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The Law Firm of Laub & Laub
Nicholus C. Palmer, Esq.
State Bar of Nevada No. 9888
630 E. Plumb Lane
Reno, Nevada 89502
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
RANBIR CHHINA, NAVDEEP SINGH,
KEWAL SINGH, OPINDER DHILLON,
AMANDEEP SINGH
Plaintiff,
vs.
PARMINDER WALIA and DOES I – X,
Defendant.
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CASE NO.: CV22-01005
DEPT NO.: 1
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, Ranbir Chhina, Navdeep Singh, Kewal Singh, Opinder, Dhillon
and Amandeep Singh through their attorney of record, Nik C. Palmer, Esq. of the Law Firm of Laub
& Laub, and hereby file their First Amended Complaint in the above-entitled case.
JURISDICTION
1. Plaintiffs are all residents Washoe County, Nevada;
2. Defendant Parminder Walia is a resident of Washoe county Nevada, his home address
being 1675 Boulder Ridge Ct., Reno, NV 89523.
3. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, co-
F I L E D
Electronically
CV22-01005
2022-06-28 04:32:51 PM
Alicia L. Lerud
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 9122969

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Partnership, or otherwise of Defendant Does I through X are unknown to Plaintiffs who therefore
sue said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and therefore
allege, that each of the Defendants designated as Does are responsible in some manner for the
occurrences and events referred to in this action and proximately caused the damages to Plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs request leave of this Court to amend the Complaint to insert the true names and
capacities of said Doe Defendants, when the same have been ascertained and to join such Doe
Defendants in this action and assert the appropriate charging allegations.
FACTS
4. On May 9, 2022, a group of friends that travelled to Jaco Beach, Costa Rica to
celebrate a birthday party. This group included the Plaintiffs and Defendant.
5. In the late hours of May 11, 2022, the Defendant asked Plaintiffs to join him in the
living area of the condominium they had rented for the trip. The Defendant had arranged a birthday
party which included adult entertainment.
6. The Defendant, filmed the birthday party including interactions between the
Plaintiffs and the adult entertainment.
7. Upon returning home from the trip to Costa Rica, the Defendant uploaded the videos
to WhatsApp, a social media messaging app that allows users to share messages, images and videos.
From there, the videos ended up on other social media sites.
8. The Plaintiffs are business owners and belong to the Sikh Community, which is a
conservative religion.
9. The Plaintiff have suffered social and financial consequences due to the Defendants
actions of posting the videos online.

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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Invasion of Privacy - Intrusion)
10. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 9 above as though fully set forth herein.
11. The Defendant recorded the Plaintiffs in their rented condominium wherein they had
an expectation of privacy.
12. The Defendant published to a social media app the recorded videos of the Plaintiffs
without their consent.
13. The Defendant’s conduct of filming the Plaintiffs and uploading it to a social media
app is highly offensive to the Plaintiffs as it would be to any reasonable person.
14. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, the Plaintiffs have suffered
damages in an amount greater than $15,000.00.
15. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants actions, the Plaintiffs are entitled to
punitive and exemplary damages.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Invasion of Privacy – Public Disclosure of Private Facts)
16. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 15 above as though fully set forth herein.
17. The Plaintiffs had rented a condominium, in Costa Rica. Within the walls of the
rented condominium, the Plaintiffs had an expectation of privacy.
18. The Defendant recorded intimate images of the Plaintiffs and without their consent
uploaded the videos to a social media app.
19. The Defendant’s conduct of filming the Plaintiffs and uploading the videos to a
social media app is highly offensive to the Plaintiffs as it would be to any reasonable person.
20. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, the Plaintiffs have suffered
damages in an amount greater than $15,000.00.

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22. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants actions, the Plaintiffs are entitled to
punitive and exemplary damages.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Negligence)
23. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 22 above as though fully set forth herein.
24. The Defendant had a duty to the Plaintiffs to not disseminate private videos taken of
the Plaintiffs to others.
25. The Defendant breached this duty, not only by filming the Plaintiffs, but also posting
the videos to social media.
26. The breach of this duty to the Plaintiffs was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs
injuries and caused them financial damages.
27. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, the Plaintiffs have suffered
damages in an amount greater than $15,000.00.
28. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants actions, the Plaintiffs are entitled to
punitive and exemplary damages.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Punitive Damages)
29. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 28 above as though fully set forth herein.
30. The Defendants actions of recording the Plaintiffs and publishing the videos to social
media is extreme and outrageous.
31. Based upon the reprehensible conduct and outrageous behavior of the Defendant, the
Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully pray for Judgment as follows:
1. For compensatory damages in excess of $15,000 to be proven at trial;

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2. For general damages in an amount in excess of $15,000.00;
3. For punitive and exemplary damages pursuant to NRS 42.005;
4. For costs of the lawsuit including attorney’s fees;
5. For interest at the legal rate; and
6. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper in the premises.
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the undersigned certifies that no Social Security numbers are contained in this
document.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2022.
LAW FIRM OF LAUB & LAUB
__s/ Nik C. Palmer_____________
NICHOLUS C. PALMER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar #9888
630 E. Plumb Lane
Reno, Nevada 89502
Telephone (775) 333-5282
Facsimile (775) 323-3699

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Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss
CV22-01005
2290
Marc J. Randazza, NV Bar No. 12265
Alex J. Shepard, NV Bar No. 13582
RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC
2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109
Las Vegas, NV 89117
Telephone: 702-420-2001
ecf@randazza.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF WASHOE
RANBIR CHHINA, NAVDEEP SINGH,
KEWAL SINGH, OPINDER DHILLON,
AMANDEEP SINGH,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PARMINDER WALIA and DOES I -X,
Defendant.
Case No. CV22-01005
Dept. 1
DEFENDANT’S ANTI-SLAPP SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO
NRS 41.660
[HEARING REQUESTED]
Defendant Parminder Walia hereby files his Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to NRS 41.660. Because Plaintiffs’ claims are based upon conduct protected under NRS
41.637 and Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of their claims.
This motion is supported by the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the papers and
pleadings on file in this action, the declaration of Parminder Walia, the attached exhibits, and any
oral argument permitted by the Court at a hearing on this motion.
F I L E D
Electronically
CV22-01005
2022-08-17 07:30:59 PM
Alicia L. Lerud
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 9212115 : yviloria

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1.0. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs are prominent members of the Reno Sikh community, a tightly-knit group of
religiously conservative people. Plaintiffs, Walia, and other members of the community traveled
to Costa Rica, during which visit they spontaneously decided to throw a party for Plaintiff
Amandeep Singh. During the party, Plaintiffs enthusiastically hired prostitutes from a publicly
visible common area and brought them to the party. Multiple people, including Plaintiffs, recorded
the party. By some measures, the events at the party were not terribly risqué – prostitutes were
giving lap dances to the men at the party and the men were eating cake and frosting off of the
prostitutes’ breasts.1
However, videos of the events are the subject of this lawsuit.
Walia sent videos of the party to a small group of Sikhs, who then found it to be a matter of
public concern, so they then shared it with the wider public. It was such a matter of public concern
that it spread widely on social media. (First Amended Complaint “FAC” at ¶ 7.) As far as viral
videos and party footage goes, this would not have even registered as a particularly notable
weekday afternoon in Las Vegas. However, this video became of quite widespread interest within
the Sikh community.
Plaintiffs seek to bankrupt Mr. Walia not because he made a video of the event – many
people did so, including some of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seem upset that they got caught doing
something that they apparently weren’t supposed to be doing – at least as far as their community
is concerned (or maybe just their wives2
). Plaintiffs are now upset that their community (or maybe
just their wives) found out that they were cavorting with prostitutes and using the prostitutes’
breasts as substitutes for dessert plates.
Plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything that actually made it into the
video clips. If any of the Plaintiffs actually had sex with one of the prostitutes, and that was filmed,
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It is not a matter of record whether anyone then had sex with the prostitutes. If this
happened, nobody filmed that part of the events and manifestations that evening.
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Mr. Walia’s wife, on the other hand, has expressed that her view on this party is “boys will
be boys.”

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CV22-01005
the story might be different. If any of the filming was surreptitious, that might make things
different. But things aren’t different – they are as they are – and as they are, some men went to a
“hooker bar,” picked up some hookers, took them upstairs, had some fun, and they were all either
hamming it up for the cameras, or even live broadcasting the events. Yet now, they claim that this
was a secret and private event where they had an expectation that nobody would find out? Did the
prostitutes sign non-disclosure agreements?3
Do they think that the prostitutes didn’t tell their
friends or other prostitutes about the party? Do they think that other people did not see them leave
the hooker bar with the prostitutes? Do they think that they can eat cake from a prostitute’s breasts,
live-stream it across the globe, yet then claim that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy?
Plaintiffs had no expectation of privacy in their conduct at the party or their association with
prostitutes, and Walia did not in any way invade their privacy. This is a frivolous SLAPP4
suit,
and as such, should be dismissed under Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP statute, NRS 41.635-670. Walia
should also be awarded his costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in defending himself, as
well as $10,000 in damages under NRS 41.637(1)(b).
2.0. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As Plaintiffs claim, the Sikh community is conservative. (FAC at ¶ 8.) And as Plaintiffs
admit, they are prominent business owners within this community in Northern Nevada. (FAC at
¶¶ 1, 8.) Plaintiffs and Walia regularly attend religious services within this community.
(Declaration of Parminder Walia [“Walia Decl.”], attached as Exhibit 1.) Plaintiffs are not merely
rank and file members of this community that happen to attend services, but rather they are
prominent members of it. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff Ranbir Chhina is the owner of the Palms Banquet
Hall in Stockton, California and VIVA Banquet Hall, a prominent business in Reno, Nevada.
(Walia Decl. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Opinder Dhillon is also involved in the operation of these businesses.
(Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff Ranbir Chhina is the President of the Punjabi Cultural and Sports Committee
in Reno, a significant organization within the Reno Sikh community. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff Kewal
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Presumably, if they had, it would have been mentioned in the complaint.
4
“SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”

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CV22-01005
Singh Sekhon5
was previously the President of the Reno Sikh Temple, the primary religious
organization in the Reno Sikh community. (Id. at ¶ 12.) While in this position, the Reno Gazette
Journal sought commentary from him in relation to an indictment on support for terrorism charges
of another Sikh man living in Reno. He was identified as the President of the Sikh Temple of Reno,
and was quoted with the following exchange:
[Kewal Singh Sekhon] said Sikhs as a whole are a peaceful people who oppose
terrorism. There are about 200 Sikh families who are active in the temple, he said.
“We live in peace of mind. We don’t need any trouble,” Sekhon said. He is aware
of other Sikhs who support terrorism. “There are some people in this country who
do that, but we don’t have any connection with those people,” Sekhon said.
(Steve Timko, “Reno man indicted on terror charges,” Reno Gazette Journal (Dec. 18, 2013),6
attached as Exhibit 2.) Plaintiff Kewal Singh Sekhon was also mentioned in a This is Reno article
about Sparks Mayor Geno R. Martini being welcomed at the Reno Sikh Temple. (Rajan Zed,
“Sparks Mayor Welcomed at Sikh Temple in Reno,” This is Reno (Feb. 9, 2012),7
attached as
Exhibit 3.) Plaintiff Opinder Dhillon was previously a committee member of the Reno Sikh
Temple, as well. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 13.)
The Reno Sikh community is tightly-knit, with many of its members having a significant
interest in the religious adherence of its other members. (Id. at ¶ 7.) A major vice in Sikh religion
and culture is kam (sensuality), an impulse towards sexual gratification that must be kept in check.
Dr. Arvinder Singh, “Sikhism & The Crisis of Modernity – Extramarital Relationships,”
International Journal of Advanced Research, Vol. 3, Issue 1 (2015), attached as Exhibit 4, at 988.)8
“Unrestrained propensity towards kam, especially sexual relationship outside the marital bond, is
condemned in the strongest terms in Sikh codes of conduct as well as in the Scripture. It is a
5
Plaintiff Kewal Singh’s actual name is Kewal Singh Sekhon. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 12.)
6
Available at: https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2013/12/19/reno-man-indicted-on-terror-
charges/4121513/ (last accessed Aug. 16, 2022).
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Available at: https://thisisreno.com/2012/02/sparks-mayor-welcomed-at-sikh-temple-in-
reno/ (last accessed Aug. 16, 2022).
8
Available at: https://www.journalijar.com/uploads/513_IJAR-4877.pdf (last accessed
Aug. 16, 2022).

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CV22-01005
destructive evil and a deadly sin . . . In Sikhism, there is no place for extra marital relationships.”
(Id.) The prohibition against adultery, i.e., sexual relations outside marriage, is so strong that “[i]ts
violation makes a Sikh an apostate and he/she has to undergo religious punishment and must get
reinitiation.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs and Defendant Walia travelled to Jaco Beach, Costa Rica. (FAC at ¶ 4.) During
this visit, Plaintiffs and Walia were present at a party for Plaintiff Amandeep Singh. (Id. at ¶ 5.)
The party took place in a building where there was a bar downstairs. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 18.) That
bar provides a place for prostitutes to advertise their services. (Id. at ¶ 17.) For patrons within the
establishment to hire a prostitute, they had to go down to the bar, within public view of all the
other patrons and select their preferred purveyor of the prostitutorial arts. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Anyone
hiring prostitutes also had to escort them back to the common area after their services were
rendered. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs went to the bar, which was open to the public, and procured a
number of them. (Id. at ¶ 20.) It is unknown how many people saw them procure and leave with
the hookers, but it was certainly done in public. (Id. at ¶ 20.) When the prostitutes were procured,
the men and the prostitutes began mutually enjoying some cake and lap dances. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
Plaintiffs happily engaged with these prostitutes, allowing them to sit on their laps and grind
on them, and ate cake off their bare breasts. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Walia and others present at the party,
including Plaintiffs Ranbir Chhina and Opinder Dhillon, took out their phones to record the events.
(Id. at ¶ 24.) It was obvious that Walia and these others were recording the party, and at various
points during the party, one or more Plaintiffs stared directly into these phone cameras. (Id. at ¶
23.) Plaintiff Dhillon even asked at one point for assistance in making a video, and Plaintiff
Amandeep Singh was broadcasting the party using the FaceTime app to friends in India. (Id. at ¶
26.) All of the recording was open and encouraged. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Nobody ever asked that Walia
delete his footage. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Even if they had, he would have had no obligation to do so, but if
they had, it might lend credence to their concerns expressed in the FAC.
Upon returning to Reno, Walia shared five short clips of his footage with a group of ten
other Sikhs, none of whom resided in the United States. (Id. at ¶ 30.) The videos of the party he

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CV22-01005
uploaded are attached to this Motion as composite Exhibit 5. To provide some examples of the
conduct on display and how open and notorious the filming was, some stills from the video are
displayed below.
Plaintiff Chhina conspicuously recording
Plaintiff Amandeep Singh receiving a lap
dance from a bare bottomed prostitute. (Walia
Decl. at ¶ 31; Video 5 at 0:26.) The Court can
see that Chhina has a camera in his hand and is
squatting down to get an advantageous camera
angle on Singh with his face in the prostitute’s
breast.
In this still image, Plaintiff Amandeep Singh is
looking directly into Walia’s camera phone
mid-recording as the unnamed prostitute puts
her breast in his mouth. (Id. at ¶ 31; Video 5 at
0:32.) He can hardly claim that he was
unaware of the fact that he was being filmed.

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Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss
CV22-01005
Plaintiff Amandeep Singh eating frosting from
another prostitute’s breasts. (Id. at ¶ 31; Video
3 at 0:20). Again, he is making direct eye
contact with the camera, laying waste to any
claim that he did not know or consent to being
filmed.
Plaintiff Amandeep Singh eating
frosting off a third prostitute’s breasts. (Id. at ¶
31; Video 4 at 0:11.) He is also obviously
posing for another camera held by another
party attendee. One can also see that there are
at least five prostitutes in this image – none of
whom have claimed that their privacy was
invaded.
Plaintiff Ranbir Chhina conspicuously
displaying his camera and saying “one more
time, one more time, I didn’t see that” after
Plaintiff Amandeep Singh finishes eating
frosting off the third prostitute’s breasts. (Id. at
¶ 31; Video 4 at 0:17).

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CV22-01005
Despite hamming it up for the cameras and livestreaming the events, now Plaintiffs want
to bankrupt Mr. Walia for showing a small group of people these videos, who then found them to
be such a matter of public concern that they helped the videos go viral. The Nevada Anti-SLAPP
law will not abide these claims.
3.0. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP statute, NRS 41.635, et seq., if a lawsuit is brought against a
defendant based upon the exercise of his First Amendment rights, the defendant may file a special
motion to dismiss. Evaluating the Anti-SLAPP motion is a two-step process. The movant bears
the burden on the first step, and the non-moving party bears the burden on the second. See John v.
Douglas County Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 746, 754 (2009).
First, the defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff’s
claim is “based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right
to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.” NRS 41.660(3)(a). The
relevant statutory category of protected speech is “[c]ommunication[s] made in direct connection
with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum … which [are]
truthful or [are] made without knowledge of its falsehood.” NRS 41.637(4).
Second, once the defendant meets his burden on the first prong, the burden then shifts to
the plaintiff, who must make a prima facie evidentiary showing that he has a probability of
prevailing on his claims. See NRS 41.660(3)(b); see also John, 125 Nev. at 754.
Nevada treats an Anti-SLAPP motion as a species of a motion for summary judgment. See
Stubbs v. Strickland, 297 P.3d 326, 329 (Nev. 2013); see also Coker v. Sassone, 432 P.3d 746,
748-49 (Nev. 2019). However, it has some additional procedures to avoid the abusive use of
discovery, and if the court grants the motion, the defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable
costs and attorneys’ fees, as well as an award of up to $10,000. See NRS 41.670(1)(a)-(b).
Nevada courts look to case law applying California’s Anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. § 425.16, which shares many similarities with Nevada’s law. See John, 125 Nev. at 756
(stating that “we consider California case law because California’s anti-SLAPP statute is similar

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in purpose and language to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute”); see also Shapiro v. Welt, 389 P.3d
262, 268 (Nev. 2017) (same); Sassone, 432 P.3d at 749 n.3 (finding that “California’s and
Nevada’s statutes share a near-identical structure for anti-SLAPP review … Given the similarity
in structure, language, and the legislative mandate to adopt California’s standard for the requisite
burden of proof, reliance on California case law is warranted”); and see NRS 41.665(2) (defining
the plaintiff’s prima facie evidentiary burden in terms of California law).
4.0. ARGUMENT
4.1. Prong One: Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Based Upon Protected Conduct
4.1.1. Definition of Public Interest
The term “issue of public interest” is extremely broad, and such an issue “need not be
‘significant’ to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute – it is enough that it is one in which the
public takes an interest.” Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (2008)
(finding that statements to a magazine about work experience for prominent businessman and
celebrity were of public interest). An activity does not need to “meet the lofty standard of
pertaining to the heart of self-government” to qualify for Anti-SLAPP protection; “social or even
low-brow topics may suffice.” Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2009). The
relevant public also does not need to be the public at large; it is sufficient for a relatively small
group to be interested. See Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 397
(2004) (finding that “[w]eb site statements” satisfied first prong because they “concerned matters
of public interest in the cat breeding community”); Stark v. Lackey, 458 P.3d 342, 346 (Nev. 2020)
(finding that online criticism of Nevada Department of Wildlife’s treatment of bears was in direct
connection with an issue of public interest, namely “the treatment of Nevada wildlife, and
specifically bears in the Tahoe Basin”); Smith v. Zilverberg, 481 P.3d 1222, 1227-28 (Nev. 2021)
(finding that statements about “a public figure of widespread fame in the thrifting community”
related to his thrifting business were in direct connection with an issue of public interest).

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Nevada generally follows five “guiding principles” laid out in Piping Rock Partners, Inc.
v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev.
35, 39 (2017). These principles are:
(1) “public interest” does not equate with mere curiosity;
(2) a matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial
number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a relatively small specific
audience is not a matter of public interest;
(3) there should be some degree of closeness between the challenged statements
and the asserted public interest – the assertion of a broad and amorphous public
interest is not sufficient;
(4) the focus of the speaker’s conduct should be the public interest rather than
a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy; and
(5) a person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public
interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people.
Id. at 968. These “guiding principles” are not a formulation of new law, but rather a distillation of
California and U.S. Supreme Court decisions on what constitutes an issue of public interest. See
Piping Rock, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 968. Nothing in Welt suggests that Nevada courts use this as an
exclusive checklist. Instead, the cases cited above and in the Anti-SLAPP Motion also guide the
public issue analysis and the application of the Piping Rock factors.
4.1.2. Walia’s Publication Was on an Issue of Public Interest
As argued in the FAC, the Sikh community is very conservative. (FAC at ¶ 8; Walia Decl.
at ¶ 4.) The subjects of the videos were 1) prominent members of the Reno Sikh community and
2) prostitutes. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 31.) Walia transmitted the subject videos to other members of the
Sikh community. (Id. at ¶ 30.) As prominent members of the Sikh community, whether Plaintiffs’
conduct is consistent with or divergent from the expectations of Sikh culture is a matter of public
concern, within that community. See Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress, 71 Cal.App.4th 226,
239 (1999); Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 667-68 (2018). Certainly,
prominent figures in the Reno Sikh community engaging in conduct that unquestionably
constituted kam and perhaps constituted adultery, two severe sins in Sikhism, would be of great
interest to anyone in that community. The videos were of such interest to the community that the
initial recipients re-published them to other parties and on other social media websites. (FAC at ¶

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7.) The “public interest” here is of interest to the Sikh community – as the complaint makes clear.
If a discussion about a prominent member of the “thrifting community” (as in Zilverberg) fits, of
course prominent members of the Sikh community in Reno fit as well.
Each of the Shapiro principles support Walia.
If there had not been a public interest within the Reno Sikh community as to Plaintiffs
failing to adhere to the religious principles they claimed to hold, then the videos would not have
spread on social media, as Plaintiffs allege. (FAC at ¶ 7.) Walia only shared the video with 10
people. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 35.) However, then the videos themselves took hold with the Sikh
community at large and went viral. (FAC at ¶ 7.) The virality of the videos can only be attributed
to the fact that these prominent Sikhs were in them – as videos of scantily clad women are hardly
difficult to find elsewhere. As far as “sexy videos” go, these videos hardly register.
The videos spreading this way show that they were not on an issue of mere curiosity. The
Reno Sikh community, while not as large as the entire populace of Reno, is large enough not to be
considered a “relatively small specific audience.” The videos have a direct connection with the
relevant public issue, namely prominent figures of the Reno Sikh community flagrantly violating
the community’s religious principles and cultural standards of conduct. Walia had no kind of
personal dispute with Plaintiffs, and so his conduct could not possibly have been “a mere effort to
gather ammunition” for a non-existent dispute. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 34.) Finally, Walia did not
publish the statements to a large number of people; it was third parties who did this completely
independently, which itself is evidence of significant public interest. Walia’s conduct was in direct
connection with an issue of public interest.
4.1.3. Walia’s Statements Were Made in a Public Forum
Emails sent to a listserv constitute a public forum sufficient to satisfy prong one of the
Anti-SLAPP analysis. See Sanson, 458 P.3d at 1067-68. Social media sites with interactive
components, such as Facebook or nextdoor.com pages, are public forums. See Lackey, 458 P.3d at
345 n.2; Kosor v. Olympia Cos., LLC, 478 P.3d 390, 397-98 (Nev. 2020).

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Walia uploaded his videos of the birthday party to WhatsApp, specifically to a group of
ten members of the Sikh community. Contrary to the assertion in the Complaint, WhatsApp is a
messaging service, not a social media platform. However, in determining whether prong one is
satisfied, a court must look to the alleged conduct, and not the moving party’s denials of such
conduct. See Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 499 P.3d 611, 614 (Nev. 2021) (in response to moving party
denying having made allegedly actionable statements, finding that “a moving party’s denial has
no relevance at step one of the anti-SLAPP evaluation”). Thus, for purposes of determining
whether the public forum requirement is satisfied, Plaintiffs’ allegation that Walia “uploaded the
videos to WhatsApp, a social media messaging app that allows users to share messages, images
and videos” controls. (FAC at ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs also allege the videos subsequently “ended up on
other social media sites.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) Because the FAC is directed at the conduct of sharing the
videos on social media sites, the public forum requirement is satisfied.
4.1.4. Walia’s Statements Were Made in Good Faith
To be protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, statements must be “truthful or … made
without knowledge of [their] falsehood.” NRS 41.637. Even if a statement is false, the defendant
must have made it with actual knowledge that it was false; neither negligence nor even reckless
disregard for the truth can defeat a defendant’s showing under prong one. Furthermore, by the
Anti-SLAPP statute’s plain language, the “good faith” analysis is completely unrelated to a
defendant’s motivations in making a statement.
There is no question that the good faith requirement is satisfied here. Plaintiffs’ claims are
premised on the allegedly unauthorized dissemination of truthful information, namely their
attendance at and participation in the procurement and partaking of prostitutes’ services. A visual
recording of an incident cannot be false. See Sanson, 458 P.3d at 1068 (finding that posting videos
of courtroom proceedings could not be “false” because “they involve visual recordings of actual
court proceedings”); see also PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 615, 629, 895 P.2d 1269,
1272 (1995), overruled on other grounds by City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht,
113 Nev. 644, 650, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (1997) (finding that videotape at issue was not “false”

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because it was an accurate portrayal of what had happened). Without any allegation of falsity,
Walia’s conduct was in good faith. To remove any possible ambiguity on this point, however,
Walia testifies that he did not know or believe that the videos he published were in any way false,
as he recorded the videos himself and was present at the party. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 33.)
Walia satisfies his burden under the first prong of the Anti-SLAPP analysis. The burden
now shifts to Plaintiffs to show a probability of prevailing on their claims. They cannot.
4.2. Prong Two: Plaintiffs Cannot Show a Probability of Prevailing on Their Claims
NRS 41.660 defines a plaintiff’s burden of proof as “the same burden of proof that a
plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California’s anti Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation law as of the effective date of this act.” NRS 41.665(2). A plaintiff cannot rely on the
mere accusations of his complaint or provide a mere scintilla of evidence to defeat an Anti-SLAPP
motion. Rather, to satisfy their evidentiary burden under the second prong of the Anti-SLAPP
statute, a plaintiff must present “substantial evidence that would support a judgment of relief made
in the plaintiff’s favor.” S. Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P., 193 Cal. App. 4th 634, 670
(2011); see also Mendoza v. Wichmann, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1449 (2011) (holding that
“substantial evidence” of lack of probable cause was required to withstand Anti-SLAPP motion
on malicious prosecution claim).
Plaintiffs bring four claims for relief: (1) invasion of privacy – intrusion; (2) invasion of
privacy – public disclosure of private facts; (3) negligence; and (4) punitive damages. The punitive
damages claim is not a claim for relief, and Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to show a
probability of prevailing on their other claims.
4.2.1. Plaintiffs Cannot Prevail on Their Intrusion Claim
The tort of invasion of privacy encompasses a variety of different causes of action,
including unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another and unreasonable publicity given
to private facts. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 135 (Nev. 2014), vacated on
other grounds by Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652A (1977)); PETA, 111 Nev. at 629. A public disclosure of private facts

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claim has three elements: (1) public disclosure; (2) of private facts; (3) that would be highly
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Montesano v. Donrey
Media Group, 99 Nev. 644, 668 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1983). An intrusion upon seclusion claim also
has three elements: “(1) an intentional intrusion (physical or otherwise); (2) on the solitude or
seclusion of another; (3) that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” PETA, 111 Nev.
at 630, 895 P.2d at 1279.
Both of these causes of action require the plaintiff to have an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy. Hyatt, 335 P.3d at 140-41. A “reasonable expectation of privacy” cannot
encompass anything exposed to the public or third parties. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 40 (1988); see Int'l Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187, 191-92 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (dismissing
plaintiff's invasion of privacy claims in part because “a person does not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, solitude, or seclusion in being free from the dissemination of inferences
drawn from observations readily perceivable in public view”).
Both claims are also governed by the same test to determine whether disclosure or
intrusion is highly offensive. A court must make “a preliminary determination of ‘offensiveness,’”
in which the court should consider “the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances
surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which
[s]he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.” City of Las Vegas
Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 644, 650, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (1997). To be
actionable, an intrusion upon seclusion must be “the result of conduct to which the reasonable man
would strongly object.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. d.
There was no intrusion upon seclusion here. One might imagine that revealing the fact that
Plaintiffs were cavorting with prostitutes could be “offensive,” to Plaintiffs – but they did this in
a public place, when they picked them up. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 18.) Then, as shown by video of the
party, multiple people were recording everything that happened for posterity. One of the Plaintiffs
was even live-streaming the party! (Id. at ¶ 26.) Those participating in the party saw these recording
devices and did not object to their use, and in fact, “hammed it up” for the cameras. See Section

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2.0, supra. Plaintiffs knew they were being recorded and had no issue with it, and Walia was
welcome to the party because he was one of the people who threw it. Further, how would anyone
be able to stop the prostitutes, themselves, from talking about the event?
There was no reasonable expectation of privacy and there was nothing offensive about
Walia recording it. The intrusion upon seclusion claim is legally frivolous; if anyone found Walia’s
recording of the party objectionable, they would have said something and they wouldn’t have been
recording the party themselves. They certainly would not have been contemporaneously
broadcasting the party to others who weren’t even present so they could see what was going on.
Plaintiffs do not so much as allege that Walia recorded the videos without consent. Without a
single fact, existing or alleged, to support this claim, it fails.
4.2.2. Plaintiffs Cannot Prevail on Their Public Disclosure Claim
4.2.2.1. Plaintiffs lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy
Plaintiffs’ Complaint rests primarily on Walia’s alleged distribution of the videos, a
distribution of private facts claim, but that distribution is not actionable either. Presumably, the
allegedly private fact at issue is that Plaintiffs were partying with prostitutes. But Plaintiffs had no
expectation of privacy in this fact. They made this fact abundantly clear to casual observers by
going to a bar, which was the designated spot for hiring prostitutes, selecting their preferred
prostitutes, and then returning to their room with the prostitutes. All of this was done in public
view. Additionally, Plaintiff Amandeep Singh contemporaneously broadcast this fact, and all other
details of the birthday party, to friends and family. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 20). Further still, there were
at least five prostitutes present at the party. One can hardly claim to have an expectation of privacy
when there is a flock of hookers watching everything you do.
Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224 (1953) is instructive on this point. That case dealt
with plaintiffs who voluntarily posed for a photograph taken on the premises of a business
accessible to the public. The court found the plaintiffs could not bring an invasion of privacy claim
for subsequent widespread publication of photo, as “[t]he photograph of plaintiffs merely
permitted other members of the public, who were not at plaintiffs’ place of business at the time it

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was taken, to see them as they had voluntarily exhibited themselves . . . In short, the photograph
did not disclose anything which until then had been private, but rather only extended knowledge
of the particular incident to a somewhat larger public than had actually witnessed it at the time of
occurrence.” Id. at 230. Just as in Gill, Plaintiffs were conspicuously present in a place open to the
public where anyone could have seen them hiring prostitutes and bringing them up to their rooms.
Apparently, they now regret that these facts became known back in Nevada, but they did nothing
to keep this information secret. If Plaintiffs take the position that they had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the details of the party because it took place in a non-public place, this argument
would fail. See Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that
fact of plaintiff kissing a man in a bathroom stall was not private because she did so “both in a bar
and on a city sidewalk,” and finding that mere location of different kissing incident did not make
underlying fact private).
Plaintiffs’ conduct is similar to the plaintiff in Fisher v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 61
Ohio Misc. 2d 303, 305 (Ct. Cl. 1988). There, the plaintiff had a conversation with co-workers on
the topic of “sexual situations involving minor children.” The court ruled that the plaintiff did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents or subject matter of this conversation
because “[t]he plaintiff’s discussion of her personal experiences were freely offered to the persons
around her without concern of the impact it might have on her character.” Similarly, Plaintiffs
were openly hiring prostitutes in a public place, partying with them in full view of a group of
people, and even broadcasting the party internationally. The prostitutes themselves were of a
crowd sufficiently large that acts performed in front of them could reasonably be considered to be
“public.” Plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in either the details of the party or
the fact they were partying with prostitutes.

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4.2.2.2. There was no “public disclosure”
The public disclosure claim also fails for lack of exactly that: public disclosure. Walia only
sent the videos of the party to a group of ten people.9
This is not sufficient publication for the claim
to succeed – in fact, there were more people than that at the party. The tort of public disclosure of
private facts ‘“must be accompanied by publicity in the sense of communication to the public in
general or to a large number of persons as distinguished from one individual or a few.’” Timperley
v. Chase Collection Service, 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 700 (1969) (quoting Schwartz v. Thiele, 242
Cal. App. 2d 799, 805 (1966)); see Fisher, 61 Ohio Misc. 2d at 305 (finding that publicity
requirement was not met where the defendant forwarded information to attorney of plaintiff’s
former spouse in compliance with subpoena in domestic relations case).
Generally, “it is not an invasion of the right to privacy . . . to communicate a fact concerning
the plaintiff’s private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a (1977). Rather, a public disclosure only occurs when ‘“the matter
is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter
must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”’ Doe v. Clark Cnty.
Sch. Dist., No. 2:15-cv-00793-APG-GWF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61637, *21 (D. Nev. Apr. 21,
2017) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a). ‘“The distinction, in other words,
is one between private and public communication.’” Id.; see Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., Inc.,
865 F. Supp. 1443, 1448 (D. Nev. 1994) (holding that communications “limited to the small group
of [the plaintiff’s] co-workers” was not sufficient for publication element).
There were at least five strangers, none of whom was sworn to secrecy, at the party, and
approximately 10 other guests. One cannot reasonably call video excerpts of such an event an
element of a “private life.” The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. b. offers examples
of “private life” that include photographs taken without consent in private, sexual relations,
9
Plaintiffs allege the statements were then disseminated by third parties more broadly, but
Walia did not publicize the videos this way. They were disseminated more widely because of their
public interest.

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intimate personal letters, and other facts that a person “does not expose to the public eye, but keeps
entirely to himself or at most reveals to his family or close friends.” Here, Plaintiffs exposed their
conduct to videography with their consent, in public. As noted above, had the recordings been
surreptitious, it would be another story. Had the recordings been of private sexual encounters,
again, another story. But this was a large group of men and a group of unknown prostitutes –
nobody thought anything here was part of anyone’s “private life.”
Even if it was, Walia published his videos to a group of only ten people. This is precisely
the kind of small group of people to whom dissemination cannot constitute public disclosure of
private facts. In fact, it is a smaller group than was at attendance at the party. It was also far from
“substantially certain” that Walia’s dissemination of the videos would result in them becoming
public knowledge. He sent the videos to a group of friends, not to a reporter or media outlet. None
of them resided in Nevada, or even in the United States, when this happened. There was thus no
reason at all to think that there would be widespread dissemination of the videos.
4.2.2.3. Walia’s disclosure was a matter of legitimate public concern
Legitimate public concern is a bar to liability for publication of private facts. Shulman v.
Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 215 (1998). Courts must decide whether a publication
is of legitimate public concern based upon: (1) the social value of the published facts; (2) the extent
of the intrusion into ostensibly private matters, and (3) the extent to which a party voluntarily
assumed a position of public notoriety. Times-Mirror Company v. Superior Court of San Diego
County, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1428 (1988). Public concern depends upon the logical relationship
or nexus between the event that brought the plaintiff into the public eye and the particular facts
disclosed, so long as the facts are not intrusive in great disproportion to their
relevance. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 215.
The Times-Mirror factors show that the videos were matters of public concern to the Sikh
community. Plaintiffs are all prominent members of this community, and due to its close-knit
nature, the community has a significant interest in whether its prominent members adhere to the
community’s religious principles. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 7.) There is thus significant social value in

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publicizing the fact that these members do not, in fact, adhere to these principles. The spread of
the videos on social media by third parties is further proof of this. The first factors favors Walia.
As discussed above, there was nothing private about Plaintiffs hiring prostitutes in a
common area visible to the general public. Even if some expectation of privacy existed as to this
fact, the extent of any intrusion was minimal given that Plaintiffs themselves were recording the
party and broadcasting it to third parties. The second factor favors Walia.
Plaintiffs were all prominent members of the Sikh community and actively sought out this
status within the community. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 8.) Because, like most public figures, they
voluntarily sought and obtained their notoriety, this factor favors Walia.
With all three factors in Walia’s favor, the publication of the videos showing Plaintiffs,
prominent members of the Sikh community, engaging in conduct that is anathema to Sikh religious
values, was a matter of legitimate public concern.
4.2.3. Plaintiffs Cannot Prevail on Their Negligence Claim
Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is derivative of their privacy claims and fails for the same
reasons the above claims fail. Because Plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
Walia owed them no duty not to disseminate the videos to a small group of people. He also owed
them no duty not to film the party, particularly when none of them objected and many were filming
and broadcasting the party themselves. He did not otherwise owe any duty not to engage in this
conduct, as there was no agreement among any of the party-goers not to film or distribute this
information. (Walia Decl. at ¶ 28.)
5.0. CONCLUSION
A bunch of guys picked up some hookers and had a party. Everyone pulled out their cameras
and took video. Some excerpts went viral, and now some of the guys think they can put the genie
back in the bottle by filing a frivolous lawsuit. The genie isn’t going back in the bottle any more
than the frosting they ate off of the hookers breasts is going back on the cake. The Court should
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and award Defendant both his costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees, as well as $10,000 under NRS 41.670(1)(b), to be substantiated by separate motion.

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AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 and 603A.040
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, Defendant’s Anti-
SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRS 41.660, filed in case number CV22-01005,
does not contain the personal information of any person.
Dated: August 17, 2022. Respectfully Submitted,
RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC
/s/ Marc J. Randazza
Marc J. Randazza, NV Bar No. 12265
2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109
Las Vegas, NV 89117
Telephone: 702-420-2001
ecf@randazza.com
Attorneys for Defendant

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Case No. CV22-01005
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that pursuant to NRCP 5(b), a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was electronically filed on this 17th
day of August, 2022 and served via the Second
Judicial District Court’s electronic filing system.
/s/ Marc J. Randazza
Marc J. Randazza