These slides about the Case study the Boeing Commercial Airline Group. They have significant innovations: Technology and its Influenced interactions among people and disciplines

1. The Boeing Commercial Airline Group:
Design Process Evolution
PRESENTED BY: Tayyaba Latif

2. Introduction
“Our Successful history has been characterized by an entrepreneurial spirit,
fueled by a passion for producing jet aircraft that safely fly higher, farther and
faster. We have been able to effectively translate that passion into integrated
product designs and production processes. Our focus on activities that
ultimately benefit our customers has allowed us to hold the lead position in
the industry, but we cannot take our market prominence for granted.
In the recent past we adopted several innovations in order to ensure that we
stay focused on the customer, that we design and build with a shared vision
using lean processes, that we function as a set of a smaller integrated
businesses rather than as isolated bureaucracies, and that our employees
innovate on the job continuously. As you know we are meeting this morning
to review two of these innovations in particularly, 1) Computer aided design
and 2) Design build teams.”

3. Cont.
• In early 1995, senior officials at the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group’s
headquarters in Seattle, Washington found themselves engaged in a
strategic review regarding design technology and organization structure
• The upcoming delivery of the first 777 commercial jet provided an
opportune time to review lessons learned regarding innovative efforts and
how to make them an integral part of the Boeing organization
• The pressure from customers to deliver more value in less time would be a
permanent characteristic of the market
• Two significant innovations:
– Technology
– Influenced interactions among people and disciplines

4. Cont.
• The goal for these innovations had been to reduce costly
‘change, errors and rework,’ which historically had added cost
and delayed delivery to airline customers
• Boeing officials felt that this goal had been accomplished on
the 777

5. THE 777 COMMERCIAL JETLINER
• In 1990, Boeing began to work toward the introduction of a new
jetliner product family
• There was a need within the company, and in the global market, for
a new model
• The company’s largest competitors had launched new design
programs that had the potential to threaten Boeing’s market share
• Market research indicated that the greatest unmet need in the
passenger jetliner market was for a medium- to large-capacity (300
to 400 passengers) airplane with a medium- to long-range distance
(5000 to 8000 miles) capability

6. The Business Environment for Commercial
Airframe Manufacturers
• Deregulation of the commercial airline industry had created a
highly competitive environment
• Airlines struggled to stay profitable as competition forced extensive
cost-cutting in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s
• Airline companies with long histories disappeared entirely (Pan Am,
Western, Braniff), and some newcomers such as People Express
experienced extremely short lives
• According to Phil Condit, the Boeing Company President, “Our
biggest competition is not from other airframe manufacturers but
from the planes we sold 20 years ago.”

7. Cost as an Order-Winner
• The airline industry had become extremely sensitive to cost
• The product life cycle had moved commercial airplanes from a differentiated
market toward a price-sensitive commodity market
• Boeing needed to offer a product that was available at an attractive price, and
that was less expensive
• Boeing designed the 777 with only two engines instead of the previously more
typical three or four
• The 777 cockpit was designed to require only two pilot operators
• An extra-wide wing-span promoted fuel economy, adding to the plane’s
attractiveness in a cost-based market
• Boeing officials anticipated that its range, flexibility, efficiency, and comfort
would attract customers away from models made by Airbus and McDonnell
Douglas

8. PRODUCT BACKGROUND
• Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, a division of the Boeing Company, was
the world’s largest airframe manufacturer in 1995.
• The enterprise held 60 percent of the global market for commercial jets in
1994, with annual sales averaging $19 billion between 1988 and 1993
• its ability Boeing held an important competitive advantage in the
commercial airplane market: to effectively orchestrate a large-scale,
globally- dispersed development and manufacturing system.
• This was an important capability, given that the design and production of
commercial jet aircraft required cooperation among thousands of people
located in all 50 of the United States and in 23 countries

9. Table 1. Summary of Financial and Employment
Data for the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group:
1977-1994
Year Sales ($) Operational Return on Number of R&D
(millions) Profit Assets Employees* Expense*
(millions) (millions)

10. Cont.
• During the company’s nearly 80-year history it had produced a successful series of
commercial jet families, including the 707, 727, 737, 747, 757, and 767.
• The 777 was the most recent addition to the company’s product mix
• A range of configuration types was offered within each of these families
• The family strategy was considered to be highly successful, based on the company’s
profitability and continuing domination of the market
• Boeing’s series of airplane families had been a commercial success.
• The 737, with its orientation toward small, short-haul markets, was the company’s most
popular model.
• The 747 jumbo jet, which could accommodate up to 400 passengers, had become Boeing’s
most profitable model.
• This history of market achievement had put Boeing in a strong cash position, allowing it the
financial capability to embark upon the development of the new 777 jetliner family in the
early 1990s

12. Historical Perspective on the Design Process at
Boeing
• Prior to its entry into the commercial jet market in 1957, the Boeing
Company was small enough to operate substantially at one location on
East Marginal Way in Seattle
• Design engineers worked in large ‘bull- pen’ rooms, with desks crowded
closely together
• Drawing boards were located in numerous places throughout the work
area.
• Primary engineering specialties at that time included: preliminary design,
structures, aerodynamics, weights, systems, and crew station. Employees
within each of these design functions clustered together on a single floor
• Formal meetings to resolve design questions were rare

13. Cont.
• The employees often were assigned temporarily to work with
designers outside their reporting function to satisfy needs for
cross- functional representation
• According to John Swihart, who retired in 1989 as Corporate
Vice President for International Affairs and had been involved
in many of Boeing’s design programs: “We didn’t really need to
label a working group as a ‘cross-functional team’ -- people just
pitched-in and went where their expertise was needed.”

14. Mock-ups
• The company used physical mock-ups to assess geometric
relationships between the systems and structures components
of an airplane
• A typical mock-up was made from inexpensive materials such
as wood, metal, and plastic, and did not necessarily involve
materials that would be used in the final product
• The most significant outcome of the mock-up process was in
the resolution of incompatibilities between structures and
systems

15. The Beginning of Specialization
• As the company expanded its sales and employment base, it outgrew its facilities
on Seattle’s East Marginal Way
• In the late 1950’s, engineering, marketing, and sales personnel were moved from
the Boeing corporate headquarters location in on East Marginal Way in Seattle to
the company’s Renton facility, located about 10 miles away
• Final assembly of the 707 product line was performed in Renton, as well, but
some subassembly and fabrication work continued at the Seattle plant
• As Boeing’s product mix and sales volumes grew in the 1960’s and 1970’s, it
became necessary to further diversify the engineering function
• As the company grew, and as airplanes became technologically more complex,
these deficiencies led to increasing numbers of errors and resulting change
orders

16. Product Development Time
• Development times and human resource hours varied across
airplane families, and had grown over time
• Table 3, drawn from Boeing Company archives, shows the
figures for the planes that were in production through 1994.
• These data represent the elapsed time for initial development
for each model, and do not include time spent on design
extensions

18. Innovations Supporting the 777 Development
Process
• The 777 design program provided Boeing with an opportunity to
rectify many of the problems that had emerged during its product
development history
• In response to the need for change, the company implemented two
complementary innovations: 1) a digitally-based design system and
2) cross-functional design/build teams known as ‘DBT’s’
• According to George Broady, who had been Chief Engineer for
Airframe Design and Integration on the 777 design program, “ We
brought together people who had never met before and gave them
tools that previously had not been available”

19. Cont.
• The goal of these two innovations was captured in the Boeing
DBT operations manual:
• “Major parts of the strategy for improving our method of
operation involve incorporating information relative to
producibility, reliability, and maintainability into our designs
earlier in the program, thereby releasing more accurate, more
complete, and more integrated designs.”

20. Digital Design
• Several computing tools were acquired and developed to support the 777
digital design effort.
• The centerpiece of the system, known as CATIA, was developed by Dassault
Systems of France, a firm with significant presence in the European
defense industry.
• Boeing had reviewed several computer-aided design (CAD) systems, but
chose CATIA because it had been used successfully in several pilot
programs, and because of its superior capabilities in three-dimensional
design
• In 1989, Boeing entered into a joint venture with the IBM Corporation,
which licensed CATIA in the U.S., to develop a software system for
commercial airplane design processes

21. Cont.
• Boeing developed in-house several extensions of CATIA which aided the digital
design process.
• Three of these, EPIC, CLASH, and FLYTHRU, enhanced the visibility of
interferences by allowing the designer to take a virtual ‘ride’ through a 3-
dimensional image of the interior of a design component
• The introduction of computer-generated human images enabled designers to
assess the ergonomics and capacity of a work-space within an airplane section
• Digital design tools also had the ability to support information exchange across
geographically dispersed design locations in the U.S., Canada, Europe, and Japan
• With CATIA, the Mylar sheets and drawing boards no longer were seen as being
necessary because designers located at multiple sites could simultaneously
view the same drawing on their own computer screens

22. Cont.
• Another advantage of the digital design process was in the
elimination of the physical mock-up phase in the new product
development cycle
• The digital design system was expected to reduce the numbers
of changes and errors by 50%
• The digital design system was seen as a real advancement
because of its potential to save time and reduce errors

23. Design-Build Teams
• In parallel with the adoption of 100% digital design, Boeing made another
significant change: the implementation of a cross-functional team
structure for the 777 development program
• The 777 seemed to provide the opportunity they needed for testing an
integrative, concurrent approach that would link designers, builders, and
tooling specialists
• In 1990, a massive effort was undertaken to form these design teams, most
of which were co-located.
• Initial co-location was at the company’s Renton facility, but in 1992 the
group was moved to the Everett facility
• DBT#1 was co-led by a representative from design engineering and a
representative from manufacturing engineering in the chart:

25. Cont.
• At the lowest levels of the organization's network of DBT’s,
each team included a core group of designers who worked on
CATIA stations and interacted on a daily basis.
• These teams were functionally specialized and did not include
significant cross- disciplinary representation

26. Putting it All Together
• The simultaneous development of a new product, employment of a new
computer-aided design technology, and conversion to a team structure created
many challenges for Boeing
• The total cost of implementing and operating CATIA and related systems was
difficult to assess with complete accuracy, but hardware, software, and training
expenses exceeded the company’s original estimates by a fairly large margin
• Boeing officials felt that the system would more than pay for itself over time
• Some of the payoff would be realized in the longer-term because the digital
design technology would permit Boeing engineers to continue to be
geographically dispersed, and to quickly create error-free customized
configurations as new orders came in
• Additionally, ‘lessons learned’ on the 777 would reduce startup costs as the
design technology was transferred to existing and new airplane families

27. Was It Worth It?
• As the first commercially-available 77711 rolled out onto the
runway and soared into the sky on its way to customer delivery in
May of 1995, Boeing officials were in the midst of an analysis of
lessons learned from this complex new undertaking
• According to Larry Olson, Director of Computing, change, errors,
and rework -- the pre- eminent measure of success -- had shown a
60 to 90% improvement over previous design efforts
• In spite of this success, the company had concerns about the
process and felt that the lessons from the effort would require
serious review prior to the extension of 777 methods to other
airplane programs

28. Cont.
• Major problem areas were described as follows:
– Career Path Issues
– Performance Evaluation and Incentives
– Learning to Work Together
– Discontinuities in Team Membership
– Manufacturing Input
– Design Rework
– Tool Engineering
– Proliferation of Teams

29. Limitations of Digital Design
• Some experienced engineers questioned whether it was possible to
develop “big picture” conceptual designs on a small computer
screen and suggested that drawing boards were still needed to
support innovative team activity in early design stages
• Some designers noted that although CATIA and its supporting
design programs provided excellent tools for identifying
interferences they were not as effective in highlighting gaps
• training several thousand employees to effectively use the CATIA
hardware and software was a bigger challenge than the company
had expected

30. MOVING FORWARD
• An analysis of digital design and cross-functional teams on the 777
revealed both strengths and weaknesses.
• In the words of Don Fudge, 777 Manufacturing Engineering
Manager, “Although the 777 design process did not achieve all that
it could have, it still was the most effective and efficient production
definition endeavor that the Boeing Company has ever
undertaken”
• However, it was clear that if the company were to elect to expand
these innovations into other product lines it would benefit from
lessons learned on the 777.