from the Center City district,
Central Philadelphia Development Corporation Center City office salaries pump in $5
billion and the city‟s hospitality sector contributes $553 million to the five county area
and parts of New Jersey. The loss of this large tax base would cripple the city‟s ability to
stay in business and interfere in providing basic services such as police, fire and garbage
collection for the 1.4 million residents of the city.
The great World War II leader Winston Churchill once said, “The farther back you
look, the farther forward you are likely to see.” Rail accidents have been occurring since
the railroad first came to the United States. It is only a matter of time before the city of
Philadelphia experiences their next train crash. The eastern part of the United States has

Hazard Analysis 40
been peppered with such incidents in the past several years. By looking back at these
accidents we can get a picture of what our next major rail incident will look like.
In addition to looking back we can also look ahead. In each incident outlined, the
accident occurred at the merging of one or more tracks. By surveying the railroad in
Philadelphia for accessibility and critical merging points, specific hazard areas could be
preplanned. Since we preplan major buildings and specific hazards, it would not be
unrealistic to have local fire companies survey their first-in local for controlled track
intersections. In every incident studied, the death rate compared to the total passenger
count was relatively low; on the other hand every accident was large enough to be a mass
casualty incident. In looking back we could expect our next railroad passenger train
crash to be hard to find, in an inaccessible location with many injuries. We will face
communications, logistics and coordination problems. The only way we will be able to
meet the challenges of tomorrow is to preplan today.
Recommendations
The Philadelphia Fire Department has a long history of providing innovative
approaches to emerging issues. The information provided in this research identified
logistic, communications and security challenges. With this in mind, I believe that any
recommendations that will affect a department of 2,300 personnel that protects a city of
1.5 million people should go through a peer review process by a fire operations
committee consisting of all stakeholders.
The first recommendation would be to up-date Philadelphia Fire Department
Operational Procedure #12 (Appendix A). This 1988 procedure is comprehensive as
related to general railroad characteristics, but was written in a pre-911 setting and does

Hazard Analysis 41
not address the post-911 terrorist environment we live in.
The second recommendation would be enforce the station captain‟s responsibility to
preplan railroad facilities and right-of-way as required by operational procedure #12,
section 3.1. Thought required for the past 11 years few companies could produce these
preplans.
My third recommendation would be to require all members of the Philadelphia Fire
Department to attend a day of training. This training would consist of railroad
characteristics, prevention, and response to suicide bombing incidents in order to raise
awareness to the hazards involved. All major railroads have responder training available.
My fourth recommendation would be to appoint a transportation liaison officer for the
Philadelphia Fire Department. This officer would be the liaison between the fire
department and all outside agencies that have rolling stock. This would include, but
would not be limited to, railroads, highway administration, state police and the trucking
industry. This officer would represent the fire department at the Center City Philadelphia
Crime Prevention Council and other organizations where intelligence is shared among the
public safety community.
My final recommendation would be for Philadelphia Fire Department Battalion Chiefs
and Deputy Chiefs to be part of the Alert Philadelphia Emergency Communications
Network or similar system in order to have real time, up to date information of
emergencies in their areas of responsibility.

Hazard Analysis 42
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Hazard Analysis 43
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Janofsky, M., (1996, Feb. 17). As fiery crash ended dreams, survivors fled.
New York Times, 1, 22.
Kramer, W. & Bahme, C., (1992). Fire officers guide to disaster control.
Saddle Brook, N.J.: Pennwell Publishing Company

Hazard Analysis 44
Kimball, J. & Stambaugh, H., (2003). Rail emergencies special report
(USFA-TR-094/February 2003). United States Fire Administration
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MSNBC.COM, (2009). NTSB: Train‟s brake depressed
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Hazard Analysis 45
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Hazard Analysis 46
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Hazard Analysis 47
Appendix A:
PHILADELPHIA FIRE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
SUBJECT: RAILROADS
1. PURPOSE
To provide guidelines for Philadelphia Fire Department operations at railroad
incidents.
2. DEFINITIONS
2.1 AIR PLENUM
An enclosed space in which air travels. The air pressure in this space is greater
than that of the outside atmosphere.
2.2 CATENARY SYSTEM
A system of wires suspended between poles on the Amtrak, Conrail and SEPTA
right-of-ways. These wires carry a voltage of approximately 13,200 volts AC.
The wires at the very top of these poles carry a voltage of approximately 138,000
volts AC.
2.3 CONDUCTOR
The member of a train crew who is responsible for the collection of fares on
passenger trains, and has control of the hazardous material shipping documents
aboard freight trains.
2.4 CONCOURSE
An open space or hall in a railroad terminal where crowds gather to board trains.
2.5 CONSIGNEE
The waybill receiver of a railcar.
2.6 CONTACT (TROLLEY) WIRE
The overhead wire from which the pantograph collects current.

Hazard Analysis 48
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
2.7 DIRECT CURRENT
An electric current that flows in one direction and is constant in value.
2.8 DUAL FEED
Two separate and independent sources of electrical power.
2.9 DWELL SPACE
A half-round indentation in the walls of a railroad tunnel.
2.10 ELECTRIC TRACTION DEPARTMENT CLASS "A" CREWS
Lineman that are first class mechanics. These mechanics, with the aid of
grounding poles, are responsible for making direct contact with high voltage
power lines in order to establish a positive ground.
2.11 EMERGENCY
An emergency will be any incident which affects the safety of passengers or
people on the Amtrak, Conrail or SEPTA right of ways.
2.12 ENGINEER
A federally certified individual who directly controls the movement of a railroad
train.
2.13 FEEDER
A heavy wire conductor that supplies electrical current, at some point, to an
electrical distribution system.
2.14 HAZARDOUS MATERIAL (HazMat)
Any material which, when released from its container, poses a threat to the health,
safety, and welfare of human beings and/or the environment.
2.15 HVAC
Heating, ventilation and air conditioning.

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PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
2.16 PANTOGRAPH
A device located on top of electrical equipment which collects power from the
overhead contact wire by means of a sliding contact shoe.
2.17 PANTOGRAPH POLE
An insulated pole with a metal hook at one end, designed to manually raise or
lower a pantograph. Stored on the side of electrical engines, it can also be used to
force side windows of passenger cars.
2.18 POSITIVE GROUND
A definite physical connection between the catenary wire and the catenary tower
by means of a grounding pole that is equipped with specialized clamps.
2.19 QUALIFIED EMPLOYEE
Class “A” electrical railroad power group employees qualified to erect, repair and
maintain electrical apparatus and catenary systems. These employees are also
qualified to use hot line tools and work on circuits energized to 138,000 volts.
2.20 RESCUE TRAIN
A train brought to the incident scene to assist in moving and transporting of
injured and ambulatory passengers.
2.21 RIGHT-OF-WAY
The property owned or leased, by a railroad, for the purpose of access and/or
operation of a railroad line.
2.22 SIDING
A short railroad track that is connected with the main track.
2.23 SUBSTATION
A location where power is received at high voltage and changed to required
voltages and characteristics for distribution to the catenary system, and other
electric apparatus.

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PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
2.24 TRANSMISSION LINES
A system of wires or cables, or both, used to transmit power at high voltage
between substations
2.25 WAYBILL
A document prepared by the carrier of a shipment of goods. This document
contains the details of the shipment's route and charges.
2.26 YARDMASTER
The person in charge of the operations in a railroad yard.
3. RESPONSIBILITY
3.1 STATION CAPTAINS
It shall be the responsibility of all station captains to preplan all sections of
railroad and facilities for their first due alarm area. These preplans shall include,
but not be limited to, accessibility, water supply, special hazards and auxiliary
appliances. These preplans will be distributed to all 1st alarm companies.
3.2 ALL MEMBERS
It will be the responsibility of each member to exercise the appropriate control as
dictated by his/her rank in the implementation of this operational procedure.
3.3 FIRE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER (FCC)
3.3.1 The Fire Communications Center (FCC) will contact all appropriate personnel
and departments on notification of a railroad emergency.
3.3.2 On a confirmed report of a train accident or derailment, FCC will dispatch
Rescue 1, with Rescue 101.

Hazard Analysis 51
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
4. PROCEDURES
4.1 INCIDENTS INVOLVING RAILROADS
4.1.1 The City of Philadelphia is serviced by five (5) railroad companies. Amtrak,
SEPTA and New Jersey Transit provide passenger service, with Conrail and CSX
moving all freight in the area. Passenger trains are powered by electric or diesel
locomotives. Freight trains for the most part are powered exclusively by diesel
locomotives.
4.1.2 The first-in fire department unit will notify the appropriate railroad via FCC, of
the exact location, any time fire department operations are on or near railroad
property.
4.1.3 Any time fire department operations are on or near railroad property, personnel
will be utilized to warn passing trains. A train will stop, anytime the engineer sees
a flag or light swung horizontally at a right angle to the track. Flag personnel must
go out a distance of 1-½ miles from the incident, for all rail lines in the
Philadelphia city limits. The flag person should have a portable radio with
him/her whenever possible.
4.1.4 All train cars are equipped with 480-volt electrical circuits. Do not attempt to cut
through or remove any electrical cables. Do not touch any electrical equipment.
Failure to heed this warning may result in electrocution.
4.2 MINOR FIRES ALONG THE RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY
4.2.1 Attack the fire from a position that will not interfere with the movement of rail
traffic. If it is necessary to cross the tracks, pass the hose line under the rails. Do
not shut down rail traffic for incidents involving minor fires.
4.3 MAJOR FIRES ALONG THE RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY
4.3.1 Before any firefighting operations commences in electrified railroad territory, the
Incident Commander shall contact the appropriate railroad, via the FCC, and
request electrical power be shut down. This is a time-consuming task, and should
be a consideration in all action taken.
4.3.2 The railroads will not declare any high voltage power line safe until they send out
a crew equipped with grounding poles. These crews are known as Electric
Traction Department Class "A" Crews. These crews will make direct contact with
the high voltage power lines and create a positive ground on the system. It can

Hazard Analysis 52
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
take fifteen (15) minutes to one (1) hour for the railroads to shut down the electric
current and place a positive ground on the system.
4.3.3 On the Conrail, Amtrak and SEPTA right-of-ways, the wires at the very top of the
catenary poles are energized at approximately 138,000 volts. These wires have
been installed on the Conrail, Amtrak and SEPTA right-of-ways by PECO Energy
under a leasing agreement. Conrail, Amtrak and SEPTA do not have control of
the power in these lines. To have the electric current shut down on these lines it
will be necessary to contact the PECO Energy Emergency Service (1-800-841-
4141) via FCC.
The Bell Telephone numbers of Power Dispatchers are as follows:
SEPTA Power Dispatcher (215)-580-6844
AMTRAK Power Director, 30th Street (215)-895-7435
AMTRAK Power Director, Harrisburg (717)-232-3319
4.3.4 The person-in-charge should only request a shut down of the electric current if it
is necessary to gain control of the fire. Arcing, caused by placing ladder pipes or
snorkels in proximity to the high voltage wires, wires directly exposed to the fire
mass evacuation of a train are all examples of when a shut down of the electric
current should be requested.
4.3.5 For fires of major proportion along the railroads, it will be necessary to halt all
rail traffic. The person-in-charge of the first arriving unit will contact FCC and
request that all rail traffic be halted.
4.3.6 Occasionally, railroad bridges and/or embankments afford us a vantage point for
the containment and control of major fires and eliminate the need for halting rail
traffic.
4.3.7 The halting of rail traffic can cause a backup of trains at remote locations. The
person-incharge of a major fire should release the railroad right-of-way when
conditions permit. He/she should not wait until the fire is completely
extinguished.
4.4 FREIGHT TRAIN RESPONSES
MANY FREIGHT TRAINS TODAY CARRY HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS,
BOTH LIQUID AND SOLID, IN THEIR DIVERSE CARGOES.

Hazard Analysis 53
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
4.4.1 If you respond to an incident/fire involving a box car or tank car, one of your first
actions would be to consult with the conductor or engineer. One or both of these
individuals carries information listing all cargoes and the location of all hazardous
materials the train. This knowledge will enable you to isolate the hazardous
materials if they are not involved in fire.
4.4.2 Due to the catastrophic potential of freight train cargo, and the frequency and
quantity of hazardous materials, every response must anticipate the worst case
scenario and consider the following actions:
a. Approach the incident site from upwind and uphill, position the
apparatus at least 2,500 feet from the scene until the nature and condition
of the response have been identified.
b. Secure the scene by using banner tape to keep people away from the
scene and outside the safety perimeter.
c. Assess the situation to determine the contents and potential hazards.
d. Do not walk into or touch spilled material. Avoid inhalation of fumes,
smoke and vapors, even if no dangerous materials are known to be
involved.
4.4.3 If the cargo is identified as hazardous, request that the dispatcher refer to the
proper texts and relay, back to the person-in-charge, the proper procedures for
handling the spill.
4.4.4 In a major derailment, select personnel from the railroad will respond to the
scene. The person-in-charge should consult with them on the most appropriate
measures to use for the situation at hand.
4.4.5 If the information regarding loaded freight or tank cars containing hazardous
materials is not readily available, then notify the CHEMICAL
TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY CENTER (CHEMTREC) PHONE # 1-
800-424-9300 via FCC.
4.4.6 For additional information on railroad hazardous materials identification systems,
refer to Operational Procedure #2, Addendum #2.
4.4.7 All members should be extremely careful of any electrical wires that may have
been severed or knocked down by the derailment. No contact should be made
with any electrical wires until a qualified railroad Electric Traction Department

Hazard Analysis 54
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
Class “A” employee has inspected the scene and declared it safe. Moving live
wires in any way, with poles or water lines, could cause arcing. If hazardous
materials are present, a fire or explosion could be generated.
4.5 DIESEL/ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES
4.5.1 Diesel/Electric locomotives have the capacity to carry up to 4,000 gallons of
diesel fuel per unit. If conditions warrant that the locomotive must be shut down,
the train crew must be advised. Control of the train's braking system relies on the
air pressure supplied by the locomotive. If a fire or spill is evident, emergency
responders can shut down a locomotive either by pulling a ring straight out about
two (2) inches or pressing the emergency fuel cut off switch (a bright red button
located on the outboard edge of the deck) on the engine near the fuel tank and
marked "Emergency Fuel Cut Off." Hold it in until the engine dies.
4.5.2 As long as the engine is running, the possibility of a high-voltage electric shock
hazard exists for rescuers working on the engine.
4.5.3 When the engine is shut down, locomotive hand brakes must be applied and wood
wedges used to chock the train's wheels.
4.6 ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES
4.6.1 All electric locomotives operate on an overhead power transmission catenary
system that carries 13,200 volts AC. The pantograph connects to the overhead
wire to enable the locomotive to operate.
4.6.2 The following guidelines will be adhered to when operating around electric
locomotives:
a. Do not walk on top of any locomotive or car where overhead catenary
wires are present.
b. Do not attempt to disconnect any jumper cables between the cars.
c. Do not touch any electrical equipment.
d. Do not touch the pantograph even if it is disconnected from the
overhead wire.
4.6.3 The high voltage carried by the catenary system makes it imperative that no
person approach or permit any object to come within eight (8) feet of the 138,000
volt transmission lines or within three (3) feet of the 13,200 volt catenary system
or 6,600 volt signal power lines.

Hazard Analysis 55
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
4.7 DERAILED ELECTRICAL CARS OR LOCOMOTIVES
4.7.1 A check must be made to see if a train's pantograph is still in contact with the
catenary system anytime an electric powered railroad engine or car has been
involved in a collision or derailment and all of the wheels are off the tracks.
a. The following guidelines will be adhered to when all the wheels are off the tracks:
(1) NO ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO GET NEAR, TO TOUCH, TO
MAKE RESCUES OR FIGHT FIRES ON THESE DERAILED WNGINES OR
CARS BECAUSE THEY MAY BE ENERGIZED A 13,200 VOLTS.
(2) REQUEST THAT THE POWER TO THE CATENARY SYSTEM BE SHUT
DOWN.
(3) REQUEST THAT RAILROAD ELECTRIC TRACTION DEPARTMENT
CLASS “A” CREWS RESOND TO THE INCIDENT AND MAKE A POSITIVE
GROUND ON THE DERAILED ENGINES AND CARS.
(4) KEEP PASSENGERS IN THE CARS.
(5) UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SEPTA THIRD RAIL TEST
METERS TO BE USED TO CHECK TO SEE IF HE POWER IS “ON” OR
“OFF.”.
4.7.2 All electrical power to the catenary system west and north of 30th Street Station is
controlled by Amtrak personnel. Amtrak must be notified, by the FCC, when a
shut down of the electrical power is necessary.
4.7.3 All electrical power to the catenary system east of 30th Street Station is controlled
by SEPTA. SEPTA must be notified, by the FCC, when a shut down of electrical
power is necessary.
4.7.4 Before fighting a fire or inspecting any voltage compartment on any car, the
person-incharge must be certain that the following items have been done:
a. The catenary system has been de-energized.
b. All pantographs on the train have been moved to the down position.
c. All manual grounding switches are in the closed position.
d. All cars have been de-energized.

Hazard Analysis 56
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
When these items have been checked and completed, entrance to a car can be
made by simply sliding the doors of the car towards the center of the car. If the
doors will not open, then break the side glass and enter there.
4.7.5 The side doors on these cars are electrically and pneumatically (air) controlled.
They open and close with the assistance of overhead rollers. In a non emergency
situation, the doors can be opened electrically by the use of a key. Inserting this
key activates the electrical circuit and places the "DOOR OPEN" button into
operation. Press this button and the doors will open electrically.
4.7.6 Manual operation of the doors changes from car to car. Forcible entry may be
necessary if assistance cannot be received from railroad personnel.
4.7.7 Most train windows are made of lexan. Lexan plastic will not break. Attempts to
break lexan will result in tool rebound which may cause injuries.
4.7.8 The pantograph on top of each car transfers electrical power from the overhead
wires to the car. Do not touch this device even if it is not connected to the power
supply.
5. GUIDELINES FOR EMERGENCIES IN RAILROAD TUNNELS
5.1 COMMUNICATIONS
5.1.1 Primary Communications - P. F. D. Portable Radios
Communications will be difficult when involved in a tunnel emergency because
of the inability of portable radios to transmit past the concrete and steel
surrounding the tunnel. Additionally, telephone service from these areas is usually
nonexistent. These problems make it imperative to establish and maintain a
reliable communications link.
5.1.2 Secondary Communication
a. Emergency phones - These phones are located in the dwell spaces inside the
tunnel. They are mounted on the wall inside a red box that resembles an old street
fire box. The phone system begins at marker 20, at the east end of Suburban
Station and extends to marker 86 which is north of Spring Garden Street. The
phone system provides automatic location and voice communication with Mark
Tower located in the Market East Station. To operate the phone simply lift the
receiver and you will be put in contact with the tower. At Mark Tower, you will
be speaking with SEPTA personnel who have the capability of relaying your
information and orders and expediting any needed power shut down or other
SEPTA service.

Hazard Analysis 57
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
b. Automatic telephones - These phones are mounted inside a gray colored box
with the word "Telephone" marked on each side of the box. The system extends
through the entire tunnel at track level. It begins at marker 20, at the east end of
Suburban Station and continues to marker 102, which is north of Brown Street.
This system is a four digit dialing system that can connect you to any SEPTA
location if you know the four digit number of the person you are trying to reach.
Fire Department officers and members, when using this system, should dial 5111.
This number is posted inside the telephone box along with a sticker displaying the
phone's location. These automatic phones are not found on the platform level at
either the Suburban Station or the Market East Station.
c. Crew Phones - This is an intercom type device which will put you in contact
with the train tower at the Market East Station. It is identical in appearance to the
Passenger Aid System and is located in a cabinet that is clearly marked as a crew
phone. Any message can be relayed to the FCC via SEPTA personnel while using
these phones. Also, the tower can patch you into the public address system and
this will give you the capability to direct evacuation within the station. Crew
phones are found on all platforms in both the Suburban Station and the Market
East Station.
d. Bell phones - In the stations, at concourse and street levels are Bell Phones.
Listen for a dial tone and then dial 911. Request to be connected to the FCC. All
messages are to be directed through the FCC and they will contact the necessary
personnel and units.
5.2 SUBURBAN STATION TUNNEL
5.2.1 Lighting And Electrical Power
Under normal conditions, power to the lighting is supplied by two (2) outside
sources. In the event of a power outage in either source, the other will
automatically pick up the full load. In the event of a power outage in both sources,
the emergency generator, located in the "T" basement at Suburban Station, will
automatically provide power to the Suburban Station platforms and tunnel
lighting eastward to 12th Street. The emergency generator will light
approximately every other lighting fixture in this area. The lighting
levels will be less but there will be adequate lighting available.

Hazard Analysis 58
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
5.2.2 "T" Basement
This is a mechanical space below the concourse level of Suburban Station. There
are two (2) entry points into this area from the concourse. One is at marker 14 and
the second is at marker 15, as shown on the accompanying drawings, sheet 8.
Keys for these entrances are held in the Station Master's Office at Suburban
Station. At the east end of this "T" basement is the high voltage electrical switch
gear area. This area is designated as the East Substation T.S. #6 and it houses
13,200 volts. It is in this area that the emergency generator and its 275 gallon
diesel fuel tank are located.
5.2.3 Emergency Generator
The emergency generator is a diesel driven unit with an output of 300 Kw. It will
provide electrical power for emergency lighting, elevator operation and other
selected mechanical functions. When the generator is operating, it will provide
power to one elevator at a time until each elevator has been recalled to the
concourse level and locked out.
5.2.4 Emergency Exits
There are no emergency exits in the Suburban Station platform area itself.
However, in the interconnecting Center City Commuter Tunnel, at marker 24,
there is an emergency exit in the Municipal Services Building's sidewalk. This
could be used for evacuations from the east end of Suburban Station. Although
there aren't any emergency exits from this platform area, there are numerous
stairways from the platform to the concourse levels that will facilitate evacuation
needs. Gate numbers at the concourse level designate the platforms they serve and
at which end of the platform they are located. For example, gates numbered 3 will
take you to platform 3. Those gates with the letter "A" are at the West end of the
platform and those with the letter "B" are at the East end of the platform.
5.2.5 Standpipes
a. Platform
(1) Twenty-four (24) dry standpipe connections exist along the platforms of
Suburban Station. Intakes for this system are located at the SWC of 15th
Street and J.F.K. Boulevard, SEC of 16th Street and J.F.K. Boulevard and at
the SEC of 17th
Street and J.F.K. Boulevard.
(2) In addition to standpipe intakes, the dry standpipe can be supplemented by a
3" fill pipe. The control for this 3" fill pipe is located in Fire Room #3,
located at the bottom of the concourse entrance at 17th Street and J.F.K.

Hazard Analysis 59
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURE #12
MARCH, 1998
b. Concourse
(1) There are eleven (11) 1 ½" and 2 ½" standpipe connections at the
concourse level between 15th
& 18th
Streets in cabinets.
c. Underground Roadway
(1) There are additional 2 ½" dry standpipe connections in the underground
roadway and the docking platforms off this roadway. These connections
may be utilized but the roadway standpipe system must be pressurized.
Pressuring any one of the intake connections pressurizes the entire dry
standpipe system. Standpipe pumper intake connections are located at the
NWC of 16th and Market Streets, the west side of 18th Street (50 ft. north
of Market St.) and the NWC of 18th and Commerce Streets. All of these
connections are triamese and consist of (2) 2 ½" and (1) 3 ½" connections.
5.2.6 Track Numbering
The track numbering in Suburban Station will prevail throughout the Center City
Commuter connection. Track 1 will be the southerly and easterly through track. It
will progress in sequence to track 4 as the northerly and westerly track. For
example, track 1 at the south end progresses northward to tracks 2, 3 and 4. The
Center City Commuter Tunnel contains four tracks and this numbering system is
followed from Suburban Station, east and north, to a point located approximately
200 feet south of Girard Avenue.
5.2.7 Platform Numbering
Within Suburban Station, the platform numbering system is as follows:
Platform 2 to gain access to tracks 0 and 1.
Note: The best means of access to the trains or into the Center City Commuter
Tunnel will be gained from platforms 3 and 4.

FINAL - A Hazard analysis and vulnerability assessment for the Philadelphia Center City Rail Tunnel 10-28-09

FINAL - A Hazard analysis and vulnerability assessment for the Philadelphia Center City Rail Tunnel 10-28-09

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