1. VictoriaDuda – LegalWritingFinalAssignment
Helen Woodley’sDog BiteCaseagainstSueSmith
I. Introduction
Belowstates the meritsof HelenWoodley’s (plaintiff, agedeight)caseseekingdamagesfora dogbite against
Sue Smith(defendant).Resolutionof this matterinvolves dissectionand interpretationofthe Massachusettsdogbite
statute, G.L. c. 215.
II. Facts
OnJanuary1, 2006,the plaintiff and her mothervisited the Stone Zoo,in Randolph,Massachusetts . Whilethere,
they cameuponabuildingwithsimilararchitecturetothezoo exhibitstructuresthat they hadalreadyvisited. This
building,infact, housed the residenceofthe zoo’s groundskeeper,SueSmith,as wellas several zoo administrative
offices.Both the plaintiffand hermother assumedthisbuildingto beanotheranimalexhibit,as there wereno signs
or noticesindicatingotherwise,andtheywalkedup the snow-coveredpathto its front door.
Both the plaintiffand her motherhadgotten approximatelyten yards awayfrom the front doorwhen a German
Shepherddog,who wasuntetheredand loose,appearedfrom behindahedgeabout five yards to the left of the front
door. Thedogcametowardstheplaintiffand hermotherandappearedfriendly enoughthat they played withthe dog
for several minutes;theythen continuedontheirpath to the front door. Themothermaintainsthatthere wasno sign
that indicated thepresence orwarned of a dog onpremisesanywherealongthe path to the building.
Oncetheplaintiffreachedthedoor, she gatheredandformeda loosesnowball,then lightlytossed it at her
mother.Themotherduckedandinstead,thesnowballsprayedthe dogandstartled him.Thedogimmediatelyleapt
onto the plaintiff, andbit her four timeson her rightarm and hand – injuriesthat required117stitches.Thedefendant
maintainsthatthe dog hadno history of viciousness,andwas in fact a therapydog whooften visited the elderlyin a
nearbyhome.
III. Issue
Doesthe Massachusettsdogbitestatute, G.L. c. 215,hold Smithliableforrecovery by Woodley?
IV. Rule
TheMassachusettsdogbite statute, G.L. c.215, provides:
“If a dog or otheranimal,withoutprovocation,attacksor injuresany personwhois peaceablyconducting
himselfinany placewherehemaylawfullybe, the ownerof suchdog or otheranimalisliableindamagesto
suchpersonfor the full amountof the injurysustained.”
V. Application:
Underthis statute, there arefour qualifiersnecessaryfor the plaintiff to prove defendant’sliability– allmust be
presentunder the law.Theseare:
(1) Ownershipofthe dog by the defendant;

2. (2) Lackof provocation by the plaintiff;
(3) Was plaintiff lawfullyon the premises;and
(4) Was plaintiff exhibitingpeaceableconduct.
1. Ownership ofthe dog by the defendant
Defendantadmittedto owningGerman Shepherd thatbitplaintiff, thus satisfying the first qualifier.
2. Lackof provocation by the plaintiff
Undeterminediswhether ornot the plaintiff provoked the dogby missinghermotherand
inadvertently hittingthe dog withthe snowball.Forfull satisfactionunderthis qualifier,provocationhas
to be proven as either (a) intentional,Segalv. Chelsea,619N.E. 2d 555, 319Mass. 234(1992) or (b)
unintentional,Rosev. Leopold,718N.E. 2d853, 415 Mass.576 (2004).
a. intentional provocation –the first rulingmadeonthe determinants ofintentionalprovocation
arosein Segalv. Chelsea.Here, the plaintiffhad kickedthedefendant’sdogtwice,both times
the doggrowledin response.Theplaintiffadmitted heknewkickingthedog madeher angry
but, kickedthe doga third time, whichresultedinhim beingbiton the face.Thecourtruledthe
repeatedkicksto the dog, combinedwiththeknowledgeofher angerat the attacks, were
deemed intentionalprovocation.
Comparing theWoodleycase, the plaintiff’sactof tossing the snowballat hermotherbut
inadvertently hittingthe dog is not the sameas the repeatedkicksto the dogin Segal. The
plaintiff’sintent was to hit her motherwiththe snowball,not the dog, thus rulingout the
intentionalprovocation aspectasoutlinedabove.
b. unintentional provocation –to define unintentionalprovocation,welookto Rosev. Leopold.
Here, the plaintiff, a two andone halfyear-old child,wasplaying a gameof crack-thewhipin
the defendant’sbackyardwith several children.Theplaintiffwasthrownfrom the whipand
landedonthe tail of the defendant’sdog, startlinghim.Thedogswipedat the plaintiff, causing
permanentdamagetohertear duct,but not to her vision. Thecourtruledherethat the child
unintentionallyprovokedthe dog by fallingonhis tail. Thecourtfurtherruledthat the dog’s
swipingreactiontothe plaintiff’sfall was a proportionalresponsetoan unintentional
provocation.Hadthe dog causedsignificantlymoreinjury, the court admittedit mighthave
concludeddifferently.
In the Woodley case,the unintended snowball hittothe dog seemsto alignwiththe accidental
fall of the childonthe dog’stail in Rose.In Woodleyhowever, it seemsthat thoughthe
provocationwasunintentionalasoutlined,the dog’sreactionmightnotbe considered
proportionaltothe provocation – 117stitches requiredfora lightly tossedsnowballseems
quitedisproportionatetothe infraction.Thisisespeciallyunreasonable whentakinginto
accountthatthe dogin Woodleyis used as a therapydog. In this fact, I believe the courtmight
find a lackof provocation,dueto the viciousnessof the attackby the dog inproportionto a
simplesprayingof snow.

3. 3. Plaintiff lawfullyonpremises
Toqualifythis sectionofthe requirements liesinthe term “lawful.”In Danv. Gilbert,818N.E. 2d
325, 983Mass. 332(2004), the courtfirst outlinedthe definitionfor oneto betrespassing. Here,a
trespasser wasspecifiedtobe, “a personwhoperforms an unlawfulact,or a lawfulact inan unlawful
manner,to the injuryof the personor propertyof another,”(G.L. c. 884). SeeCommonwealthv. Jones,
332N.E. 2d 876(Mass. 1980).Here the definitionappliedtoa seventeen year-old girlattemptingto sell
GirlScoutcookiesdoor-to-doorinherneighborhood.Theissueoftrespassingwasdismissedasthe
cookiesellerwason the stated premises,duringnormaldaylighthours,trying to sell the defendant
cookies.
In Woodley, the plaintiffand her motherwereon the Smithpremisesasan extensionof the zoo
grounds.Both of them thoughtSmith’sbuildingtobe that of an animalexhibit,thatwhichattendingthe
zoo that day duringbusinesshours,afforded them access. Usingthetrespassingdefinition,it canbe
stated that neitherthe plaintiffnor her motherhadintendedany “unlawful”actsnor hadthey actedin an
unlawfulmannerwhenonthe Smithpremises.Clearly,neithercanbe consideredtrespassingonthe
residentialgrounds.
Thesecondpartof this “lawfullyonpremises” determinantcanbegleaned from theintentof any
accessgiventowardthe entranceof the premises.Again, citing Danv. Gilbert,the courtruledthat “the
ownerof property whoprovides a path or walkwayfrom a public street or sidewalktohis front door
withoutsomeindication(asign,postingof notice,or symbolof danger)to warnaway thosewho seek
lawfulbusinesswith him,extendsa licensetouse the path or walkwayduringthe normalordinaryhours
of the day.” SeeCommonwealthv. MacDonald,665N.E. 2d648 (Mass.1994); Commonwealthv.
Christie,564 N.E. 2d342 (Mass.1992). In Dan, a dirt walkwayprovided accessfrom thesidewalkto
the front door.Along this path, therewas no warningorindicationofthe presenceofa dog on
premises.Also in Dan, the defendantarguedthat the presenceofa warningor deterrentfor entry to his
propertywas the simplesightof the dog having been chainednearthefront door. Thecourtfoundthat
sincethe plaintiffdidnot see the dog beforehe jumpedfrom behindbushes,that this didnot satisfy the
requirementofnoticeuponsight.
In Woodley, the similarityto Dan is in boththe presenceof the walkwaybetweenthe zoo buildings
as wellas the absenceofthe posteddangerof the dog onpremises. Theplaintiffandher motherwould
not have followedapath to the Smithresidencehadtherenot beenone, especiallyinconsiderationthat
there was snowon the groundandthe path was clearenoughforthem to followdirectlyto the building.
In additionto the lackof noticeof a dog on premiseswastheabsenceof anyindicationthatthe path led
to a residence,clearlynotan animalexhibit.Hadthe buildingbeensolabeled,this wouldhave violated
the Woodleysatisfactionof lawfullybeingonpremises,as having beennotified,the daughterand
motherwouldhave beendirectedelsewhere.
4. Plaintiff exhibitingpeaceableconduct
In section 2 above, the distinctionwasmadethat the plaintiffin Woodleywas not actingto
intentionallyprovoke the dog withthe snowball.Tossingthesnowballather mother,andnot the dog, it
was purelyaccidentthatthe dogwas hit by snow. Certainly, reiteratingthat both the plaintiffand her
motherwereplayfully engaged beforethe snowballtargetcameincontactwiththe dog also

4. demonstratesthe“peaceable” naturebeforethebite. Again, using Danv. Gilbert,the courtheldthat the
plaintiffwas peaceablyconductingherselfanddoingsowithoutprovocation.I believethe courtwould
find similargroundstoruleaccordinglyinWoodley, thus meetingthe fourth and last qualifierfor G.L. c.
215to stand.
VI. Conclusion
With regardto the above facts anddeterminationsoutlinedabove,eachofthe four qualifiersto prove liability
underMassachusettsdogbitestatute, G.L. c. 215,has beensatisfied - Woodleyshouldbe entitledto damages
againstSmith.