1. CHEUNG, Thanakorn Professor Marie Mendras Russian Politics – Sciences Po
WORD COUNT: 3643
10 November 2015
The Putin regime claims to have a special right over its “sphere of influence”. What impact does this
claim have on Moscow’s foreign policy?
'Russia like any other countries in the world, has regions which it maintains privileged interests'1
Dmitry Medvedev, September 2008
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the loss of 'great power' status associated with it, the Kremlin
struggled at first to integrate herself into the West consequently forcing her to develop a foreign policy of her
own. In what initially started off as a largely defensive foreign policy and a continuation of the 'Soviet balance
of power model', her foreign policy became progressively aggressive especially since the 2008 Georgian
War. The collapse of the Soviet Union heralded in an era where sovereign and independent republics
surround her former master, to the general annoyance of the ruling elites and policy-makers in the Kremlin.
Over the last two decades, pro-Moscow and corrupt administrations in the former Soviet republics have
depleted in numbers due largely to the democratic 'colour' revolutions. The enlargement of NATO and the
European Union of the mid 2000s further deteriorated the situation, as for the first time NATO member states
border Russian Federation proper (though with the ascension of Poland in 1999, Kaliningrad Oblast has
been bordering a NATO member ever since). Despite the security alliance's reassurance that the
enlargement was largely 'defensive' in nature, the Kremlin saw it as a remnant of Cold War policy thus
synonymously aggressive. Moscow could not help but feel the move an encroachment into her heartland
especially given that the former Eastern satellites used to act as an insulator, so she drew a line at her
former Soviet border. The inclusion of the three Baltic states was interpreted as downright foreign
aggression, which was why the recent attempts at bringing more former Soviet republics were met with a
much more stiff resistance. Moreover the Kremlin feels that her orbit was slipping away faster than she could
retain any sense of order with the 2009 EU's Eastern partnership Programme that was opened to six former
Soviet republics, resulting in her quick but irrationally drawn responses such as the 'Eurasian' integration. In
an increasingly multi-polar world, the Kremlin is desperately trying to show that she is still relevant on the
world stage but her policies of 'appearing strong' through 'alliances' with the former empire in fact backfires,
resulted in even the distancing of her closest allies: Kazakhstan and Belarus during the 2014 Crimean
dispute. This paper will explore how its special right influences the foreign policy pursued by the Kremlin over
its sphere of interests, since the 2008 Georgian war until the present day in her Near Abroad.
Although Tbilisi has never been overtly friendly with Moscow since 1991, the de facto ‘occupation’ of
her two strategic regions by Moscow has always undermined diplomacy between the two states. Moreover,
the Rose revolution that brought an American-educated lawyer to the presidency began a process of
1 Michael Rywkin, 'An Adventure to Restore the Empire', American Foreign Policy Interests, 37.2, (May, 2015), p. 95.

2. CHEUNG, Thanakorn Professor Marie Mendras Russian Politics – Sciences Po
irreversible break from her former master. The five days war in August 2008 occurred due to a longer term
decline in relations between Tbilisi and Moscow which deteriorated further from April with the Bucharest
summit, whereby president George W. Bush pushed for a rapid NATO membership bid for Georgia and
Ukraine, only to be turned down by Chancellor Merkel. The Kremlin nonetheless has interpreted this as the
West crossing the rubicon, not only was the planned deployment of defensive missiles in Poland and Czech
Republic threatening, the admission of two more former Soviet republics would reduce Moscow's already
depleted sphere of influence, translating to greater threats of destabilisation on her borders especially on her
troubled region of the Caucasus where Tbilisi was less than helpful in her two dealings with Chechnya. Over
the months leading to August, 'Russian' military build-up under the guise of volunteers and 'isolated' attacks
against Georgian targets such as the downing of its drone in late April resulted in Georgian deployment of
12,000 troops along the Abkhaz border. The war itself was triggered by South Ossetian attacks on Georgian
positions in July and August. Equipped with superior weaponries and the support of the Russian armed
forces, the war ended quickly but the context in which Russia drew for her responses was what captured the
international community and at the same time acted as a precursor to Moscow's 'new' foreign policy. The
Kremlin framed the heavy military response as largely 'defensive' but the scale that was the largest incursion
of Russian forces into another state since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the speed of this 'response'
that violated Georgia's national sovereignty and territorial integrity has prompted the motivations and
objectives of the Russian leadership.2
Oxford professor of Russian studies, Roy Allison called the response
as Russia's 'coercion of Georgia to peace'.3
Due to Georgia's 'hostile' stance towards the Kremlin since
Sakaashvili's election victory in 2004, Moscow can no longer rely on 'soft coercion' in what she saw as her
sphere of influence and thus turned to hard power to pressure Tbilisi, and ensure that she does not act
against Moscow's interests, even if she does not take a pro-Moscow line of policy. Moscow's recognition of
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in which no other members of the CIS followed suit, and the
stationing of her troops in those break-away frozen zones provide a clear virtual evidence of Moscow's
international isolation with regards to her right of claim and actions. Her disregard for state-borders as
guaranteed by the CIS 1991 founding agreement has largely undermined the future cooperation of the
organisation due to members' discomfort with the regional heavyweight punching above her due.
In the short-term, Moscow's harsh action may have yielded results. If the West were serious about
incorporating Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, as a result of the war, one should expect an expedited fast-
track of membership request but on the contrary, Georgia's NATO membership bid has 'froze' as a result of
the war, with no clear membership prospects in the near future.4
As recently as June 2014, NATO announced
that Georgia would not be invited to take part in the Membership Action Plan, a decisive step towards
membership.5
Directly after the war and perhaps as a consequent of it, the then Russian president, Dmitry
Medvedev outlined a new five-point doctrine in what later became known as the 'Medvedev doctrine' in
September 2008, the third of which cited at the beginning of this paper promises to 'defend its citizens
abroad and retain privileged interests in the CIS region', but in reality this extends beyond the CIS to include
the Baltics and Ukraine as well as former Soviet states. This is to later develop into a full-fledged pillar and
2 Roy Allison, 'Coercing Georgia to Peace', International Affairs, 84.6, (October 2008), p. 171.
3 Ibid.
4 Bertil Nygren, 'Russia and Georgia – From Confrontation to War', in Roger Kanet Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st
Century,
Palgrave Macmillan (2011), p. 111.
5 Ibid.

3. CHEUNG, Thanakorn Professor Marie Mendras Russian Politics – Sciences Po
cornerstone of Russian foreign policy giving her 'special right' to intervene on non-Russian soil in the name
of citizens protection as published in Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020, approved in 2010.6
Nonetheless this doctrine was largely reflected even during the Georgian war where Moscow's policy of
'passportisation' gave her a pretext and a justification to interfere to protect 'Russian citizens' of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia.7
This was to occur again in the Crimea in 2014 but on a largely propagandistic scale
as will be illustrated later. The previous analysis regarding Georgia illustrate that Russia and the Kremlin in
particular has refused to come to term with the fact that their former 'brotherly Soviet nations' have full
sovereignty and can act independently of Moscow. Due to a large part of the Russian mentality and the
Russian political language, states that were former member of the USSR are viewed not as a separate entity,
therefore they are not 'foreign lands' but instead countries that are 'nearby to foreign lands' and thus called
the 'Near Abroad'.8
This notion was further strengthened by the fact that citizens of the CIS did not need an
international passport to travel between their borders, only an 'internal' identification piece would suffice, this
is still the case today even with the Ukraine where despite after the Crimean crisis, citizens of both countries
can still travel on an internal passport. However an international passport and visa were required to visit the
Baltic states since 1991, despite this fact they still remain termed as the 'Near Abroad'. This discourse has in
turn affected the Russian view of 'foreign policy', given that these states are not really 'foreign', they are not
treated in such ways despite bilateral and multi-lateral agreements Russia signed with them.9
They are de
facto treated on a somewhat different tier of 'domestic' policy, thus her dealings in the Georgia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan are hardly considered foreign policy by the Kremlin.
This idea is perhaps best illustrated by Sovietologist, Alfred Rieber's 'persistent factors' in which the
idea of porous frontiers have always featured heavily in Russian foreign policy ever since the Tsarist era
when the borders kept contracting. The experience of the Russian Revolution where Russia first lost Finland,
the Baltics, and Poland could be said to have plagued the Russian notion of border security when these
countries turned aggressive and hostile towards her Bolshevik regime during the 1920s. The regime later
suffered an invasion of Russia proper by foreign troops who aided the Whites, that increased the average
Russian distrust towards outside power as well as hastened the need for her to build a strong border of her
own. This hard-line policy was deployed during the Brezhnev era with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 to ensure that ideologically 'correct' regimes stayed bordered to her. The
collapse of the USSR was also partly attributed to unsecured and porous border where dissent was able to
flourish and later spread to the republics of the USSR (the Estonian SSR was able to receive Finnish
airwaves and influence given the close proximity and cooperation the ESSR had with Finland, ironically
Estonians who shared the same anthem as Finland were able to listen to their 'banned' anthem on the radio,
contributing to a greater sense of national identity). Hence, in this regards, it is understandable why Putin's
foreign policy places a strong emphasis on secured borders and a 'domesticated Near Abroad'. 'Nothing
agitates Russian security policy more than an absence of strategic frontiers', according to Professor Robert
Legvold of Columbia University.10
6 Agnia Grigas, 'Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States', Chatham House, (August, 2014), p.8.
7 Ibid, p. 9.
8 Rywkin, 'An Adventure to Restore the Empire', p. 99.
9 Alfred Rieber, 'How Persistent are the Persistent Factors?' in Robert Legvold Russian Foreign Policy of the Twenty First Century,
(New York, 2012), pp. 226-228.
10 Ibid.

4. CHEUNG, Thanakorn Professor Marie Mendras Russian Politics – Sciences Po
Given the Kremlin's largely anachronistic take on 'power' laid during the Westphalian peace treaty in
1648, that according to her is determined by large states maintaining the status quo in the world order.11
The
ruling class still sees it as Russia's duty, obligation and almost as if by divine providence to return as one of
the principal guardian of the world order.12
Vladimir Putin himself wishes to restore Russia as an independent
international actor at a world stage. With such thinking, it is thus not difficult to see why the primary object of
Russia's most active foreign policy is the Near Abroad. The Kremlin understands that while she is the sole
power that mattered in the global stage in the post-Soviet space, the space itself is a complex arena where
great powers play themselves out since the day of 'The Great Game' of the Tsarist era.13
On the other hand,
the Kremlin has not come to term with the irreversibility of the changes in geopolitics. While Moscow lashes
out in her propaganda war on American hegemony and imperialism, she often ignores that the world has
new players on the global stage, primarily China and to a lesser extent the BRICS have arose in the past two
decades. According to her worldview shaped by 20th
century Slavophile thinking, she sees herself as the sole
contender to the US and Western liberalism in Samuel Huntington's 'Clashes of Civilisation' term, thus the
need to regain her former superpower status.14
Her refusal to make peace with the loss of an empire proves
to be a stumbling bloc in her pursuit of foreign policy as she holds onto those former states given the close
'historical, cultural and economic' ties, oftentimes without their consent. At the same time, this Kremlin
thinking paradoxically undermines the political, economic and civilisational independence of the very states
she were supposed to 'safeguard'.15
The Eastern Partnership Initiative that began in 2009 which drew six former Soviet republics to the
south and west of Russia for 'further' corporation with the EU greatly hastened the preparation of the largely
Russian led Eurasian Economic Union, an idea proposed by Nazarbayev since 1994 but only recently picked
up by Putin when circumstances suited him. While countries such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia has
largely 'escaped' the Russian orbit due to their geographical proximity to continental Europe (albeit with great
difficulties) and signed the EU Association Agreement, countries such as Armenia and Belarus have found it
harder to escape the Russian grip due to their overt military and political dependence on Russia (not that
there is a political or popular will in Belarus to detach herself from Russia). Armenia who was presented with
an option of opting for either trade bloc was bullied into ‘requesting’ the membership of the Eurasian
Economic Union (EaEU) in September 2013, largely in the same fashion the Baltic States 'requested' to join
the USSR in 1940. Despite the grand narrative often associated with the foundation of such associations or
unions, the EaEU remains a largely 'hollow' organisation with members who are wary of Russian actions. In
relative terms, the trade figures remain minuscule and contradictory to what Putin envisioned it to be. The
junior partner of the organisation; Kazakhstan, has an economy with a huge potential but is yet to be
developed. The EaEU is therefore an attempt to appear 'strong' through numerical strength (the number of
members) and her sheer geographical size.
This attempt to stop the Near Abroad going westwards did not stop with Armenia; Kyrgyzstan who
since the Tulip revolution of 2005 enjoyed the 'freest form of democracy' anywhere in the CIS was again
11 Mankoff, Jeffrey, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman & Littlefield (Maryland, 2011), p.7.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, p.11.
14 Ibid, p.12.
15 Ibid, p.27.

5. CHEUNG, Thanakorn Professor Marie Mendras Russian Politics – Sciences Po
'forced' into the EaEU despite the unfavourable tariffs on her trade. Since the War on Terror, Kyrgyzstan has
become one of America's most important ally in the region, with the airfield at Manas rented out for the use of
US forces, and her education largely modelled on the American system. The republic has recently had a
change of heart and 'politely' requested that the US leave her territory and looked increasingly towards
Moscow.16
Though Kyrgyzstan somewhat remains an anomaly given her liberal politics after the collapse of
the USSR and the Tulip Revolution where Russian is still an official language and ties with Russia warmly
cherished, to the extent that many in the Kremlin policy-making circle consider it to be part of the Russian
Federation, where it is joked that 'Putin is more popular in Bishkek than in Russia'.17
Only in Kyrgyzstan
would those seeking high-political office visit Moscow to obtain 'official' Kremlin blessings, to the point that
the Kyrgyz Electoral Commission having to ban posters of Presidential candidates taken with Putin and
Medvedev in 2011.18
But the 'unequivocal' attachment the country has for Russia is unquestioned.
The Kyrgyz scenario is an important illustration into Russia's other mean of pressuring the former
republics and it is by far Russia's most successful mean of 'soft power'.19
While biopolitics may be harder to
term and quantify due to the difficulty of pinpointing who exactly constitute a 'Russian' in the former republics,
Moscow uses this fact to her advantage and devote a large sphere of her foreign policy at mobilising those
she calls as 'compatriots' to undermine and pressurise the former republics.20
Compatriots are ethnic
'Russians' who may hold citizenships of states that were former members of the USSR. Due to the dispersal
of ethnic Russians due to the favourable treatment by the power structure during Soviet time, the collapse of
the Soviet Union found millions in newly independent states. Though many have returned to the Russian
Federation due to the violence that occurred as a result of the breakup from Central Asia to the Caucasus,
others chose to stay due to varying circumstances ranging from not having links to the Russian Federation.
While many became 'full' citizens in their new respective republics, many 'remain' Russian.2122
The Kremlin is
convinced that many 'compatriots' of hers possess some sort of loyalty for their 'Motherland' through the
'unsuccessful' integration attempts of ethnic Russians and thus crafted a policy out of it. Organisations such
as the Russkiy Mir Foundation and the Rossotrudnichestvo aim at mobilising the compatriots, distilling in
them a greater sense of belonging to the Motherland through highly subsidised linguistic and cultural
activities. While such organisations are aimed at ethnic Russians, they are opened to a wider pro-Kremlin
public as well.23
Take Estonian social scientist, Marju Lauristin's study of 'Russian-Estonians' who constitute
a quarter of the population. While 21% of those ethnic Russians have become 'Westernised' (mainly the
younger generation) and displayed traits of good citizenship, knowledge of Estonian, trusting of state's
authority and considering themselves to be part of the wider Estonian community, and another 13% who are
16 Alexey Malashenko, The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia, Canergie, (Washington D.C., 2013), p. 136.
17 Ibid, p. 137.
18 Ibid.
19 For the sake of simplicity, the Kyrgyz will be incorporated into the 'compatriots' category due to their highly successful integration
during the Soviet period and their high communicability of Russian.
20 Philipp Casula, 'The road to Crimea: Putin's Foreign Policy Between Reason of State, Sovereignty, and Bio-Politics', Russian
Analytical Digest, 148 (May, 2014).
21 The Russian nationality law allowed up until 2002 for former citizens of the USSR to apply for Russian nationality, despite living
outside the border.
22 For an example, you may have an ethnic Russian who was born in Chita Oblast but lived in the Estonian SSR since his youth, who
became Estonian upon independence due to his ability to speak the Estonian language while at the same time his wife, who was
born in Archangelsk Oblast but did not speak Estonian 'retained' her Russian citizenship.
23 I have experienced this first hand at the International Seliger Youth Forum where pro-Kremlin youth from the former satellites and
Communist states gather for pro-Kremlin narratives. My Czech colleague at the event termed them as 'sheeps' who are so willing
to be 'guided' by the great shepherd.

6. CHEUNG, Thanakorn Professor Marie Mendras Russian Politics – Sciences Po
integrated but are critical of the Estonian government.24
A large majority has not been successfully integrated
and a half of these majority are downright aggressive to Estonian authority who are readily happy to believe
Russian media while the other half are socially passive but still trustful of the Russian media. Through such
divide, Moscow is able to 'insert' pro-Russia if not pro-Kremlin party into local politics, providing them with a
lobby for support within the European Union. For an example, the recent 2010 Estonian Parliamentary
Election, the Keskeerakond (a pro-Russia party) won a quarter of parliamentary seats while the Mayor of
Tallinn is likewise from the same party. The picture is similarly reflected in Latvia with the Saskana party
whose majority in parliament despite being on the opposition was greatly illustrated during the 2012
constitutional referendum draft in introducing Russian as Latvia's second national language. Though it was
turned down, the readiness of the Russian propaganda media to frame Latvia as a 'fascistic' regime and
'violator of human rights'.25
Such a move by Russia raised great concerns in Tallinn and Riga since their
country's large Russian minority might provide another pretext for 'assistance'.26
This concern of former Soviet republics was further heightened during the annexation of Crimea in
March 2014. An event that put the final nail in the coffin of Russian international isolation and consequently
ended the Kremlin's ambition of gaining any permanent and sincere cooperation in the post-Soviet space.
Firstly the pretext that it was done 'legally' and that it was done in order to save 'Russian citizens' by the
'fascist regime' in Kiev.27
Though it is true that the interim government in Kiev may have overstepped her
power in many regards, the fact that the Russian State Duma has circumvented their own Constitutional Law
№.6-FKZ to rubber-stamp the re-integration of the Crimea itself raises questions of double-standards. Prior
to the Crimean crisis, Transdniester breakaway republic in Moldova held at least two referenda to join the
Russian Federation that has only been met with a cold dismiss despite many holding Russian citizenship. On
the issue of Russian citizenship, the passportisation was done solely for the purpose of propaganda with
insider's account stating that as little as 80 Russian passports were given out in the Crimea during the crisis,
and eight months after the 're-integration' into Russia, only around 800 were given out with the majority of
'citizens' still waiting for their passports. Despite this fact, during Kuchma's Ukraine it is widely known that
Crimean residents have been provided with Russian passports on a huge scale, though this scale is
unknown and uncertain and if this fact illustrates anything, it is that Russia does not really abide by laws that
she always proclaim to go by but that she does what is necessary in her views and would act in everyway to
achieve it.
The annexation had great ramifications with her Near Abroad and shook the other two members of
the troika who run the EaEU to the core. Kazakhstan with her northern Russian enclaves militarised her
border with Russia 'secretly' during the Crimean Crisis with Astana having placed her armed forces on high
alert. It was rumoured that Nazarbayev spent three weeks in the Military High Command monitoring the
situation. Immediately as a result, Nazarbayev announced the 550th
anniversary of Kazakh 'nationhood'
despite the fact that the nation let alone the country did not exist before the Soviet authority demarcated the
24 Katja Koort, 'The Russians of Estonia: Twenty Years After', World Affairs.
25 Grigas, 'Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power', p.10.
26 Having been stationed in the Baltic capital of Tallinn myself in 2014-2015, it is extremely unlikely that this scenario will occur.
Because even the most economically unstable Russian family in Estonia will not support a Russian intervention. Narva-Ivangorod
crossing is one of the best virtual evidence of this. Despite Narva being 98% ethnically Russian, fewer than 1% of the population
support a Crimean style scenario since they could see the economic misery as a result of sanction first hand in Ivangorod.
27 Casula, 'The road to Crimea'.

7. CHEUNG, Thanakorn Professor Marie Mendras Russian Politics – Sciences Po
Kazakh SSR in 1936. Nonetheless the move illustrate the thinkings of the Kazakh elites who are now turning
inwards as a result of the Kremlin's rash behaviour. Nazarbayev and Lukashenko also agreed as a result of
Crimea to limit cooperation of the EaEU to the sphere of economic as they are unwilling to concede anymore
autonomy to an organisation largely run by Russia. In the end, even their closest allies are turning away from
them.
Moscow, like a divorced man is looking for the comfort he knew in the seven decades of 'ups and
downs' with his ex-wife and children he has recently lost. While trying to gain some form of closure and
influence over his lost loves, he fails to understand the fact that his former spouse and children have largely
moved on. Blinded by past happiness, he acts irrationally and in a drunken behaviour to 'coerce' them back
to their former happiness and unity, only to realise after his actions that he is driving them away further. He
does this, only to show that other family in the great white house that he too has a great and happy family.
The two remaining daughters in the house are largely grown up and are starting to act independently on their
own, it will not be long before one of his most cherished daughter leave to pursue her own happiness.
Nonetheless he can remain with the comforting notion that his youngest daughter will not leave her dear old
father beyond the wooden fence of their crumbling dacha.
References:
Allison, Roy, 'Coercing Georgia to Peace', International Affairs, 84.6, (October 2008), pp. 1145-1171.
Bebler, Anton, 'Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict', Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 15.1 (March, 2015).
Cheung, Thanakorn, 'The Ukraine Crisis: An Estonian Perspective', Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, (March 2015).
Casula, Philipp, 'The road to Crimea: Putin's Foreign Policy Between Reason of State, Sovereignty, and Bio-Politics', Russian
Analytical Digest, 148 (May, 2014).
Grigas, Agnia, 'Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States', Chatham House, (August, 2014).
Koort, Katja, 'The Russians of Estonia: Twenty Years After', World Affairs, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/russians-
estonia-twenty-years-after, (July, 2014).
Lo, Bobo, Russia and the New World Order, Brookings Press, (Washington D.C. 2015)
Лукьянов, Феодор, 'Россия в глобальной политике', conference speech, (March 2014).
Malashenko, Alexey, The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia, Canergie, (Washington D.C., 2013).
Mankoff, Jeffrey, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman & Littlefield (Maryland, 2011)
Mendras, Marie, "Russia and the Quest for Lost Power", in Jacques Rupnik, ed., 1989 as a Political World Event: Democracy,
Europe and the New International System in the Age of Globalization, Routledge, (London, 2013).
Nygren, Bertil, 'Russia and Georgia – From Confrontation to War', in Roger Kanet Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st
Century,
Palgrave Macmillan (2011.)

8. CHEUNG, Thanakorn Professor Marie Mendras Russian Politics – Sciences Po
Pynnöniemi, Katri, 'Russian Thinking in the Ukraine Crisis: From Drawing a Line of Defence to Seeing a Threat to National
Security', The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 140, (September 2014).
Rieber, Alfred, 'How Persistent are the Persistent Factors?' in Robert Legvold Russian Foreign Policy of the Twenty First
Century, (New York, 2012).
Rywkin, Michael, 'An Adventure to Restore the Empire', American Foreign Policy Interests, 37.2, (May, 2015), pp. 95-99.