This document discusses key implications for climate geo-engineering and summarizing knowledge about innovation and knowledge. It argues that conventional expert practices suppress full understanding of knowledge and its limitations. Knowledge is insufficient, incomplete, indeterminate, can increase ignorance, is intractable, and knowledge systems are often incommensurable. Innovation pathways are contingent rather than inevitable and are "closed down" through both intended and unintended social processes and power dynamics. Risk assessment focuses analysis in ways shaped by institutional and political pressures. Precaution and participation methods can help "open up" appreciation of uncertainties, ambiguities, and ignorance through considering alternative options, issues, approaches and perspectives. This moves analysis beyond narrow decision rules toward more open and democratic

1. Knowing Knowledge and Innovation:
some key implications for climate geo-engineering
presentation to the Third Transdisciplinary Summer School on Climate Geo-Engineering
Queens College University of Oxford
21st August 2012
Andy Stirling
SPRU & STEPS Centre

2. Geoengineering Challenges
‘Governance’? Know Thyself!
Question content and processes of knowledge production
Learn from studies of innovation and social choice
Appreciate Diversity of Methods, Principles and Procedures
Understand Key General Lessons

3. Knowledge in Policy
on zoonotic pandemics:
“… sound science … science-based decisions”
- UN WHO DG Margaret Chan
on genetic modification:
“… this government's approach is to make
decisions … on the basis of sound science”
- former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair
on chemicals:
“ …sound science will be the basis of the
Commission's legislative proposal…”
- EC RTD Commissioner, Philippe Busquin
on energy:
“[n]ow is the right time for a cool-headed,
evidence based assessment … I want to
sweep away historic prejudice and put in its
place evidence and science”
former UK Energy Minister Malcolm Wicks
Justification: move from political ‘problems’ to technical ‘puzzles’

4. Ambiguity in Evidence
Energy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…

5. Ambiguity in Evidence
Energy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
coal
oil
gas
nuclear
hydro
wind
solar
biomass
0.001 0.1 10 1000
low RISK high externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)

6. Ambiguity in Evidence
Energy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
n=
coal
oil
gas
minimum 25% 75% maximum
nuclear 21
hydro
wind
solar
biomass
0.001 0.1 10 1000
low RISK high ‘externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)

7. Ambiguity in Evidence
Energy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…
n=
coal 36
oil 20
gas 31
nuclear 21
hydro 16
wind 18
solar 11
biomass 22

8. Knowing Knowledge
Conventional ‘risk practices’ suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’

9. Knowing Knowledge
Conventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’
marginalises, elides, ignores, (often) denies radical openness of ‘incertitude’:
- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action
. Aristotle, Kant, Habermas know-how is less important than know-why
– eg: how to apply neuroscience?

10. Knowing Knowledge
Conventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’
marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:
- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action
- incompleteness: knowledge enabling utility is limited on wider effects
. Lao Tzu, Socrates, Keynes ‘unknowns’ as important as ‘knowns’
– eg: unexpected
mechanisms
in nanohealth
technologies

11. Knowing Knowledge
Conventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’
marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:
- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action
- incompleteness: knowledge enabling utility is limited on wider effects
- indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise
. Gödel, Dosi, Collingridge ”known knowns” foster hubris
– eg: dangers of thinking we know
halogenated hydrocarbons,
CFCs and the ozone hole
endocrine disruptors
methyl tertbutyl ether

12. Knowing Knowledge
Conventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’
marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:
- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action
- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action
- indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise
- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase
ignorance . Einstein, Ravetz, Beck… area / perimeter of known
– nonlinear
dynamics
of climate
and oceans

13. Knowing Knowledge
Conventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’
marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:
- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action
- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action
- indeterminacy : effective knowledge does not preclude surprise
- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase ignorance
- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability
. Ellul, Wynne, Tenner not existence but exposure to unknown
eg: nuclear
dependency

14. Knowing Knowledge
Conventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’
marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:
- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action
- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action
- indeterminacy : effective knowledge does not preclude surprise
- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase ignorance
- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability
- incommensurability: knowledges are plural and often
conflicting . Kuhn, Arrow, Jasanoff… knowledge often not linear / additive
- eg: agronomy, ecology, soil science,
molecular biology on GM

15. Knowing Knowledge
Conventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’
marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:
- insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action
- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action
- indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise
- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase ignorance
- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability
- incommensurability: knowledges are plural and often conflicting
representing incomplete knowledge as expert ‘risk’ is deeply problematic

16. Science in Policy
“you can’t stop progress” …
- The Economist
PROGRESS
“we'll restore science to its rightful place”…
`
- President Obama
“Our hope … relies on scientific and
technological progress” - Premier Wen Jiabao
“One can not impede scientific progress.” SCIENCE
- President Ahmadinejad

17. Innovation in Policy
Lord Alec Broers, President, RAEng PROGRESS
…“history is a race to advance technology”
Technology:
“will determine the future of the human race’”
The challenge of government:
TECHNOLOGY
SCIENCE
“to strive to stay in the race”…
The role of the public:
“to give technology the status it deserves”…

18. Innovation Governance
all innovation is progress…
Lisbon Strategy for: “pro-innovation action” PROGRESS
- EU Council of Ministers
“we need more pro-innovation policies”
- PM Gordon Brown
“… the Government’s strategy is …
pro-innovation” - PM David Cameron
TECHNOLOGY

19. Innovation Governance
all innovation is progress…
Lisbon Strategy for: “pro-innovation action” PROGRESS
- EU Council of Ministers
“we need more pro-innovation policies”
- PM Gordon Brown
“… the Government’s strategy is …
pro-innovation” - PM David Cameron
all technology is progress… TECHNOLOGY
“a pro- technology culture must be created…”
- Council for Science and Technology
GM critics are “anti-technology … members
of the 'flat earth society’, opposed to
modern economics, modern technology,
modern science, modern life itself”
- UN DDG Malloch-Brown

20. Conventional Innovation Governance
PROGRESS
TECHNOLOGY
Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no
alternatives… no politics … no choice
!

21. Conventional Innovation Governance
PROGRESS
TECHNOLOGY
Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives …
no politics … no choice !
Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much?
how fast? … who leads?

22. Conventional Innovation Governance
PROGRESS
TECHNOLOGY
Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives …
no politics … no choice !
Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much?
how fast?’ … who leads?
Seriously neglects questions over: which way? …what alternatives?
says who? …why?

23. Inevitability of Pathways?
space of pathway
configurations
direction
The example of the bicycle…
… early designs took many exotic forms

24. Inevitability of Pathways?
space of pathway
configurations
direction
Conventional idea: eccentric configurations converge to ‘optimality’…
…but ‘optimality’ depends on context, moment and perspective

25. Contingency of Pathways
multiple
diverging
directions
time
direction
So… … the ‘big picture’ is more the other way around!
each starting point yields many feasible, viable innovation pathways
‘best path’ not just about determining necessity or ‘optimising’ markets …
deliberately or blindly societies close down the pathways they pursue

26. Realities of Innovation
For instance... “sustainable energy”
Not all that is conceivable, feasible, viable – will be fully realisable

27. Realities of Innovation
Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways
social shaping (Bijker, 85) co-construction (Misa, 03)
studies: expectations (Brown, 03) imaginations (Jasanoff, 05)

28. Realities of Innovation
Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways
history: contingency (Mokyr, 92) momentum (Hughes 83)
path-dependence (David, 85) path creation
(Karnoe, 01)

29. Realities of Innovation
Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways
philosophy: autonomy (Winner, 77) closure (Feenberg, 91)
/politics entrapment (Walker, 01) alignment (Geels, 02)

30. Realities of Innovation
Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways
economics: homeostasis (Sahal, 85) lock-in (Arthur, 89)
regimes (Nelson & Winter, 77) trajectories (Dosi,
82)

31. Beyond Risk
contrasting aspects of ‘incertitude’
unproblematic RISK
engineered components
closed deterministic systems
high frequency incidents
knowledge familiar contexts
about
INCERTITUDE
likelihoods
open dynamic systems
low frequency events
human factors
changing contexts
problematic UNCERTAINTY
- Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Smithson, Ravetz, Wynne ...

32. Beyond Risk
contrasting aspects of ‘incertitude’
knowledge about possibilities
unproblematic problematic
unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY
engineered components defining pros & cons
closed deterministic systems contrasting impacts
high frequency incidents diverse perspectives
knowledge familiar contexts alternative options
about
INCERTITUDE
likelihoods
open dynamic systems novel agents or vectors
low frequency events surprising conditions
human factors new alternatives
changing contexts wilful blinkers
problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE
- Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Smithson, Ravetz, Wynne ...

33. Pressures for Closure
institutional drivers of risk assessment
knowledge about possibilities
unproblematic problematic
unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY
aggregative analysis
patronage, pressure
political closure
knowledge
about
insurance limits ` science-based
reductive models policy
likelihoods stochastic reasoning institutional
remits
political
liability protection culture
harm definitions
indicators / metrics
problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE
risk focus is shaped by power – Beck’s “organised irresponsibility”

34. Methods for ‘Opening Up’
precaution and participation are about rigour
knowledge about possibilities
unproblematic problematic
unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY
aggregated probabilities
optimisation algorithms
synthetic decision trees
Delphi / Foresight
knowledge predictive modelling
about
likelihoods
problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE
precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude

35. Methods for ‘Opening Up’
precaution and participation are about rigour
knowledge about possibilities
unproblematic problematic
unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY
aggregated probabilities
optimisation algorithms
synthetic decision trees
Delphi / Foresight
knowledge predictive modelling
about
likelihoods
burden of evidence
onus of persuasion
uncertainty factors
decision heuristics
interval analysis
sensitivity testing
problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE
precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude

36. Methods for ‘Opening Up’
precaution and participation are about rigour
knowledge about possibilities
unproblematic problematic
unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY
aggregated probabilities scenarios / backcasting
optimisation algorithms interactive modelling
synthetic decision trees mapping / Q-methods
Delphi / Foresight participatory deliberation
knowledge predictive modelling democratic procedures
about
likelihoods
burden of evidence
onus of persuasion
uncertainty factors
decision heuristics
interval analysis
sensitivity testing
problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE
precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude

37. Methods for ‘Opening Up’
precaution and participation are about rigour
knowledge about possibilities
unproblematic problematic
unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY
aggregated probabilities scenarios / backcasting
optimisation algorithms interactive modelling
synthetic decision trees mapping / Q-methods
Delphi / Foresight participatory deliberation
knowledge predictive modelling democratic procedures
about
likelihoods
burden of evidence responsive civic research
onus of persuasion curiosity monitoring,
uncertainty factors evidentiary presumptions
decision heuristics flexibility, reversibility
interval analysis diversity, resilience,
sensitivity testing agility, adaptability
problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE
precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude

38. ‘Opening Up’ Incertitude
precaution and participation are about rigour
knowledge about possibilities
unproblematic problematic
unproblematic RISK AMBIGUITY
definitive participatory
prescription deliberation
knowledge
Options
about
likelihoods safety humility
Options
reflexivity
precautionary adaptive
sustainability
appraisal learning
problematic UNCERTAINTY IGNORANCE
‘opening up’: options, issues, approaches, possibilities, perspectives

39. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
MTBE PCBs, DES; human systems; experimental
lock-in

40. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance
CFCs, EDCs, GMOs: use broader, open methods reviewed,

41. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance
humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulation
MTBE, CFCs: special vulnerability under known threats

42. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance
humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulation
pro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experiment
TBT, BSE; asbestos, C6H6, PCBs: monitoring over models:

43. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance
humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulation
pro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experiment
deliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasion
antimicrobials: acknowledge values, conflicts, politics, power

44. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance
humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulation
pro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experiment
deliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasion
alternative options pros, cons, justifications for range of options & substitutes
BAT, BPM: note systematic blinkers on superior approaches

45. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance
humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulation
pro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experiment
deliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasion
alternative options pros, cons, justifications for range of options & substitutes
transdisciplinarity collect all relevant knowledge, beyond ‘usual suspects’
MTBE; BSE: society, humanities, arts, … sceptics

46. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
;‘
explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance
,
humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulation
pro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experiment
deliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasion
alternative options pros, cons, justifications for range of options & substitutes
transdisciplinarity collect all relevant knowledge, beyond ‘usual suspects’
engage public independence through pluralism and robustness on values
not as political correctness, but rigour of framings

47. Precaution, Participation, Adaptive Learning (cf: EEA, 2001)
Narrow ‘decision rules’ to broad, open ‘technology democracy’
extend scope additive, cumulative, synergistic effects; life cycles, compliance
;‘
explicit incertitude explicitly engage with uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance
,
humility on science sensitivities & proxies: mobility, persistence, bioaccumulation
pro-active research prioritise open monitoring & surveillance & targeted experiment
deliberate argument levels of proof, burden of evidence, onus of persuasion
alternative options pros, cons, justifications for range of options & substitutes
transdisciplinarity collect all relevant knowledge, beyond ‘usual suspects’
engage public independence through pluralism and robustness on values
‘open up’ politics ‘plural conditional’ (not unitary definitive) inputs to policy debate
from CGE technologies to CGE democracies

48. Catalysing New Political Spaces
combining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy
closing down opening up
narrow
expert / analytic
participatory /
deliberative
broad

49. Catalysing New Political Spaces
combining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy
closing down opening up
narrow
expert / analytic
citizen’s juries
participatory /
deliberative
broad

50. Catalysing New Political Spaces
combining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy
closing down opening up
narrow cost-benefit open
analysis hearings
expert / analytic risk
assessment structured
interviews
stakeholder
negotiation
citizen’s juries
participatory /
deliberative
broad

51. Catalysing New Political Spaces
combining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy
closing down opening up
cost-benefit open multi-site
narrow
analysis hearings ethnographic-
risk methods
expert / analytic
assessment structured
interviews dissenting
stakeholder sensitivity opinions
negotiation analysis
citizen’s juries
interactive
modelling
participatory / consensus decision
deliberative conference analysis
narrative-based
participant
broad observation

52. Catalysing New Political Spaces
combining scientific rigour and democratic legitimacy
acknowledging inherently politics in geoengineering governance
closing down opening up
cost-benefit open multi-site
narrow
analysis hearings ethnographic-
risk methods
expert / analytic
assessment structured
interviews dissenting
stakeholder sensitivity opinions
negotiation analysis
citizen’s juries
interactive q-method
modelling
scenario
decision workshops
participatory / consensus
deliberative conference analysis multi-criteria
participatory mapping
rural appraisal deliberative
narrative-based
participant do-it-yourself mapping open
broad observation panels space

53. Geoengineering Challenges
‘Governance’ – Know Thyself!
Question not only Knowledge – but knowledge production
Seriously Explore Choice – branching path-dependencies
Be aware of Power – in subject as well as object of scrutiny
Fallacies of Control – affect both sides of geoengineering debate
Rigour of Precaution – not emotive fear; reason under uncertainty
Open up and Broaden out – inputs and outputs to options appraisal
Urgency and Robustness – democracy and science reconciled