CENTRE FOR ADVANCED ARTS, SCIENCE, SOCIAL AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE RESEARCH

IN SEARCH OF A PARADIGM FOR UNDERSTANDING THE DIALECTICS OF
POVERTY AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA REGION:
EVIDENCES FROM OGONI

BY

NEKABARI JOHNSON NNA Ph.D
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMIN. STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF PORT HARCOURT
P.M.B. 5323
PORT HARCOURT
NIGERIA

Abstract
This paper attempts to identify a theoretical paradigm to understanding the deepening
poverty, conflict and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Using the
Ogoni experience, the paper examines the theory of internal colonialism that has been
applied by many scholars. It maintains that those who apply the theory tend to put the blame
on domination and exploitation by elements within the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, while
ignoring the class character of the Ogoni society. It maintains that the poverty and conflict in
Ogoni has been accentuated by the elites within the Ogoni society who act in concert with
their partners from other groups.

Key words: Conflict, Niger Delta, Internal Colonialism, Political Elites and Poverty.

INTRODUCTION

The Ogoni people inhabit an area between longitudes 7o 101 and 70 30E and
latitudes 4o 301 and 4o 50H along the Coast plains terraces to the north-east of the Niger
Delta region of South Eastern Nigeria. The population of the area, according to the 2006
Nigerian National Census is 934,878 with a density of 771 (NPC, 2006). According to
Saro-Wiwa (1994:29), this translates to 1,200 per square mile, making it one of the
highest in the world and five times the Nigerian national average of 250. There is
therefore severe land scarcity and land hunger, a situation which is further exacerbated by

the fact that the Ogoni area accommodates a large number of agro-chemical, petroleum
and gas industries because of the enormous agricultural and petroleum and gas resources
found in the area. Interestingly therefore the Ogoni area is prone to a high level of
industrial pollution.
In spite of the enormous resources and the large number of industrial
establishments, the Ogoni area has experienced a very high level of youth unemployment,
Saro-Wiwa (1994:26) in his reaction to the deplorable economic condition of the youths
observed that over seventy percent of Ogoni youths are unemployed and those in
employment only find normal jobs, which abound in companies in Ogoni, such as
NAFCON, the two refineries, the petro-chemical complex, even the Eleme people who
have lost almost all their land to the companies do not find employment at a level
commensurate with the sacrifices they have made as hosts of the companies.
This has become a sore point in the relationship between the companies and the
host communities. Added to the problem of unemployment is the issue of environmental
pollution and degradation. In a statement attached to the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990). Dr.
G. B. Leton, one of Nigeria‟s foremost natural scientists and first President of the
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) expressed deep concern about the
adverse environmental and ecological consequences of oil exploration and exploitation
which the Ogoni has suffered and continues to suffer.
The Lands, streams and creeks are totally and continually polluted. The atmosphere
is for ever charged with hydrocarbons; carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide; many
villages experience the informal quaking of the wrath of gas flares which have been
burning 24 hours a day for 33 years; acid rains, oil spillages and blow outs are common.
The result of such unchecked environmental pollution and degradation is that the Ogoni
people can no longer farm successfully. An environment that was once the food basket of
the Eastern Niger Delta, the Ogoni now buy food (when they can afford it). Fish which is
a common source of protein is now rare in the area yet they have the capacity and all it
takes to produce it. Owing to the constant and continued pollution of our stream and
creeks, fish can only be caught in deeper and offshore waters for which the Ogoni are not
equipped. The Ecology is changing fast, the mangrove tree, the aerial roots of which
normally provide a natural and welcome habitat for many a sea food – crabs, periwinkles,

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muds kipper, crockies, mussels, shrimp‟s and all – is now being gradually replaced by
unknown and otherwise useless palms. The health hazards generated by an atmosphere
charged with hydrocarbon vapour, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are innumerable.

Interestingly, this view has been supported by many natural scientists in Nigeria.
For instance a Report on Page 3 of the Punch Newspapers of 15 July 2011 and attributed
to some experts at the Ohio State University‟s Department of Geosciences, states that
although air pollution is often linked with some heart and lung-related illnesses, it can
also have a negative effect on the brain. The Report revealed that exposure to air
pollution has both short and long term toxic effects that insure the heart and blood vessels
and increase rates of hospitalization for cardiac illness.

The worsening economic situation in Ogoni, manifesting in high rate of
emigration and rural poverty has great consequences on the development of the area.
Naanen (2003:72) observed that the economic situation in Ogoni since the 1950s has led
to the migration of farm labourers to other parts of South-Eastern Nigeria and the Niger
Delta. A significant number traveled to the former Spanish Colony of Fernando Po (now
Equatorial Guinea) as contract labourers. Similarly, Cameroon has attracted a significant
number of Ogoni migrants since the 1950s, most of who were involved in fishing. But the
hostility of Cameroonian Law Enforcement Agencies and the decline of the local fishing
industry have in recent years, considerably reduced the number of Ogoni migrants. Some
of the migrants to other parts of the Niger Delta and across Niger Delta as far as field in
Lagos and Ondo claim to pursue occupations such as palm wine tapping for which the
Ogoni remain famous.

A significant percentage of the agricultural labourers have been boys of school age,
some of whom took to such occupations for an income either to pay their ways through
school or to provide for themselves some money for survival. Naanen, (ibid) also
maintained that majority of these child labourers, never had the opportunity of going to
school and simply had to find a way of earning an income early in life either to help
themselves or support their parent and siblings.

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This sort of development, for sure accounts for the disadvantaged position of the
Ogoni in the Niger Delta. Indeed, Naanen (1995:10) has observed that the Ogoni area is
underdeveloped in all ramifications. Thus it does not only lack basic social infrastructure
but human capital as well. He argued that as at 1969, the Ogonis had only a secondary
school enrolment of less than 400 and approximately 10 university graduates and an
overall in literacy rate of about 15 percent. He reveals that by the late 1950s, the Ogoni
had lost most political rights as part of Biafra. He was referring here to a population of
more than 450,000 cutting across more than 200 village communities.
Naanen (2003:651) maintained that the Ogonis find themselves very much in this
context of national poverty. However, consideration has to be given to the country,
political peculiarities, which tend to be weighed heavily against minorities and
indigenous groups. Control or access to power in Nigeria and to state-centred economy
can make a lot of difference between poverty and progress, group such as the Ogoni have
largely remained marginal in the distribution of power hence the entrenched
discrimination they suffer. Such socio-economic inequality affects access to jobs, the
provision of social facilities, the development of infrastructure and other economic
opportunities.
No wonder, many scholars of Ogoni extraction such as Saro-Wiwa (1994), Naanen
(1995) and Nna (1999) have attempted to analyze the Ogoni condition within the context
of the theory of internal colonialism. In doing so however, they tend to ignore the role of
internal class forces within the Ogoni society and thus failed to follow the theory of
internal colonialism to its logical conclusion. This paper attempts to focus attention on
the nature and character of the class division within the Ogoni society, particularly the
role of political elites as internal agent or collaborators in the deepening of the poverty
condition within the Ogoni society and the competition between them for access to such
and resources through the state.

Theoretical Framework
The dominant theoretical explanation for the Ogoni condition attributes the
poverty situation to the relationship of domination and exploitation by the major or
dominant groups in Nigeria and small ethnic groups such as the Ogoni. This perspective
draws largely on the theory of “Internal Colonialism” adapted from the works of Russian

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scholar and revolutionary, V. I. Lenin. According to Levinson (1994:44), internal
colonialism is a form of majority – group-minority group relations in which the minority
group is treated much the same as a colonized group under exploitative colonialism.
Accordingly, internally colonized groups perform a disproportionately high share of low-
paid, unskilled labour, subject to control by the majority, viewed and treated
ethnocentrically in accordance with dominant culture values.

To Marger (1997:131) it is a type of inequalitarian pluralism which is
characteristic of societies like the United States where ethnic relations otherwise follow a
pattern of assimilation. He reveals that in such cases, racial ethnic groups are treated in a
colonial fashion.

Wolpe (1975:230) has identified two major characteristics of the internal
colonialism model.
(i) The colonial relationship is conceived of as occurring between different countries
total population, nation‟s geographical areas or between different races, colours or
cultures.
(ii) The colonial relationship is characterized in a general way as involving
domination, oppression and exploitation
McRoberts (1979:294) reports that the perspective assumes that for various reasons
(economic, political or military) a stronger, more developed core region imposes itself
upon a peripheral region whose subsequent development is geared to the needs of the
core. He posited that out of this colonial relationship between regions, there develops a
cultural division of labour in which high status positions are reserved for members of the
core region and periphery populations are relegated to lower level position.
This perspective thus assumes that resources from the periphery regions that is,
areas inhabited by internally colonized populations are used for the development of the
regions of the dominant groups and this tends to engender in those internally colonized,
feelings of resistance and rebelling and therefore leading to the formation of secessionist
movements (Nna, 1999). Paloni (1979:363) has therefore revealed that under the theory
of internal colonialism, the existence of strong secessionist movement or the persistence
of conflict emerging from religious affiliations, language distinctions or other primordial

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attachment can be expected and would be explained as in the case of the Celtic Fringe,
Belgium or Quebec.
Naanen (1995:19) is a major exponent of this perspective with regard to the Ogoni
condition. He maintains that Internal colonialism in Ogoni land is broadly characterized
by certain fundamental developments. First, ethnic based political domination, which is
used to expropriate Ogoni resources; especially oil and gas for the development of the
power-controlling group while the Ogoni remain underdeveloped and impoverished.
Second, the alliance between these dominant groups – the multinational oil companies
and state enterprises (which are controlled by the dominant groups) operating in Ogoni-
land, which restrict the Ogoni‟s access to the modern and more rewarding sectors of the
Nigerian oil economy, establishing a pattern of economic discrimination against the
Ogoni people. Third, oil based environmental degradation which gravely undermines the
traditional peasant and fishing economy of the Ogoni, leaving the people without a
dependable alternative means of livelihood and fourth, gross land widespread human
rights violation in Ogoni land.
Furthermore, Naanen submits that Ogoni-land, which has produced more than 30
billion dollars worth of oil for Nigeria, has virtually nothing to show for the prodigious
wealth and that Ogoni land continues to exist in its original condition: no potable water,
no dependable health facilities, few usable roads, no electricity, no telecommunications,
and for the past three years, the schools have not been functioning because teachers have
not been paid. Poverty and social deprivation are conspicuous, the mortality rate is high.

Paloni (1979:360) has argued that this sort of use of the internal colonialism
model is incomplete at the theoretical level because it leaves aside the consideration
value that the expansion of the core responds to the interests of a class. He thus maintains
that the character of this expansion depends in part on the strength of this class and in
part on the strength of ruling classes in the periphery. Consequently, he submits that the
nature of the process of the expansion of the core is at least a function of the relation
between both dominant classes. He reveals that a variety of strategies can be adopted,
depending on the historical conditions determining the limit of action of these classes.
They include the following:

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(i) The core‟s ruling class is sufficiently powerful (economically and militarily) to
completely eliminate the basis of power of the periphery‟s ruling classes.
(ii) The completion of the core‟s expansion depends on the ability of the core‟s ruling
classes to enlist the support of the periphery ruling class. He observes that under these
circumstances, the alliance between both sets of ruling classes is crucial to seal the
process of expansion. He further notes that if the realization of the first strategy could
permanently cripple the basis or authority of the ruling classes in the periphery it could
facilitate the implementation of centralized administration. However, the coalescence of
an alliance, he says, may operate in the opposite direction. Consequently being
recognized as parties in the common enterprise, the ruling classes in the periphery may
strengthen their local influence and maintains the conditions of their legitimacy. Paloni
cautions however, that in most cases, the situation would produce a system of loyalties
gained by the distribution of personal production or other materials of symbolic
advantage. Furthermore, he makes it clear that the relation in which the core and
periphery stand after a certain period of time will depend not only on which of these two
strategies have been implemented but also on the degree to which peripheral regions are
culturally and ethnically homogenous. He nevertheless stresses that regardless of how
distinctive the peripheral regions are when compared with the core regions, the presence
of internal heterogeneity will prevent the crystallization of an ethnic or other segmental
based reaction against the centre in forms other than sporadic outbursts of discontent. He
thus maintains that the alliance of both ruling classes will eventually favour the
maintenance of a system of personal loyalties as the dominant factor behind political
alignments in the periphery.

He however explains that the establishment of this system of alliances can be
traced back to the predominance of feudal relations or some of its variants. He further
explains that the backwardness of the periphery before its contact with the core is both an
effect and a condition of the maintenance of these relations and identifies the two main
characteristics of the relationship as follows:
(i) The existence of personal relations between individuals occupying positions with
unequal control of resources,

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(ii) The existence of systemic instability in which mutable loyalties may be
transferred or displaced or simply withdrawn if resources became scarce or if
alternative resources enter the situation.
In conclusion, therefore, Paloni maintains that in a situation of clientelistic relations
governed by the principle of maximizing immediate personal advantages, there is a
common identification with symbols and no possibility of communal action. It strongly
resembles an aggregate of contractual link, subject to permanent alteration. It is therefore
imperative to unravel and analyze the class relations in Ogoni and the relationship
between the dominant classes, particularly the political class and the state structures.

Political Elites and the Dialectics of Poverty and Conflict: Evidence from Ogoni-
Land.
There is no consensus among historians on when exactly the Ogoni people settled
in their present location or from where they came there. What appears common in some
sources is that they were a relatively egalitarian and well ordered society except for the
position of priests to deities such as the Gbenebeka who were well respected and proud
for by the people. It is also suggested in those sources that the Ogoni build in relative
isolation from the outside world before the advert of British colonialism and this perhaps,
account for why they escaped European sources (Nnanen, 2003:15). Naanen (2003:16)
attributes this relative isolation to the refusal of the Ogoni to engage in inter-marriage
with any groups apart from their Ibibio neighbours to the North-East and their refusal to
participate in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. Saro-Wiwa (1994:3) on his part attributes it
to the fierce and independent character of the Ogoni people. He asserts that historically,
the Ogoni people have always been fierce and independent. This is the reason they have
never been colonized by other people and were not sold as slaves in the course of the
notorious Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. They were known to their neighbours as cannibals
and were able to preserve for themselves the most fertile and most healthy parts of the
coastal plain terraces North of the Niger Delta.

He reveals that the refusal of the Ogoni people to engage in inter-marriage with
other ethnic groups except the Ibibio, was as a result of the law passed by their ancestors
in order to preserve the purity of the Ogoni, preserve their language and culture and to

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stop their absorption or dilution by any of the neighbouring larger groups. Within this
content, it may not necessary be the cause of their isolation. However, Naanen (2007:16)
also has further revealed that the Ogoni people refused to sign any treaty of protection
with the British and had to resist the imposition of British rule by force of arms resulting
in battles of resistance in 1901, 1905 and 1907 when a protectorate was declared over in
Ogoni and in which the Gbenebeka deity served as the major rallying point for the
Ogonis. This resistance was ended in 1914 when one Major G. H. Led a military
expedition which burnt down the Gbenebeka shrine at Gwara, and signaled the eventual
end of Ogonis sovereignty.
Saro-Wiwa (1994:4) attributes the problems of the Ogoni people to the advent of
British colonialism which shatter the Ogoni society and inflict on them a backwardness
from which we are still struggling to escape. It was British colonialism which forced us
into the domestic colonialism of Nigeria, he asserted. Right from 1908 when Ogonis were
administered as a part of Opobo Division, they were made part of the Rivers Province of
the Eastern Region in 1951 and Rivers State in 1967, the Ogoni people have struggled to
resist colonialism and return to their much-cherished autonomy and self-determination.
Saro-Wiwa traced the struggle of the Ogoni people to the 1930s through to the
1950s as organized by Paul Birabi under the Ogoni Central Union and the Ogoni State
Representative Assembly. He lamented that the efforts of Ogoni people have been made
difficult by Nigeria‟s domestic colonialism, which is cruel, unfeeling and monstrous; its
method has been an outrageous denial of rights, a usurpation of our economic resources,
a dehumanization which has sought to demoralize our people by characterizing them as
meek, obscure and foolish.

He concluded that this development has made the Ogoni people to lose pride in
themselves and their ability and compelled them to “vote for a multiplicity of parties or
election regard themselves as perpetual clients of other groups and come to think “that
there is nowhere else to go but down.” This perspective has some short-comings: top of
which is that it sees the Ogoni people as a monolithic group devoid of social divisions. It
therefore ignores the actual social impact of colonialism on the structure of Ogoni
society.

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The introduction of British rule over Ogonis was accompanied by same things
which altered the structure and basis of social relationship. For instance, the introduction
of the common law and the subsequent establishment of courts for the dispensation of
justice led to the appointment of warrant chiefs, court clerks, bailiffs and interpreters
among others. These positions were filled with people who had had some form of access
to the colonial institutions in long distance trades and thus had an idea of how to
communicate with representatives of colonial authorities. The introduction of Christianity
and through the western education gave rise to the appointment of catechists‟ interpreters
and Sunday school teachers among others. These positions put these individuals in a
vantage position in the new order and thus transformed their position in society vis-à-vis
the rest of the society. They began to serve as clients to those who represented the
dominant political authority at the time and in the process not only sustained their control
of Ogoni political affairs but their own livelihood as well (Nna, 1986:62). It was therefore
possible for the emerging political elites in Ogoni therefore to consolidate their position
in the society by sending their children to patrons and friends in the coastal cities to learn
the ways of the white man by acquiring western education. Indeed Naanen (2003:15) has
revealed that until the second decade of the 20th century, formal western education was
virtually unknown among the Ogonis, who produced their first university graduate in
1943. This is markedly different from other parts of the country such as Lagos and certain
coastal areas of the Niger Delta where western education had impacted on society much
earlier.

Naanen attributes this development to what he calls the “historically insular
nature” of Ogoni society which was forced by a fierce determination by the group to
defend its cultural identity. He maintained that the Ogoni were isolated from broader
social forces found in the Coastal region, stimulated by European trade, which carried
western education in Nigeria due to the Christian missionaries who followed the trade
route. Ogoni‟s capacity to embrace Western education, when it did enter the area was
limited by poverty and customary practices. The trend was not helped by government
policy, which not unexpectedly, tended to favour the power-controlling groups.

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For sure, all government policies were transmitted through warrant chiefs. These,
of course, included policies on education and community development. These people
used this trend to all advantage, denying the poor access to opportunities for education
development. This trend contrasted sharply from other communities in which children of
the warrant chiefs and elites shunned western education and allowed the poor to embrace
it. The implication of this development, of course, was the creation of conditions for
socio-economic disempowerment which reinforced the political domination by the
emergent elites and their patrons.
Naanen (1995:19) locates the historical domination of the Ogoni in the last
decades of the 19th century when Nkwerre traders from the Igbo hinterland, arrived the
area. He premised his analysis on a 1932 Colonial Intelligence Report on Ogoni, which
stated that in its state of (relative) isolation, the only channel of intercourse with the
outside world were the Nkwerre sellers who introduced all the European articles used, did
all the tribe‟s blacksmithing, carried on such (internal/slave dealing as there was in the
western side of the area and exploited the Ogoni … (The Nkwerre) settlers remain a
problem in Ogoni affairs to this day.

This is far from the whole truth indeed; the Ogoni also had trade relations with
coastal communities in Okrika, Bonny, Opobo, Andoni and Egwanga (Ikot Abasi).
Again, the Nkwerre traders may have exercised same form of dominance in their
economic, relations with the Ogoni but that did not extend to the exercise of political
authority over the Ogoni people. Naanen (2003:17) stated emphatically that Ogoni‟s
fiercely independent disposition in historical times is abundantly attested to by the
traditions of its neighbours and European reward which also emphasize the people‟s
reputation for hostility to outsiders. Other sources claimed they were war like and had a
reputation for cannibalism. These were important factors in explaining why Ogoni was
never subjugated by any groups as they successfully defended their independence up to
British conquest.

This position is corroborated by Saro-Wiwa (1999:3). Granted that this was the
situation, it would be near impossible for few Nkwerre traders to have exercised any
meaningful political influence over the Ogoni people in the 1930s. Within this period

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(1930), political leadership in Ogoni coalescent around Ogoni warrant chiefs and elites
who emerged from the colonial structure and institution. It was these individuals who
formed the Ogoni Central Union in the 1990s. The Union in the preface to its
Constitution Rules and Regulations recognized the relative backwardness of the people
and appealed to Ogoni sons and daughters to take the development of Ogoni-land as a
major challenge.
The only logical conclusion to be drawn from this therefore is that Ogoni political
affairs were in the hands of emergent Ogoni political elites. These elites, however, were
not the autonomous leaders of the pre-colonial period but rather peosuxra of colonial rule
and therefore clients of dominant forces outside of Ogoni. It was these people who
formed the nucleus of the Ogoni Central Union in the 1930s and 1940s.
The Ogoni Central Union appealed to the youths and people in general wherever
they are, reminding them of their backwardness and uneven position among other tribes
of Nigeria and calling them to action. It appeals to those in authority, the Native
Authorities, the District officers, the Resident and Chief Commissioner, Eastern
Provinces for tolerance, sympathy and cooperation.

This challenge was taken up in the 1950s by Paul Birabi and others who
undertook various developments projects, including the establishment of primary schools
and a secondary school, dispensaries, and the award of scholarship, to indigent students.
This dispensation continued during the 1960s under the aegis of the Ogoni Representative
Assembly. It was however short lived by the incessant squabbles among the elites in their
competition for positions with the Native Authority and the political dispensation. These
squabbles came to a head with the Nigerian Civil War which began in 1967. The Civil
War pitched Ogoni political elites into two camps. A few, led by Saro-Wiwa pitched
camp with the Federal side while the vast majority, led by I. S. Kogbara and Dr. G. B.
Leton pitched camp with the rebel Biafran side in which Kogbara served as ambassador
to the United Kingdom and Leton served as head of the scientific unit of the rebel
movement. It was however, made worse when the war ended with the creation of a new
Rivers State.
The creation of the new state came with opportunities that were limited in the
defunct Eastern Region. There emerged many opportunities for recruitment into the civil

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service and appointment into the Executive Council and membership of boards of
parastatals. The elites played the leadership roles in all these and were the direct
beneficiaries of the new developments. The creation of the new Rivers State also
provided new opportunities for the accumulation of wealth through the award of
contracts. In order to consolidate their position, Ogoni political elites, especially those
who resurrected from the Biafran rebellion and got assimilated into the new state
structures formed on organization called KAGOTE.
KAGOTE is an acronym for Khana, Gokana, Tai and Eleme the six clans that
make up Ogoni land, it emerged as the most powerful social organization in Ogoni after
the Civil War and consisted of the pioneer members of the Rivers State Executive
Council, Traditional Rulers and businessmen. Members of the organization effectively
used their position in government and business to create opportunities for private
accumulation of wealth for themselves and their members and thus continued to
consolidate their stranglehold on Ogoni political affairs. Thus, membership of KAGOTE
provided people with leadership position in Ogoni land, for instance members of
KAGOTE within the Rivers State Executive Council were instrumental to the allocations
of six first class chieftaincy stools to Ogoniland. The highest to a single ethnic group in
Rivers State and determined who occupied such stool. It was members of KAGOTE who
determined chairmanship and membership of local government councils, membership of
the Rivers State Executive Council from Ogoni and top positions in the state civil service.
It also assisted its members to win major contract from multinational corporations and
state enterprises within the area and protect them from security agencies where they went
wrong. It was therefore common to see chief who had connection with the group to use
security agents to full advantage in the intimidation and harassment of dissident members
of their communities. Ogoni people subsequently found themselves under a new form of
domination and exploitation, not from major ethnic groups this time but from their own
leaders, leaders thrown up by their own historical circumstances.

The Nature and Character of Ogoni Political Elite
Many scholars on the post-colonial state formation in Nigeria have described it as
a “Rentier State” because of its near total dependence on oil revenue. According to Graf
(1983:19), the essential features of the Rentier State in the world market is that it serves

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the link between production and distribution. State revenues accrue from taxes or rents on
production rather than productive activity. This production depends, however, on
techniques, expertise, investment and markets – generated outside the territory controlled
by the state. For this reason, practically all aspects of exploration, production and
marketing are dominated by international capital, typically in the form of transnational
corporation. For the transnationalized state, rents derive from local ownership of the areas
and/or resources of extraction.
There are certain implications of this for the political leadership in Ogoni. One is
that the Nigerian state is not productive and the leadership lacks an effective economic
base. Being dependent on rents from transnational enterprises, its survival to a large
measure, depends on the stability of the local communities from which resources are
extracted. It must therefore groom an equally parasitic petit-bourgeois sector in those
communities who will help maintain stability and for which protection from the state is
paramount. Thus, the more oil flowed uninterrupted from the soil of Ogoni-land, the
more prosperous the oil companies and the state and the better it is for the Ogoni political
elites. There is therefore an unwritten alliance between international capital, the state and
the Ogoni elites represented by members of the KAGOTE. The political elites in Ogoni
therefore are not likely to serve the interest as the people of such interest do not make for
the prosperity of international oil companies and those who manage state affairs in
Nigeria. It is therefore not capable of lifting the people from their conditions of poverty
and deprivation. S.F. Nwika clearly made this point clear in a public lecture delivered to
Ogoni political elites in 1983; He observed that the last three years have been a period
marked by private prosperity in the midst of public poverty for the Ogoni people. While a
few Ogoni leaders have done exceptionally well for themselves and their families, within
the present political system, the nationality is probably worse off today than it was under
military rule.
He therefore concluded that our present-day leadership is prone to confused and
personal with group interest. This weakens the moral base of leadership. It is my strongly
held view that the problem of the Ogoni nationality in can be placed at the door of our
leaders. Most of our leaders faced for the first time by contract with enormous wealth
have forgotten their bearing and their people. A situation such as this is prone to throw up

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additional challenges; one of such challenges is disunity among the leadership. The
factionalization of leadership may result from the shift competition for state resources,
the type that would pitch one leader against the other(s). Saro-Wiwa (1995:51) makes this
point in the situation in Ojukwu‟s rebel Biafra when he reveals that the mentality of the
educated Ogoni was always to keep close to the government of the day in order to pick
up crumbs from the master‟s table. Accordingly, although Ojukwu‟s rebel Biafran
government was hostile to the Ogoni as a people, the educated few were picking by
groveling off the feet of the administration.
There is thus, a tendency for most of the political elites to lean towards the
government of the day no matter how hostile the policies of that government may be for
the people as a collectivity. This may account for the rather cut throat competition for
government appointments as a means of guaranteeing self aggrandizement. Osaghae
(1995) alludes to the fact that the Ogoni elites are not united, he maintains that, the
Ogonis have fared better than most other minorities (including oil producing minorities in
appointment to top government positions, which is usually the yardstick for measuring
access to state power … since the creation of Rivers State in 1967, every clan in Ogoni
has produced one minister or more at the federal and state levels in addition to other top
political appointment.

It is rather exaggerating to say that every clan in Ogoni has produced one minister
or more at the federal level. The point remains that for the Ogoni political elite,
appointment to government position is not only a measure of one‟s status but a
guaranteed access to the means of private accumulation of wealth. It is therefore a major
cause of the factionalization within the elites.
The movement for the Survival of Ogoni People was formed by a fraction of the
Ogoni Political elite in 1990 to establish a broad base approach to Ogoni leadership
question. It emerged as a new strategy to attract the attention of the government and oil
companies to its diminishing access to the means of private primitive accumulation of
wealth. It therefore sought the support of the mass of the people by appealing to their
poverty. As a means of facilitating its access to wealth or state controlled resources.
However, because of the cut-throat competition among the elite, it too became

14

factionalized with one group in strong alliance with the state and the other which did not
have state support radicalized.
In 1990, it had issued a Bill of Rights which demanded among others the
following:
1. Political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
as a distinct and separate unit by whatever name, whether Ogoni State, province,
etc. through political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people;
2. The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources
for Ogoni development;
3. Adequate and direct representation as a right in all Nigerian national institutions;
4. The use and development of Ogoni language in Ogoni territory;
5. The full development of Ogoni culture;
6. The right to religious freedom;
7. The right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation.
The Ogoni Bill of Rights was presented to the Nigerian people and government under the
dictatorship of General Ibrahim Babangida. Rather than address the issues raised, the
government merely acknowledge receipt a year after the document was received.
MOSOP was then compelled to issue a demand notice to shell to pay compensation for
environmental damages it caused in Ogoni land and pay royalties and mining rents to the
Ogoni people. The total demand involved amounted to 10 million U.S dollars. Shell
refused to pay and respond to MOSOP letters. What it did later was to rely on obnoxious
laws that are detrimental to the interest of Ogoni people. According to Shell, the demands
of the Ogoni people were outside the business scope of oil operating companies and
within the government‟s sphere of responsibility. Their campaign is overtly political and
shell is being used to raise the international profile of the campaign through disruption of
oil operations and environmental accusation.

MOSOP followed up with a shopping list of things it expected shell to do for the
Ogoni people; but the company refused to cooperate. This non-compliance compelled
MOSOP to go international in 1992. The movement addressed the United Nations
Commission on Racial Discrimination and registered with the Unrepresented Nations and
Peoples Organization, (the only group in Nigeria to do so) in December 1992. It was

15

within this framework that Ogoni people celebrated the International year of Indigenous
Peoples, otherwise called the Ogoni Day, on the 4th of January 1993. The Ogoni struggle
was thus internationalized.
The Nigerian government responded with the arrest and detention of Ogoni
leaders and promulgated the treasonable offences Decrees 1993, outlawing the demand
for self-determination and propagation of sub-national ideas aimed at creating “a state
within a state”. Excerpts of the decree published in Newswatch May 24 define offences
that constitute treason as:
A person who levies a war against Nigeria in order to
intimidate; or overawe the President and Commander-in
Chief of the Armed forces or the Governor of the state is
guilty of treason and liable on conviction to death sentence.
A person, who utters any word, displays anything or
publishes any material, which is capable of causing a
community or section to engage in violence against a
section of that community or another community is also
guilty of treason. A Person, who unlawfully displays
anything or publishes any material, which gives or creates
the impression that a particular country, state or local
government has been located or is being created or
established out of Nigeria is guilty of treason. Similarly,
guilty of treason is a „person, who files or exhibits in any
open or public place in that part of Nigeria, state, local
government, a flag whether or not the flag is of a national
flag or is similar to the flag and represents that such a flag
of the country, state or local government.

The Rivers State Government followed up with a similar edict. The editorial of
Newswatch Magazine of 29 May, 2006 maintained that the decree, which saw such
activities as treason, punishable with death, was aimed at Ogoni leaders and to stifle the
Ogoni struggle. Ogoni people already had a flag following their membership of U.N.P.O.
The Ogoni solidarity song was being sung in most quarters as an anthem and their
campaign for self-determination and demand for royalties were also misconstrued as
creating “a state within a state”. The government followed up with a policy of
encirclement. This included propping neighbours against the Ogoni people. Between
1993 and 1994, the Ogoni people were at war with the Andoni, the Ndoki and the Okirika
people. When this is added to the harassment by the security, fortes, the burden on a
collective struggle was clear. Ake intervened in the Ogoni – Andoni conflict and served

16

as the chairman of the peace conference. While efforts were on to disengage the
combatants, the Rivers State Government under Governor Rufus Ada – George hastily
arranged a peace agreement. As chairman of the peace conference, Claude Ake protested
this seeming haste. In a letter dated October 19, 1993 and addressed to Chief Rufus Ada-
George, Executive Governor of Rivers State on the peace agreement, Ake said he was
writing to express his misgiving about the peace agreement on the above conflict, which
was signed on October 6, 1993. He could have preferred to ignore it except that it raises
important issues and also because, having been publicly identified as the Chairman of the
peace conference, it is popularly assumed that he had something to do with it.

Ake‟s concerns were that the „Peace Agreement‟ was hastily arranged and
signed without consideration to the plight of the refugees or any show of compassion
for the dead and suffering. He added that it is ironic that we proceed with such haste
now when we took so long to disengage the combatants even after they had
unanimously called for peace deployment. It may be that the long delay was due to
circumstances beyond one‟s control. But the fact is that most of the dying and
destruction occurred during this long interval. We should, at least, have offered an
explanation and expressed regrets.

This was indicting on the part of the Government. However, what was even more
indicting was Ake‟s observation that the reports on the conflict have noted the scale and
systematic nature of the destruction as well as the sophistication of the operations. These
features raised questions about whether the conflict is merely communal and also the
possibility that the two communities might have been victims of some other forces
exploiting a local situation. It was surely in the interest of the communities as well as
national security to have looked more closely at these issues.

Ake further expressed concern that the agreement was signed without the prior
consultation with the people neither was it ratified by them. Even then, the agreement had
hastily added that were no outstanding issues as basis of conflict between the two
communities and proclaimed safe, passage for oil companies to operate in the area. The
implication of this was clear; the place must be made safe for oil activities to go on. It

17

also implied that what was important to government was not the suffering of the people
but the need to have unhindered access to oil. The policy of encirclement was also noted
in the class of the Ndoki where the administration of Dauda Komo appeared not only to
have facilitated the war but also to have rewarded the Ndoki people with amenities.
Although, government denied complicity in the crisis had been demonstrated by
the shooting of unarmed Ogoni farmers protesting the destruction of their farmland and
crops by soldiers who had accompanied Wilbros, an American contracting company to
Ogoni land, it was even clearer in the suppression of the report of the Major Taiwo
Commission of Enquiry into the Ogoni-Okirika water Front Conflict in December, 1993.
The various crises and the internationalization of the Ogoni struggle threw up a major
crisis in the leadership of MOSOP and pitied some moderate politicians and traditional
rulers against the younger, more radical elements in the movement.
The impetus was the 1993 Presidential Election. While a segment of the MOSOP
leadership had favoured a boycott of the election based on certain provisions of the 1979
constitution, which legalized the usurpation of Ogoni rights over their resources, a more
moderate segment was disposed towards participation. This moderate group was made up
with (mainly political elements in MOSOP) mostly members of the KAGOTE. While a
boycott was considered necessary in enhancing the international profile of MOSOP, and
its publicity, it was also needed to emphasize the focus of the Ogoni struggle by drawing
attention to the basic flaws of the constitution as it affects the oil producing minorities.
Fundamentally, the boycott was perceived as humiliation of the petit bourgeois
politicians in Ogoni land, in denying them an avenue for accumulation at the expense of the
Ogoni people. A boycott was advocated by more youthful and dynamic segment under K.
B. Saro-Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa endeared himself to Ogoni youths in his 20s when he opposed
the war of secession in Biafra by joining the Federal side. This was in contrast to the elders
like Chief Kobani, Dr. Leton, Mr. Baddey and Chief Kogbara, among others who were on
the side of Biafra. Again, in his days as a member of the State Executive Council, Saro-
Wiwa, did more than any other Ogoni leader in mobilizing the people for education in line
with the legacy of the Ogoni Central Union. It was even said that as Commissioner for
Education, he awarded scholarships to a lot of Ogoni youths to study in the universities. He

18

therefore facilitated the educational empowerment of the new generation of Ogoni youths.
In the voting that ensued, the Saro-Wiwa group won by 11-16 votes in favour of a boycott.
MOSOP was thus polarized with the resignation of most of the pioneer officials.
This development paved way for the more youthful elements to take over leadership
position in MOSOP and its subsequent reorganization around community-based
democratic structures; thus threatening the old power structure in Ogoni land.
According to I.S Kogbara, most elders of MOSOP felt that such situation would
spell the demise of MOSOP, as they would have no control of its components, not to
mention the unintentional exclusion from membership of many Ogoni who might not fit
into any of the independent organization.

With the emergence of more youths in the decision-making organ of MOSOP (the
steering committee) the organization emerged as a force for those who were hitherto
denied access to power and economic opportunities, including those who were denied
their rightful positions as Chiefs. MOSOP mobilized the people through the affiliate
community-based organizations to the extent that the basis, of the authority of the old
power elites (KAGOTE) was undermined. It was not only the authority of KAGOTE that
was threatened, its means of livelihood, its members were also put in jeopardy following
the harassment of Shell and the stoppage of oil exploration activities. It was of this „born
again‟ MOSOP that Professor Ake spoke of when he stated that, MOSOP and Ogoni land
must survive and flourish for the sake of us all, for better or for worse; MOSOP and
Ogoni land are the conscience of this country. They have risen above our slave culture of
silence, and have found courage to be free and they have evolved a political
consciousness, which denies power to rogues, hypocrites, fools and bullies.

At the height of the confrontation between the State and oil companies on the one
hand and the Ogoni people represented by the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni
People (MOSOP) on the other, a group of Politicians and Traditional Rulers of Ogoni
extraction put up a paid advertorial in the State government owned newspapers on May 4
1993, not only distanced themselves from the Movement activities but castigated its
leadership. They decided to register their anger and complete disapproval of the lawless
activities of certain elements in Ogoni who claim to be operating under MOSOP or the

19

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people and apologized to the then Governor
Chief Rufus Ada George for the insult and disrespect organized and insinuated on him.
Similarly, the apology was extended to the Federal government for any embarrassment
caused to the nation and stated that they appreciated the steps being taken by the federal
government to address the issues of the development of oil producing areas in general
and Ogoni in particular (Saro-Wiwa, 1995:158)

Some of these individual were signatories to the Ogoni Bill of Rights and cannot
claim ignorance of the demands of Ogoni people presented by MOSOP. Saro-Wiwa
(1995:159) reveals that the stipulated cost of the advertorial was beyond the reach of the
advertisers, implying that they were sponsored by the state government which allowed
them free access to the state media. He also reveals that the Shell Petroleum
Development Company, the main target of MOSOP‟s environmental campaign used the
same advertisement in international circles to portray Saro-Wiwa as not popular and that
MOSOP was working at cross-purposes with the Ogoni people. This notwithstanding, an
alleged Ogoni person under the false name of Baridan Lekara in a paid advertisement in
the influential Guardian Newspapers, on the 26th of September 1993 castigated the
leadership of MOSOP, saying that Ken-Saro-Wiwa is out to gain cheap popularity and
has brainwashed the people, promising each adult Ogoni 3 Million Naira reparation if the
struggle succeeds.

The same pattern of attack was made on the return to civil rule in 1999 by Ogoni
political elites who claimed to be Ogoni representatives in government. On return to civil
democratic rule in 1999, many had expected that the crisis of development in Ogoni-land
would be resolved. This was particularly so for the fact that many international
development agencies and Human Right groups had anchored the resolution of the crisis
in the return to democratic rule in Nigeria. This expectation was further raised when
President Olusegun Obasanjo and Vice-President Atiku Abubakar paid visit to Ogoni
land on different occasions with the first two years in the life of the administration. Each
of these leaders was given high level civic reception and chieftaincy titles by Ogoni
traditional rulers and political elites. The visits came with a promise to normalize strained
relationship between the Ogoni people and Shell Petroleum Development Company

20

which had been forced out of the area of the height of the Ogoni agitation in 1993. This
promise brought to the fore old rivalries between fractions of the political elites. Those
serving in government who supported reconciliation with Shell and those opposed to
reconciliation, mainly remnants of the radical elements within the Movement for the
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP).
In 1999, the Obasanjo administration appointed a commission to look into past
Human Right Violations under the military. It was headed by a renowned jurist, Justice
Chudifu Oputa. More than three thousand petitions were received from Ogoni alone,
(about three quarters of the total received by the commission). This was the only
government hoped to assuage the feelings of the people and pave the way for
reconciliation within Ogoni society. The success was limited. Those elected, in
government were not ready to commit class suicide. They kept up their antagonism
against the MOSOP which had now lost much of its potency caused by in-fighting and
desertion. In 2005, the Federal Government appointed Reverend Father Matthew Hassan
Kukah to facilitate reconciliation between Shell Petroleum, the government and Ogoni
people with a view to opening up the area for full economic activities. The whole process
was stalemated because of mistrust between the parties concerned.
The attempt by the Obasanjo administration to push through the commencement
of oil exploration on the eve of its departure was vehemently opposed by the radical
elements in MOSOP but was as expected, supported by the dominant political elites,
particularly those serving at the various levels of government. This pushed Ogoni back to
the brink of disaster. In a release issue by the Ogoni representatives in government on
14th May, 2007, they applauded the efforts of government in tackling the Ogoni crisis.
They specially listed the following as the achievement of the civilian administration with
regard to the Ogoni crisis.
1. A visit by the President of Federal Republic of Nigeria to Ogoni land on May,
2007. During that visit, the President laid the foundation stone for the monument
of the Ogoni heroes, marking for the first time a concrete expression of the end of
internal hostilities within Ogoni land. The symbolism of this event was not lost on
the Ogoni people, in particular, and the nation in general.
2. Resettlement of the families of the Ogoni 13.

21

3. Incorporation of more Ogonis into Federal and State Government.
4. A visit by a delegation of nearly 100 Ogoni people spread across the length and
breadth of Ogoni land to meet with the President in Abuja.
5. Getting the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to undertake the
assessment study and subsequent clean up of Ogoni land.
For a people who have sacrificed so much, this is surprisingly an achievement;
particularly so, when put side by side with the demands in the Ogoni Bill of Rights. This
however, goes to show the extent of the division in Ogoni and the trend in loyalty of the
political elites. The situation is critical when seen in the context of the depth of the
bitterness and rivalry within the political class. The press release contained a catalogue of
attack on the more radical elements in the Movements for the Survival of Ogoni People
(MOSOP).
It said among other things that all Ogoni people know the role that MOSOP
played in the struggle against the dictatorship of the military. They claimed of improved
living condition since the return of democracy and maintained that the Rivers State
Government, has, by a succession of policies, exhibited its commitment to ending the
suffering and repositioning the Ogoni people to attain greater heights. They also claimed
that many key positions in the Rivers State Government were held by Ogoni sons and
daughters, and hundreds of kilometer of road networks existed in Ogoni land, not to talk
of the infrastructure that were on ground.

Apparently, a study conducted by Naanen and others on “progress of the Ogoni in
Nigeria towards the attainment of the International Development Targets for Poverty
eradication, education and health” in 2004 does not give room for optimism. Indeed, it
noted that the Ogoni, as an indigenous people, mainly minorities have been marginalized
just like other indigenous people elsewhere. Their powerlessness and exclusion in multi-
ethnic Nigeria has naturally translated into a corresponding magnitude of
underdevelopments.

This view notwithstanding, Ogoni representatives in government accused the
leadership of MOSOP of trading with the plight of Ogoni people, stating that the plight of
the Ogoni people has been turned into an industry ending this situation therefore creates a

22

vacuum for those whose relevance depends on it. We appreciate what the state and
Federal government have done for us in the last seven years. We remain committed to
collaborating with the government agencies, men and women of goodwill in ensuring the
best deal for the people of Ogoni. It accused the leadership of MOSOP of corruption and
lack of accountability and transparency, arguing that this has cost Ogoni people a great
deal.

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing, we were concerned with identifying the most appropriate
theoretical model for dealing with the crisis of development and conflict in Nigeria‟s
Niger Delta region. We specially looked at the Ogoni experience. We noted that the most
dominant model applied is the internal colonialism model. We observed, however that
scholars who apply this model do not take cognizance of its inbuilt class analysis and
thus see the situation specifically as a dichotomy between a majority-controlled state
system and a pauperized minority. We suggested that this approach is not adequate and
thus not appropriate. We then suggested the use of clientelism, bearing in mind the fact
that Ogoni is not only sectionally divided but also class divided. In the situation which
existed, the political elites were divided and most of them derive their status and power
from sources outside Ogoni society.
These sources may be related to oil multinational corporations or the state system.
It is these sources, which define the nature and character of the conflict in Ogoni and it is
this link which elites have with these sources that provide their major means of survival.
It is therefore no wonder that Ogoni elites have remained predominantly pawn in the
political system. The conflict between elected representatives and MOSOP at the
inception of democratic politics is a manifestation of the development and it is this too,
which underscored the killing of the four moderate Ogoni leaders on May 21, 1994. Will
history repeat itself? Only time will tell. It is an understatement just to say that there is
sectional and class division in Ogoni. The case is that the ordinary people have lost
power. There must be conscious effort to empower the people and in that process
empower the communities. The way to begin is to recreate the conditions for the
regeneration of the traditional economies of the people. By this, we mean the farming and

23

fishing activities for which the Ogoni people, once the food basket of Rivers State are
known. The ongoing process of environmental audit by the United Nations Environment
programme (UNEP) is welcome. It is the expectation that the environmental clean-up of
the area will also follow. We do hope the issue of gas flaring, oil spillages and other
forms of environmental degradation will be resolved so as not to endanger the flora and
fauna in future. Then, there will be need to follow up with the required injection of
resources into agriculture. To this end, communities should be organized on the basis of
clusters and particular agricultural products for which these clusters are known should be
identified and funded. The cluster communities should then be encouraged to form the
elected representative assemblies, the responsibility of which will be to manage the
cluster communities industries. These companies, specializing in the production,
processing and marketing of products of community industries, oil companies and the
various level of government will be expected to provide funding as well as technical
assistance while the communities provide land and labour. This type of public-private
partnership is expected to relieve the oil companies and governments of the burden of
providing jobs, social amenities and basic infrastructure for the communities and thus
help to minimize the level of conflict and violence in the area.

It is interesting to note that the Nigerian Federal Government has proposed a
Petroleum Industry Bill which is now being considered by the National Assembly. A key
ingredient in that Bill is the proposal to allocate ten percent equity in the oil industry to
the oil bearing communities. This is far from the clamour for resources control by the
communities of the Niger Delta. However, it can provide initial investment into the
cluster community agro-allied industries.
This proposal is expected to engender a period of economic empowerment
revolution in Ogoni. Once peoples are empowered economically, they are expected to
make political demands and seek representation in politics. This will end the dominance
of political clients who derive their power from outside Ogoni and have the political
affairs of the communities for personal aggrandizement. This will however work on two
conditions. First, the human capital base of Ogoni must be developed and expanded
through increase investment in public education. The current effort by the Rivers State
government in building and equipping model primary and secondary schools is

24

commendable. The government must however follow up by instating on the training and
posting of teachers to rural schools in Ogoni. It must also insist on monitoring and
evaluation of the performance of these teachers in partnership with community based
performance monitoring and evaluation committees in this context, government must
encourage the formation of viable civil society/community based organization as part of
its development agenda.
Beyond this, government must revive technical colleges and vocational education,
to pursuer for middle level technical manpower in the area. It must also encourage the
enthronement of community values and institutions and with that, the empowerment of
rural communities. This will give communities a greater say in their own affairs.

REFERENCES

Ake, C. Statement on the Ogoni – Andoni Conflict, April 1994, Port Harcourt.

Ake, C. Interview, Liberty Magazine, 1 April 1993, pg. 32.

Alberto, P. (1970). “Internal Colonialism or Clientelism Politics? The Case of Southern
Italy”, Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 2, No. 3, July, 1979.

David, L. (1994). Ethnic Relations: A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia. California : ABC-
CLIO, Santa Barbara.

Draft Press Statement: Report to MOSOP, 14 May 2007.

Eghosa, O. (1995). “The Ogoni Uprising and Oil Politics: Minority Agitation and the
Future of the Nigerian State”.

Kenneth, M.C. R. (1979). “Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec” Ethnic and Racial
Studies. Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1979.

Kogbara, I. S., Interview in Newswatch Magazine, May 24, 1993.

Leton, E.B (1990). “Address at the Launching of the Ogoni Bill of Rights. Lagos: NUJ
Light House.

MOSOP (1990). The Ogoni Bill of Rights. Port Harcourt : Saro‟s International Publishers.

Naanen, B. (1999). “Nigeria: Ogoni, an Endangered Indigenous Peoples” Indigenous
Affairs, April-June 1995.

Martin, N. M. (1997). Race and Ethnic Relations: America and Global Perspective. New
York: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

25

Naanen, B. Appendix A, “Progress of the Ogoni people in Nigeria Towards the Attainment
of the International Development Targets (IDTs) for Poverty, Education and
Health”, in Richard Bourne, Invisible Lives, Undercounted Underrepresented and
Underneath. The Socio-economic plight of Indigenous people in the
Commonwealth CPS unit, May, 2003.

Naanen, B (2003). “History, Politics and the Niger Delta: A Reply to Bala Usman”,
kiabara in the Journal of Humanities. Vol. 9 No 1, pp 13-21.

Newswatch Magazine, May 24, 1993.

Nna, N.J. (1999). Oil and the National Question in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Expreince.
Ph.D Dissertation, submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of
Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

Nna, N.J. (1986). The Colonial Impact on the Political Economy of Tai, an Unpublished
B.Sc Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political
and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria., June.

Nwika, S.F. (1982). This is not our Finest Hour. Key-note Address at the General
Meeting of the Ogoni Nationally, held at Bori on Saturday 15th May 1982.

Saro-Wiwa, K. (1999). A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

SPDC (1996). People and Environment, Annual Report.

The Guardian, Sept. 26, 1993.

The Ogoni Central Union, Constitution, Rules and Regulations

Wolpe, H. (1975). The Theory of Internal Colonialis‟ The South African Case; Ivra
Oxaol, Tony Barnett and David Booth (Ed) Beyond the Sociology of Department,
Economy and Society, in Latin America. USA: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Dr Nekabari Johnson Nna is a Senior Lecturer in the Department Of Political and Administrative
Studies, Faculty Of Social Sciences, University Of Port Harcourt Port Harcourt, Nigeria. He Has
Published widely in both Local and International Journals in Political Science particularly and Social
Sciences generally.

26

THE READINESS OF ORGANIZATIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CHANGE
MANAGEMENT IN A HYPER-COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT

BY

NICHOLAS N. IGWE, Ph.D, JP, MIMC, MNIM
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
GODFREY OKOYE UNIVERSITY ENUGU,
ENUGU STATE, NIGERIA.
e-mail: ngozinick@yahoo.com

VICTORIA C. CHIBUIKE, Ph.D, MNAE
DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
ENUGU STATE UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (ESUT) ENUGU,
ENUGU STATE, NIGERIA.
e-mail: victoriachibuike@yahoo.com
AND
FRANCIS C. ALINNO, MNIM
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
AKANU IBIAM FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC
UNWANA AFIKPO, EBONYI STATE-NIGERIA
E-mail: alinoy@yahoo.com

Abstract
Successful Nigerian organizations of the future must not only be efficient, effective,
competent and competitive within any specific domain, but must be able to adapt,
respond, manage change and turbulence in their environment. The paper seeks to identify
factors that get managers and employees of manufacturing firms in Anambra and Enugu
States ready for change management implementation. It examines equally whether
middle managers in these organizations act as dinosaurs or dynamos of change
management implementation. The survey research method was adopted. Data was
collected from a population of 177 manufacturing organizations from the two states. The
Yamane‟s statistical formula was employed for sample size determination. Out of the four

27

readiness factors of change content, change context, change process, and individual
attributes, individual attributes was ranked highest with a mean of 4.31. The paper
reveals that middle managers in the organizations are not dinosaurs but dynamos of
change management implementation. It recommends that those who will be affected by
change management implementation must be involved in the work of structuring it from
the outset with a view to identifying their interests, their knowledge, their attitude toward
the change project and their mental state.

Key words: Readiness, Change Management, Hyper-Competitive, Middle
Management, Implementation.

INTRODUCTION
The management literature has claimed that the complexity of business activities
has made firms to confront hyper-competitive or high-velocity environments (D‟Aveni
1994; Brown and Esienhardt, 1997) or shaped by jolts (Meyer et al, 1990). The Nigerian
corporate profile has not been spared in these phenomenal changes taking place all over
the world accentuated by the wave of globalization. Since 1990s, we have seen dramatic
changes in this direction, and its impact on business and corporate practice in Nigeria.
The environment for business has changed tremendously and so have the consequences
for business practices (Osisioma, 2004). These environmental features have been
exacerbated by a sudden opening of the markets to free competition accelerated by hyper-
competitivity among the business firms. In these circumstances, rapid adaptive and
organizational processes are essential to a firm‟s survival and success. A myriad of
complex and often contradictory factors help determine who wins, who loses and how the
game is played. Moreover, many of these factors change, often abruptly and in
unpredictable ways-over time. Managers therefore must continually be alert to these
changes in the environment, as well as challenges and be prepared to take decisive action
when appropriate.
Ohmae (1999) asserts that the inevitability of globalization cannot be de-
emphasized pointing out that competition is increasing from all quarters and modern
corporations no longer have any place to hide. If they cannot compete globally they run
the risk of becoming extinct due to manufacturing inefficiencies or poor products and
service. Again customers are increasingly demanding more for less. They are putting

28

increased pressure on both the price and the quality of products and services that various
firms offer. This creates increased pressures for efficiency that many firms would prefer
not to face.
This is why managers must be skilled in change management techniques. There are
a number of reasons why managing change becomes inevitable in a hyper competitive
environment:
To change the direction of an organization in order to accelerate growth and
productivity.
To improve the performance of weaker divisions or units, and
To train and develop managers to adapt to changing conditions.

Organizations are designed to accomplish some objectives or functions and to
continue doing so for as long as possible. But change can affect all types of
organizations, from giants to the smallest business. No one can escape change. A change
in one part of the system will have an impact on one or more of the other parts. Drucker
(cited by Herbert (2002:2) succinctly puts it in corporate parlance: “Managers must learn
to build and manage a human group that is capable of anticipating the new, capable of
converting its vision into technology, products, processes and services, willing and able
to accept the new”. The challenge facing Nigerian organizations therefore is not to avoid
change and attain a state of changelessness. It is to manage change. That is seek change,
initiate it, keep looking for something new to do, something old to discard and do all
these with minimum disruption of the status quo, thus attaining a state of profitable
dynamic equilibrium. Organizations that do not change are forced to change from
existence to non-existence (Ejiofor, 1998). Given the prevalent and importance of
organizational change and the difficulty of successfully bringing it about, there has been
much debate over the last two decades in particular as the most appropriate way to
manage change (Pettigrew, 1990; Stacey 2003; and Dawson, 2003). There is a consensus
among academics and practitioners that organizations are facing unprecedented levels of
change and consequently the ability to manage change successfully should be a core
organizational competence (Cooper and Jackson, 1997). From the foregoing, the
following pertinent research questions become imperative:

29

Research Questions
From the foregoing the following research questions, could be deciphered.
What are the readiness factors that get organizational employees for change
management?
What is the level of commitment of the top management for change management
implementation?
To what extent is a middle level manager dinosaur or dynamos of change
management in organizations?

Research Objectives
Using Anambra and Enugu States as research areas, this study sought to investigate
the readiness of organizations for a successful change management. Accordingly, the
following research objectives were set for the study:
To identify factors that get organizational employees ready for change
management.
To examine the commitment of top management in crafting out a successful
change management.
To find out if middle managers in these organizations are dinosaurs or dynamos
of change management.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REVIEW OF RELATED
LITERATURE
Organizational theorists worldwide might agree that readiness for change is often
the crux to any change management strategy (Armenakis, Harris and Mossholder, 1993).
If people are not ready for change, they tend to resist (Lewin, 1945; Prochaska et al,
1994). The key question for change agents appears to be how people get ready for
changes in their environment in such a way that they are eager to implement effective
changes within their organizations. Change is seen as a departure from the status quo. It
implies movement towards a goal, an idealized state or a vision of what should be and a
movement from present conditions, beliefs of attitudes. Readiness can be defined as
prepared mentally and physically for an experience or action (Merriam-Webster, 2005).

30

However, (Walinga, 2008) defines readiness as being at peace, tolerant or open to
change. Thus, change readiness is defined as the state in which one is best prepared to
change intentionally because one is best prepared for change in the environment, and the
challenge of change readiness becomes “getting managers ready to get employees ready
for change”. Readiness is arguably one of the most important factors involved in
employees‟ initial support for change initiatives (Armenakis, Harris and Feild, 1999).
The concept of readiness may have been first introduced by Jacobson (1957), the
foundation for readiness as a unique construct has been embedded within several
theoretical models of the process through which change unfolds. Van de, Ven and Poole
(1995) synthesized change theories across several disciplines giving researchers
managers and organizational development professionals a theoretical means to better
understand the phenomenon.
Readiness takes its roots in early research on organizational change (Schein and
Bennis, 1965). Perhaps, the greatest challenge of change lies with the assumption in the
organization change literature that employees needed to “be made ready” for the change
that is imminent within the organization (Armenakis and Harris, 2002). Increasing
employee decisional latitude, participation and power often requires a further change in
managerial approach from authoritative to participative. Perhaps, more important than
facilitating employee readiness for change would be exploring how leaders can get ready
to get employees ready for change.
The theoretical basis for change readiness begins with early studies on creating
readiness “by reducing reassure to change”. Coch and French (1948) illustrated the power
of participation in their experiments involving garment workers. Experiments in creating
readiness involve proactive, attempts by a change agent to influence the beliefs, attitudes,
intentions and ultimately the behaviour of organizational members. At its core, it is
believed that change readiness involves changing individual recognitions (Bandura,
1982). Most change readiness models emphasize the importance of the need for
generating an awareness of the need for change and supporting people‟s perceived ability
to change.

31

Defining change management is tough under any circumstances write Holland and
Skarke (2003) especially in the context at a new technology being implemented in an
existing organization. In its simplest sense, change management means the process of
helping an individual, group or organization change. Thus, change management implies a
purposeful effort to bring about change (Rothwell et al, 2009). Contributing, Kudray and
Kleiner (1997) define change management as the continuous process of aligning an
organization with its market place and doing it more responsively and effectively than
competitors. In their own commentary, Anderson and Anderson (2001) define change
management as a set of principles, techniques and prescriptions applied to the human
aspect of exerting major change initiatives in organizational settings. Its focus is not on
what is driving change (technology, reorganization plans, merger and Acquisition (M &
A), globalization etc.) but on how to orchestrate the human infrastructure that surrounds
key projects as that people are better prepared (ready) to absorb the implications affecting
them.

Readiness for Change
The change readiness model explores and elaborates on the gap between
preparation and action by asserting first that effective organizational change begins at the
individual level of analysis. Whereas social information processing models (Griffin,
1987) suggest that an individual's readiness to change may be shaped by the readiness of
others, the present research begins from the assumption that all organizational change
must first be enacted at the individual level and perhaps even more specifically at the
leadership level. Leaders, after all, are individuals. Ultimately, it would seem that all
change, whether organizational, individual, externally, or internally initiated, depends on
the individual's resolve or willingness to change. Edmondson and Woolley (2003)
discovered that variance in interpersonal climate and behavioural norms across different
work groups are likely to affect responses to a change program or other organizational
intervention, even when implementation methods are consistent in their delivery.
Researchers in the area of individual change or “personal transformation” have described
the individual change process in terms of unfreezing, moving, and refreezing (Lewin,
1951). Researchers have identified the “stages of change” (Prochaska et al., 1997), while

32

suggesting a variety of psycho-socio-emotional factors that may contribute to an
individual's movement from one stage to the next, including self efficacy, perceived
behavioral control, and social support (Lazarus and Folkman, 1987).
However, as these purposeful changes are introduced, differences and conflicts
between the organizational leaders and members may be confronted. For change to occur
in the direction that leadership desires, conflicts must be resolved such that organizational
members‟ beliefs and cognitions align with those of the leaders (termed dialectical
change by Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). In essence, a state of readiness must be
developed. Therefore, it is not surprising that the assessment of readiness prior to the
introduction of change has been encouraged and several instruments have been developed
to fulfill that gap (Cunningham et al, 2002; Weeks et al, 2004).
These instruments measure readiness from one of several perspectives namely,
change process, change content, change context and individual attributes, (Jones,
Jimmieson and Griffiths, 2005). The change process refers to the steps followed in
implementation. One dimension of process can be the extent to which employee
participation is permitted. A second perspective is the organizational change content
which refers to the particular initiative that is being introduced (and its characteristics).
Content typically is directed toward administrative, procedural, technological or
structural characteristics of the organization. The third perspective is organizational
context. Context here consists of the conditions and environment within which employees
function. For example, a learning organization is one in which employees are likely to
embrace continuous change. The fourth and final perspective is the individual attributes
of the employees. Because of the differences between individuals, some employees are
more inclined to favour organizational changes than others may be. So in this paper;
readiness for change can be seen as a comprehensive attitude that is influenced
simultaneously by the content (i.e. what is being changed), the process (i.e. how the
change is implemented), the context (i.e. circumstances under which the change is
occurring) and the individuals (i.e. characteristics of those being asked to changed
involved. Collectively, it reflects the extent to which an individual or individuals are
cognitively and emotionally inclined to accept, embrace and adopt a particular plan to
purposefully alter the status quo.

33

Middle Management: Dinosaurs or Dynamos of Change Management
A central debate within the literature on middle management is whether the middle
management plays a destructive or productive role through the way it responds to and
tries to influence senior management. A search through the literatures shows that middle
management has more often than not been singled out as the primary locus for resistance
to change management (Biggart, 1977; Dopson and Neumann, 1998; Dopson and
Stewart, 1990). A frequent complaint of senior executives is that middle operating
managers fail to take actions necessary to implement strategy or that they interfere with
the implementation process by trying to manipulate the process. Added to this is the
pressure on organizations on cutting costs, being adaptable and flexible have made
middle management more vulnerable. More often, they are seen as adding costs and
obstructing information flow. And implementation problems connected to change
management issues are often heaped at the door steps of middle managers citing poor
understanding and commitment to strategy (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Guth and Mac
Millan, 1986).
However, recent studies have questioned this notion of “foot-dragging” middle
managers, suggesting that middle management can have an important role promoting and
facilitating change management strategy in organizations (Currie, 1999; and Huy, 2002).
This perspective views middle managers as strategic assets championing new ideas,
facilitating adaptability and synthesizing strategic information for senior managers in
formulating strategies (Floyd and Lane, 2000). Moreover, it argues that middle managers
can have a key role in implementing strategic intents because they are uniquely suited to
communicate the change across different organizational strata and above all, they can
address their employees‟ emotions during change management. Leading scholars have
suggested that whether middle management takes a constructive or disruptive role
depends on its commitment to the strategy (Macmillan and Guth, 1985). In general, the
middle management‟s strategic commitment depends on: how the contemplated strategy
fits with what the managers perceive as the interest of the organization; how it fits with
the managers‟ own personal self-interest. It must be pointed out for middle managers‟ to
behave like dynamos in the implementation of change management strategy, the top

34

managers must play their role very well. Huy, (2001) says that the main problem is that
the top managers fail to listen to their middle managers because they view them as
inherently resistant to change. Since senior managers „know‟ middle managers resist
change, they only pretend to listen to them. Middle management in turn, learns that they
won‟t be listened to, so they take the role as “the complaint child”. The above assertion is
in tandem with (Igwe, 2008:158) where it was pointed out that leadership and middle
management commitment were the key drivers to both success and failure toward the
realization of organizational competitive challenges such as productivity, performance
and profitability via organization development.
Whether middle management takes a constructive or destructive role also depends
on how top management defines its role in the implementation process. In studying a top-
down change, (Balogun and Johnson, 2004) find that senior management was largely
absent in operationalizing strategic intent. Rather than being active directors of change,
senior management became “ghosts” in the implementation process. In terms of structural
changes, this implied that top management outlined the new structure and left it to the
middle managers to develop the operational details of this structure in its absence (Meyer,
2006).
METHODOLOGY
The study adopted a survey design in order to facilitate the realization of the
research objectives as earlier stated (Eboh, 2009). The research frame utilized consists of
organizations in Anambra and Enugu States Southeastern Nigeria. The population of the
study was 177 manufacturing organizations. It is made up of 157 organizations registered
with Manufacturers Association of Nigeria and 20 other organizations not registered but
whose amount of capital was more than N20 million. The principal instrument for data
collection was the structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered to both
management and non management employees of 372 obtained from a population of 5407
employees using Yamane (1964) for sample size determination. The questionnaire
containing 31 questions with issues raised in the study was divided into two (2) sections:
section A and Section B. section A sought to collect bio-data of the respondents. Section
B dealt with the core subject matter. Structured questionnaire was considered inevitable
because of the population of the target respondents coupled with the technical nature of

35

the information sought. The researchers utilized open ended and check list questions. The
open ended questions were centred on change management readiness, the commitment of
top management and middle management in the implementation process. After
calculating the sample size, this value was allocated proportionally to the two states
depending on the proportion of the employees that came from each state using Kumar
(1976) proportional allocation formula. Again the questions were optioned using a five
point Likert type of responses namely: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and
strongly disagree. In addition to the primary data, secondary data were drawn from
published works and the internet.

Table 1.0: Distribution of Questionnaire among the two states
S/N State Number of Number of personnel Number of
organizations in the organizations questionnaire
served
1. Anambra MAN members 135 4075 305
Non MAN members 14 352
Total 149 4,427 305
2. Enugu MAN members 22 852 67
Non MAN members 6 128
Total 28 980 67
Grand Total 177 5407 372
Source: Field Survey, 2011.

36

Table 2.0: Distribution of respondents based on organizational level
S/N Organizational level Number of Percentage
respondents
1. Upper management 52 14.0
2. Middle management 110 29.6
3. Lower management 92 24.7
Total management (254)
4. Operatives 188 31.7
Grand total 372 100.0

Source: Field survey, 2011.
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The data collected from the survey were analyzed using frequency and percentages
to provide clues to the problems under investigation. This enabled the researchers come
up with the findings and recommendations. Out of the three hundred and seventy two
copies of questionnaire administered on respondents, (362) three hundred and sixty two
(97.31%) were retrieved in a usable form Eight (2.1%) were not returned and two (0.5%)
were not usable that is badly filled.
The demographic distribution of the respondents (organizations employees) is
shown below on table 3.0. The data on sex 215 or 59.4 percent of the respondents were
male while 147 or 40.6 percent were female. On marital status of the 362 respondents,
162 or 44.8 percent were single, 128 or 35.4 percent were married, 46 or 12.7 percent
were widowed, 18 or 4.9 percent of the respondents have separated from their spouses
while 8 or 2.2 percent claimed that they were divorced. Details on age, religion and
highest education of the respondents are shown on the table.

37

Table 3.0: Demographic characteristics of the 362 respondents
S/N Question Response Frequency Percentage
1. Sex? Male 215
Female 147
Total 362 100.0
2. Marital status? Single 162 44.8
Married 128 35.4
Widowed 46 12.7
Separated 18 4.9
divorced 8 2.2
362 100.0
3. Aged? Less than 20 12 3.3
21-30 120 33.2
31-41 157 43.4
41-50 45 12.4
51-60 16 4.4
Above 60 12 3.3
362 100.0
4. Religion? Christianity 325 89.8
Moslem 30 8.3
Other religion 07 1.9
362 100.0
5. Highest educational SSCE 55 15.2
qualification? RSA - -
OND 75 20.7
HND/B.Sc 160 44.2
M.A/M.Sc/MBA 72 19.9
Ph.D - -
362 100.0
Source: From the 362 questionnaire returned 2011.
Table 4.0: Ranking of Change Readiness Factor

38

S/N Factors N Mean SD Rank

1. Change content 362 4.16 2.05 3
2. Change context 362 4.22 2.08 2
3. Change process 362 3.90 1.87 4
4. Individuals attributes 362 4.31 2.16 1
Source: Field survey, 2011. See Appendix III.

Key: N stands for total number of respondents
stands for mean
SD stands for standard deviation

Table 4.0 shows the respondents‟ ranking of the four readiness factors for change
management in the selected organization based on their mean importance. Individual
attributes of the employees ranked highest followed by change context with means of
4.31 and 4.22 respectively. Change context factor was third (4.16) and change process
was ranked least (3.90). This finding collaborates earlier researches by Van de Ven and
Poole, 1995; Weeks et al, 2004 and Jones, Jimmieson and Griffiths, 2005.
These writers assert that assessment of readiness prior to the introduction of change
is very essential for change management success. It has been suggested that a variety of
psycho-emotion factors may contribute to an individual‟s readiness for change
management.
These are perceived behavioural control, self efficiency and social support
(Lazarus and Folkman (1987).

39

Table 5.0: Level of commitment of top management
S/N Response Frequency Percent Cumulative frequency
1. Very high 182 50.3 50.3
2. High 80 22.1 72.4
3. No opinion 36 10.1 82.4
4. Low 50 13.8 96.2
5. Very low 14 3.8 100.0
Total 362 100.0

As shown on table 5, 182 (50.3%) and 80 (22.1%) of the respondents agreed that the
level of commitment of top management was very high and high respectively. However,
36 (10.1%) expressed no opinion. 30 (13.8%) and 14 (3.8%) responded that the level of
commitment by leaders of organization was of low and very low respectively. This result
reveals that change readiness in the part of the employees can be enhanced greatly by the
commitment of the top management/leaders in the organization. Edmondson and
Woolley (2003), discovered that variation in international climate and behavioural norms
across different work groups in organizations are likely to affect response to change
program or organizational intervention, Griffin, (1987) agreed with the above assertion
when he suggested that an individual‟s readiness for change can be shaped by the
readiness of others, especially the top leaders.

40

Table 6.0: Middle level managers as Dinosaurs
S/N Response Frequency Percent Cumulative
frequency
1 Strongly agree 40 11.0 11.0
2 Agree 43 11.9 22.9
3 No opinion 25 6.9 29.8
4 Disagree 72 19.9 49.x
5 Strongly disagree 182 50.3 100.0
Total 362 100.0


As evidenced on table 6, 40 (11.0%) and 43 (11.9%) of the respondents agreed that
middle level managers are dinosaurs (that is they „foot drag‟ on change management
implementation. Only 25 (6.9%) expressed no opinion on the issue. However, there was a
sharp distinction as 72 (19.9%) and 182 (50.3%) of the respondents disagreed and
strongly disagreed respectively. This finding contradicts earlier researches on the issue by
Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Gouth and Macmillan, 1986) who submitted that
implementation problems connected with heaped management are often heaped at the
door steps of middle level managers.

Table 7.0: Middle level managers as Dynamos
S/N Response Frequency Percent Cumulative frequency
1 Strongly agree 203 56.1 56.1
2 Agree 102 28.2 84.3
3 No opinion 12 3.3 87.6
4 Disagree 30 8.3 95.9
5 Strongly disagree 15 4.1 100.0
Total 362 100
Source: Field Survey, 2011.

41

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