1. HAS THE NSA POISONED
THE CLOUD?
Steven Titch
INTRODUCTION
T
he U.S. technology industry enters 2014 facing a
backlash to its perceived role as accomplice to a series
of National Security Agency surveillance programs,
each making extensive use of data mining to parse bil-
lions of consumer telephone, Internet and computer records
in what now appears to have been an ineffective effort to
track international terrorists.
Recent analysis projects the caution and mistrust engen-
dered by the NSA’s programs could cost U.S. technology
industry between $35 billion and $180 billion over the next
three years. Widespread NSA spying is unsettling because its
hits at the current focal point of communications and com-
puter innovation—cloud computing. Effective protection
of privacy and security is best managed by regulating the
activities of government, as opposed to the utility of Inter-
net services.
RECENT NSA SPYING REVELATIONS
PRISM, the NSA electronic surveillance program with the
most notoriety, was created in 2007, ostensibly under the
authorization of the Protect America Act and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Its activities have been
overseen by the FISA Court, an independent judicial arm set
up by FISA to determine persons and agencies who could be
targeted for surveillance.
The PRISM program remained secret until June 2013, when
news broke that the FISA Court had ordered Verizon Com-
munications to provide the NSA data on all customer tele-
phone calls on an ongoing daily basis.1
Days later, the Wash-
ington Post and the United Kingdom’s Guardian published
NSAdocumentsleakedtothembyEdwardSnowden,anNSA
contractor who claimed to have grown concerned over the
scope of the spying program.2
Snowden’s revelations revealed the NSA has been capturing
and mining massive amounts of private U.S. telecommuni-
cations and Internet traffic generated by ordinary citizens
in an attempt to gain intelligence primarily on international
terrorism, and that the program had further expanded to
support investigations into narcotics trafficking, the inter-
nal security of foreign countries and to obtain military and
political data on foreign countries, including U.S. allies.
Throughout the remainder of 2013, we learned that PRISM
was just one of several programs aimed at intercepting and
analyzing routine communications of not only of American
citizens, but foreign nationals, as well, ranging from ordinary
consumers to heads of state.
Some of the details of the NSA electronic spying include:
• Collecting “metadata” on millions of wireless
phone calls. Metadata describes information such as
the calling and called numbers, location of the callers,
R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 17
January 2014
1. Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily – Top Secret Court Order Requiring Verizon to Hand Over All Call Data Shows
Scale of Domestic Surveillance under Obama,” The Guardian, June 5, 2013, available
at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court-order.
2. Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, “U.S., British intelligence mining data
from nine U.S. Internet companies in broad secret program,” The Washington
Post, June 7, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/
us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.
CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Recent NSA spying revelations 1
Legal, legislative and economic fallout 2
Implications for cloud computing 3
Industry backlash 4
Potential solutions 5
About the author 6
R STREET POLICY STUDY: 2014 HAS THE NSA POISONED THE CLOUD? 1

2. duration of the call, and other information pertaining
to the call other than the actual contents of the con-
versation.
• Monitoring emails and social media for “keywords”
that might signal terrorist or criminal activity. Among
other methods, the NSA tapped directly into private
networks owned by Google and Yahoo—an operation
dubbed MUSCULAR—reportedly without the knowl-
edge or consent of the companies.
• The development of algorithms designed to use the
Internet to connect to and gather information from
personal computers without knowledge of the users.
• Tapping phones of world leaders, such as German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, a U.S. ally.
• A plan to use the Internet to turn on embedded per-
sonal computer web cameras without user knowledge
or consent.
• A $10-million contract with RSA, a major supplier
of security software to Internet infrastructure manu-
facturers, to secretly install software on Internet rout-
ers and servers that could decode encrypted data.3
• The NSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit, which
developed a special computer code, known colloquially
to programmers as “back doors,” that defeat firewalls
designed to protect private data. The program target-
ed Internet infrastructure from major manufacturers
such as Cisco Systems, Juniper Networks, Huawai and
Dell.
The NSA used common Web advertising tracking programs,
called “cookies,” to follow user surfing habits and determine
whether they should be targeted for further hacking.
The data of a large number of U.S. companies – including
Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Apple – was used by
the PRISM program, sometimes with their knowledge and
consent, and sometimes without it.
The disclosures show no sign of letting up. As this paper
went to publication, reports emerged that the NSA, in a pro-
gram called Quantum, had implanted radio transmitters in
some 100,000 personal computers around the world. Using
radio, the NSA was able to access and spy on these PCs even
when they were not connected to the Internet.
LEGAL, LEGISLATIVE AND ECONOMIC FALLOUT
TheweightandscopeoftheNSAprogramshassparkedheat-
ed debate over their legality and constitutionality. Last year
closed with two conflicting court decisions on the constitu-
tionality of the PRISM program. On Dec. 16, 2013 in Wash-
ington D.C., Federal District Court Richard J. Leon ruled that
the NSA’s systematic recordkeeping of all Americans’ phone
calls most likely violated the Constitution. He ordered the
government to stop collecting data on two plaintiffs’ per-
sonal calls and to destroy the records of their calling history.4
Eleven days later, however, a federal judge in New York, Wil-
liam H. Pauley III, ruled the same data collection legal, set-
ting up an eventual appellate court battle.5
Congress’ 2014 session got underway with the introduction
of a bill from Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., that would restruc-
ture the NSA’s phone metadata surveillance program. More
recently, on Jan. 17, President Barack Obama announced
steps to curtail the NSA’s surveillance programs, but stopped
well short of suspending them.
Obama announced the government would no longer main-
tain a database of millions of Americans’ telephone records,
which had been conducted under the auspices of Section 215
of the Patriot Act, but said telecommunications companies
or an independent third party could continue to maintain
that data, and did not rule out mandating that companies
do so. The president also said the White House would not
support the FISA Improvements Act, which would codify
into law the NSA’s authority to conduct many of its existing
surveillance programs, as well as endorsing creating a role
for independent advocates at the FISA court and conducting
an annual review of the court’s declassification decisions.
He also appointed John Podesta to lead a review of privacy
issues that affect non-suspects, called for a higher standard
for surveillance of foreign leaders and proposed ending per-
manent gag orders for National Security Letters
However, he did not call for an end to international surveil-
lance of Internet communications under Section 702 of the
FISA Amendments Act, nor did he rescind Executive Order
12333, which permits surveillance of overseas communica-
tions. He also did not take up the review panel’s recommen-
dation that National Security Letters only be issued after
judicial review, nor their recommendation against sabotag-
ing private encryption technology. While it remains to be
seen what legal and legislative remedies will be applied in
2014, there is already concern that the NSA programs will do
significant economic damage to the U.S. technology sector.
4. Charlie Savage, “Federal Judge Rules Against NSA Program,” The New York Times,
Dec. 16, 2013,
5. Adam Liptak and Michael S. Schmidt, “Judge Upholds N.S.A.’s Bulk Collection of
Data on Calls,” The New York Times, Dec. 27, 2013.
3. Joseph Menn, “Exclusive: Secret Contract Tied NSA and Security Industry Pioneer,”
Reuters, Dec. 20, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-
usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220.
R STREET POLICY STUDY: 2014 HAS THE NSA POISONED THE CLOUD? 2

3. The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
(ITIF), a research institute that aims to promote public pol-
icies that advance technological innovation and productiv-
ity, estimates international concern and mistrust of U.S. tech
companies could cost the industry between $21.5 billion and
$35 billion through 2016. This is based on the assumption
that the industry loses 20 percent of its current foreign mar-
ket share, while retaining its projected domestic share.6
ITIF’spredictionsalreadymaybecomingtrue.CitingDefense
News, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the United
Arab Emirates may cancel a $926 million purchase of two
spy satellites from France unless two U.S.-made components
are removed from the product. Those components allegedly
contain digital “backdoors” that could allow unauthorized
access to data sent to the U.A.E.’s ground station.7
Elsewhere, John Henry Clippinger, ID3 executive director at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab, told
an interviewer: “What people do not appreciate is the eco-
nomic damage…that the NSA has done to the cloud comput-
ing business for the U.S.” He noted a number of European
banks no longer want to host data in the United States and
that Salesforce.com, which provides highly sensitive cloud-
based sales leads and customer information, has lost a major
client.8
Salesforce.com’s CEO has felt the need to publicly
state that it was not part of the PRISM program.9
It appears
the NSA’s aggressive surveillance has created an overall fear
among U.S. companies that there is “guilt by association”
from which they need to proactively distance themselves.
A more alarming figure comes from Forrester Research,
which provides analysis for financial firms and investors.
Forrester analyst James Staten cited the ITIF report, but
suggested its estimates are too conservative. Staten set
the potential global industry cost of PRISM at $180 billion
worldwide by 2016—the same time period ITIF uses. Staten
believes international buyers—particularly governments and
large corporations that are already sensitive to surveillance—
will be spooked enough by the NSA program that they will
throttle back their development of cloud computing technol-
ogy altogether.10
IMPLICATIONS FOR CLOUD COMPUTING
Although the term is literally nebulous to the layman, the
definition is quite simple. The “cloud” refers to the Internet
at large. Cloud computing refers to information processing
and storage done on the Internet, not on a home computer
or cellphone, as was standard until a few years ago. Cloud
computing makes it possible for users to, for example, access
playlists and movies from multiple devices, because that con-
tent is stored on servers in data centers that could be any-
where in the world.
That’s just one example. Services like Google’s Gmail and
Yahoo’s calendar are cloud-based, too. Social networks like
Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram and Twitter use cloud com-
puting to deliver information across their billions of users.
Cloud computing has enable many users to now carry light-
weight tablets instead of bulky PCs.
Cloud computing is also the root of development for the
emerging generation of Web-based applications—home
security, outpatient care, mobile payment, distance learning,
efficient energy use and driverless cars. And it is a research
area where the United States is an undisputed leader.
Yet despite the excitement and innovation surrounding it,
cloud computing was raising privacy and security concerns
long before the revelations about the NSA program. The very
fact that personal information is stored and processed on
servers and computers belonging to third-parties, by defi-
nition, means some loss of user control. As companies like
Google and Facebook have grown, with revenue streams
derived partly from monetizing the information supplied by
users, debate in policy circles has intensified about privacy
protection.
Companies themselves have had to walk a fine line. While
the popularity of cloud-based services argues that consum-
ers are comfortable with trading a certain amount of per-
sonal information for the value of free access to many use-
ful applications, there have been instances when users have
pushed back. For example, Google blurred identifiable faces
and blacked out windows of homes that were photographed
for its Street View application, but not before international
complaints.11
Facebook has repeatedly modified and clarified
its privacy policies in response to user concerns.
10. James Staten, “The Cost of PRISM Will Be Higher Than ITIF Projects,” Forrester
Blogs, Forrester Research, Aug. 14, 2013, available at http://blogs.forrester.com/
james_staten/13-08-14-the_cost_of_prism_will_be_larger_than_itif_projects.
6. Daniel Castro, “How Much Will PRISM Cost the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry,”
ITIF, August 2013, p. 3.
7. Mark Clayton, “Five overlooked costs of the NSA surveillance flap,” Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Jan. 12, 2014, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/
World/Security-Watch/2014/0112/Five-overlooked-costs-of-the-NSA-surveillance-
flap.
8. VentureBeat (e-publication) video, “DataBeat 2013-John Henry Clippinger, Execu-
tive Director, ID3, MIT Media Labs, available at http://vimeo.com/81855881. Clippinger
makes his remarks starting at approximately 10:10.
9. Taylor Armerding, “NSA spying could mean US tech companies lose international
business,” Computerworld, June 19, 2013, available at http://www.computerworld.
co.nz/article/487899/nsa_spying_could_mean_us_tech_companies_lose_interna-
tional_business/
R STREET POLICY STUDY: 2014 HAS THE NSA POISONED THE CLOUD? 3

4. These and other cases where Internet companies may have
overreached, but then apologized and adjusted, reflect an
understanding that their continued success depends heav-
ily on consumer trust. Consumers hold them to their word
that personal information will be protected, and are poised
to punish those who break that trust.
Alas, this underlying trust could be a casualty of the NSA
spying program. While it has supplied late-night TV hosts
with plenty of fodder for jokes (“I finally got through to the
Obamacare helpline because, after two hours, the NSA got
tired of listening to that music they play while on hold”),
their humor derives from the uneasiness people now have
about how much the government is snooping on private
phone calls and emails. As a recent headline to another NSA
critique dourly put it, 2013 was “the year trust died.”12
This is why the degree of “brand damage” PRISM, MUSCU-
LAR and other NSA initiatives have inflicted on the U.S. tech-
nology industry may take longer to determine. People may be
less inclined to use social networks, or could opt for search
engines that are less thorough, but more private. For many
sites, this will mean a decline in visitors, which will have an
impact on revenues, profits and re-investment.
This is not to let some major players off the hook, how-
ever. PRISM did come under the jurisdiction of the FISA
Court, and third-party companies were obligated to com-
ply. However, there were instances where, in retrospect,
telephone companies could have used their legal resourc-
es to push back more aggressively. Verizon, after all, once
stood up to the Recording Industry Association of America
when it demanded the phone company provide the identi-
ties of account-holders the record companies believed were
involved in music piracy. Although the RIAA insisted it had
a right to the data, Verizon’s lawyers instructed the organi-
zation to seek court approval—a route which, in the end, the
RIAA did not choose.
In more recent years, the NSA demanded a huge amount of
data, not simply on suspected terrorists, but on millions of
customers who, perhaps for innocuous reasons, had talked
to persons who talked to persons who talked to a suspect.
For perspective, if Boston Marathon bombers Dzhokhar and
Tamerlan Tsarnaev bought coffee from a barista at Starbucks
the morning of their attack, it would be as if the government
then placed surveillance on every person who ever bought
coffee from that barista, as well as their friends and friends’
friends.Thephonecompanies’unprotestedcompliancewith
NSA directives puts some responsibility for the backlash at
their doorsteps. That RSA, a respected U.S. company in the
security space, so willingly agreed to compromise its own
customers for a government contract, is also disappointing.
Nonetheless, the public and the media do not seem to be in a
discerning mood, and the entire U.S. technology industry has
been tarred by what is being called “the Snowden effect.” Dis-
trust, suspicion and customer ill-will plague companies that
were unknowingly hacked by the NSA, as well as companies
like Saleforce.com and Amazon, who were never involved.
INDUSTRY BACKLASH
Much of the NSA’s surveillance was done without the knowl-
edge of tech companies it affected. Several programs, like
MUSCULAR and the Tailored Access Operation were undis-
guised attempts to undermine privacy and security protec-
tions these companies had put in place for consumers.
President Obama avoided discussion of these more inva-
sive NSA initiatives during his Jan. 17 address to the nation,
which focused largely on the PRISM program. PRISM was
much more sweeping than any of its predecessors, but at
least there is precedent for court-ordered wiretapping and
data collection. What makes many of the other NSA proj-
ects even more egregious is that they set out deliberately to
undermine security and privacy mechanisms that companies
put in place for their users. This is the high-tech equivalent
of breaking into someone’s home and prying open a locked
filing cabinet with a crowbar.
While there are laws that protect private citizens from such
burglary, there are none that offer explicit protection in the
cloud. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),
enacted in 1986, still reflects the technology of that era, and
mainly protects Americans against illegal wiretapping and
seizure of stored phone records. Because cloud computing
and storage did not exist in 1986, the act says nothing about
the protection of private information in the cloud.Many
judges have therefore interpreted seizure of any data stored
by third parties as not requiring consent or a search warrant.
The NSA has leveraged both jurisprudence and the lack of
specific law to push the limits as of its search and seizure
powers. President Obama, in his address, conceded there
was a “bias” within government to expand information-gath-
ering. The NSA’s activities provide clear examples.
Concern in U.S. technology circles is high enough that rivals
are unifying in demand for due process, transparency and
accountability for NSA surveillance. Bipartisan efforts to
strengthen ECPA are gaining momentum. Another effort,
“Reform Government Surveillance,” is an initiative of eight
technology companies who believe their brands were dam-
11. “Google Blurs Faces in Street View Map Pictures,” The Economic Times, May
15, 2008, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-05-15/
news/27714235_1_street-view-google-blog-post-google-spokeswoman.
12. David Gewirtz, 2013: The Year Trust Died, ZDNet, Dec. 9, 2013, available at http://
www.zdnet.com/2013-the-year-trust-died-7000024067/.
R STREET POLICY STUDY: 2014 HAS THE NSA POISONED THE CLOUD? 4

5. aged by the PRISM revelations: AOL, Apple, Facebook,
Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter and Yahoo. “People
won’t use technology they don’t trust,” Brad Smith, gener-
al counsel and executive vice president of legal at Micro-
soft, stated in a letter to President Obama and Congress.
“Governments have put this trust at risk, and governments
need to help restore it.”13
Separately, Google and Yahoo have
petitioned the government for the right to inform custom-
ers when intelligence and law enforcement agencies have
requested data and the type of data that was sought.
Ironically, the NSA turned the competitive edge U.S. com-
panies have in cloud computing into a liability, especially in
Europe. Commercially, it will give European competitors an
opportunity to promote their own systems as more secure
and as safe from U.S. law enforcement. Second, on the regu-
latory front, it provides impetus for the privacy measures
the European Union wants on certain cloud-based services.
These measures could undercut the U.S. firms’ competi-
tiveness. For example, such rules would limit the ability of
content providers, search and social networking services to
access and process personal data of users for purposes of
targeted advertising or location-based services. While these
measures have a degree of popular support from regula-
tors who fear that consumers are being unduly “tracked,”
research shows that regulation that limits the use of targeted
advertising and other personalized cloud services inhibits
growth, innovation and overall use.14
Similarly, Internet companies face “Do Not Track” regula-
tion in a number of states, including California, which would
put severe limits on their ability to provide free services in
exchange for user data. Data has shown that American users
historically have been comfortable with current Internet
business models. In a 2013 Zogby poll, 70 percent of respon-
dents said they’d like at least some ads tailored directly to
their interests, while 40 percent said they wanted all their
ads targeted.15
Nonetheless, in the wake of the NSA revela-
tions, activist legislators may take advantage of a wave of
popular unease to enact regulations that in, the long term,
prove harmful to Internet service and innovation.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
The NSA’s surveillance activities represent a massive over-
reach on the part of the U.S. government into the private
communications and information transactions of its citi-
zens—communications and transactions for which there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the govern-
ment needs to be restrained through clear laws and policies
that govern the collection of private and proprietary data.
President Obama’s response falls short. Although he said the
government will stop storing phone records, he nonetheless
implied that phone companies would continue to do so on
the government’s behalf. The appointment of John Podesta
to review privacy concerns appears cosmetic. For one, what
metrics will determine Mr. Podesta’s effectiveness? The fact
that Obama did not call for judicial review of National Secu-
rity Letters, nor a halt to NSA efforts to break encryption,
remains troubling.
PRISM, MUSCULAR, Quantum and all of the other NSA sur-
veillance programs that have come to light should not just be
tweaked, reformed or repaired. They are all unconstitutional
programs that need to be scrapped.
1. Dismantle PRISM and rebuild a surveillance­­program
in accordance with specific defense and homeland
­security goals.
Surveillance is a useful tool for law enforcement, but it yields
the best results when employed against suspected wrong-
doers and where there is concrete evidence of a crime or
conspiracy. Long before PRISM, law enforcement agencies
required judicial sign-off on wiretaps and searches. There is
no reason these protections cannot be extended to anti-ter-
rorism efforts. PRISM and the other programs have grown
so large that it should not be surprising they have not found
any actionable intelligence. After news of the PRISM broke
last June, Gen. Keith Alexander, the NSA director, told Con-
gress that NSA surveillance programs stopped at least 50
terrorist attacks. Since then, that figure has been called into
question. In a review of cases brought against 225 individu-
als associated with al-Qaeda or inspired by its ideology who
were charged in the United States with an act of terrorism
since 9/11, the New America Foundation found the NSA’s
bulk surveillance programs played an identifiable role in at
most, 1.8 percent of these cases. Instead, the report found,
traditional law enforcement investigative methods—the use
of informants, tips from local communities, and targeted
intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus nearly
all of these investigations.16
As Judge Leon noted in his decision finding PRISM uncon-
stitutional—there is no evidence that PRISM prevented any-
thing. His observation serves as both a legal and practical
indictment of the program.
13. Microsoft Corp. News Release, “Tech Company Coalition Supports Global Sur-
veillance Principles, Calls on US to Lead Reform Efforts,” Microsoft Corp., Dec. 8, 2013,
available at http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2013/dec13/12-08compa-
nycoalitionpr.aspx.
14. cf. Avi Goldfarb and Catherine E. Tucker,“Privacy Regulation and Online
Advertising,” University of Toronto, August 5, 2010,available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1600259.
15. Katy Bachman, “Poll: Targeted Advertising Is Not the Bogeyman [Updated],”
Adweek, April 18, 2013, available at http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/poll-
targeted-advertising-not-bogeyman-updated-148649.
16. Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Emily Schneider and Bailey Cahall, “Do NSA’s Bulk
Surveillance Program Stop Terrorists?” New America Foundation, January 13, 2014,
pp. 1-2, available at http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/do_nsas_bulk_
surveillance_programs_stop_terrorists.
R STREET POLICY STUDY: 2014 HAS THE NSA POISONED THE CLOUD? 5

6. 2. Enact legislation that recognizes that expectation of
privacy extends to personal data stored in the cloud.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution secures citizens’
“papers and effects” against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. In the 21st
century, arguing that the Bill of Rights does
not apply because papers and effects are stored in electronic
form on the Internet, not in a roll-top desk at home, is legal
sophistry.
For several years, there have been bipartisan efforts to
extend Fourth Amendment protection to cloud-based data,
either through new bills, or a rewrite of the 28-year-old Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act. Little by little, courts
have been chipping away at law enforcement’s blatant use of
surveillance in the cloud, but legislation would do the most
toward curbing this abuse. Congress should be encouraged
to move forward. This would go a long way toward reining in
collection of Internet data through clandestine use of wire-
tapping, back doors or decryption codes.
3. Allow for greater transparency and accountability
Had there been appropriate judicial and legislative over-
sight, it is hard to imagine that these surveillance programs
would have grown as large and intrusive as they did. Any
future surveillance programs require the checks and bal-
ances of oversight from lawmakers who represent the peo-
ple and from an independent judiciary. Laws that authorize
such programs must incorporate mechanisms for transpar-
ency and accountability, especially when the government
demands information owned by third-party companies.
Among these, companies should have the right:
• To be notified when their infrastructure is being
used for surveillance;
• To disclose instances when they have been asked
to assist with surveillance and turn over information
• To demand that due process be followed
• To oversight of domestic civilian surveillance by
conventional courts, not FISA or secret military courts
• To requests for data that are held to the same stan-
dard as other search warrants, wherein the requester
must identify the suspect, the probable cause, the data
to be searched and what specific information is being
sought.
As House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte,
R-Va., put it: “We must ensure our nation’s intelligence col-
lection programs include real protections for Americans; civ-
il liberties, robust oversight, and additional transparency.”17
In a free society, individuals are not automatically assumed
to be suspects that need to be vetted and surveyed. Citizens
have the right to go about their business without the need
to answer to the state for every thought, act, purchase or
Facebook comment. The argument that widespread surveil-
lance is required to secure the common defense is specious,
anditsdarkconsequenceswerearticulatedbyGeorgeOrwell
almost 70 years ago in the novel 1984:
You had to live—did live, from habit that became
instinct—in the assumption that every sound you
made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every
movement scrutinized.18
While not every aspect of Orwell’s grim vision of a totalitar-
ian regime has come to pass, one unsettling aspect of 1984
has: the surveillance state he envisioned is a practical reality.
The government, indeed, has shown it can use technology
to keep tabs on much of what its citizens are doing. Fortu-
nately, we still hold to the idea that the government itself is
subject to its own laws. It will be critical to remember this
as we seek to reclaim our fundamental right to privacy and
to be left alone.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Steven Titch is an associate fellow at the R Street Institute, focused
on telecommunications, Internet and information technology. He
also serves as a policy advisor to the Heartland Institute and is a
former policy analyst at the Reason Foundation. His columns have
appeared in Investor’s Business Daily, the Washington Examiner and
the Houston Chronicle.
Titch also was co-founder and executive producer of Security
Squared, a business-to-business Web publication covering IT con-
vergence in physical security and surveillance. Previously, Titch was
editor of Network-Centric Security and director of editorial projects
for Data Communications magazine. He also has held the positions
of editorial director of Telephony, editor of Global Telephony maga-
zine, Midwest bureau chief of Communications Week and associate
editor-communications at Electronic News.
17. House Judiciary Committee, “Goodlatte Statement on PCLOB’s Report on
Intelligence-Gathering Programs,” Jan. 23, 2014. http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/
press-releases?ID=E9B835FE-AA07-4A06-9DCB-91494B463BF1
18. George Orwell, 1984, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1949 (64th Signet
Edition), pp. 6-7.
R STREET POLICY STUDY: 2014 HAS THE NSA POISONED THE CLOUD? 6