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Malware
Understanding the Malware Threat and How to Respond
Jean-Pierre LESUEUR
Full Stack Developer x IT Security Researcher
Thomas ROCCIA
Security Researcher, Advanced Threat Research at McAfee
@DarkCoderSc @fr0gger_
Malware Agenda
#1 What is a Malware?
# Malware Definition
# Malware Economy
# Malware Attribution
#2 Malware Techniques
# Infection Vectors
# Persistence
# Privilege escalation
# Evasion Techniques
# C&C
#3 Malware Analysis
# Static Analysis
# Dynamic Analysis
#4 Usecase Remote Administration Tools (RAT)
# Definition
# Business Model
# Network Architecture
# Network Protocol
# Payload Configuration
#5 Conclusion
What is a Malware?
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
An introduction to Malicious Software
Malware
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Different families of Malware
Virus, Worm
Dropper, File Binder / Wrapper / Crypter, Downloader
Trojan Backdoor
Remote Administration Tools (RAT)
HTTP Botnet
Scareware / Rogue
Ransomware
Stealer (Password and/or Files)
Spyware, Adware
CoinMiners
Rootkit / Bootkit
What is a Malware? Malware Families
What is a Malware?
# Who is behind ?
Grey-hat Black-hat
# Who use them and why ?
• Script Kiddies
• Criminal Organizations
• Governments
• Terrorism
• IT Security Researcher
Who and why
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
What is a Malware? Malware Economy
# Criminals are making money with their creation
# Using it to steal data
# Selling it for other criminals
# Creating business model such as Malware as a Service
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
What is a Malware? Malware Economy
# Ransomware as a Service
Source: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/free-ransomware-available-dark-web/
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
What is a Malware? Malware Economy
# Exploit kits
Source: https://www.mcafee.com/threat-center/threat-landscape-dashboard/
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
What is a Malware? Malware Attribution
# Malware are developed by Humans
# Many techniques can lead to attribution
# PDB Path
# Strings
# Code comparison
# Tools used
# Operating method
# Timestamp
# Infrastructure reuse
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
What is a Malware? Malware Attribution
# Malware are developed by Humans
# Many techniques can lead to attribution
# PDB Path
# Strings
# Code comparison
# Tools used
# Operating method
# Timestamp
# Infrastructure reuse
Attribution can be faked!
Malware Techniques
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Infection / Evasion / C&C / Privilege Escalation
Malware
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Infection Vectors
Medias
USB keys, CD/DVD, (External) Hard Drives
Social Networks
Facebook, Twitter, Google+, YouTube / Dailymotion, Instagram etc.
Websites
Phishing, Distributed Software, Vulnerabilities (JAVA, Flash, Web-browser)
Exploits
Local Exploits, Remote Exploits, Physical Exploits
Network Sharing
P2P Software (Torrent, Emule), Network file (NAS, FTP)
Email
Phishing, attachment
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Infection Vectors
# Supply Chain Attack
Third Party Infected Download
Trojanised Software
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tX0v-rMcuwc
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Persistence
# To survive to reboot Malware need to be persistent on the infected machine.
# Registry RUN keys
# Task Scheduler
# Windows Services
# AppInit_DLL
# COM Hijacking
# Bootkit
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Persistence
# Registry RUN Keys
# Emotet Malware Example
HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce
HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesExplorerRun
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Persistence
# Scheduler can be used to run tasks | NotPetya
• at <time> shutdown.exe /r /f
• schtasks /create /SC once /TN “” /TR shutdown.exe /r /f /ST <time>
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Persistence
# Bootkit
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation
# Malware needs to elevate privilege to perform actions
To access to sensitive data to steal/modify/encrypt…
# Token Manipulation
# Bypass User Access Control (UAC)
# Vulnerability Exploitation
# Hooking
# Dump Credentials
# Many more
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation
# Token Manipulation | Teslacrypt
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation
# UAC Bypass | Operation HoneyBee
cmd /c wusa %TEMP%setup.cab /quiet /extract:%SystemRoot%System32 &&
del /f /q %TEMP%setup.cab && cliconfg.exe cmd /c expand
%TEMP%setup.cab -F:* %SystemRoot%System32 && del /f /q
%TEMP%setup.cab && cliconfg.exe
# The macro extracts the CAB file into %systemroo%system32,
using either wusa.exe or expand.exe (depending on the OS) to
bypass UAC prompts
# Once the files have been extracted, the Visual Basic macro
deletes the CAB file and runs the malicious NTWDBLIB.dll via
cliconfg.exe (to gain privileges and bypass UAC protections)
Source: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/mcafee-uncovers-operation-honeybee-malicious-document-campaign-targeting-humanitarian-aid-groups/
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation
# Vulnerability Exploitation | Wannacry - EternalBlue
# EternalBlue Vulnerability from Equation Group (MS17-010) – Kernel Exploit
# Used to spread on the network but also to obtain system privileges
https://www.slideshare.net/ThomasRoccia | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/analysis-wannacry-ransomware/
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation
# Credentials Dumping | Olympic Destroyer
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques
# Malware use Evasion Techniques to avoid detection, analysis
https://www.slideshare.net/ThomasRoccia/malware-evasion-techniques
Packer/Binder/Crypter
Compress/Encrypt, IAT Protect, Code Virtualizing
Process Injection
Process Hollowing, DLL Injection, Process Doppelganging
Sandbox Evasion
VM Artifacts, x86 Instructions, Sleep, Running Process
Anti-Virus Evasion
Disabling AV, file Size, Injection
Obfuscation
Base64, XOR, Encryption, Hash, Custom
Anti-Debugging
Windows API, Timing Check, Debugger Detection
Anti-Forensic
Melting, File-less, Wiper, Removal
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques
# Packers
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/technical-how-to/malware-packers-use-tricks-avoid-analysis-detection/
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques
# Process Hollowing | Zcrypt Ransomware
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques
# Antivirus Detection | Pinkslipbot
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques
# Virtual Machine Detection | Pinkslipbot
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques
# Unprotect Project | Malware Evasion Trick Database
Unprotect.tdgt.org
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Command & Control
# Malware needs to communicate with C&C
# Infected machines controlled by the same C&C are called Botnet
# Malware use C&C to:
# Receive command
# Exfiltrate/download data
# Get encryption key (Ransomware) or
interact to pay the ransom
Matthew Andrews/Getty Images/Hemera
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Command & Control
# Fast-Flux communication
# One domain has multiple IP addresses
# Every 3 min or more, host is pointing to
another computer
# Infected machines can serve of proxy
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Single_und_double_flux.png
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques Command & Control
# Domain Generation Algorithm
# Connexion to multiple domains
# Lot of domain can be generated by the
sample
# Attackers can activate one of several
servers to allow communication
# Conficker worm used this technique
https://www.senet-int.com/blog/2013/09/malware-domain-generation-algorithm-dga
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Techniques More Information
# Mitre ATT&CK Matrix | https://attack.mitre.org
Malware Analysis
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Process, Techniques, Tools
Malware
• Packed?
• Encrypted?
• Reverse
Engineering
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Analysis Process
Identification Analysis
• Hash calculation
• Virus Total…
• Anti-Virus
• Previous research
• Internal Databases
Static
Dynamic
Detection
and
Remediation
• What the malware
does?
• Which CnC it
contacts?
• Does it still data?
• How does it
infects my system?
• Sandboxing
• Debugging
• Monitoring
Infected
machines
• Block CnC
• Deploy signature
• Clean infected
machines
• Improve Security
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Analysis Toolkit
# Static Analysis
# Packer Detection: PEiD, RDG Packer
Detect, DIE…
# PE Format: Ressource Hacker, PEStudio,
StudPE…
# Reverse Engineering: IDA, Radare2,
DnSPY…
# Sysinternals: Strings, Sigcheck…
# Utilities: HexEdit, Python…
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Malware Analysis Toolkit
# Dynamic Analysis
# Process: Process Explorer
# Monitoring: Regshot, Procmon, Autoruns,
API-Monitor…
# Network: Wireshark, Fiddler, CurrPort…
# Debugging: OllyDBG, X64DBG…
# Sandbox: Cuckoo, Proprietary Sandbox…
Remote Administration Tools (RAT)
Malware
A popular Malware Framework
Malware
# What is a Remote Administration Tool
A RAT is a Malware Framework designed to take the control of a remote system:
• Trojan Backdoor
• Botnets
• File Binder / Wrapper, Downloader
• Stealer
• Spyware
• Crypter
• Worms
Commonly offered remote control modules:
• Remote Desktop Streaming
• Remote Webcam Streaming
• Remote Ambient Sound Streaming (Micro)
• Keylogger
• Password Grabber
• System Management
• File System Management
RAT Introduction
• Backorifice
• SubSeven (Sub7)
• Optix
• Beast
• LanFiltrator
• Institution 2004
• Netbus
• Coma
• Y3k RAT
• Prorat
• Mosucker
Past generation : Recent generation :
• Poison Ivy
• Bifrost
• Blackshades
• Turkojan
• DarkComet
• NetWire
• SpyNet (Xtreme RAT)
• NjRAT
• NanoCore
• L0stD00r
• SubSeven (New gen)
# Few renowned RAT’s
RAT Introduction
Freeware
Shareware
Open Source
SaaS (Software as a Service)
It is a real business
RAT Business Model
One shot
The product owner received a one time payment and gives in exchange the different
application parts.
Monthly, Yearly, Version
The product owner could also decide to rent his Malware with a subscription limited in time.
Extra Services
• FUD / UD
• Support
• Pay per installs
• Extra Modules
• Training
• Open Source Access
RAT Business Model
Payment methods:
Liberty Reserve
Online banking system
Western Union
Cash deposal service
PayPal
Ease of use
Crypto-currency
Bitcoin, Monero, Ethereum
RAT Business Model
Malware Identify the different parts of the Framework
C&C Stub Editor Stub
Graphical application
to take the control of
infected machines
by the Malware
Graphical application
designed to configure
the Malware
The Malware
.exe, .js, .bat, .py, .pdf, .docx
RAT Identify the Different part of the Framework
Malware Network Protocol
• Client / Server based architecture
• Malware coder can create custom protocol
• They can also use existing protocol (HTTP Botnet)
• To evade detection, cryptographic principle could be used
RAT Network Protocol
# Mode 1 : Direct Connection
C&C – Client
Connect(89.27.25.120)
Stub – Server
Listen(1403)
Out Port
(TCP/UDP) > 1403
Internet (Cloud)
In Port
(TCP/UDP) > 1403
Malware Network Models
RAT Network Models
# Mode 2 : Reverse Connection
Malware Network Models
C&C – Client
Listen(1403)
Stub –Client
Connect(45.25.142.32)
In Port
(TCP/UDP) > 1403
Internet (Cloud)
Out Port
(TCP/UDP) > 1403
RAT Network Models
# Mode 3 : Hybrid (Direct and/or Reverse)
Malware Network Models
C&C – Client
Connect(89.27.25.120)
Stub – Server
Listen(1403)
Out Port
(TCP/UDP) > 1403
Internet (Cloud)
In Port
(TCP/UDP) > 1403
C&C – Client
Listen(1403)
Stub –Client
Connect(45.25.142.32)
In Port
(TCP/UDP) > 1403
Internet (Cloud)
Out Port
(TCP/UDP) > 1403
AND / OR
RAT Network Models
# P2P (Peer to Peer)
Malware Network Models
RAT Network Models
Malware Network Protocol
# Example of communication system
Server
Client
Main Thread + Listener Thread
(Server)
Closed Client
New Client
Receive Plain / Text
Management Thread
Receive Buffer
Thread
Process List
File List
Reverse shell stdout buffer
Webcam Streaming
Desktop Streaming
File Transfer
+
+
Main Thread +
Connection
Attempt to C&C
routine Thread
New Server +
Command Parser
and Dispatcher
Thread
Process List
File List
Remote Desktop Thread+
RAT Network Protocol
Malware Network Protocol
# HTTP Protocol
RAT Network Protocol
GET ; POST ; PUT ; UPDATE ; DELETE etc.
Malware Network Protocol
# Nature of transmitted data
CSV
kill:14032,1254,12687
JSON
{
“action”:”kill”,
“data”:[
14032,
1254,
12687
]
}
BYTES (Struct)
4c000000011402000000
0000c0000000000000469
b000800200000005284ce
b6f7c8d3015284ceb6f7c
8d3014b5333d55ba3d301
00fa01…
RAT Network Protocol
Malware Network Protocol
# Use case : Basic File Transfer
1
2
filesystem;c:
filesystem;c:windows,c:users,c:Pr
ogram Files,c:Program Files
(x86)|c:file.pdf,c:file2.png...
3 downloadfile;c:file.pdf
4downloadfile;c:file.pdf,10240
5 OK
6CHUNK 1 CHUNK 2 CHUNK N
C&C Infected system
file size / packet size = number of packets required for a file transfer
RAT Network Protocol
Malware Network Protocol
# Encryption Layer
Symmetric Encryption
RC4 / AES / Camelia
Key : passw0rd
RC4 / AES / Camelia
Key : passw0rd
Packet Data (Plain,
Byte)
Cloud Packet Data (Plain,
Byte)
Hello CF012FA29C HelloCF012FA29C
RAT Network Protocol
Malware Network Protocol
# Little reminder to XOR Encryption
0 0 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
Plain data
Secret key
Encrypted data
DATA xor KEY = ENCRYPTED_DATA
ENCRYPTED_DATA xor KEY = DATA
ENCRYPTED_DATA xor DATA = KEY
RAT Network Protocol
Malware Network Protocol
# Encryption Layer
Asymmetric Encryption
RSA / ECC
Remote public key
RSA / ECC
Local private key
Session key Session keyCloud
Step 1 : Transmit a generated temporary session key using asymmetric algorithm
RC4 / AES / Camelia
Key : temporary session key
RC4 / AES / Camelia
Key : temporary session key
Packet Data (Plain,
Byte)
Cloud Packet Data (Plain,
Byte)
Hello CF012FA29C HelloCF012FA29C
Step 2 : Symmetric encryption using transmitted session key
RAT Network Protocol
Malware Payload Configuration
• Payload configuration contains important information about how to contact
the C&C
• IP address(es) / Domain Name pointing to IP address(es)
• Communication Port(s)
• It also contains other important configuration elements such as
• Persistence Information's (Startup, Process, File)
• Anti’s functions (Anti-VM, Anti-Debugger etc.)
• Encryption key (symmetric)
• C&C private key for asymmetric traffic encryption (Asymmetric)
• Optional file downloader (if dropper module available and enabled)
• Embedded files (File Binder / Wrapper)
• Fake error messages / events (Open other process)
• Etc.
RAT Payload Configuration
Malware Payload Configuration
• Multiple ways exist to store the configuration inside the Stub
• PE Resources Section
• PE Custom Section
• EOF (End Of File)
• In the same way of network communication, the configuration could be from any formats
• Plaintext : CSV, JSON, XML
• Byte encoded structures
• Some Malware encrypt configuration data to hide sensitive data's
RAT Payload Configuration
Malware Payload Configuration
# PE (Portable Executable) Resources
.rsrc
(Resource Section)
DOS Segment
PE Header
Section Tables
Section 1
…
Section N
DOS Header
Icon
Versions Info
Bitmaps
Custom Resources
Window Resources (Dialogs)
* LockResource, LoadResource, UpdateResource, SizeOfResource…
RAT Payload Configuration
Malware Payload Configuration
# PE (Portable Executable) Sections
Section Tables Add new section info
Section Address : 0x000FF12A
Size of section : N Bytes
Name of section : malconf
Section 1
DOS Segment
PE Header
Section 1
Section N
DOS Header
…
Custom Section
0x000FF12A
Explore PE Header and Sections (PE Bear)
JSON / CSV / Structures etc.
{
"cncaddr": [
"127.0.0.1",
"192.168.0.11",
"89.214.25.111",
"lamer.no-ip.org",
"lamer2.dyndns.org"
],
"startup": {
"enabled": true,
"name": "svchost.exe"
}
[...]
}
RAT Payload Configuration
Malware Payload Configuration
# EOF (End of File)
Payload configuration is simply appended at the End of the application file.
Appending content at the end of an application file doesn’t corrupt the application itself since it is out of the scope defined by the PE Structure
(SizeOfImage structure attribute defined in the PE Header > IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER)
Most Antivirus detect such behavior by comparing the size of the image (SizeOfImage) from the PE Header with the file size.
Example (Pascal/Delphi)
RAT Payload Configuration
Malware Payload Formats
Binary Application
Script Files
Documents
Exploit Kit
RAT Payload Format
Malware An example of timeline
Malware Execution
ping + timeout
delete original copy
run installed copy
Installed
Exit Process
Copy to destination location
Register location to startup
Extract embedded files
Download / Execute
Initialize Melting
Inject code to legitimate process
(Explorer.exe ; Iexplore.exe ; firefox.exe)
No
Create Mutex
Exists
No
Yes
Establish a connection to C&C
Anti-VM
Yes
Detected
Yes No
RAT Infection Process
Conclusion
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
“Know your enemy”
Malware
Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family
Conclusion
# Malware are becoming more and more complex
# Security industry and researcher are developping new techniques to
fight advanced threats.
# Understand the concepts behind malware can help to stay protected
Thank You
Jean-Pierre LESUEUR
Full Stack Developer x IT Security Researcher
@DarkCoderSc
Thomas ROCCIA
Security Researcher, Advanced Threat Research at McAfee
@fr0gger_
Q/A

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42 - Malware - Understand the Threat and How to Respond

  • 1. Malware Understanding the Malware Threat and How to Respond Jean-Pierre LESUEUR Full Stack Developer x IT Security Researcher Thomas ROCCIA Security Researcher, Advanced Threat Research at McAfee @DarkCoderSc @fr0gger_
  • 2. Malware Agenda #1 What is a Malware? # Malware Definition # Malware Economy # Malware Attribution #2 Malware Techniques # Infection Vectors # Persistence # Privilege escalation # Evasion Techniques # C&C #3 Malware Analysis # Static Analysis # Dynamic Analysis #4 Usecase Remote Administration Tools (RAT) # Definition # Business Model # Network Architecture # Network Protocol # Payload Configuration #5 Conclusion
  • 3. What is a Malware? Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family An introduction to Malicious Software Malware
  • 4. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Different families of Malware Virus, Worm Dropper, File Binder / Wrapper / Crypter, Downloader Trojan Backdoor Remote Administration Tools (RAT) HTTP Botnet Scareware / Rogue Ransomware Stealer (Password and/or Files) Spyware, Adware CoinMiners Rootkit / Bootkit What is a Malware? Malware Families
  • 5. What is a Malware? # Who is behind ? Grey-hat Black-hat # Who use them and why ? • Script Kiddies • Criminal Organizations • Governments • Terrorism • IT Security Researcher Who and why
  • 6. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family What is a Malware? Malware Economy # Criminals are making money with their creation # Using it to steal data # Selling it for other criminals # Creating business model such as Malware as a Service
  • 7. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family What is a Malware? Malware Economy # Ransomware as a Service Source: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/free-ransomware-available-dark-web/
  • 8. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family What is a Malware? Malware Economy # Exploit kits Source: https://www.mcafee.com/threat-center/threat-landscape-dashboard/
  • 9. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family What is a Malware? Malware Attribution # Malware are developed by Humans # Many techniques can lead to attribution # PDB Path # Strings # Code comparison # Tools used # Operating method # Timestamp # Infrastructure reuse
  • 10. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family What is a Malware? Malware Attribution # Malware are developed by Humans # Many techniques can lead to attribution # PDB Path # Strings # Code comparison # Tools used # Operating method # Timestamp # Infrastructure reuse Attribution can be faked!
  • 11. Malware Techniques Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Infection / Evasion / C&C / Privilege Escalation Malware
  • 12. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Infection Vectors Medias USB keys, CD/DVD, (External) Hard Drives Social Networks Facebook, Twitter, Google+, YouTube / Dailymotion, Instagram etc. Websites Phishing, Distributed Software, Vulnerabilities (JAVA, Flash, Web-browser) Exploits Local Exploits, Remote Exploits, Physical Exploits Network Sharing P2P Software (Torrent, Emule), Network file (NAS, FTP) Email Phishing, attachment
  • 13. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Infection Vectors # Supply Chain Attack Third Party Infected Download Trojanised Software Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tX0v-rMcuwc
  • 14. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Persistence # To survive to reboot Malware need to be persistent on the infected machine. # Registry RUN keys # Task Scheduler # Windows Services # AppInit_DLL # COM Hijacking # Bootkit
  • 15. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Persistence # Registry RUN Keys # Emotet Malware Example HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesExplorerRun
  • 16. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Persistence # Scheduler can be used to run tasks | NotPetya • at <time> shutdown.exe /r /f • schtasks /create /SC once /TN “” /TR shutdown.exe /r /f /ST <time>
  • 17. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Persistence # Bootkit
  • 18. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation # Malware needs to elevate privilege to perform actions To access to sensitive data to steal/modify/encrypt… # Token Manipulation # Bypass User Access Control (UAC) # Vulnerability Exploitation # Hooking # Dump Credentials # Many more
  • 19. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation # Token Manipulation | Teslacrypt
  • 20. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation # UAC Bypass | Operation HoneyBee cmd /c wusa %TEMP%setup.cab /quiet /extract:%SystemRoot%System32 && del /f /q %TEMP%setup.cab && cliconfg.exe cmd /c expand %TEMP%setup.cab -F:* %SystemRoot%System32 && del /f /q %TEMP%setup.cab && cliconfg.exe # The macro extracts the CAB file into %systemroo%system32, using either wusa.exe or expand.exe (depending on the OS) to bypass UAC prompts # Once the files have been extracted, the Visual Basic macro deletes the CAB file and runs the malicious NTWDBLIB.dll via cliconfg.exe (to gain privileges and bypass UAC protections) Source: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/mcafee-uncovers-operation-honeybee-malicious-document-campaign-targeting-humanitarian-aid-groups/
  • 21. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation # Vulnerability Exploitation | Wannacry - EternalBlue # EternalBlue Vulnerability from Equation Group (MS17-010) – Kernel Exploit # Used to spread on the network but also to obtain system privileges https://www.slideshare.net/ThomasRoccia | https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/analysis-wannacry-ransomware/
  • 22. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Privilege Escalation # Credentials Dumping | Olympic Destroyer http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
  • 23. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques # Malware use Evasion Techniques to avoid detection, analysis https://www.slideshare.net/ThomasRoccia/malware-evasion-techniques Packer/Binder/Crypter Compress/Encrypt, IAT Protect, Code Virtualizing Process Injection Process Hollowing, DLL Injection, Process Doppelganging Sandbox Evasion VM Artifacts, x86 Instructions, Sleep, Running Process Anti-Virus Evasion Disabling AV, file Size, Injection Obfuscation Base64, XOR, Encryption, Hash, Custom Anti-Debugging Windows API, Timing Check, Debugger Detection Anti-Forensic Melting, File-less, Wiper, Removal
  • 24. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques # Packers https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/technical-how-to/malware-packers-use-tricks-avoid-analysis-detection/
  • 25. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques # Process Hollowing | Zcrypt Ransomware
  • 26. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques # Antivirus Detection | Pinkslipbot
  • 27. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques # Virtual Machine Detection | Pinkslipbot
  • 28. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Evasion Techniques # Unprotect Project | Malware Evasion Trick Database Unprotect.tdgt.org
  • 29. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Command & Control # Malware needs to communicate with C&C # Infected machines controlled by the same C&C are called Botnet # Malware use C&C to: # Receive command # Exfiltrate/download data # Get encryption key (Ransomware) or interact to pay the ransom Matthew Andrews/Getty Images/Hemera
  • 30. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Command & Control # Fast-Flux communication # One domain has multiple IP addresses # Every 3 min or more, host is pointing to another computer # Infected machines can serve of proxy https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Single_und_double_flux.png
  • 31. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques Command & Control # Domain Generation Algorithm # Connexion to multiple domains # Lot of domain can be generated by the sample # Attackers can activate one of several servers to allow communication # Conficker worm used this technique https://www.senet-int.com/blog/2013/09/malware-domain-generation-algorithm-dga
  • 32. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Techniques More Information # Mitre ATT&CK Matrix | https://attack.mitre.org
  • 33. Malware Analysis Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Process, Techniques, Tools Malware
  • 34. • Packed? • Encrypted? • Reverse Engineering Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Analysis Process Identification Analysis • Hash calculation • Virus Total… • Anti-Virus • Previous research • Internal Databases Static Dynamic Detection and Remediation • What the malware does? • Which CnC it contacts? • Does it still data? • How does it infects my system? • Sandboxing • Debugging • Monitoring Infected machines • Block CnC • Deploy signature • Clean infected machines • Improve Security
  • 35. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Analysis Toolkit # Static Analysis # Packer Detection: PEiD, RDG Packer Detect, DIE… # PE Format: Ressource Hacker, PEStudio, StudPE… # Reverse Engineering: IDA, Radare2, DnSPY… # Sysinternals: Strings, Sigcheck… # Utilities: HexEdit, Python…
  • 36. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Malware Analysis Toolkit # Dynamic Analysis # Process: Process Explorer # Monitoring: Regshot, Procmon, Autoruns, API-Monitor… # Network: Wireshark, Fiddler, CurrPort… # Debugging: OllyDBG, X64DBG… # Sandbox: Cuckoo, Proprietary Sandbox…
  • 37. Remote Administration Tools (RAT) Malware A popular Malware Framework Malware
  • 38. # What is a Remote Administration Tool A RAT is a Malware Framework designed to take the control of a remote system: • Trojan Backdoor • Botnets • File Binder / Wrapper, Downloader • Stealer • Spyware • Crypter • Worms Commonly offered remote control modules: • Remote Desktop Streaming • Remote Webcam Streaming • Remote Ambient Sound Streaming (Micro) • Keylogger • Password Grabber • System Management • File System Management RAT Introduction
  • 39. • Backorifice • SubSeven (Sub7) • Optix • Beast • LanFiltrator • Institution 2004 • Netbus • Coma • Y3k RAT • Prorat • Mosucker Past generation : Recent generation : • Poison Ivy • Bifrost • Blackshades • Turkojan • DarkComet • NetWire • SpyNet (Xtreme RAT) • NjRAT • NanoCore • L0stD00r • SubSeven (New gen) # Few renowned RAT’s RAT Introduction
  • 40. Freeware Shareware Open Source SaaS (Software as a Service) It is a real business RAT Business Model
  • 41. One shot The product owner received a one time payment and gives in exchange the different application parts. Monthly, Yearly, Version The product owner could also decide to rent his Malware with a subscription limited in time. Extra Services • FUD / UD • Support • Pay per installs • Extra Modules • Training • Open Source Access RAT Business Model
  • 42. Payment methods: Liberty Reserve Online banking system Western Union Cash deposal service PayPal Ease of use Crypto-currency Bitcoin, Monero, Ethereum RAT Business Model
  • 43. Malware Identify the different parts of the Framework C&C Stub Editor Stub Graphical application to take the control of infected machines by the Malware Graphical application designed to configure the Malware The Malware .exe, .js, .bat, .py, .pdf, .docx RAT Identify the Different part of the Framework
  • 44. Malware Network Protocol • Client / Server based architecture • Malware coder can create custom protocol • They can also use existing protocol (HTTP Botnet) • To evade detection, cryptographic principle could be used RAT Network Protocol
  • 45. # Mode 1 : Direct Connection C&C – Client Connect(89.27.25.120) Stub – Server Listen(1403) Out Port (TCP/UDP) > 1403 Internet (Cloud) In Port (TCP/UDP) > 1403 Malware Network Models RAT Network Models
  • 46. # Mode 2 : Reverse Connection Malware Network Models C&C – Client Listen(1403) Stub –Client Connect(45.25.142.32) In Port (TCP/UDP) > 1403 Internet (Cloud) Out Port (TCP/UDP) > 1403 RAT Network Models
  • 47. # Mode 3 : Hybrid (Direct and/or Reverse) Malware Network Models C&C – Client Connect(89.27.25.120) Stub – Server Listen(1403) Out Port (TCP/UDP) > 1403 Internet (Cloud) In Port (TCP/UDP) > 1403 C&C – Client Listen(1403) Stub –Client Connect(45.25.142.32) In Port (TCP/UDP) > 1403 Internet (Cloud) Out Port (TCP/UDP) > 1403 AND / OR RAT Network Models
  • 48. # P2P (Peer to Peer) Malware Network Models RAT Network Models
  • 49. Malware Network Protocol # Example of communication system Server Client Main Thread + Listener Thread (Server) Closed Client New Client Receive Plain / Text Management Thread Receive Buffer Thread Process List File List Reverse shell stdout buffer Webcam Streaming Desktop Streaming File Transfer + + Main Thread + Connection Attempt to C&C routine Thread New Server + Command Parser and Dispatcher Thread Process List File List Remote Desktop Thread+ RAT Network Protocol
  • 50. Malware Network Protocol # HTTP Protocol RAT Network Protocol GET ; POST ; PUT ; UPDATE ; DELETE etc.
  • 51. Malware Network Protocol # Nature of transmitted data CSV kill:14032,1254,12687 JSON { “action”:”kill”, “data”:[ 14032, 1254, 12687 ] } BYTES (Struct) 4c000000011402000000 0000c0000000000000469 b000800200000005284ce b6f7c8d3015284ceb6f7c 8d3014b5333d55ba3d301 00fa01… RAT Network Protocol
  • 52. Malware Network Protocol # Use case : Basic File Transfer 1 2 filesystem;c: filesystem;c:windows,c:users,c:Pr ogram Files,c:Program Files (x86)|c:file.pdf,c:file2.png... 3 downloadfile;c:file.pdf 4downloadfile;c:file.pdf,10240 5 OK 6CHUNK 1 CHUNK 2 CHUNK N C&C Infected system file size / packet size = number of packets required for a file transfer RAT Network Protocol
  • 53. Malware Network Protocol # Encryption Layer Symmetric Encryption RC4 / AES / Camelia Key : passw0rd RC4 / AES / Camelia Key : passw0rd Packet Data (Plain, Byte) Cloud Packet Data (Plain, Byte) Hello CF012FA29C HelloCF012FA29C RAT Network Protocol
  • 54. Malware Network Protocol # Little reminder to XOR Encryption 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 Plain data Secret key Encrypted data DATA xor KEY = ENCRYPTED_DATA ENCRYPTED_DATA xor KEY = DATA ENCRYPTED_DATA xor DATA = KEY RAT Network Protocol
  • 55. Malware Network Protocol # Encryption Layer Asymmetric Encryption RSA / ECC Remote public key RSA / ECC Local private key Session key Session keyCloud Step 1 : Transmit a generated temporary session key using asymmetric algorithm RC4 / AES / Camelia Key : temporary session key RC4 / AES / Camelia Key : temporary session key Packet Data (Plain, Byte) Cloud Packet Data (Plain, Byte) Hello CF012FA29C HelloCF012FA29C Step 2 : Symmetric encryption using transmitted session key RAT Network Protocol
  • 56. Malware Payload Configuration • Payload configuration contains important information about how to contact the C&C • IP address(es) / Domain Name pointing to IP address(es) • Communication Port(s) • It also contains other important configuration elements such as • Persistence Information's (Startup, Process, File) • Anti’s functions (Anti-VM, Anti-Debugger etc.) • Encryption key (symmetric) • C&C private key for asymmetric traffic encryption (Asymmetric) • Optional file downloader (if dropper module available and enabled) • Embedded files (File Binder / Wrapper) • Fake error messages / events (Open other process) • Etc. RAT Payload Configuration
  • 57. Malware Payload Configuration • Multiple ways exist to store the configuration inside the Stub • PE Resources Section • PE Custom Section • EOF (End Of File) • In the same way of network communication, the configuration could be from any formats • Plaintext : CSV, JSON, XML • Byte encoded structures • Some Malware encrypt configuration data to hide sensitive data's RAT Payload Configuration
  • 58. Malware Payload Configuration # PE (Portable Executable) Resources .rsrc (Resource Section) DOS Segment PE Header Section Tables Section 1 … Section N DOS Header Icon Versions Info Bitmaps Custom Resources Window Resources (Dialogs) * LockResource, LoadResource, UpdateResource, SizeOfResource… RAT Payload Configuration
  • 59. Malware Payload Configuration # PE (Portable Executable) Sections Section Tables Add new section info Section Address : 0x000FF12A Size of section : N Bytes Name of section : malconf Section 1 DOS Segment PE Header Section 1 Section N DOS Header … Custom Section 0x000FF12A Explore PE Header and Sections (PE Bear) JSON / CSV / Structures etc. { "cncaddr": [ "127.0.0.1", "192.168.0.11", "89.214.25.111", "lamer.no-ip.org", "lamer2.dyndns.org" ], "startup": { "enabled": true, "name": "svchost.exe" } [...] } RAT Payload Configuration
  • 60. Malware Payload Configuration # EOF (End of File) Payload configuration is simply appended at the End of the application file. Appending content at the end of an application file doesn’t corrupt the application itself since it is out of the scope defined by the PE Structure (SizeOfImage structure attribute defined in the PE Header > IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER) Most Antivirus detect such behavior by comparing the size of the image (SizeOfImage) from the PE Header with the file size. Example (Pascal/Delphi) RAT Payload Configuration
  • 61. Malware Payload Formats Binary Application Script Files Documents Exploit Kit RAT Payload Format
  • 62. Malware An example of timeline Malware Execution ping + timeout delete original copy run installed copy Installed Exit Process Copy to destination location Register location to startup Extract embedded files Download / Execute Initialize Melting Inject code to legitimate process (Explorer.exe ; Iexplore.exe ; firefox.exe) No Create Mutex Exists No Yes Establish a connection to C&C Anti-VM Yes Detected Yes No RAT Infection Process
  • 63. Conclusion Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family “Know your enemy” Malware
  • 64. Malware Introduction to Malware – Focus on Remote Administration Tool Family Conclusion # Malware are becoming more and more complex # Security industry and researcher are developping new techniques to fight advanced threats. # Understand the concepts behind malware can help to stay protected
  • 65. Thank You Jean-Pierre LESUEUR Full Stack Developer x IT Security Researcher @DarkCoderSc Thomas ROCCIA Security Researcher, Advanced Threat Research at McAfee @fr0gger_ Q/A