A Concise History of Crimea's Diverse Peoples

“I was and will remain a citizen of Ukraine. I do not recognize the
annexation of Crimea and the military takeover of Crimea by the
Russian Federation and I consider any agreements made by the il-
legitimate Crimean authorities with the Russian Federation to be
null and void. I am not a serf; I cannot be transferred with the land.”
- Ukrainian film director Oleh Sentsov, speaking at the Lefortovo District
Court, Moscow July 7, 2014
In May 2014, Oleh Sentsov, a famous Crimean Ukrainian filmmaker, was kid-
napped by the Russian intelligence services. Subsequently, Oleh was declared
a citizen of the Russian Federation without his consent and joined the thou-
sands of others from Crimea who were forced to take-up Russian citizenship
following the annexation of Crimea. On August 25, 2015, a year after Sentsov
was detained, tortured and sat in a Russian prison awaiting release, the North
Caucasus District Military Court sentenced Sentsov to 20 years in prison to be
served in a remote penal colony.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT, 1975
No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force.
BUDAPEST MEMORANDUM, 1994
The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their
weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, 1945
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
RUSSIA HAS VIOLATED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER 47 MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH UKRAINE.
*

THE CRIMEAN CRISIS 3
THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF CRIMEA 5
THE CRIMEAN KHANATE 7
RUSSIAN CONQUEST:THE FIRST CRIMEAN GENOCIDE 9
THE SECOND CRIMEAN GENOCIDE 11
THE DEPORTATION OF CRIMEANTATARS 13
CRIMEAN RUIN: COLLAPSE OF RUSSIA’S POLICY IN CRIMEA 15
CRIMEA JOINS SOVIET UKRAINE 17
«KHRUSHCHEV’S GIFT»: FORMATION OFTHE RUSSIAN MYTH 19
UKRAINE REBUILDS CRIMEA 21
CRIMEA’S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON UKRAINE 23
A LONGWAY HOME: CRIMEANTATARS COME BACKTO CRIMEA 25
UKRAINE’S INDEPENDENCE ANDTHE GUARANTEE OFTERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 27
CRIMEA AND UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN 1991-2013 29
RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN CRIMEA, 1991‑2013 31
THE CONFLICT OVERTHETUZLA ISLAND (2003) 33
CRIMEA, 1991‑2013 35
CRIMEA,THE LAND OF HEROES 37
CRIMEA ONTHE DAYS OFTHE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY 41
ANTI‑CONSTITUTIONAL COUP IN CRIMEA ON FEBRUARY 23‑26, 2014 43
INVASION: BEGINNING OFTHE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN CRIMEA 45
UKRAINIAN ARMY AND NAVY IN CRIMEA 47
YULIY MAMCHUR: FAITHFULTOTHE OATH 49
IMITATION OF REFERENDUM IN CRIMEA 51
EUROPEAN RADICALS IN CRIMEA 53
THE ANNEXATION 55
HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED CRIMEA 57
THE OLEG SENTSOV CASE 59
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OFTHE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 61
UKRAINE ANDTHE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA 63
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSETOTHE OCCUPATION OF CRIMEA 65
FREE CRIMEA – CRIMEAN DIASPORA IN UKRAINE 67
MUSTAFA DZHEMILEV —THE“SON OF CRIMEA”. 69
GLAMAROUSVOICE OF JAMALA 71
UN CRIMEANTEST 73
CONTENTS

5
THE CRIMEAN CRISIS
March 2014 marks an important month in contemporary European history. It was the first time following the
Second World War when a European country invaded another country and annexed its territory.
H
iding behind a civilian population unmarked
Russian soldiers blockaded Ukrainian military
units at their own bases. At the same time, the
undercover Russian servicemen, carrying machine
guns, falsified referendum results in Crimea stating
that residents had agreed to join Russia. An unde-
clared hybrid war, using unconventional military and
information tactics, had been initiated by the Russian
Federation to change the borders of Ukraine. This
style of warfare had never been seen in Europe, but
had been tested in Georgia and Moldova for over two
decades. The Russian Federation was using the same
tactics in Ukraine that included a mixture of sub-
versive campaigns, cyber warfare and an unmarked
military presence.
Most alarming was the international laws that were ignored
as the Russian Federation moved forward with annexing the
Crimean peninsula at breakneck speed.
Russia, attracted by the strategic military potential of
Crimea, located on the northern coast of the Black Sea,
wanted ownership of the rich oil and gas deposits found in
this region. The strategic port city of Sevastopol was also
home to their naval fleet and Russia knew the peninsula was
an important geopolitical area. In the Soviet days, the Soviet
Air Force, based in Crimea, was a threat to Europe and NATO.
Crimea, once a booming Ukrainian resort region, is now a
large Russian military base.
In an attempt to justify the Crimean invasion and annex-
ation, the Russian government and its propaganda team
called the events in Crimea“the Russian Spring” – a label
intended to hide Russia’s aggressive policies under the guise
of peaceful, democratic protests taking place in other parts of
the world, such as Egypt.
Crimea has a rich and interesting history and is home to
many minorities and indigenous populations, such as the
Tatars. To be clear, Russians are not indigenous to Crimea. The
history of Crimea can be traced over three thousand years.
Crimea was part of the Russian and Soviet Empires for only
two and half centuries. During that time, the indigenous peo-
ple of Crimea suffered several genocides and in 1944 many
were deported thousands of kilometers eastward. When
Ukraine gained its independence, many Crimeans returned
home.
On March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly in its
Resolution A/68L.39, condemned the aggression of Russia
and supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine. However,
this has not prevented Russia from engaging in war. The
people of Ukraine continue to live in fear, many of them have
been displaced and long for peace, freedom and democracy.
Despite the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by Russia
along with the United Kingdom and the United States, which
guaranteed Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity in
exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear arsenal, Russia has
continued to act with impunity.

7
THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF CRIMEA
One of the key treasures of Crimea is its historical tradition, the culture of dozens of ancient peoples, who
considered peninsula their homeland. Three thousand years ago, Crimea was at the periphery of the ancient
civilizations, and the whole time the ethnic map of Crimea has been changing. However, none of the numerous
peoples disappeared without a trace; they left behind archeological, cultural, written memorials and records,
turning Crimea into a real treasury.
T
he old name—Tauris – was given byTauri tribes
living in the mountains along the southern coast.The
steppes in the Northern Crimea were inhabited with
Iranic-speaking nomads — first the Cimmerians, later the
Scythians. From 7th century BC numerous Greek colonies
appeared on the Crimean coast,Tauric Chersonese (in the area
of modern Sevastopol) and Panticapaeum (modern Kerch) are
the best known of them. In the 5th century BC, the kings of
Panticapaeum managed to unite the Greek colonies based in
the Kerch andTaman peninsulas into the Bosporan Kingdom,
which existed for almost 800 years. In the 2nd century BC,
the Bosporan Kingdom was captured by king Mithridates of
Pontus, who fought against Rome. After him Crimea was ruled
by the Roman Republic and Empire. In 3rd - 4th centuries AD,
the steppe part of Crimea was controlled by Alans and the East
German Goth tribes.The latter left these lands under the pres-
sure of nomadic Hun tribes later conquering Rome and Spain
and, eventually, founding Barbarian kingdoms on the ruins of
the Roman Empire.
After the Hun invasion, Crimea turned into theWestern pe-
riphery of theTurkic world. One by one, several peoples came
to change one another: Bulgarians, Avars, Khazars, Pincenates,
Cumans. However, thanks to the fortification efforts of the
Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Emperor Justinian, the Greeks man-
aged to maintain several strongholds on the coast. Chersonese
became the capital of Byzantine Crimea. It was here where
Clement and Martin, some of the first Roman Popes, died in ex-
ile.The seedlings of Christianity started proliferating from here
to the lands of modern Ukraine. In the late 10th century, the
ruler of Ancient Rus, Kyivan PrinceVolodymyr Svyatoslavych
surrounded and occupied Chersonese. In exchange for return-
ing the city, Emperor Basil ІІ was forced to bestow his sister
Ann in marriage.The Kiyvan Prince adopted Christianity in
Chersonese that meant Christianization of the entire Rus.
The 13th century was turbulent for Crimea. Constantinople
was captured by crusaders, new people, the Mongols appeared
in the Black Sea steppes, so the political map of the penin-
sula changed completely.The rulers ofWestern Mongolian
state – the Golden Horde – demonstrated favorable attitude
to Italian merchants from Genoa andVenice, so their colonies
were erected along the coast — Chembalo, Sudak, Kafa. It
was here that exotic goods delivered along the Great SilkWay
from China and Central Asia, were loaded to ships destined for
theWestern Europe. However, the Greek population had not
disappeared completely. Along with various old Crimean peo-
ples — Iranic-speaking Scythians and Alans, Goths, Armenians
and Karaites (theTurkicmen who adopted Judaism) – they
founded the Principality ofTheodore in the foothills, which had
been resisting the Italian and Golden Horde expansion for 200
years. However, 15th century AD made the political map of the
Crimea look completely different. In 1441, the Crimean Khanate
was founded in the western lands of the Golden Horde, while
the Principality ofTheodore along with the Italian colonies on
the Crimean coast were conquered by the Ottoman Empire in
1475.

9
THE CRIMEAN KHANATE
Historically, Crimea was at the crossroads of many cultures. Before it was even known as Crimea, the peninsula
was known as Taurica by the Greek and Roman empires which incorporated the region into their empires. The
peninsula had been invaded and ruled by Gothic tribes, the Kyivan Rus state, the Byzantium Empire and the
Mongols, among many others.
F
rom the mid‑1400s it existed as the Crimean Khanate,
a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire, during which
time it became home to the Tatar people and the
center of a unique Tatar culture. Ethnic CrimeanTatar history
is traced back to theTurkic people made‑up of the Cumans,
Oghuzs, and Pincenates who lived in the northern Black Sea
region before the Mongolian invasion and was based on Islamic
Tatar law.TheTatars called the peninsula Qırım.
In the late 14th century, the Golden Horde suffered political
and economic problems, which weakened their influence and
power. In theWest, the majority of former Rus lands were united
to form the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL).The rulers of the
GDL expanded their influence to Crimea in an attempt to gain
territory and extend their influence eastward. In 1441, support-
ed by the GDL, Haci І Giray, who fought for Crimean indepen-
dence for several decades, proclaimed himself the sovereign
ruler of the Crimean Khanate with the backing of the GDL.
Soon after Haci I Giray’s accession to the throne, the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania united with the Grand Duchy of Poland to
form the Polish‑Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita)
and the lands of the Principality ofTheodore, along with the
Italian colonies in southern Crimea, were captured by the
Ottoman Empire. A Muscovy state was also soon established
in north‑eastern Europe and the Muscovites competed and
fought against the Polish‑Lithuanian Commonwealth for former
Rus lands.
The territory of the Crimean Khanate was not limited to the
Crimean peninsula but also included the entire northern Black
Sea region, and later the Kuban. In 1532, a newly founded city
of Bakhchisaray became the capital of the Crimean Khanate and
the khan’s lavish residence, which stands even today.
In the first centuries of Khanate history, the CrimeanTatars
lived nomadically, while other ethnic minorities in Crimea,
including the Karaites, Krymchaks, Greeks, Jews, Armenians lived
in the foothills and farmed the land.TheTatars permanently
settled in Crimea and left their nomadic lifestyle in the later years
of the Khanate.
When the southern coast of Crimea and the Principality of
Theodorewasoccupiedby theOttomanEmpire,Crimeabecame
an Ottoman vassal state and supported the sultan in other
important campaigns and battles.
Crimean Khanate relations with its northern neighbor,
current day Ukraine, were complicated. Crimean khans
attempted to conquer Ukrainian lands of the Polish‑Lithuanian
Commonwealth and Muscovy by launching several attacks.
Most notably, in 1483, the CrimeanTatars destroyed Kyiv and in
1571 set Moscow ablaze.
On the northern border of the Crimean Khanate, the Ukrainian
population formed a Cossackdom to protect and defend
Ukrainian land from attack.The Cossacks also organized and
led raids on Crimea. In the 17th century, the Crimean Khanate
became a Ukrainian ally and supported Ukraine’s defense, led
by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, against Polish reign in 1648. In the
18th century, the territory fended off attack when Hetmans Ivan
Mazepa’s and Pylyp Orlyk’s CrimeanTatar detachments took
part in the NorthernWar against the Russian Empire.This was
shortlived as Muscovite Russia became too strong for theTatars
and Ukrainians.

11
RUSSIAN CONQUEST:THE FIRST CRIMEAN GENOCIDE
In the 18th century, the Russian Empire set its sights on Crimea. With a weakening Ottoman Empire, Russia saw
an opportunity to gain land and influence in the Ukrainian steppe and build a military base in Crimea to control
the Black Sea. The Russians focused on dismantling the Crimean Khanate and renewing the Byzantine Empire in
the region. Russia launched an invasion that resulted in the destruction of Crimea.
F
rom the onset, the Russian invasion of Crimea resulted in
the extermination of theTatars and many ethnic minorities
who lived on the peninsula. In 1736‑37, Field Marshal
von Münnich’s army destroyed the large, beautiful cities of
the Khanate that included Bakhchisaray, Kezlev, Karasubazar,
destroyed its monuments and killed its residents.The devasta-
tion of Crimea was so severe that the following year the Russian
campaign for Crimea was delayed as the region had been so
significantly devastated that Russian forces would not have been
able to find food on the peninsula.
However, following the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of
1774 Crimea fell under the influence of the Russian Empire who
quickly moved to dismantle the Khanate and destroy the local
economy. In 1778, Russia forcefully relocated 30,000 Crimean
Christians, including Greeks, Armenians,Volokhs (Romanians),
and Georgians.This had severe consequences for local trade and
agriculture and the influx of displaced people resulted in food
shortages. Many sufferred and died from starvation.The Greek
population that survived settled in the modern Ukrainian city of
Mariupol.
In 1783, the Russians attempted to install Sahin Giray as the
leader of Crimea. However, this failed and Russia annexed the
peninsula to quell rising political tensions. On June 24, 1783,
Empress Catherine ІІ has officially annexed the Crimean Khanate
to the Russian Empire.Too weak to fight the annexation, the
Crimean population migrated to Asian and European prov-
inces of the Ottoman Empire in large numbers. According
to historical research on Crimea at that time, approximately
300,000 Crimeans left the peninsula and the population
plummeted in the years following Russia’s annexation.Today,
over 100,000 CrimeanTatars live inTurkey.
Several years later, Russia, who left Crimea in ruins, real-
ized that the Crimeans were needed to cultivate the land. In
response, the Russians granted theTatar upper class the same
rights as the Russian gentry, the lands owned by the Islamic
clergy were exempt from paying taxes and ordinary Crimean
Tatars were protected from serfdom. At the same time, Russia
largely re‑divided the land giving the Russian gentry the most
desirable and prosperous land.The massive forced coloniza-
tion of Crimea by Russians and Ukrainians soon completely
changed the peninsula’s ethnic map.
Despite thriving tobacco, grape and silk production industries,
Russia was primarily focused on developing a military base in
Crimea. Sevastopol, the newly built city close to the ruins of
the Greek Chersonese, became the main base of the Russian
Black Sea Navy.The CrimeanWar, fought between the Russian
Empire and an alliance of the French Empire, the British Empire,
the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Sardinia, and the Duchy
of Nassau, was part of a contest between the major European
powers for influence over territories of the declining Ottoman
Empire.With poorly developed infrastructure and lack of com-
munications with the other Russian territories Sevastopol was
seized in 1854 when allied troops landed in Crimea.
The war devastated much of social and economic infrastruc-
ture of Crimea. Many CrimeanTatars fled to Anatolia, in nearby
Turkey. Eventually, Russia ended the war as Crimean land,
sitting unattended, began to suffer and led to an agricultural
crisis.

13
THE SECOND CRIMEAN GENOCIDE
The Russian Revolution of February 1917 offered hope of cultural autonomy to people living under the Russian
Empire. However, the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, seized control of Russia through a coup and pledged
to introduce socialism and fight class‑warfare. The Bolsheviks employed a method of social engineering that
meets today’s UN definition of genocide. Their strategy was to annihilate entire social groups, such as the
intelligentisia that included the gentry, clergy, businessmen and cultural elite. Those who opposed Bolshevik
policies were to be punished or eliminated.
A
t the beginning of the massive colonization of Crimea,
Russia lost interest in the Crimean Tatars. Few Tatars
managed to get a formal education under Russian rule
and found themselves unable to compete in the Soviet labor
market. Many were encouraged to leave Crimea all together.
More than 200,000 Crimean Tatars moved to the territories of
the Ottoman Empire in the 1950’s and 1960’s, changing the
ethnic make‑up of Crimea. Crimean Tatars only accounted
for one third of the population of Crimea following Bolshevik
rule.
When Ismail Gasprinskyi, a great Crimean Tatar intellectual
called for the modernization and education of the Turkic peo-
ple, Tatars united and forged a plan for Crimea. Following the
February 1917 revolution, the All‑Crimean Islamic assembly
was called in March, and Kurultai, a representative body of the
Crimean Tatar people was created in November. The Kurultai
drafted and approved a Constitution for the peninsula which
granted equal rights to all people living there.
Political power in Crimea quickly shifted with the Bolshevik
revolution and Russian civil war. The peninsula was affected
by the political chaos in Russia. Both the European allied
forces and the Bolshevik’s gained control of the peninsula
at different periods. Crimeans resisted and fought‑off the
Bolshevik’s rule. Crimea became heavily populated by thou-
sands of political refugees, but its economy was devastated.
In 1920, after the Bolsheviks secured power in Russia
against their political opponents they looked to Crimea,
where they unleashed a campaign of terror. Crimeans could
not defend themselves against the brutal Communist regime
and according to historians between 50,000 and 150,000 peo-
ple were put to death by the Bolsheviks.
One year later, in October 1921, the Bolsheviks established
the Autonomous Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic as part of
the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the pre-
cursor of the Soviet Union. Initially, CrimeanTatars received
proportionally significant representation and the CrimeanTatar
language was made an official language together with the
Russian language. National rural councils were also estab-
lished throughout the peninsula and Russian, CrimeanTartar,
German, Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian and national districts were
established. One Ukrainian district was created.
As Joseph Stalin rose to power, political and cultural repres-
sion began to gain momentum in Crimea yet again. Between
1928 and 1931, approximately 3,500 CrimeanTatar intellectuals
were put to death or exiled. In 1928, Stalin sought to crush
CrimeanTatar culture and called for the collection, destruction
and burning of ancientTatar manuscripts and literature. He
removed the Arabic script and introduced the Latin alphabet
and later the Cyrillic alphabet.The Russification of the penin-
sula resulted in the destruction of thousands of years ofTatar
cultural traditions.
In the mid 1930s, the GreatTerror took hold of the entire
Soviet Union. No one could have imagined that the most brutal
and deadliest time in Crimean history was still to come.

15
THE DEPORTATION OF CRIMEANTATARS
Russia has long prided itself on restoring world peace following the defeat of Nazism. However, following the
Second World War, Stalin’s regime clamped down on its citizens and introduced some of the most repressive
and brutal policies in contemporary history.
U
nder Stalin, the Soviet Union introduced censorship,
political, religious and cultural repression, mass depor-
tations, and slave-like labor camps known as gulags.
His regime relocated citizens to remote and inhospitable
areas in Siberia and Central Asia and carried out genocides
meant to destroy whole groups. Millions died during Joseph
Stalin’s reign of terror. Today, many former Soviet republics,
such as Ukraine, are dealing with this brutal Soviet legacy.
During the Second World War, Stalin began to re-draw the
borders of Europe together with Adolf Hitler. Both signed a
non-aggression pact and committed to not engage in war
with the other or aide one another’s enemies. One week later,
Hitler attacked the Soviet Union.
It was during this period that Stalin introduced a policy
calling for the deportation of Crimeans. In August of 1941,
approximately 50,000 Crimean Germans totaling about 4.6
percent of the population of the peninsula were removed and
sent to Siberia and Kazakhstan.
Many Soviet republics suffered during Stalin’s brutal
forced collectivization that led to famine of 1932-1933. As
a response, many Soviet republics welcomed the German
army. In Crimea, a small portion of Tatars cooperated with
the Germans however, the majority of Crimean Tatars fought
for the Soviet Army or took part in the guerilla movement.
Many years later, many Tatars were honored with prestigious
military medals for their service.
After World War II everyone thought they had seen the
worst and no one foresaw the brutal deportations that Stalin
had planned for the Crimean Tatars.
The CrimeanTatar deportations took place May 18-20, 1944
and were carried out by the NKVD’s 32,000 Army. According
to official documents, a total of 183,155 people were rounded
up and deported, including 150,000 people to Uzbekistan.
Approximately 9,000 veterans of the Soviet Army were among
those collected and deported. Smaller numbers ofTatars were
deported to Kazakhstan,Tajikistan and remote areas of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Reportedly, nearly
16,000 people died in the first six months after relocation to the
Uzbek SSR.
According to survivor testimonies, they were transported by
trucks to local railway stations and sent to their final destination
by train.Those who resisted or were immobile were executed.
Survivor stories tell of gruesome conditions in the railway cars
and their long journey; the trip spanned weeks without food or
water.Those who died were thrown out of the railway cars and
left to rot near the tracks.
According to CrimeanTatar human rights activists the real
numbers of those who did not survive have reached 46 percent.
Soon after the deportation of the CrimeanTatars, Crimean
Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians were also rounded-up and
deported.Today, the CrimeanTatar Mejlis community has called
for the deportations of the CrimeanTatars to be recognized as an
act of genocide.
Any memory of the CrimeanTatars and ethnic minorities
were deleted from the map of Crimea.The Soviet government
renamed 80 percent of the cities, towns and villages. Following
Stalin’s death, CrimeanTatars were not allowed to return home.
Instead, Crimea was transformed into a Soviet resort destination
for the Soviet Communist Party.

17
CRIMEAN RUIN: COLLAPSE OF
RUSSIA’S POLICY IN CRIMEA
For a war‑torn Crimea the deportation of different peoples that inhabited Crimea – Germans, Crimean Tatars,
Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Turks, and Roma – was a fatal blow. Even during a decade following the
Second World War, the Soviet Russian government could not overcome demographic and socio‑economic
consequences of this barbaric act.
A
fter complete deportation of the Crimean peoples,
the autonomy of the region was curbed, transform-
ing Crimea into an ordinary region within the Russian
Federal Soviet Socialist Republic. However, the change of
the administrative status did not influence the catastrophic
situation there. The population of Crimea decreased three-
fold due to the war and forceful deportations, namely from
1,126,000, in 1939 to 379,000 in the autumn of 1944. Some
previously densely populated regions were devastated.
For instance, only 672 people stayed in the Kubyshevsky
District, 3,380 in the Sudak District, 2,637 in the Alushta
District, or 2,233 in the Balaclava District. Russian govern-
ment tried to overcome this demographic crisis by resettling
people from Russia’s central regions.
However, due to climate difference, lack of water and
undeveloped social infrastructure, most of the settlers
quickly returned home. One of the reasons for this was a
disastrous situation with social infrastructure. By 1955 the
majority of the buildings even in large cities have not been
rebuilt. There was no centralized water and power supply.
Unbelievably, in 1953, the whole Crimea had only three
bakeries, 18 butcher shops, eight dairy shops, two textile
stores, nine shoe stores and five shops selling construction
materials.
The condition of Crimean agriculture was hardly any bet-
ter. The remaining population and migrants from Russia had
no skills of commercial production of fruits and vegetables,
especially under constant shortage of irrigation water. Ten
years after the war, the area of gardens and vineyards in the
Crimea reached nearly 80 percent of the pre‑war level, while
their yield was hardly comparable due to the dropped levels
of output. Only 10 percent of Crimean farms managed to
master сrop‑rotation, while the livestock breeding satisfied
only one third of the region’s demand.
The same situation was observed in the textile production
and food industries. Despite the Soviet command economy,
not a single Crimean enterprise could achieve the produc-
tion plan. Despite the allocation of huge funds for construc-
tion works, they remained unused due to the lack of workers
and undeveloped infrastructure. Against this background,
Ukrainian economic assistance to Crimea grew from year
after year. Ukrainian enterprises and experts took patronage
over facilities in the Crimea. The Soviet leadership came to
realize that only Soviet Ukraine could avert the catastrophic
situation on the peninsula. Hence, preparations for Crimea’s
transfer to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic started
from the early 1950s.

19
CRIMEA JOINS SOVIET UKRAINE
Over the first postwar decade of 1945‑1955, the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic (RSFSR) did not
reconstruct a single town or a village in Crimea, as well as did not provide assistance to overcome the economic
crisis after the mass deportations of its population. The functioning of the local infrastructure and agriculture
increasingly depended on supplies and human resources provided by Soviet Ukraine in a form of assistance.
The ambiatious plan for the reconstruction of Crimea was only feasible if it joined the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic (Ukrainian SSR).
T
he decision to transfer the Crimean region from the
RSFSR to Soviet Ukraine was taken at the highest
level of the Communist Party. The meeting of the
Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (USSR) under the leadership of Georgy
Malenkov on January 25, 1954, approved the draft decree
which outlined the legal procedure of the transfer. On
February 5, 1954, Russia’s Council of Ministers appealed to
the Presidium of the Supreme Council to consider the issue
and then forward it to the Presidium of the Supreme Council
of the USSR. The same day the Presidium of the Supreme
Council concluded that“given the economic connections,
geographic proximity and close economic and cultural ties
of the Ukrainian SSR and the Crimean region”the transfer
was approved. Crimean and Sevastopol authorities as well
as Russian Ministers of Justice and heads of the Supreme
Court and the Prosecutor’s office were also present during
this historic meeting.
On the other hand, the equivalent legislative body in the
Soviet Ukraine appealed for a transfer on February 12, 1954.
Seven days later, the decree“On the transfer of the Crimean
Region from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
(RSFSR) to the Ukrainian SSR”was issued.
This Decree was approved on April 26, 1954 after the
Supreme Council of the entire Soviet Union has adopted the
Law“On transfer of the Crimean Region from the RSFSR to
the Ukrainian SSR”and decided to amend the Constitution
of the USSR governing the administrative divisions of the
Soviet republics. Thus, the Crimean Region was excluded from
the Russian regions in Chapter 22 of the Soviet Constitution,
and included into Article 23 of the Constitution dedicated to
administrative and territorial division of the Ukrainian SSR.
The Decree and the laws were signed by Kliment Voroshilov,
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the
USSR.
On June 2, 1954 any reference of the Crimean Region as
part of Soviet Russia was exluded. Henceforth, it was written
down as part of the Soviet Ukraine.
The transfer was flawless legally‑wise. Russia’s Supreme
Council decision was adopted in the presence and with the
consent of representatives of the Crimean Region and the
city of Sevastopol, who legally confirmed their agreement
to change the status of Crimea. Nevertheless, the myth
of Crimea as a gift from Khrushchev had quickly taken
shape in Russia. This myth had considerable influence on a
further course of the socio‑political history of Crimea and
Ukraine‑Russia relations.

21
«KHRUSHCHEV’S GIFT»: FORMATION
OFTHE RUSSIAN MYTH
Russian intelligentsia and Soviet politicians who sympathized with imperialist ideas were traumatized by the
transfer of Crimea from the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
despite the economic imperatives that made such a transfer inevitable. Crimea was the gem in Russia’s imperial
crown in the hearts and minds of many. The myth of Sevastopol as the place of exclusively Russian military glory
contributed to this sentiment. As a result, the myth of Crime’s transfer to Ukraine as a brazen gift soon emerged.
T
he transfer was labelled as“Khrushchev’s gift”emphasiz-
ing the Soviet leader’s personal will rather than economic
rationale that justified the action. Modern advocates
of the so-called Crimea’s return to Russia called it a whim of a
despot, a gift to Ukraine to mark the 300th anniversary of the
so-called“Reunification of Ukraine with Russia”, commemorat-
ing the Pereyaslav Agreement between the Ukrainian Cossacks
and the RussianTsar in 1654. In part, these interpretations were
inspired by the Russian secret services as the campaign against
Khrushchev portraying his incompetence.This was part of the
internal party plot that ousted Khrushchev from power.
However, the documents that stipulate transfer of Crimea’s
region and the city of Sevastopol to the USSR are lacking
Khrushchev’s signature. Back in 1954, Khrushchev did not
have the ultimate authority as the first Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR.The transfer
was ordered by Georgy Malenkov and KlimentVoroshilov.
Equally false is the statement that Khrushchev was ethnic
Ukrainian. A native of Kursk region in Russia, he spent only
part of his adult life in Ukraine and spoke very poor Ukrainian.
During the reign of Stalin, Khruschev took part in mass repres-
sions of intelligentsia, particularly in Ukraine, hence he did not
have any desire to thank Ukrainians.
In early 1990s, the son of Nikita Khrushchev, Sergei, who
had worked at theWatson’s Institute for International and
Public Affairs, Brown University, since 1991, became the main
propagator of this myth.Thinking of his father as victim of fraud-
ulent charges, Sergei tried to defend him by promoting another
myth about Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine for“temporary use”or
even under“lease conditions.”
First voices of dissent started to emerge right after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.Those who protested against the
transfer argued that it had occurred in violation of laws as it
could happen only after a legitimate referendum. However, the
referendum procedures were not clearly pronounced in the
Soviet law in the 1960s, since the only referendum in the USSR
was held in March 1991, while the region’s consent was insti-
tutionalized through adoption of the decision of the Supreme
Council of the RSFSR on the transfer of Crimea on February 5,
1954, witnessed by the elected representatives of Crimea, mem-
bers of the Supreme Council as well as Crimea’s and Sevastopol’s
executive authorities.
Russia has reinforced doubts on the legitimacy of the transfer
of the city of Sevastopol to the Soviet Ukraine referring to the
law of 1948 which had excluded the city from the Crimean
Region and gave it a special status. However, the change of
administrative status had to be written in the Constitution of the
RSFSR and the Soviet Union; hence the transfer of Sevastopol
took place. Sergei Sosnitsky, Chairman of the Municipal
Executive Committee, participated in the Supreme Council of
the RSFSR session on February 5, 1954, thus agreeing to the
transfer of the city to the Soviet Ukraine.

23
UKRAINE REBUILDS CRIMEA
Following the World War Two the Crimean peninsula looked like a wasteland. The war and Stalin’s deportations
of Crimeans devastated the region. In the decade following the handover of the Crimean region to the
Ukrainian SSR from the Soviet Union, Crimea experienced a building boom.
A
few years after Crimea became part of Ukraine, the
economy began to improve as the region increased
agricultural and manufacturing production and
developed a small but strong wine and grape‑growing
industry. The region began to emerge as a resort destina-
tion. However, with growing industries in Crimea, a water
shortage became a problem.
In 1957 Ukraine built the North Crimean Canal to address
the water shortage. The length of the canal totaled 402.6 ki-
lometers and smaller canals branched off from the main
canal. Following the first phase of the canal’s construction,
irrigated areas grew four‑times in size. As a result, grape pro-
duction grew, the size of vineyards expanded and grain crop
harvests significantly increased. With more irrigated land,
Crimea produced 38 percent of grapes, 15 percent of fruit
and berries, 6 percent vegetables and 4.6 percent of meat for
the Soviet Union’s total output. In addition, 80 percent of the
canal’s water was used for farming, including 60 percent for
the growing of rice on salt marsh soils, which could not be
used for agriculture earlier.
Crimean industry experienced dramatic growth after it
became part of Ukraine. For instance, in 1956 iron ore output
grew by 36 percent, electricity production by 57 percent, and
the manufacturing of bricks and stones grew by 72 percent
and plaster production by 39 percent as compared to 1953.
From 1953 to 1963, the gross industrial output in Crimea
increased 3.4 times. Capital investment in the national
economy grew nearly threefold and totaled 1.5 billion Soviet
rubles. During this time 76 large industrial sites were built and
developed.
In 1955‑1960, Simferopol’s first thermal power plant was
built. It was considered advanced and state‑of‑the‑art at
the time; the plant provided power and heating to the main
administrative center in Crimea as well as the burgeoning
greenhouse industry. High‑voltage power transmission lines
connected the peninsula to the Kakhovka and Zaporizhzhia
hydroelectric power plants on the Dnieper. With a safe and
reliable supply of electricity, thriving chemical, metallur-
gy and ship building industries began to develop. Today,
hydrofoil vessels, manufactured by“More”at the Feodosiya
Shipbuilding Plant are operating in many countries around
the world.
The construction of Simferopol‑Yalta trolley line in
1958‑1961 resulted in a tourist boom in Crimea. The world’s
longest trolley line connected the peninsula’s center and in-
ternational airports with Crimean resorts via a mountain pass.
Vacationers flocked to Crimea; the number of vacationers
increased to 1.5 million within a few years. As of 2013, the
number of vacationers in Crimea reached 6 million.

25
CRIMEA’S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON UKRAINE
Crimea and Ukraine always enjoyed deeper economic ties than the ones that existed between Ukraine and
Russia, hence the decision to transfer the Crimean region to the Soviet Ukraine in 1954. Decades of Ukraine’s
investments into the Crimean economy resulted in comprehensive financial links with the rest of Ukraine, which
made the everyday life on the peninsula heavily rely on the mainland part of the country.
T
ransport. Crimean peninsula and Ukraine are con-
nected by two highways and two railway tracks via
Perekop in Crimea and Chonhar, Kherson region. On
the other hand, the only connection between Crimea and
the Russian Federation is via Kerch‑Taman ferry line. This
connection, however, could not ensure a sufficient transport
flow during the tourist season even before Russia’s annex-
ation of Crimea. Moreover, the ferry line does not operate
in a stormy weather, making Russia’s connection with the
peninsula in autumn and winter even more difficult.
Foodstuffs. Transportation problems affect the food supply
to the Crimea. The population of the peninsula increased
threefold since the 1954 transfer, yet it produces just 20 per-
cent of essential foodstuffs. While Russia experiences short-
age of food production, Ukraine has a considerable surplus of
food of higher quality at lower prices.
Water. After Ukraine invested in the construction of the
Kakhovka reservoir on the Dnieper river and the North
Crimean Canal, Crimean residents obtained 80 percent of
water from the Dnieper. After the Russian annexation of
Crimea, the local agricultural output has dropped dramatical-
ly, while the new harsh restrictions have been imposed on the
Crimean households.
Electricity. Crimea’s own power stations are able to generate
mere 15 percent of electricity consumed by the peninsula.
The remaining 85 percent are generated by power stations
located in mainland Ukraine.
Natural Gas. Despite considerable deposits of natural gas
stored in the shelf, Crimea covers 66 percent of its gas needs
while 34 percent of gas is supplied from mainland Ukraine.
Telecommunications. Optic fiber lines and trunk communi-
cations connect Crimea with the outside world exclusively via
the territory of Ukraine.
Finance. Crimea is a region with the highest number of pen-
sioners amongst the total population. The specialization in
agriculture and tourist business that hindered local industrial
development transformed Crimea into Ukraine’s most heavily
subsidized region. About 64 percent of Crimea’s budget was
direct subsidies allocated from the state budget of Ukraine.
Even after the Russian annexation of the peninsula, the in-
troduction of trade quotas and economic sanctions, Crimean
economic dependence on Ukraine remained very strong. The
data from Ukrainian customs office is an illustrative example:
in the first five months of 2015, Crimea received Ukrainian
goods worth USD 374 million, whereas the reverse trade flow
amounted to only USD 15.5 million.

27
A LONG WAY HOME: CRIMEANTATARS
COME BACKTO CRIMEA
Crimea Tatars cherished their cultural and mental connection to their homeland through four and a half
decades of forceful exile. But the return to the peninsula did not mean that the Crimean Tatars found home.
Their houses had long been occupied by new settlers and land divided between other people. This led to
socio‑economic problems and new conflicts. Neither the Soviet, nor the Ukrainian government later could
overcome negative consequences of repatriation.
U
nlike most peoples that suffered, CrimeanTatars were
hardly affected by the wave of de‑Stalinization and the
rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinist purges launched
in 1956.The only change was the removal of their“special
settlers”status, which was a ban to cross the preassigned
administrative borders of residential communities. In 1967,
the Decree on rehabilitation of formerly deported people was
adopted. However, about 300 CrimeanTatars were convicted
of the breach of passport regulations within two decades of its
adoption. In 1978, a special resolution on the reinforcement of
passport regulations in Crimea was passed, making it easier to
deport unwanted migrants. Soviet security services were active-
ly fighting the leaders of the CrimeanTatars’cultural and nation-
al movement that emerged during the Khrushchev’s thaw.
It was not until Gorbachev’s perestroika, that the first
CrimeanTatars started arriving home in 1989.The deep crisis
in the USSR caused various ethnic conflicts, especially on the
Muslim‑dominated periphery of the Soviet empire. In 1988‑89,
ethnic massacres occurred in Uzbekistan where the predomi-
nant majority of CrimeanTatars lived.They and the Meskhetian
Turks were among the victims.The return to Crimea became
the main driving force behind the survival of the CrimeanTatars,
while the weakened empire could no longer prevent that.
CrimeanTatars were not welcomed back as hundreds of
thousands Russian and Ukrainian migrants had settled there
in the course of 50 years, driving the population figures of the
region up to 2.5 million.The South Coast of Crimea became
a favorite site for retired Soviet military men.The households
of the CrimeanTatars and their lands had long been divided
between other people. Even the grave plates from their ancient
cemeteries could often be seen in the foundations of new
houses. Against the backdrop of the peninsula’s overpopulation,
new conflicts related to land or on ethnic grounds emerged.The
Soviet and then the Ukrainian administration delayed with the
allocation of land for resettlers because of the lack of political
will of central government and often for corrupt motives.
Squatting became endemic: CrimeanTatars left Uzbekistan in
the midst of ethnic conflicts without any financial compensa-
tion for the houses they lost. Mass unemployment was a serious
problem of the returnees. Amid deep economic recession in
the USSR and Ukraine later, the repatriates’social and economic
problems were a too heavy burden to be handled with the
public funds available.
After their return, the CrimeanTatars made a number of
steps to restore their national self‑rule. In 1991, the second
Kurultai convened after more than 70 years of underground
activities, adopting the“Declaration of national sovereignty of
the CrimeanTatar people”and set up an executive manage-
ment body called the Mejlis, which was headed by Mustafa
Dzhemilev, the prominent human rights activist and leader
of the national liberation movement. As of 2013, around
270,000 CrimeanTatars resided in Crimea.

29
UKRAINE’S INDEPENDENCE ANDTHE
GUARANTEE OFTERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
On December 1, 1991, a referendum on the Act of Declaration of Independence took place in Ukraine. Over
90% of Ukrainians voted in favor of breaking away from the Soviet Union and creating a sovereign and
independent Ukraine. An overwhelming majority of voters in all regions of Ukraine, including citizens in Crimea,
voted in favor of dissolving the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
U
kraine’independence was enshrined in the Proclamation
of Independence of Ukraine Act and adopted by the
UkrainianparliamentonAugust24,1991.Today,Ukraine’s
independence from the USSR is celebrated annually on August
24, known as Ukrainian Independence Day.
Ukraine, a founding member state of the UN, has respected
and complied with all international laws, treaties and coopera-
tion agreements. As the largest country in Europe, it has respect-
ed the territorial integrity of its neighbors as per the international
agreements, which Ukraine has signed since its independence.
It remains committed to peace, democracy and its right to
self‑determination.
Following Ukraine’s independence, a number of international
treaties guaranteed the territorial integrity of the successor states
of the USSR.
On December 7‑8, 1991, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha (Belarus),
the leaders of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus declared the
Soviet Union dissolved and formed the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). A few weeks later, on December 21,
1991, in Almaty (formerly Alma‑Ata, Kazakhstan), most of the
former republics of the USSR, including Ukraine, agreed to sign
the Declaration formally establishing the Commonwealth of
Independent States. As part of the Declaration creating the CIS,
documents outlining each country’s territorial integrity and
boundaries were adopted and signed.
Importantly, on April 15, 1994, the“Declaration of observance
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders
of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independence
States”was signed.This document guaranteed the sovereignty
of each member country and outlined the borders of each
member state. Additionally, it clearly outlined that each member
country was politically independent and could not influence or
use aggression or force against another signatory to change the
legal status of a state.
Ukraine’s independence and right to self‑determination was
also protected under the Budapest Memorandum signed on
December 5, 1994. As part of the signing of the memorandum,
Ukraine, a nuclear power at that time, voluntarily gave up its
nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees.The
Budapest Memorandum was signed by the United States, Russia
and the United Kingdom.The signatories welcomed the decision
by Ukraine to accede to the non‑proliferation agreement and
pledged, among other things, to respect the independence and
“existing borders”of Ukraine.Today, Ukraine remains the first and
only country to have renounced its nuclear weapons voluntarily.
Ukraine’s borders were also recognized and guaranteed in
numerous bilateral treaties with Ukraine’s neighboring states.
For example, in the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and
Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine dated
May 31, 1997 (ratified by theVerkhovna Rada of Ukraine on
January 14, 1998, and by the State Duma of Russia on December
25, 1998) both parties committed to respect each other’s territo-
rial integrity.

31
CRIMEA AND UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS IN 1991-2013
Immediately following Ukraine’s independence, nationalist and neo-imperialist political forces in Russia
challenged Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the status of Crimea as a legitimate part of Ukraine. However, it was
only after the change of Russia’s president in 1999 from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin that these political forces
gained active support at the top levels of government and in the Kremlin.
I
n the first few years following the dissolution of the
USSR, the political crisis in Russia deepened. The political
landscape was marked by a tense stand-off between
the Communist-Nationalist parliament headed by Ruslan
Khazbulatov and President, Boris Yeltsin, and were com-
pounded by an uncontrolled army, hundreds of radical para-
military groups and political organizations, and ongoing
national and ethnic conflicts in many regions across Russia.
As individual politics and turf wars continued to dominate
the political landscape in Russia, other political forces that
supported conflicts, destabilizing Crimea, and supporting
pro-Russian separatists were making gains.
On May 21, 1992, the parliament of the Russian Federation
zeroed in on Crimea. It found the February 5, 1954“transfer of
the Crimean region from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic”“legally
invalid from the moment of its approval”.
In response, Russia engaged in bilateral negotiations under
the guise of the will of the Russian people. On July 9, 1993, the
Russian parliament passed a resolution declaring Sevastopol“a
federal Russian city”.
Ukraine was forced to contact the UN Security Council that
quickly denounced the decision of the Russian parliament and
supported the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine
(Resolution S/26118). On July 20, 1993, Russia voted in favor
of the UN resolution since the foreign policy of the Russian
Federation was under control of the President, and not the
parliament.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict around Crimea was mitigated
following a political crisis and the subsequent dissolution of the
parliament in 1993. As a result, financial support from Russia to
the separatists in Crimea began to decrease. Nevertheless, in
January 1994, a group of separatists were able to form a major-
ity in the Crimean Autonomous Republic parliament. However,
they quickly lost popularity without Russian support and were
defeated in the 1998 Crimean election.
On May 31, 1997, the“Agreement on friendship, cooperation
and partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine”
was signed pledging to respect each other’s territorial integrity.
AsVladimir Putin rose to power in Russia, neo-imperialist
revanchist forces started gaining momentum in Russia and
the geopolitical issue of Crimea was back in the spotlight. The
demarcation of the sea border in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch
Strait and the status of the Russian military bases in the Crimea
became key points of contention in bilateral relationships
between the two countries. Under President Putin’s leadership
Russia again intensified its support and influence in Crimea and
issued Russian passports en masse, opened numerous schools,
cultural centers and financed Russian radical paramilitary orga-
nizations (such as Kazaki etc.). .

33
RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN CRIMEA, 1991‑2013
One of the most sensitive issues in Ukraine‑Russian relations from 1991‑2013 was the headquartering of
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Crimea.
S
ince Ukraine’s independence, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet
has remained in Crimea, which has been a direct threat
to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The
Russian fleet was used as an instrument of influence in
Ukrainian domestic politics and has strengthened Russian
influence in Crimea for several decades.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, the
second largest former Soviet republic in population and
economic output, was entitled to a large share of the former
Soviet Navy. However, the Black Sea Fleet did not only include
warships, but also the main naval base located in Sevastopol.
However, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union the
Russian Federation was unwilling to move its fleet and naval
base.
Up until 1994, the Black Sea Fleet was formally shared, but
resulted in numerous conflicts between the two countries.
When the crew of СКР‑112, a guard vessel, decided to fly
Ukraine’s national flag on July 21, 1992, the commander of
the Black Sea Feet started a military operation and involved
naval aircrafts. The situation was diffused, however it became
clear that sharing of the Black Sea Fleet was not a viable
option.
Both countries engaged in dialogue and mutual agree-
ments were made in regards to the fleet. On April 15, 1994,
Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma, and Russian President,
BorisYeltsin, signed an agreement that dealt with the Black
Sea Fleet issue. Throughout 1995‑1997, treaties were signed,
which divided the Black Sea Fleet assets between the two
countries. As part of the agreements, Ukraine received
67 ships and vessels and 90 aircrafts. Russia received 338 ships
and vessels, as well as 106 aircrafts and helicopters. Russia
leased Sevastopol bays for up to 20 years (until 2017) and
a number of onshore facilities on the Crimean peninsula.
Russia’s military forces on the peninsula could not exceed
25 thousand persons, nor could Russia have nuclear weapons
in its Black Sea Fleet arsenal while on Ukrainian territory. The
agreement came into effect on July 12, 1999.
Russia, however, did not comply with the signed agree-
ments and grossly violated Ukraine’s sovereignty. Despite
agreements being signed, Russia did not transfer the
lighthouses, important for navigating the Black Sea. Despite
an escalation regarding the lighthouses, Russia still refused
to transfer the lighthouses to Ukraine and they remained in
Russia’s possession following the annexation of Crimea. In
2009, when Russian troops invaded Georgia, Ukraine warned
Russia against using the Black Sea Fleet located on Ukrainian
territory, which Russia perceived as an unfriendly act.
Ukraine sent a firm message to Russia about its Black Sea
Fleet and the use of aggression in the region, however after
President VictorYanukovych came to power, the Kharkiv
Agreements were signed on April 21, 2010, extending the
Russian lease of the Black Sea Fleet until 2042 in exchange for
a discounted price for oil and gas.
PresidentYanukovych was accused of betraying national
interests and breaching of Ukraine’s laws. In response, he said
the move would normalize relations between the two coun-
tries. In actual fact, the deal helped Russia prepare to annex
Crimea from Ukraine.

35
THE CONFLICT OVERTHETUZLA ISLAND (2003)
After Vladimir Putin came to power, the Russian authorities demonstrated a tendency to solve domestic and
international conflicts through the use of force. In particular, the first show of flexing muscles vis‑a‑vis Ukraine
was attempted in 2003 during a sea border delimitation dispute and the status of the Kerch Strait.
I
n 1925, Tuzla Spit, an extension of the Taman peninsula
in the Kerch Strait, was eroded with a strong storm and
turned into an island. It is separated from the Crimean
coast with a broad canal on the one hand, and from the
Taman peninsula with a broad strand of shallow waters
where industrial fish species spawn on the other. In 1941,
the Presidium of Soviet Russia’s Supreme Council admin-
istratively attached the Tuzla Island to Crimea, which was
still part of Russia as well. On February 19, 1954 Tuzla was
handed over to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
together with the Crimean region. Thus, after the collapse of
the USSR and the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence,
it was Ukraine that assumed control over the canal in the
Kerch Strait, making the Russian vessels pay a fare for the
passage via the canal.
The Tuzla Island ownership issue became especially urgent
during the disputes about delimitation of sea border and ter-
ritorial waters of the Sea of Azov between Ukraine and Russia.
Ukrainian government argued that the Sea of Azov and the
Kerch Strait were the internal waters of the country, hence
must be separated from Russia with a state border. Russia, on
the other hand, insisted on the absence of clearly defined sea
borders in the region and demanded that Tuzla be considered
a spit, not an island.
Russia’s refusal in border delimitation paved the way to
unregulated use of the natural resources stored at the bottom
of the Sea of Azov. Ukraine delayed with clearly expressing its
grievances, which allowed the Russians to resolve the Tuzla is-
sue by force. On September 29, 2003 the Russian government
started to build a dike to connect the Tuzla Island with Russia
without any official consent from Ukraine. According to the
Russian official version, this work was intended to prevent
the erosion of the island and Taman peninsula. Despite the
note of protest and visit of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister to
Moscow, the construction works continued.
However, Ukraine’s swift and decisive response came by
surprise to the Russians. After the hearings in the Ukrainian
Parliament, the border guard unit was deployed on the island,
making it clear that Ukraine would protect its territorial
integrity through any available legitimate means. On October
22, 2003, the dike construction was stopped 100 meters short
of the Ukrainian island. Next month, the respective decision
was officially taken at the joint meeting of between the prime
ministers of both states.
Nevertheless, even after the issue passed its climax, differ-
ences between Ukrainian and Russian official statements on
the consequences of the dispute revealed that the conflict
was far from over. While the Ukrainian party stated that Russia
had finally recognized Tuzla Island as the territory of Ukraine,
Russia’s Foreign Ministry commented on its status as“unde-
termined.”It became clear then that Russia’s aggressive policy
went beyond that tiny island. It went to gradual intensifica-
tion of anti‑Ukrainian propaganda and ideological expansion
of Russians in Ukraine.

37
CRIMEA, 1991‑2013
Following Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 1999, Russian hegemony became a political priority in Russia. The
idea of Russian control and supremacy was extended to Crimea where the Russian government sought to
influence the local region and population.
I
n 1990s, Soviet authorities moved to change the status of
certain republics and granted autonomy in preparation
of the Union Treaty. On February 12, 1991, the Crimean
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was restored following
an opinion poll with the majority of voters indicating they
were in favor of the move. Despite gaining autonomy, the
majority of Crimean residents voted in favor of Ukraine’s
independence in the Ukrainian referendum that took place
on December 1, 1991.
In 199293, the Russian parliament approved a number of
resolutions that outlined Russia’s territorial claims to Ukraine.
At the same time proRussian civil and public organizations,
as well as paramilitary forces were emerging and growing in
popularity in Crimea as a result of Russian financing.
On October 21, 1998, a new Constitution of the Republic
of Crimea was adopted and was politically aligned with the
Ukrainian Constitution. During this time, proRussian political
parties in Crimea struggled to win seats.
In an attempt to destabilize the peninsula, Russia
continued to provoke interethnic and religious conflicts
in Ukrainian Crimea. Tensions grew around the issue of
repatriation for deported Crimean Tatars. Growing national
and religious intolerance was displayed by local, foreign-
funded proRussian organizations. The Crimean Tatars,
Ukrainians, Jews and other minority groups were subjected
to hate and discrimination by proRussian organizations.
In August 2006, the UN Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination expressed concerns that the Russian
Orthodox Church was actively involved in antiTatar and
antiIslamic campaigning.
Following the Orange Revolution in 2004, Russia aggressively
launched a misinformation campaign in Ukraine and leveraged
the political divide in the country. In Crimea, Russia painted
politicians in Kyiv as fascists and“Banderites”referring to Stepan
Bandera who fought for Ukrainian independence (Banderites is
a negative term in Russia, as they believe Bandera collaborated
with Hitler during the SecondWorldWar. In fact, he fought
against both Hitler and Stalin in the hopes for Ukraine’s indepen-
dence). Russian propaganda was also depicting CrimeanTatars
as Nazi collaborators even though all charges against them were
dropped during the Soviet Union times and the deportation
was condemned as a crime.This caught the attention of local
residents in Crimea, who were largely retired military officers. It is
important to note that as of 2001 more than half of the Crimean
population was born outside of Crimea. Local people were
indoctrinated into believing that all Ukrainians were fascists and
“Banderites”and that by extension CrimeanTatars were too.
Russia continued to voice concerns that Russianspeakers were
being oppressed while a campaign of“forceful Ukrainianization”
was underway. However, numerous monitoring missions found
the opposite.The OSCE and the UN stated that Russianspeakers
were not in fact oppressed, but that Ukrainians, CrimeanTatars
and other minority groups had to be protected. Russian politi-
cians denounced the monitoring mission reports and tried to
discredit them.
Russian influence in the region continued. From 2010-
2014, prior to the annexation of Crimea, a sharp increase in
antiUkrainian media was broadcast across the peninsula.The
messages remained the same: Russian speakers in Crimea had to
be protected from the fascists in Kyiv.

39
CRIMEA,THE LAND OF HEROES
A popular Russian slogan reads“Crimea is a place of Russian military glory”. This slogan best summarizes the
impact the region has had on the Russian psyche and the important role the peninsula has played in Russia’s
military history.
T
he Russian narrative that Crimea is Russian is
inaccurate since the history of the peninsula spans
thousands of years and the area has long been home
to a diverse mix of cultures, including Tatars, Ukrainians,
Greeks and Jews who, for the most part, lived in peace. This
narrative neglects to mention the complicated and bloody
history of Crimea, which changed hands many times, or the
important role Ukrainians have played in shaping the social,
cultural and economic landscape of the region.“These were
mainly the Russians who shed their blood here, and no
other nation has the right on this land,”reads a slogan in a
photograph taken in 1904.
This photograph and slogan were used as powerful
Russian propaganda to maintain the pride of Soviets. After
all, the Russian narrative is about maintaining Russian pride
and blurring fact and fiction to create a new truth. In the
photograph housed at the Sheremetev Museum a group of
veterans who took part in the 50th anniversary of the defense
of Sevastopol during the Crimean War of 1853‑57, stand
proudly.
Interestingly, the majority of their surnames are Ukrainian:
“1. A.V. Rekov, 2. K.T. Subbota, 3. M.A. Rekov, 4. T.K. Sarana,
5. M. Bulba, 6. I.K. Krivoy, 7. S.E. Grinko, 8. G.I. Dyadyk, 9. I.T.
Scherbakovsky, 10. P.P. Rudenko, 11. S.F.Yevtushenko, 12. M.I.
Stukal, 13. A.M. Barabash, 14. V.I. Zanudko, 15. S.S. Pavlyuk,
16.Y.V. Svistun, 17. P.M. Ternovsky, 18. G.D. Fershal, 19. G.M.
Borodenko, 20. SS. Chorny, 21. G.A. Kleshch, 22. E.M. Loik,
23. M.A. Kleshch, 24. A.A. Konstantinov, 25. F.I. Usatyy, 26.
P.A. Doroshenko, 27. I. Hrynko, 28. P.A. Dudnychenko, 29. S.E.
Chupryno, 30. M.D. Smolensky, 31. M.M. Loik, 32. I.A. Kalina,
33. F.S. Hilobochenko, 34. G.T. Nastoburka, 35. T.F. Gorobets,
36. K.I. Cherep, 37. G.M. Reznik, 38. S.D. Smolensky, 39. S.D.
Stoyanenko, 40. N.I. Odnoshevnyy, 41. G.L. Topal”.
How can it be that more than half of the veterans’names
identified in this picture are Ukrainian? The answer is obvious
‑ to serve in that war soldiers were often recruited from the
territories that were closer to fighting grounds. Besides,
there was no railway to Crimea at that time. Russians must
remember that many people spilled their blood for Crimea.
Ukrainians played an active role in defending the penin-
sula and fought for a free and peaceful Crimea. Ukrainians
fought alongside Russians, Tatars and other ethnic minorities
and were buried alongside them. Crimea has been a part
of Ukraine’s history for centuries and the Russian narrative
that glorifies Russia’s military past, and excludes mention of
others, must be re‑written.

41
PETRO KISHKA: There are hardly any Soviet or Russian
books or movies on the siege of Sevastopol in the Crimean
War of 1853‑57, which do not have a brief reference to
the legendary sailor“Petro Koshka”. This Russified name
masks the identity of Petro Markovich Kishka, a Ukrainian, a
serf, a Russian military sailor, and a native of the Ukrainian
Podillya region. Not yet 20, the young lad was recruited into
the armed forces at the order of his owner the landlord.
In August 1849, he arrived in Sevastopol. For several years
he served as a military sailor with the Russian navy. When
the united squadrons from Britain, France, the Kingdom of
Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire arrived in Sevastopol and
the city was besieged, the Russian navy was sunk; and Petro
Kishka went ashore and retrained into a scout. During the
day, he and other soldiers defended the battery, and almost
every night he went into the enemy rear for French and
British captives. He quickly became a living legend. Once
Petro Kishka stole a horse from the enemy camp in broad
daylight, only to resell it and set up a monument at the
grave of his perished comrade Ignatiy Shevchenko, another
Ukrainian defender of Sevastopol. Metropolitan newspapers
wrote about his adventures; and a young artillery officer
named Leo Tolstoy was among the authors. Kishka was
wounded several times, distinguished with numerous signif-
icant awards, including a Golden Cross personally from the
Empress. He was also promoted to junior corporal. At the
end of his many years of service (in those days they served
for as long as 25 years) Petro Kishka returned to his home
village and lived on a small pension. He died of a cold in
1882 after attempting to save the lives of two drowning girls
who fell through the ice in the local river. Over the years, the
location of his grave was lost.
AMET‑KHAN SULTAN: An ace pilot, recognized as a two
times Hero of the Soviet Union. During World War II he was
also awarded with three Orders of Lenin, four Orders of the
Red Banner, an Order of Alexander Nevsky, an Order of the
Patriotic War (1st degree), and an Order of the Red Star.
After the war, he became a legendary test pilot, who tested
over 100 items of combat equipment, became the winner
of the Stalin Prize and received several state awards. This
extraordinary man was banned from living in his native
land and was often denounced for his ethnic origin. Even
after his death, pro‑Russian politicians in Crimea refused to
honor his memory by naming the Simferopol airport in his
honor; instead, this was later done by the Verkhovna Rada
(parliament) of Ukraine. Most Ukrainians will recognize the
hero having read only the first few words of this description.
Amet‑khan Sultan was born in Alupka, Crimea to the family
of a Dagestani and a Crimean Tatar woman; and accepted
his mother’s national origin. He went through the entire
war from the first day and became a living legend. In May
1944, he participated in the liberation of Crimea from the
Nazis. He managed to intercept a German liaison aircraft
with valuable documents over the Karkinit bay and forced
it to land on the local airstrip. After the end of the Crimean
operation, he received a vacation and went to visit his moth-
er. Coincidentally, at the same time Joseph Stalin declared
all Crimean Tatars as Nazi accomplices and condemned
them to exile from their native land. Amet‑khan’s mother
was called on as well. Who knows how the story would have
ended for the hero, if it were not for the intervention of one
of his friends, another hero‑pilot. Yet, Amet‑khan’s family
still had to leave Crimea. The executioners of the Crimean
Tatar people made a single indulgence for his mother – they
allowed her not to go to distant Uzbekistan but to settle in
the relatively close North Caucasus. Even after his death,
Amet‑khan’s body was not allowed to be brought back
to Crimea. Having lost his life in a tragic accident during
a scheduled test, he was buried despite his last will in
Moscow, a city so alien to him.

43
CRIMEA ONTHE DAYS OFTHE
REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY
In the summer of 2013, the Russian Federation started a customs war, trying to force Ukraine to give up signing
the Association Agreement with the European Union. Civic protests, which started in Kyiv on November 21,
2013, and in 10 days evolved into the Revolution of Dignity, were caused by the Ukrainian government’s
deviation from the European integration strategy, despite it being outlined in Ukrainian legislation. Having
succumbed to Russian blackmail, the Ukrainian government refused to sign the agreement at the last moment.
However, the customs war was only a part of a hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine.
M
eanwhile, the Russian side intensified the informa-
tion war against Ukraine, and with the beginning
of the Revolution of Dignity the population of
some regions of Ukraine, including Crimea, was completely
isolated from reliable news. As a result of the information
campaign, which lasted several decades prior to these
events, the Crimean society was already split. Therefore,
for a large part of the local population, the pro‑Russian,
Russian and later state media convincingly portrayed op-
ponents to Yanukovych’s criminal regime as Nazis and their
accomplices.
In November, the Supreme Council of Crimea, the majority of
its members belonging to the party of PresidentYanukovych,
supported the unconstitutional decision of Mykola Azarov’s
government, and encouraged integration with the Russian
Federation. On December 2, after unarmed protesters
were attacked in Kyiv, the Crimean Parliament urgedViktor
Yanukovych to declare the state of emergency. On December
11, the Presidium of the Crimean Parliament encouraged
the people of Crimea“to be ready to defend the autonomy”.
Vyacheslav Svetlichny, consul of the Russian Federation, coor-
dinated efforts to establish illegal self‑defense armed groups,
some of which took part in the so‑called“Anti‑Maidan”move-
ment, where criminals and pro‑Russian radicals were mobilized
from all over Ukraine and assisted by security forces engaged
in beatings and kidnapping of unarmed civilians in Kyiv. He
managed to establish cooperation between the Russian parties
“Russian Bloc”and“Russian Unity”with several local MPs from
the Party of Regions (Yanukovych’s party), who then executed
an unconstitutional coup in Crimea in late February 2014.
On January 24, 2014,VolodymyrYatsuba, chairman of the
Sevastopol State Administration and a member of the Party
of Regions, urged residents to be prepared“to go out of the
legal framework of Ukraine”in case the revolution prevails. At
the same time, the Russian fleet in Crimea was already working
out scenarios of seizing government buildings in the city. On
February 4, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the auton-
omous region of Simferopol suggested turning to the Russian
president for assistance.
Despite the overall atmosphere of hysteria stirred up through
newspapers and television, artificially creating the desired im-
age, the real threat to peace and security of Crimea came from
the semi-criminal local self-defence brigades. On the other
hand, the Mejlis of the CrimeanTatars and the Crimean pro-de-
mocracy groups turned out to be defenceless against brute
force and snipers. In Kyiv, the lives of the Heavenly Hundred
became the cost of freedom. Soon thereafter Crimea fell victim
to the Russian invasion and annexation.

45
ANTI‑CONSTITUTIONAL COUP IN
CRIMEA ON FEBRUARY 23‑26, 2014
The escape of the former PresidentViktorYanukovych on February 22, 2014 marked a watershed in the Russian
designs to destabilize Ukraine. It was disguised as if the local population took to the streets in a series of pro‑Russian
political rallies in defiance of the new pro‑European government installed in Kyiv. However, the Russian plan
succeeded only in Sevastopol where most of the Russian troops as well as the Russian Black Sea fleet base were
located. In the evening of February 23, 2014 a large pro‑Russian rally took place on the Sevastopol central square.
The separatists declared the vote of no‑confidence against Sevastopol City Administration HeadVolodymyrYatsuba.
Alexei Chaly, a Russian businessman, was elevated to the role of the“people’s mayor”by raising hands by the
people on the square.There was not even an illusion of legitimacy that Chaly represented the will of the majority.
Pro‑Russian separatists condemned the Revolution of Dignity Kyiv and labeled the ousting ofYanukovych as a coup.
The locals started installing anti‑tank obstacles, fearing the fabricated stories of the Russian propaganda that rabid
“fascists”from Kyiv and Lviv were about to arrive to the peninsula.
O
n February 24, Sevastopol City Administration Head
Yatsuba resigned, arguing that the president who has
appointed him resigned.The city state administration
immediately condemned actions of pro‑Russian separatists
and did not recognize the authority of the“people’s mayor.”
The security agencies failed to arrest Alexei Chaly. On the same
evening, the Sevastopol City Council – under great duress
– voted for the creation of the new executive body called
the Coordination Council on Creating the Administration for
Ensuring Daily Activities of Sevastopol led by Alexei Chaly.
On the evening of February 24, the legitimate authorities of
Ukraine have de facto ceased to exercise any authority in the
city.The separatists hoisted Russian flags in front of the city
administration.
Similar events took place in Simferopol, the Crimean capital.
On February 25, several hundred pro‑Russian activists held
a protest demanding to hold an extraordinary session of the
local parliament.That day the leader of the Russian Liberal
Democratic Party at the State DumaVladimir Zhirinovsky and
several other Russians arrived to Crimea to announce the launch
of expedited issuing of Russian passports to Crimean residents.
On February 26, between 3,000 and 5,000 pro‑Russian sepa-
ratists gathered near the Supreme Council of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea. However, pro‑Ukrainian activists learned
from the bitter experience of Sevastopol.They managed to
organize themselves and throw a parallel rally by the walls of
the Crimean Parliament, which acquired unequivocal support
of the CrimeanTatar community and some pro‑Ukrainian
Russians. Overall, between 12,000 and 14,000 attended the rally.
An attempt to seize power along the same lines as in Sevastopol
was halted, as the separatists failed to gather enough deputies.
In the meantime,Vladimir Konstantinov, the Chairperson of the
Crimean Parliament, said that the statements about Crimea con-
sidering its separation from Ukraine were a provocation aimed
at discrediting the Parliament of Autonomous Republic and
depriving it of legitimacy. Radicalized by their failure, pro-Rus-
sian separatists attacked a pro-Ukrainian rally.Thirty peaceful
demonstrators were injured and two were killed as a result.

47
INVASION: BEGINNING OFTHE RUSSIAN
AGGRESSION IN CRIMEA
Residents of Crimea have protested against the Russian incursion and thus disrupted Moscow’s plans to disguise its
aggression as a free expression of the people’s will.The only part of the plan which had some success was unfolding
in Sevastopol – the city which hosted the Russian Naval base according to the Ukraine‑Russia bilateral treaties.
Crimea’s secession without Russia’s direct armed intervention proved impossible. On the night of February 27, armed
people wearing unmarked uniforms seized the Supreme Council building.The unidentified soldiers informed the
representative of the Council of Ministers of Crimea that they were the“Self‑Defense Force of the Russian‑speaking
citizens.”A year later these men were identified as servicemen of the Russian Special Forces. Attempts to start
negotiations with the militants brought no results – they did not put forward any demands. Under their cover, several
dozen MPs assembled in the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and imitated the vote of
no‑confidence against Anatoly Mogilev, the then Prime Minister of Crimea, and resolved to hold a referendum about
the status of the peninsula. According to their statement, there were 64 MPs out of 100 in the hall, however, actually
there were about 40 members who had copies of MP cards of their absent colleagues, produced in advance, in order to
get a necessary number of votes. As a result, Sergei Aksyonov, leader of the pro‑Russian marginal party Russian Unity,
was elected the new chairman of the so-called Council of Ministers of Crimea.
T
he same day, Russian politicians and the military ceased
to hide their involvement in the events in Sevastopol.
A Russian delegation of the State Duma members
and the mayor of Moscow visited the city, supporting the
annexation of the peninsula. That evening about 300 Russian
servicemen seized the runway of the Belbek airport near
Sevastopol. Russian military started blocking Ukrainian
military bases in the city,“to prevent the leak of weapons
into the hands of extremists”. The Russian side halted the
Kerch ferry service to conceal the accumulation of military
equipment and personnel of the Russian Army on the other
coast of the Black Sea. On the night of February 28, soldiers
wearing unmarked uniforms seized the Simferopol airport,
the local office of the mobile operator Ukrtelecom, and the
headquarters of the Crimean state television and radio, as
well as arranged checkpoints at every entrance to Crimea
from mainland Ukraine.
Meanwhile, more convoys of Russian military hardware were
arriving to Crimea.The Russian Special Forces blocked activities
of“Krymaeroruh”that regulates airspace over Crimea and
conducted a series of unauthorized flights of Russian military
planes to Crimean airfields. Furthermore, the Russian missile
boat Ivanovets forcefully blockaded Ukrainian warships at the
Balaclava Bay under a false pretext.
A series of well-coordinated actions of the Russian Special
Forces and pro-Russian separatists among the local politicians
on February 27-28, 2014, was only the first phase of a pre-
planned operation to annex the peninsula. On March 1, Russia
openly resorted to a full-scale military intervention into Crimea,
while launching the plan of its legitimization through the State
Duma of Russia. On March 1, 2014 the Federation Council
[Russia’s upper chamber of the parliament] gave its consent to
the use of Russian military on the territory of Ukraine upon the
request of PresidentVladimir Putin.

49
UKRAINIAN ARMY AND NAVY IN CRIMEA
Someone called it a“Strange War”. During the Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian soldiers never received
the order to use weapons. However, their courage and unarmed resistance to heavily armed Russian Special
Operation Forces caused sincere admiration around the world. Even when in March 2014, Russia got military
victory in Crimea, moral superiority remained on the side of the Ukrainian troops.
A
fter declaring its independence, Ukraine inherited from
the Soviet Union one of the largest military groups in
Europe and the status of a nuclear state. However, in
return for international guarantees of security and territorial
integrity, Ukraine joined theTreaty of 1990 on reduction of
conventional weapons; and in 1994 Ukraine became the first
country to renounce nuclear weapons. Later, the economic
crisis and the total corruption in the top branches of power
and in the Army command had disastrous impact on combat
capability of the Ukrainian Army and Navy. Furthermore, in
contrast to the neighboring Russia, Ukraine after declaring its
independence had never experienced separatism, terrorism
and did not conduct internal or invasive wars, therefore the
Ukrainian Armed Forces had zero combat experience. During
the term of PresidentViktorYanukovych, the process of
destruction of Ukrainian Army gained an unprecedented pace.
Especially negative consequences had the appointments of the
former Russian Army and intelligence officers to the top‑level
official positions.
The problems surfaced altogether during the annexation.
Several months prior to annexation the Russian Black Sea Navy
and its ground troops held war‑games where they trained
blocking and seizure of Ukrainian military basis and admin-
istrative buildings. However, it did not trigger any interest of
Ukrainian Army and Navy command or Ukrainian security
services. So, when the Russian military invasion started, the
Army and Navy commanders were caught off‑guard. As it
became known later, some of them switched sides long before.
Thus, immediately after his appointment, Denis Berezovsky,
the Navy Commander Rear Admiral of Ukraine, switched sides.
Many Ukrainian military units and the docked ships remained
blocked by the Russian troops. In the first stage of the invasion,
the Russian Special Operation Forces disguised themselves as
local self‑defence, wearing no insignia (press dubbed them
as“green men”).They often used locals and relatives of the
Ukrainian troops as hostages.The Russians organized massive
provocations to force Ukrainian soldiers open fire, so that
the local population would be hurt.The Russian leadership
thought this would give them carte blanche for the start of
the so‑called“peacekeeping operation”in Crimea. Under these
conditions, the top leadership of Ukraine decided not to give
orders to use weapons, but to confine to protection of military
bases and other military facilities.
First of all, the occupants tried to seize the ships of Ukrainian
fleet.The Ukrainian military ships were blocked in their docking
sites.To accomplish this task the Russians sank a few vessels at
the bay exit. Ukrainian sailors were repeatedly offered higher
salaries, better benefits; their family members were under
huge pressure. However, when the traitor Rear Admiral Denis
Berezovsky, who was escorted by the Russian snipers to the
Ukrainian Navy headquarters, tried to persuade his Ukrainian
colleagues to betray their military oath, Ukrainian officers met
him by singing the anthem of Ukraine. Ukrainian sailors coura-
geously stood fast for several weeks. In the end, the Russians
had to use their special operation forces and even helicopters.
The Ukrainian trawler“Cherkassy”stood firm the longest. After
several assaults, the Russians managed to capture the ship only
on March 24. By the end of March all Ukrainian troops were
forced to leave the occupied territory of Crimea.

51
YULIY MAMCHUR: FAITHFULTOTHE OATH
On March 5, 2014, the headlines of international newspapers published photographs of a modest Ukrainian
pilot Yuliy Mamchur who stopped armed to the teeth Russian soldiers without firing a shot. He stayed loyal to
the military oath, surviving through the weeks of siege and being kidnapped and held in Russian captivity. He
became a symbol of Ukrainian resistance and moral victory over the Russian invaders.
B
orn in the town of Uman, Cherkasy region, the then
42‑year‑old Colonel Yuliy Mamchur was appointed as
commander of the Sevastopol tactical aviation brigade
of the Air Command“South”(based in Belbek airport) in ear-
ly 2013. On March 3, unidentified soldiers holding Russian
weapons and wearing no insignia blocked the Ukrainian
military base and issued an ultimatum demanding the
surrender of Ukrainian troops.“The brigade’s crew remains
faithful to the Ukrainian nation and military oath. We are
ready to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine with arms
in our hands,”was Colonel’s response.
Col. Mamchur never received the order from the top
command to use weapons. On March 4, his unit raised the
Ukrainian National flag and military flags of the WWII era
and carrying no arms approached the Russian soldiers while
singing the national anthem of Ukraine. The latter were
frightened by such untypical actions and fired in the air and
at the ground to deter Ukrainian servicemen but to no avail.
This courageous act turned Col. Mamchur into a symbol of
Ukraine’s resilience to the Russian aggression in Crimea. After
negotiations, the impressed Russian soldiers withdrew from
the occupied military facilities. But on March 12, the Russian
forces cut electricity supply to the military base and commit-
ted arson. Col. Mamchur personally led the fire fight, which
was quickly extinguished.
The military base was under siege for almost two and a half
weeks. On March 22, the Russians launched another attack.
Given the superiority in numbers and absence of the direct
orders to retaliate, the brigade’s leadership resolved to leave
the base. However, the Russian Special Forces abductedYuliy
Mamchur during the base takeover attempt. His subordinates
refused to leave the base until he would be set free. Col.
Mamchuk spent three and a half days in a solitary confine-
ment of the Sevastopol military prison subject to psycholog-
ical pressure; the Russians simultaneously tried to cajole or
force the Ukrainian officer to violate the oath. Having received
no consent, Col. Mamchuk and five other captured service-
men were taken to the administrative line between Crimea
and the Kherson region on March 26 and handed over to the
Ukrainian side.
Soon the entire tactical aviation brigade of Col. Mamchur
left the peninsula. It was relocated to the city of Mykolaiv.
On August 21, 2014 ColonelYuliy Mamchur was awarded
the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitskyi (3rd‑class) for his personal
courage and heroism shown in defending the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the loyalty
to the military oath and highly professional actions shown
in the line of duty. In November 2014,Yuliy Mamchur was
elected Member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Ukrainian
Parliament), where he occupied the position of the Deputy
Head of the Parliamentary Committee on the National
Security and Defence.

53
IMITATION OF REFERENDUM IN CRIMEA
After the failure of the plan to detach Crimea from Ukraine due to pro‑Russian protests of the local population,
Russia had to resort to direct military invasion. Imitation of expression of will of the Crimean population was
held under the supervision of Russian military and its proxies in the atmosphere of intimidation and terror. The
world media most commonly found parallels of the events in Crimea with the ones during the Nazi Anschluss
of neighbouring Austria in spring 1938.
O
n March 1, 2014 Sergey Aksyonov, the self‑pro-
claimed President of the Council of Ministers of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, announced that
from now on he would be taking over the power structure in
Crimea, and admitted that on his request the Russian Black
Sea Fleet troops promised to protect the strategic facilities
on the peninsula. Unmarked Russian commandos seized
government agencies and blocked military units. To add
credibility to the Russian narrative an orchestrated armed
provocation was arranged in front of the Government of
Crimea. The staged event was recorded by the cameras of
the Russian TV journalists, who were invited beforehand.
Several dummies gave an imitation of Russian soldiers
allegedly killed by“Ukrainian nationalists”.
Then Aksyonov publicly appealed to Russian President
Vladimir Putin with a request for help to“ensure peace and
tranquillity in the region”. A few hours later, the properly
instructed both houses of Russian State Duma voted for
granting the Russian president the right to use armed forces
outside the country. At the same time, the self‑proclaimed
Crimean government moved the date of the referendum in
Crimea from May 26 to March 16. On March 6, the referendum
questions were amended now contemplating Crimea becom-
ing a part of the Russian Federation as its subject. Despite the
decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and decree
of the Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov on
suspension of the decision of the Crimean parliament, the
referendum took place.
On March 11, 2014, the Parliament of Crimea and the
Sevastopol City Council adopted a declaration of inde-
pendence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
Sevastopol, which allowed in case of the majority vote to de-
clare Crimea a sovereign republic and appeal to the Russian
Federation with a proposal to adopt the peninsula as a new
subject of the Russian Federation.
Despite the fact that the vote took place based on obsolete
lists, and in some localities polling station were not estab-
lished because of the unwillingness of the population to
collaborate with the occupiers, despite the boycott by the
Crimean Tatars, despite numerous recorded facts of voting by
citizens of the Russian Federation, the occupation authorities
proclaimed the referendum of the 16th of March as complete.
According to the organizers of the referendum, the turnout
was 81.4 percent in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and 89.5 percent in Sevastopol. According to independent
estimates, the turnout was 32.4 percent and allegedly
96.77 percent of voters favoured Crimea’s joining the Russian
Federation as one of its subjects.
International organizations did not sent observers to the
referendum on March 16. According to the opinion of the oc-
cupying authorities, the legitimacy of the pseudo referendum
was provided by representatives of European extreme left‑
and right‑wing, neo‑fascist organizations and parties. The UN
Security Council, OSCE and Venice Commission deemed the
so‑called March 16 referendum as illegitimate.

55
EUROPEAN RADICALS IN CRIMEA
Despite the condemnation of the Russian annexation of Crimea by the international community and Russia’s
growing isolation, some extreme right‑ and left‑wing political parties in the West continue to toy with an idea
of cooperating with Russia. Over the last 25 years, Russia has created a belt of regional conflicts and grey zones
with puppet governments along its borders. The Russian satellites and representatives of European radical
parties were summoned to lend an illusion of legitimacy to the plebiscite in Crimea.
D
uring a pseudo‑referendum on March 16, 2014,
Russian propaganda trumpeted the presence of
“135 foreign observers, including the MPs from East
andWest European countries.”Upon a closer inspection, it was
revealed that the monitors were members of the neo‑Nazi and
far‑right parties – the very people that Russian propaganda
strove to intimidate the Crimeans with. Here is a far‑from‑be-
ing‑complete list of“friends of Russia”who were invited to
legitimize similar farce plebiscites inTransnistria, Gagauzia,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
SrdjaTrifkovič, United States – an Islamophobe publicist
and a professor who actively promotes nationalist and racist
views. He publicly spoke in support of the Serbian President
Slobodan Milošević convicted by the Hague Tribunal; justified
the genocide of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica (1995). He
was an advisor of Republika Srpska that was responsible for
crimes against humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2011,
the Canadian government officially banned him from enter-
ing the country, accusing him of involvement in the crimes
against humanity and links with international terrorism.
Béla Kovács, Hungary. Mr. Kovács is the only MEP who
observed the so‑called Crimean“referendum”. He is a member
of the Hungarian party Jobbik which professes nationalism
and anti‑Semitism. He is also the President of the European
Alliance of nationalist movements elected after its leaders
were convicted for promoting racial hatred and Holocaust de-
nial. Later Bela Kovacs was formally charged with espionage
against Hungary and the European Union in favor of Russia.
At the moment, the question of stripping Kovács of his immu-
nity is under consideration by the European Parliament.
Fabrizio Berto, Italy. A former member of the Forza Italia
party, a former mayor of the Turin suburb. In 2012, he was
suspended from his duties under suspicion of having links to
international mafia syndicate Ndraheta.
Zoran Radojičić, Serbia. A candidate from the Serbian Doors
party (Dveri Movement), professing Great Serbia national-
ism, clericalism, and homophobia. Radojičić is banned from
entering Canada for promoting anti‑Semitism and Holocaust
denial.
Kiril Kolev, Bulgaria, MP and the chairman of the youth orga-
nization of the Ataka party, which professes racist, nationalist,
anti‑Islamic and anti‑Turkish views.
Charalampos Angourakis, Greece, member of the
neo‑Stalinist Communist Party of Greece.
Enrique Ravello, Spain, member of the party Plataforma per
Catalunya which promotes racist, anti‑Islamic, and xeno-
phobic views. Ravello is a former member of the neo‑Nazi
CEDADE organization.

57
THE ANNEXATION
Despite the protests of Ukraine and the boycotting of the occupying authorities by the Crimean Tatars, in spite
of the international community’s harsh reaction to Russia’s actions, the Russian Federation aggressively started
to integrate the annexed Crimea into its economic and legal domain. The Russians chanted‘The Crimea is ours!’,
and a documentary,‘Coming Back Home’, which commemorated the first anniversary of the annexation of
Crimea was screened; in it, the Russian president publicly acknowledged the many years of preparation for the
annexation, as well as the involvement of Russian special forces and the military.
O
n March 17, 2014, based on the Declaration of
Independence adopted six days earlier by the puppet
parliament the Republic of Crimea was declared an
independent and sovereign state with Sevastopol as a city with
special status.The pseudo‑referendum was held under the
supervision of Russian occupying army.The Republic of Crimea
requested to be included into the Russian Federation as a new
subject with republican status. Just hours later the Russian pres-
ident inked a decree recognising the‘independent’Republic of
Crimea and approved a draft treaty to incorporate the Republic
of Crimea into the Russian Federation.The treaty to merge
Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia was signed on 18 March in
Moscow. It took the State Duma an unprecedented two days to
validate the treaty (20 March); the Council of Federation of Russia
promptly followed suit, ratifying the document on the next day.
In parallel, a law to change and amend the Constitution of the
Russian Federation was voted on.That same day the documents
were signed by the Russian president, and the Crimean Federal
District was created.
On 18 March, the so‑called‘Transitional period’was announced
to deal with issues associated with Crimea’s transfer into Russia’s
legal, financial and economic system.The process was to be
finalized by January 1, 2016. From 31 March 2014 until 15 June
2015, a separate Ministry of the Russian Federation on Affairs of
the Crimea established; it was tasked with developing national
Crimean development programs, though in reality it exercised
daily supervision of the government authorities in the Republic
of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. According to the law issued
on March 21, 2014, starting from the day of Crimea’s adoption
into the Russian Federation, all Ukrainian nationals and individu-
als without citizenship who resided in Crimea were automatically
deemed to be Russian nationals. Contrary to international legal
standards, one’s intention to remain a Ukrainian national had
to be confirmed with respective authorities within one month.
With the procedure purposely made complicated and with not
enough authorities to process everyone, the majority of those
interested in remaining Ukrainian nationals were not given
the chance to do so. On 11 April, the Supreme Council of the
Republic of Crimea approved a new constitution largely similar
to that of the Russian Federation. A free economic zone was to
be established in Crimea for 25 years.
Some of the local political elite who had betrayed Ukraine and
began cooperating with Russian occupants did so to protect the
social and financial standing they acquired by economic and
political corruption since Ukraine’s independence.When the
Simferopol‑based associates of Aksyonov‑Konstantinov man-
aged to remain in power despite numerous allegations of illegal
profiteeringfromtheso‑called‘nationalisation’ofUkrainianprop-
erties and abuse of office, Oleksiy Chaly, who had spearheaded
the anti‑Ukrainian revolt in Sevastopol was later forced to leave
the office and was replaced by the ex‑Deputy Russian Black
Sea Fleet Commander,Vice Admiral Serghiy Minyailo. Still, the
ever‑growing social tensions in Crimea, caused by the oversights
of the occupying authorities, compel Russian executives to visit
Crimea much more often as other means of control have proved
to be ineffective.

A Concise History of Crimea's Diverse Peoples

A Concise History of Crimea's Diverse Peoples

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