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Results
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure
1.
Experiment
1:
Six
original
jury
instruc3ons
Subject
Comprehension
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure
2a.
Experiment
1:
Six
original
jury
instruc3ons
Passive
verbs/total
words
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure
2b.
Experiment
1:
Six
original
jury
instruc3ons
Presupposed
terms/total
words
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Original
Plain
English
p
-­‐value
<
0.01
Figure
3a.
Experiments
1
&
2
Instruc3on
6:
Comprehension
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
Original
Plain
English
Figure
3b.
Experiments
1
&
2
Instruc3on
6:
Passive
verbs/total
words
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
Original
Plain
English
Figure
3c.
Experiments
1
&
2
Instruc3on
6:
Presupposed
terms/total
words
You’re
a
juror
in
MassachuseOs.
Before
deliberaSng,
the
judge
reads
you
the
jury
instrucSons
to
explain
the
laws
that
apply
to
the
case.
One
reads:
"Failure
of
recollec-on
is
common.
Innocent
mis-­‐recollec-on
is
not
uncommon."
But
in
California,
the
same
instrucSon
reads,
"People
o7en
forget
things
or
make
mistakes
in
what
they
remember."
1
The
California
jury
instrucSons
were
revised
in
2003
because
jurors
found
many
of
them
incomprehensible
and
someSmes
returned
misinformed
verdicts
(Marder,
2006).
Now,
in
MassachuseOs,
a
task
force
of
judges,
lawyers,
and
linguists
believes
that
our
instrucSons
also
need
rewriSng.
But
for
a
rewriSng
project
to
win
widespread
support,
we
must
show
that:
(1)
our
MassachuseOs
instrucSons
are
too
difficult;
(2)
we
can
pinpoint
why;
and
(3)
we
can
significantly
improve
them.
To
demonstrate
(1),
we
ran
Experiment
1:
subjects
heard
six
MassachuseOs
jury
instrucSons
and
answered
true/false
quesSons
about
them.
The
results
fell
into
two
groups.
Four
of
the
six
instrucSons
confirmed
(1),
with
low
comprehension
rates,
61-­‐77%,
but
two
instrucSons
were
understood
by
88-­‐89%
of
subjects.
A
linguisSc
analysis
suggested
why,
addressing
(2):
the
“difficult”
instrucSons
contained
more
linguisSc
features
known
to
increase
processing
load
than
the
“easy”
instrucSons:
stacked
negaSves
(Wason,
1956;
Just
&
Clark,
1973;
Just
&
Carpenter,
1976),
passive
verbs
(Ferreira,
2003),
mulSply-­‐embedded
clauses
(Klare,
1976),
low-­‐frequency
words
(Diana
&
Reder,
2006),
"legalese
(Benson,
1984),"
and
presupposed
terms.
Experiment
2
improved
subjects’
comprehension
rates
significantly
(p
<
0.001)
using
rewriOen
“Plain
English”
versions
of
the
instrucSons.
Though
legal
language
is
entrenched
and
reform
is
difficult,
psycholinguisSc
research
is
providing
the
jusSficaSon
for
a
full-­‐scale
rewriSng
project
with
promising
outcomes:
to
make
courtroom
verdicts
more
reliable
and
the
judicial
system
more
accessible
and,
ulSmately,
more
fair.
Abstract
Background
Goals
Method
Jury
Instruc3on
6
Direct
and
Circumstan;al
Evidence
Original
Plain
English
Conclusions
References
Acknowledgements
The
California
jury
instrucSons
were
revised
in
2003,
because
jurors
found
many
of
them
incomprehensible
and
someSmes
returned
misinformed
verdicts
(Marder,
2006).
Now,
in
MassachuseOs,
a
task
force
of
judges,
lawyers,
and
linguists
believes
that
our
instrucSons
also
need
rewriSng.
For
a
rewriSng
project
to
win
widespread
support,
we
must
show
that:
(1)
our
MassachuseOs
instrucSons
are
too
difficult
for
jurors
to
understand;
(2)
we
can
pinpoint
why;
and
(3)
we
can
significantly
improve
them.
To
test
(1)
-­‐
(3),
we
ran
two
experiments.
Experiment
1
hypothesized
(1)
that
our
current
“original”
MassachuseOs
jury
instrucSons
are
difficult
to
understand
and
(2)
the
reason
comes
from
their
linguisSc
features:
certain
features
are
known
to
increase
linguisSc
“processing
load.”
Experiment
2
was
designed
to
show
(3)
that
we
could
make
the
instrucSons
easier
by
using
rewriOen
“Plain
English”
versions
containing
fewer
of
these
features.
We
focused
on
two
features:
passive
verbs
and
presupposed
terms.
There
are
two
types
of
evidence
that
you
may
use
to
determine
the
facts
of
a
case:
direct
evidence
and
circumstan-al
evidence.
You
have
direct
evidence
where
a
witness
tes-fies
directly
about
the
fact
that
is
to
be
proved,
based
on
what
(he/she)
claims
to
have
seen
or
heard
or
felt
with
(his/her)
own
senses,
and
the
only
ques-on
is
whether
you
believe
the
witness.
You
have
circumstan-al
evidence
where
no
witness
can
tes-fy
directly
about
the
fact
that
is
to
be
proved,
but
you
are
presented
with
evidence
of
other
facts
and
then
asked
to
draw
reasonable
inferences
from
them
about
the
fact
that
is
to
be
proved.
You
have
heard
evidence
that
you
must
use
to
decide
what
the
facts
are
in
this
case.
There
are
two
types
of
evidence.
One
type
is
called
direct
evidence,
which
is
what
a
witness
claims
to
have
seen
or
heard
or
smelled.
So,
a
witness
saying
that
she
saw
a
mailman
put
mail
into
her
mailbox
is
direct
evidence
that
the
mailman
delivered
her
mail.
The
other
type
of
evidence
is
indirect
or
“circumstan-al”
evidence.
A
witness
saying
that
she
saw
that
her
mailbox
was
empty
when
she
le7
the
house,
and
full
when
she
came
home
is
indirect
evidence
that
the
mailman
delivered
her
mail.
Indirect
evidence
allows
you
to
reach
the
same
conclusion
as
direct
evidence,
but
you
have
to
make
an
inference
-­‐-­‐
a
logical
connec-on
-­‐-­‐
to
get
there.
It
makes
no
difference
whether
evidence
is
direct
or
indirect.
One
is
not
bePer
than
the
other.
Subjects.
• 58
total
subjects
(29
in
Experiment
1,
29
in
Experiment
2)
Materials.
• Experiment
1:
6
current
MassachuseOs
jury
instrucSons
(“Original”
instrucSons)
+
1
pracSce
instrucSon
• Experiment
2:
6
re-­‐wriOen
jury
instrucSons
(“Plain
English”
instrucSons)
+
1
pracSce
instrucSon
• Digital
recordings
of
all
instrucSons
read
by
a
judge
Procedure.
• Subjects
listened
to
the
instrucSons
one
at
a
Sme,
beginning
with
the
pracSce
instrucSon.
• Aper
hearing
each
instrucSon,
subjects
answered
a
set
of
true/false
quesSons
about
it,
the
number
of
quesSons
corresponding
to
the
length
of
the
instrucSon.
The
statements
were
the
same
in
Experiments
1
and
2.
• Each
session
ran
for
approximately
25-­‐30
minutes.
Psycholinguis3cs
meets
“Legalese”:
Improving
courtroom
verdicts
in
MassachuseWs
Janet
Randall,
Lucas
Graf,
Brian
Kim,
Aaron
McPherson,
Lindi
Nguyen,
Elizabeth
Steyngrob
and
Tong
Zhang
Discussion
The
comprehension
results
of
Experiment
1
fell
into
two
groups.
Four
of
the
six
instrucSons
(instrucSons
3-­‐6)
confirmed
(1):
MassachuseOs
jury
instrucSons
are
difficult
to
understand,
with
low
comprehension
rates
(Fig.
1),
ranging
from
61-­‐77%.
However,
instrucSons
1
and
2
were
understood
by
88
-­‐
89%
of
subjects.
The
difference
between
the
two
sets
was
significant
(p
<
.05).
In
answer
to
(2),
why?,
we
analyzed
the
instrucSons
for
two
features
known
to
increase
processing
load:
passive
verbs
(Fig.
2a)
and
presupposed
terms
(Fig.
2b).
As
hypothesized,
the
“difficult”
instrucSons
3-­‐6
contained
relaSvely
more
passive
verbs
and
presupposed
terms
than
the
“easy”
instrucSons
1-­‐2.
For
example,
InstrucSon
6,
Direct
and
Circumstan;al
Evidence
(shown
in
brown),
contained
5
passives
and
2
presupposed
terms
in
the
Original
jury
instrucSon,
its
comprehension
rate
was
the
lowest,
61%.
In
Experiment
2,
we
rewrote
all
of
the
instrucSons
in
Plain
English,
decreasing
the
number
of
passive
verbs
and
presupposed
terms
(Fig
3b)
and,
as
predicted
by
(3),
comprehension
rates
rose
significantly.
For
instrucSon
6,
for
example,
comprehension
rose
significantly
(p
<
.01)
for
the
Plain
English
version
from
61%
to
82%
(Fig.
3a),
reflecSng
significant
decreases
in
passive
verbs
from
5
to
1
(Fig.
3b)
and
in
presupposed
terms
from
2
to
0
(Fig.
3c).
As
hypothesized,
our
two
experiments
have
shown
that:
(1)
our
MassachuseOs
jury
instrucSons
are
too
difficult
to
understand;
(2)
the
cause
of
difficulty
is
linguisSc;
and
(3)
we
can
significantly
improve
comprehension.
Experiment
1
demonstrated
that
comprehension
correlated
with
two
linguisSc
factors
known
to
increase
processing
load:
(a)
passive
-­‐-­‐
not
acSve
-­‐-­‐
verbs
and
(b)
presupposed
terms.
Experiment
2
demonstrated
that
rewriSng
the
instrucSons
in
“Plain
English”
with
fewer
of
these
factors
significantly
improved
comprehension.
These
findings
bode
well
for
the
movement
to
reform
jury
instrucSons.
Though
“legalese”
is
entrenched
and
reform
is
difficult,
psycholinguisSc
research
can
provide
the
empirical
evidence
to
support
judges
and
lawyers
advocaSng
change.
Clearer
instrucSons
should
give
all
jurors
full
parScipaSon
in
the
jusSce
system.
The
result:
their
verdicts
will
be
more
reliable
and,
ulSmately,
more
fair.
We
are
grateful
to
the
MassachuseOs
Bar
AssociaSon
for
providing
grant
support
for
this
research
and
for
sponsoring
Professor
Janet
Randall
as
a
2012-­‐13
VisiSng
Research
Fellow.
We
also
thank
the
members
of
the
MBA
Plain
English
Jury
InstrucSon
Task
Force
for
comments
and
suggesSons.
1
Book
of
Approved
Jury
InstrucSons
(BAJI),
2.21.
Judicial
Council
of
California
Civil
Jury
InstrucSon
(CACI,
2003)
Benson,
R.
(1984)
The
End
of
Legalese:
the
game
is
over.
NYU
Review
of
Law
and
Social
Change
13,
519-­‐574.
hOp://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/caci_2012_edSon.pdf
Diana,
Rachel
A.
and
Lynne
M.
Reder
(2006)
The
Low-­‐Frequency
Encoding
Disadvantage:
Word
Frequency
Affects
Processing
Demands.
Journal
of
Experimental
Psychology:
Learning,
Memory,
and
Cogni-on
32,
805–815.
Ferreira,
F.
(2003)
The
misinterpretaSon
of
non-­‐canonical
sentences.
Cogni-ve
Psychology
47,164–203.
Marder,
Nancy
(2006)
Bringing
Jury
Instruc-ons
into
the
Twenty-­‐First
Century,
81
Notre
Dame
L.
Rev.,
451-­‐470.
Just,
M.
A.,
&
Carpenter,
P.
A.
(1976).
Eye
fixaSons
and
cogniSve
processes.
Cogni-ve
Psychology,
8,
441–480.
Just,
M.
A.,
&
Clark,
H.
H.
(1973).
Drawing
inferences
from
the
presupposiSons
and
implicaSons
of
affirmaSve
and
negaSve
sentences.
Journal
of
Verbal
Learning
and
Verbal
Behavior,
12,
21–31.
Klare,
G.
R.
(1976)
A
second
look
at
the
validity
of
the
readability
formulas.
Journal
of
reading
behavior
8,
159-­‐152.
Wason,
P.
C.
(1959).
The
processing
of
posiSve
and
negaSve
informaSon.
Quarterly
Journal
of
Experimental
Psychology,
11,
92–107.