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Hix-Benedetto-Rise and Fall of Social Democracy-2May2017

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Presentation of the empirical results of a new project on the Rise and Fall of Social Democracy, 1918-2017

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Hix-Benedetto-Rise and Fall of Social Democracy-2May2017

  1. 1. Rise and Fall of Social Democracy 1918-2017 Simon Hix, LSE Giacomo Benede2o, Royal Holloway London
  2. 2. Mo;va;on Popular claims about recent changes in European poli;cs •  Collapse of support for the Centre Le?, and par@cularly for social democra@c par@es •  Rise of the Populists (taking votes from Le? and Right) •  Growing fragmenta@on of the vote (na@onally & geographically) •  Increasing electoral vola@lity How valid are these claims? What have been the long-term pa2erns? How can these pa2erns be explained / understood? What we have done (so far): 1. Describe the trends in European electoral poli@cs over the last 100 years (1918-2017) 2. Inves@gate the determinants of one of the main trends: the Rise and Fall of Social Democracy (using cross-sec@on @me-series) Future: individual level data, from public opinion, panel studies etc. causal iden@fica@on, e.g. looking at cons@tuency level data other party families, esp. Centre Right (Conserva@ves & Chris@an Democrats)
  3. 3. The Cases 31 countries 570 elec@ons Criteria: 1. Popula@on >500,000 in 2017 2. Democra@c (Polity2 or PolComp >5) 3. ≥20 years of democracy Country Years counted as democratic Years(N) Elections(N) Sweden 1918-2017 100 29 Switzerland 1918-2017 100 26 UK 1918-2017 100 26 Ireland 1921-2017 97 30 Finland 1918-39, 1944-2017 96 29 Denmark 1918-39, 1945-2017 95 38 Belgium 1918-38, 1944-2017 95 29 Netherlands 1918-39, 1945-2017 95 27 Norway 1918-39, 1945-2017 95 25 France 1918-39, 1945-2017 95 24 Luxembourg 1918-39, 1945-2017 95 20 Austria 1918-32, 1945-2017 88 26 Germany 1919-32, 1949-2017 83 27 Italy 1918-21, 1946-2017 76 20 Greece 1920-36, 1944-48, 1974-2017 64 24 Hungary 1920-43, 1990-2017 52 12 Czechoslovakia/Cz.Rep 1918-38,1945-46,1990-92,1993-2017 51 13 Cyprus 1970-2017 48 10 Portugal 1975-2017 43 15 Estonia 1918-33, 1991-2017 43 13 Romania 1925-38, 1990-2017 42 14 Latvia 1920-33, 1990-2017 42 13 Spain 1977-2017 41 13 Poland 1918-30, 1990-2017 41 12 Bulgaria 1918-23, 1990-2017 35 11 Croatia 1991-2017 27 8 Macedonia 1991-2017 27 8 Lithuania 1991-2017 27 7 Slovenia 1991-2017 27 7 Albania 1992-2017 26 7 Slovakia 1993-2017 25 7
  4. 4. 100 Years of European Electoral Poli;cs 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 1918 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 Numner of votes Millions Total votes in elec.ons in 31 European countries, by poli.cal family AL, AT, BE, BG, HR, CY, CZ, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, MK, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI, ES, SE, CH, UK Non voters Other parPes Radical Right Cons/Chr.Dem. Liberal/Centrist Regionalist/Nat. Social Democrat Green Radical LeY
  5. 5. Others Ways of Telling the Story 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1918 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 Percentage of votes % votes 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1918 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 Percentage of votes % votes, excluding non-voters & others
  6. 6. Comparing West and East, since 1990 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Percentage of votes 18 West European countries (excl. non voters & others) AT, BE, CY, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH, UK 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Percentage of votes 13 East European countries (excl. non voters & others) AL, BG, HR, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, MK, PL, RO, SK, SI
  7. 7. 14 18 22 26 30 34 1918 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 Total share of votes (%) Average share of votes (%) Total share of electorate (%) Social Democra;c Votes & Voters
  8. 8. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 North Western Europe 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Scandinavia 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19201925193019351940194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015 Southern Europe 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19201925193019351940194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015 Eastern Europe Different Regional Trends (% votes) Note: Frac@onal polynomials
  9. 9. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Sweden (SAP) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 United Kingdom (Labour) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19201925193019351940194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015Germany (SPD) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19201925193019351940194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015 Netherlands (SDAP-PvdA) 4 Classic “Rise and Fall” Cases % votes (solid) % electorate (dashed)
  10. 10. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Greece (UFWFR etc/PASOK-DS/Potami) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Spain (PSOE/PSC) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19201925193019351940194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015Italy (PSI/FdP/PDS-DS-PD) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19201925193019351940194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015 Portugal (PS) A Tale of Two “Souths” % votes (solid) % electorate (dashed)
  11. 11. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Poland (SLD/UP-LiD-ZL) Hungary (MSZP-Ö) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Czech Republic (ČSSD/ČSS/SDL) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19901992199419961998200020022004200620082010201220142016 Romania (FDSN-PSDR-USL) 19901992199419961998200020022004200620082010201220142016 Slovakia (SDL/SDSS/SDA-Smer) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19901992199419961998200020022004200620082010201220142016 Croatia (SDP) Varying Trends in Eastern Europe % votes (solid) % electorate (dashed)
  12. 12. 19401920 19792013 20131996 19511918 19571924 19822015 19352011 20051985 19721933 20022008 19251999 19392015 20111992 19772002 19481922 19811933 20121998 19311987 19922008 19201995 20061939 19811962 19201990 19941923 20121937 20081976 20111996 19191995 20011930 19221933 19852016 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 % of votes Sweden Austria Albania UK Norway Spain Denmark Portugal Germany Macedonia Belgium Finland Croatia Netherlands Luxembourg Greece Slovakia Switzerland Lithuania Latvia Hungary France Czech Bulgaria Romania Italy Slovenia Estonia Poland Ireland Cyprus Min Mean Max Peaks and Troughs in SD Support
  13. 13. Explaining the (Rise and) Fall of Soc Dems “Embourgeoisement” Rising affluence of working class -> middle class aspira@ons Decline in “core supporters” Declining employment in manufacturing (and agriculture?) Declining trade union membership Strategic dilemmas for Social Democrats (e.g. Przeworski & Sprague, Sassoon) SD par@es have needed to move to the centre, to appeal to the Middle Class -> losing Working Class votes, but gaining MC votes -> poten@al of being “oublanked” by Radical Le?/Right Interac;on of strategic party behaviour & electoral system (e.g. Iverson & Soskice) SD par@es are more likely to lose WC votes in PR systems if they move to the centre, because of the low threshold of entry for par@es (Radical Le?) to their le?
  14. 14. More Explana;ons Conflict within Social Democra;c coali;on (e.g. Kitschelt, Kriesi et al.) WC remain socially conserva>ve (e.g. an@-immigra@on) Rise of service sectors, expansion of higher educa@on -> new MC, more socially liberal Rise of compe;tor par;es, appealing to SD supporters Greens / Radical Le? -> appeal to new MC Radical Right -> appeal to old WC Centre-Right becoming socially-liberal -> taking SD votes from the ‘centre’ Globaliza;on (e.g. Colantone & Stanig) Growing compe@@on for investment and jobs threat of capital flight and/or immigra@on -> threat to economic interests and social values of SD core supporters Social democra;c success High public spending, public services, workers’ rights, womens’ rights etc. -> SDs no-longer needed [nb. controlling for GDP per capita, e.g. Wagner’s Law]
  15. 15. Hypotheses and Variables 1 Dependent Variables: Vote share (%) for main SD party in an elec@on (1918-2017) Electorate share (%) for main SD party in an elec@on (1918-2017) Embourgeoisement GDP per capita Life expectancy ê core supporters % of workforce in industry / agriculture Trade union density Strategic dilemmas Le?-right posi@on of SD party (& interacted with District Mag.) Le?-right posi@on of main Centre Right compe@tor Conflict in SD coali;on Liberal-authority posi@on of SD party % of popula@on with higher educa@on % of popula@on in urban areas Compe;tor par;es % support for Radical Le?, Greens, Radical Right Liberal-authority posi@on of Centre Right compe@tor Effec@ve number of electoral par@es
  16. 16. Hypotheses and Variables 2 Globaliza;on Trade: Global trade as % of GDP Annual trade balance (log) Immigra@on: Stock: % Foreign-born popula@on Flow: 5-year net immigra@on (log) SD success (Post-tax) income inequality (GINI) Public spending as % of GDP % Women par@cipa@on in the workforce Controls Turnout (in % vote share models) SD government status (in coali@on and/or holding PM) Econ. performance: GDP growth, unemployment, infla@on Popula@on (log), Popula@on >65 & 0-14 Society: Majority Catholic, Ethnic/linguis@c frac@onaliza@on Poli@cal ins@tu@ons: Presiden@alism; Electoral system (DM) Years of democracy EU, Eurozone
  17. 17. Es;ma;on Two different types of models (1) (2) Where: V/E is the SocDem Vote share %/Electorate share % in country i at @me t α is a constant W is a vector of independent variables X is a vector of control variables Y is a vector of @me-invariant control variables η are country fixed-effects θ are year and decade fixed-effects β, ρ, γ, κ are the parameters to be es@mated ε is the error term Models are es@mated with and without country-specific @me-trends (2) is es@mated with panel-corrected standard-errors V / Eit =α + β1Wit +γΧit +ηi +θt +εit V / Eit =α + ρV / Eit−1 + β1Wit +γΧit +κϒi +θt +εit
  18. 18. Periods and Cases 1918-2017 All 31 countries Cases of “con@nuous democracy” (11 countries: BE, CH, DK, FI, FR, GB, IE, LU, NL, NO, SE) 1918-1939 Interwar democracies (21 countries: 11+ AT, BG, CZ, DE, EE, GR, HU, LV, PL, RO) 1945-2018 Postwar democracies (14 countries: 11+ AT, DE, IT) 1975-2018 Postwar democracies + Southern Europe (18 countries: 14+ CY, ES, GR, PT) 1990-2018 All 31 countries Western Europe only (18 countries) Eastern Europe only (13 countries)
  19. 19. Periods and Variables Period 1918-2017 1918-1939 1945-2017 1975-2017 1990-2017 Cases All countries N=570 Con@nuous democracies N=303 Interwar democracies N= 131 Postwar democracies N= 277 Post 1975 democracies N = 207 All countries N = 223 Independent variables Set A GDP per capita Public spending Party compe@@on Rad.Right %, Rad.LeR %, ENPV C.Right %, Libs %, Greens % Poli@cal ins@tu@ons Presiden>al, Electoral system DM Years democracy Time-invariant variables Catholic, Ethnic/Linguis>c fract’za>on Decade fixed-effects Set B Set A + GDP growth SD party posi@on CR party posi@on General LeR-Right, Economic LeR-Right / Social Liberal-Authority SD le?-right posi@on *Electoral system DM EU & Eurozone dummies Set C Set B + Life expectancy Empl. in industry/agric Union density Trade volume/balance Net immigra@on Income inequality Women in work Unemployment Urbaniza@on Pop/n & >65 / 0-14 Set D Set C + Foreign born Infla@on Youth unemployment Higher educa@on
  20. 20. Social changes 0100002000030000 GDPpercapita(maroon) 10 20 30 40 SD%voteshare(red) 19201925193019351940194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015 SD Votes and GDP per capita 10 20 30 40 50 60 SD%voteshare(red) %Employmentinindustry(green)/%Uniondensity(blue) 1974197619781980198219841986198819901992199419961998200020022004200620082010201220142016 SD Votes and Manufacturing/Trade Union Decline
  21. 21. Average lee-right party posi;ons Note: Postwar democracies only Standard devia@ons shown by dashed lines -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Average Le4-Right Loca;on of Party Manfestos Social Democrats Centre Right
  22. 22. 2025303540 SD%voteshare -60 -40 -20 0 20 Social Democrat party left-right position (manifesto) SocDem facing a centrist Centre Right party SocDem facing a right-wing Centre Right party Interac;on of SocDem & C.Right lee-right posi;ons
  23. 23. 40-50s 60-70s 80-90s 00-10s 40-50s 60-70s 80-90s 00-10s -20-15-10-505 SocialLeft-Right -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 Economic Left-Right Party posi;ons in 2 dimensions Average economic and social le?-right posi@ons of Social Democrat and Centre Right party manifestos (in postwar democracies)
  24. 24. No iden;fiable electoral system effect 0204060 SD%voteshare single member districts proportional
  25. 25. 202530354045 SD%voteshare -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 Social Democratic party economic left-right position Majoritarian electoral system (DM=1) Proportional electoral system (DM>9) But there is an interac;on between SocDem lee-right posi;on & electoral system Cases: Western Europe, post-1990
  26. 26. GDP per capita (Semi)Presidential system District magnitude SocDem in gov (single party) SocDem in gov (coalition+PM) SocDem in gov (coalition+junior) -5 0 5 10 -5 0 5 10 All countries Continuous democracies only Country FEs Country FEs + other parties Lagged DV Lagged DV + other parties Basic results: all elec;ons, 1918-2017 Dependent variable = Social Democra@c party Vote share (%) Results are the same for SocDem Electorate share (%) Con@nuous democracies: BE, CH, DK, FI, FR, GB, IE, LU, NL, NO, SE
  27. 27. GDP per capita (Semi)Presidential system District magnitude SocDem in gov (single party) SocDem in gov (coalition+PM) SocDem in gov (coalition+junior) Catholic Ethnic fractionalization Linguistic fractionalization -20 0 20 40 -20 0 20 40 % SD vote share % SD electorate share Country FEs Lagged DV Interwar democracies: 1918-1939 AT, BE, BG, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, LU, LV, NL, NO, PL, RO, SE
  28. 28. Radical Left vote share Greens vote share Liberals vote share Centre Right vote share Radical Right vote share -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 Country FEs Lagged DV Compe;tor par;es: 1918-2017 Dependent variable = SocDem party Vote share (%), Con@nuous democracies only
  29. 29. Radical Left vote share Liberals vote share Centre Right vote share Radical Right vote share Greens vote share Radical Left vote share Liberals vote share Centre Right vote share Radical Right vote share Greens vote share -1.2 -1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 -1.2 -1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 1918-1939 1945-1969 1970-1989 1990-2017 Country FEs Lagged DV Compe;tor par;es: periods compared 14 common cases: AT, DE, BE, CH, DK, FI, FR, GB, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, SE Dependent variable = Social Democrat party Vote share (%)
  30. 30. Radical Left vote share Greens vote share Liberals vote share Centre Right vote share Radical Right vote share -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 Western Europe Eastern Europe Country FEs Lagged DV Compe;tor par;es, 1990-2017: West v. East Dependent variable = Social Democrat party Vote share (%)
  31. 31. Social Democrat left-right position Centre Right left-right position SD economic left-right position CR economic left-right position SD liberal-authority position CR liberal-authority position -.1 0 .1 .2 Country FEs & general LR Lagged DV & general LR Country FEs & 2 dimensions Lagged DV & 2 dimensions Effect of SD & CR party posi;ons: 1945-2017 Dependent variable = Social Democrat party Vote share (%)
  32. 32. Social Democrat left-right position Centre Right left-right position SD economic left-right position CR economic left-right position SD liberal-authority position CR liberal-authority position -1 0 1 -1 0 1 Western Europe Eastern Europe Country FEs & general LR Lagged DV & general LR Country FEs & 2 dimensions Lagged DV & 2 dimensions Effect of SD & CR party posi;ons: 1990-2017 Dependent variable = Social Democrat party Vote share (%)
  33. 33. Employment in industry (%) Employment in agriculture (%) Union density (%) Trade volume (% GDP) Trade balance (% GDP) Net 5-year immigration (log) Urban population (%) -1 0 1 2 -1 0 1 2 % SD vote share % SD electorate share Country FEs Lagged DV 1975-2017: core supporters & globaliza;on? AT, BE, CH, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PT, SE
  34. 34. Public spending (% GDP) Net 5-year immigration (log) Post-tax income inequality (Gini) Women in workforce (%) Enrolment in higher education (ratio) Urban population (%) -4 -2 0 2 -4 -2 0 2 Western Europe Eastern Europe Country FEs Lagged DV Some other 1990-2017 results: West v. East Dependent variable = Social democrat party Electorate share (%)
  35. 35. Main Findings 1 The is li2le evidence that embourgeoisement explains declining support for Social Democra@c par@es. Richer countries have higher levels of support for Social Democrats than poorer countries, and support for Social Democrats grew as countries got richer. Regarding core supporters, there is some evidence that the growth and decline of employment in manufacturing correlates with the rise and fall in support for Social Democrats. However, union density appears to be nega>vely correlated with support for Social Democrats. In terms of strategic dilemmas, there is some evidence that Social Democra@c par@es gain support when they move to the right, and lose support when they move to the leR. Social Democrats also gain (lose) support when their main Centre Right compe@tor moves to the right (le?). However, this pa2ern does not hold for Social Democra@c par@es in Eastern Europe. These effects are magnified in majoritarian electoral systems (with low district magnitudes), in that Social Democrats gained more support when moving rightwards in these systems than when moving rightwards in PR (high district magnitude) systems.
  36. 36. Main Findings 2 In terms of conflicts in the Social Democra;c coali;on, there is some evidence that SD par@es won more votes when they were less ‘liberal’. The expansion of higher educa@on is nega>vely correlated with support for SocDems, while growing urbanisa@on is posi>vely correla@vely with support for Social Democrats. Regarding compe;tor par;es, Social Democrats have won votes from (and lost votes to) all the other main party families. •  That said, in all periods Social Democrats have traded votes with Radical Le? par@es more than with any other party family. •  Fragmenta@on of the vote has had a large nega@ve effect on support for SocDems. •  SocDems lose fewer votes to Centre Right par@es when SDs are more ‘authoritarian’. In terms of globaliza;on, there is some evidence that nega@ve trade balances undermine support for Social Democrats, whereas overall trade volume has li2le effect. The effect of immigra@on on support for Social Democrats is unclear.
  37. 37. Main Findings 3 In terms of Social Democra;c “success”, there is some evidence that public spending is posi>vely correlated with support for Social Democrats (perhaps a larger public sector means more SD voters). There is some evidence that voters turn to SocDems when income inequality rises. We found no effect of the % of women in the workforce. Social Democra@c par@es have generally won more votes when they have been in government. But this effect declined a?er 1975, and they have always been punished by voters when they have been junior coali@on partners. On average, Social Democrats have performed be2er in Semi/Presiden;al systems than in parliamentary systems: sugges@ng that they have lost fewer votes in winner- take-all electoral contests. However, there is no clear evidence that Social Democrats do be2er or worse in low (majoritarian) or high (propro@onal) district magnitude electoral systems.
  38. 38. Addi;onal Slides
  39. 39. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Sweden (SAP) Denmark (SD) Norway (DNA) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Finland (SSDP) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 United Kingdom (Labour) Ireland (Labour) Netherlands (SDAP-PvdA) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Belgium (PSB-BPS / PS/SP) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Luxembourg (PS-LSAP) Germany (SPD) Austria (SDAPÖ/SPÖ) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Switzerland (SPS-PSS) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 France (SFIO-PS) Spain (PSOE/PSC) 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Portugal (PS) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Italy (PSI/FdP/PDS-DS-PD) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Greece (UFWFR etc/PASOK-DS/Potami) 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Cyprus (EDEK/KISO) 18 West European countries (SD % vote shares)
  40. 40. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Poland (PPS/SLD/UP-LiD-ZL) Lithuania (LSDP/SDC-AB) Latvia (LSDSP etc./SDLP-SC) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Estonia (ESDTP-ESTP/SDE) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Czech. (ČSD/ČSSD/ČSS/SDL) Slovakia (SDL/SDSS/SDA-Smer) Hungary (MSZDP-SZDP/MSZP-Ö) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Croatia (SDP) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Slovenia (ZL-SD/LZJ-PS) 19201930194019501960197019801990200020102020 Macedonia (SDSM) 19201930194019501960197019801990200020102020 Albania (PS/PSD/LSI) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19201930194019501960197019801990200020102020 Romania (PSD/PSDR-USL) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 19201930194019501960197019801990200020102020 Bulgaria (BSP-B/BSP-KzB) 13 Central & Eastern European countries (SD % vote shares)

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