1. E Mare Domus
Seasteading: Independent Governments on the High Seas
______________________________________________
Sean Michael Jones
University of San Diego, School of Law
Spring, 2015
Professor Jorge Vargas
The Law of the Sea
______________________________________________
ABSTRACT: Ardent libertarians have aspired for decades to fabricate sovereign lands on
the high seas which would enable an unprecedented degree of individual liberty and
autonomy in the modern age. As the movement to create the first feasible and sustainable
seastead continues to gain steam, questions arise regarding the ability of existing nation-
states to assert jurisdiction and regulation over seasteads and as to the bodies of law to
which seasteads and their inhabitants will be subject.

2. 1
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION 2
WHAT IS A SEASTEAD?
TYPES OF SEASTEADS
II. THE HISTORY OF SEASTEADING 4
THE PRINCIPALITY OF SEALAND
THE REPUBLIC OF MINERVA
OPERATION ATLANTIS
THE SEASTEADING INSTITUTE
III. HARNESSING THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 9
PAST EFFORTS TO EVADE THE LAW USING INTERNATIONAL WATERS
PIRATE RADIO
GAMBLING BARGES
WOMEN ON WAVES: OFFSHORE ABORTIONS
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
IV. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO SEASTEADING 14
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS
THE TERRITORIAL SEA
THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
CONTINENTAL SHELF
INTERNATIONAL WATERS
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
APPLICATIONS IN SEA ZONES
JURISDICTION OVER SEASTEADS
DOMESTIC ADMIRALTY JURISDICTIONS
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
JUS COGENS LAWS
V. THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE 25
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
THE UNITED NATIONS
SOVEREIGNTY
VI. CONCLUSION 28

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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a passionate group of anti-establishment types, fed up with an ineffective
congress and excessive taxation and looking to free themselves from the tangles of
bureaucracy and the oppression of an overinflated government. They host meetings, raise
funds, and sketch out a revolutionary plan to build a nation at sea, beyond the reach of
domestic and international jurisdictions; a high seas utopia with minimal regulation,
allowing its citizens to freely express themselves and live life on their own terms.
Ambitious and well-funded, the group builds a massive oil rig-like structure three-
hundred miles off the coast of California, raises its own flag and declares a new
sovereign nation. As more people are drawn to the new island, more and more platforms
are erected and annexed. A small airport is built and harbors are constructed, allowing for
increased trade opportunities. The few small barracks that housed the structures first
inhabitants have now evolved into towering apartment buildings.
With no official laws or ability to restrain inhabitants’ conduct, anything goes.
Drug use, prostitution and gambling are allowed, and a vague notion of altruism
constitutes the only form of governance over the new nation.
This seemingly far-fetched scenario is not the stuff of science fiction, but rather a
very serious endeavor, known as ―seasteading,‖ which has been attempted several times
with varying degrees of success. While none of these ventures have quite reached the
degree of success envisioned above, the question remains: is it really possible to start a
new nation on the high seas with all the rights, recognition and sovereignty of an existing
nation state? And to what extent, if any, do the laws of the rest of the world apply?

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This paper seeks to demystify the grey areas of admiralty and international law on
the high seas, where ambitious seasteaders endeavor to realize absolute freedom and
lawlessness.
What is a Seastead?
While the exact origin of the concept of claiming the high seas as home is
unknown, it was given its name in 1981 in Ken Neumeyer’s book, ―Sailing the Farm,‖
which explored the potential of life off the mainland. However, the idea itself existed
well before Neumeyer ever penned the term ―seastead,‖ and several attempts, dating as
far back as the 1960s, have been made at establishing sovereignty in international waters,
and numerous other conceptualizations posited.1
The Seasteading Institute, founded in 2008, (TSI) defines seasteading as the
creation of ―permanent dwellings on the ocean – homesteading on the high seas.‖2
This
wording is a slight deviation from Friedman’s earlier definition, including the term
―autonomous.‖3
Libertarian publication, Reason Magazine explains in a 2008 article on the
subject, ―The idea is to get out into international waters and set up a floating outpost (or
12, or 1,200) from which people can come and go, experimenting with different types of
legal, social, and contractual arrangements.‖4
Types of Seasteads
TSI’s definition of a seastead as a permanent dwelling likely conjures an image of
some sort of artificial island. However, a seastead can technically exist in the form of
either a floating vessel, like a retrofitted cruise liner or aircraft carrier, or a fixed
platform, like a deep sea oil rig.5
While establishing a floating colony is the easier

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solution in the short term, it is likely impossible to realize the true dream of seasteading
without establishing a fixed platform.6
As discussed in further detail below, vessels are
subject to significant regulation and must be registered with a nation state prior to
departure. More importantly, boats are not viewed as their own territory, but rather as a
small extension of whatever land they came from. For these reasons, seasteaders,
including TSI, aspire to establish permanent fixed platforms in international waters.7
The History of Seasteading
While the allure of the open ocean has beckoned pioneers to reach further and
seek new freedom and opportunity, the idea of the high seas as an end rather than a
means is a relatively new one. Like the early settlers of North America, enterprising
seasteaders are searching for the next global frontier on which to stake their claims and
manifest their destiny. The key difference is that rather than searching for new
unconquered lands, they intend to manufacture their own.
In the last century there have been three noteworthy seasteading efforts. None yet
have succeeded in fully establishing sovereignty and recognition on a global scale, but
their efforts provide something of a roadmap of what has worked and what hasn’t for the
fourth and perhaps most promising seasteading campaign: The Seasteading Institute.
The Principality of Sealand
Micronations8
are not all that uncommon and can spring up anywhere a person or
group desires to expend the time and effort to create flags, stamps, passports, maps or
other identification for a location. Generally viewed as a novelty – the Conch Republic,
the self-proclaimed ―drinking community with a fishing problem‖ is a notable example –

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most micronations make no genuine endeavor to gain the respect and recognition of other
nations, but rather constitute a grand form of creative expression.9
One micronation in particular, however, stands apart, having actually made
measurable progress toward achieving sovereignty and recognition.10
In 1975, Paddy Roy Bates established the Principality of Sealand on the
abandoned military base, H.M. Fort Roughs, claiming the land under the doctrine of terra
nullis. Although Bates initially inhabited the base for radio broadcasting purposes (see
further discussion on Pirate Radio, below), he later expanded the magnitude of his
dominion, eventually appointing himself prince, raising a flag and issuing currency. Over
the years, Bates defended the fort as his own, insisting on Sealand’s absolute
sovereignty.11
In Bates’s first skirmish with British forces, he and his son fired warning shots
over the bow of an approaching British vessel, effectively asserting dominion over the
seastead. Upon Bates’s next return to the mainland, he was arrested for the alleged
crimes. However, the British court dismissed the case, determining that Britain’s laws
were not applicable to Bates because Sealand was outside of Britain’s territorial waters.12

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Since this ruling, Bates has continually maintained that Britain’s refusal to exercise
jurisdiction over his otherwise criminal acts committed on Sealand constitutes de-facto
recognition.13
Unfortunately for Bates, the ratification of the third United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) in 1982, creating the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), dealt a potentially fatal blow to Sealand’s claims of independence.
Originally established before Britain adopted and ratified the UNCLOS-
prescribed 200 nautical mile EEZ, Sealand was not grandfathered in and is considered to
sit in British waters. However, based on Sealand’s relative success at preserving
sovereignty, it appears at least plausible that if Sealand were situated in international
waters, as recognized under UNCLOS, it might achieve recognition as a sovereign
state.14
The biggest legal impediment to seasteads becoming recognized sovereigns, as
demonstrated by the Principality of Sealand, is that the UNCLOS has ruled that ―artificial
islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no
territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the
territorial sea, the EEZ or the continental shelf.‖15
The counter argument, though, is that the UNCLOS decision not to respect
artificial islands likely stems from the fear that States would systematically and
unscrupulously extend their own EEZs outward by creating artificial islands at the outer
edge of their inherent EEZ. For example, the United States could foreseeably create a 400
nautical mile EEZ off the coast of California by building an artificial island 200 nautical
miles west of Monterey. The logic underlying this prohibition has little to no application
to outfits like Sealand. As the concept of seasteading becomes more mainstream and

8. 7
garners public respect, it is foreseeable that the movement’s proponents will seek an
amendment to the existing Conventions. A revision of the UNCLOS excepting artificial
islands which are not the extension of some existing State could allow for recognition
without setting dangerous precedent for existing member States of the UN.
Republic of Minerva
Another micronation worthy of note is the Republic of Minerva. Settled by real
estate tycoon, Michael Oliver, the Republic of Minerva was built in 1971 on an artificial
island and created with the eventual goal of becoming a libertarian utopia. Ultimately, the
laissez-faire mindset which prompted the creation of Minerva became its undoing, as its
would-be residents failed to fight for their land. 16
After importing tons of sand from Australia to reefs off the coast of Tonga,
settlers of Minerva erected a tower and a flag and declared their independence. This
declaration was proliferated to the governments of surrounding lands. Unwilling to cede
the reefs to Minerva, the nearby nations convened, resolving to support Tonga’s claim of
dominion over Minerva’s artificial island. On June 15, 1972, Tonga issued a
proclamation that the reefs, which lay within 12 miles of its coastline, were its territory.17
Later, Tongan military were deployed to the island, raising a flag and defending the land
in the name of the Kingdom of Tonga. Since these territorial disputes, the artificial island
has slowly eroded and has essentially been reclaimed by the ocean.18
Wayne Gramlich of The Seasteading Institute reflected upon Minerva’s demise,
explaining how seasteading ventures have seemed to follow a four-step path:
Phase 1 (Enthusiasm): Initial enthusiasm and excitement;
Phase 2 (Replan): Several replans to reduce project costs;

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Phase 3 (Bummer): The growing realization that even the rescaled plans are still
too expensive;
Phase 4 (Slow Death): Growing disenchantment with the whole project and a
slow exodus of people working on the project. (This last part is still a bit
speculative.)19
Operation Atlantis
Sharing the same libertarian spirit of the Republic of Minerva, Operation Atlantis
was launched with the goal of evading mainland laws and taxation. It’s visionary, Werner
Stiefel, an active member of the Radical Libertarian Alliance (RLA), built a massive
concrete vessel which he then navigated from the Hudson River out to the waters of the
Bahamas where he intended to dock upon a string of unclaimed cays. However, upon
reaching its intended permanent location, the platform was destroyed by a hurricane and
Stiefel’s ambitions sank along with the platform. Like Minerva, Atlantis followed the
same 4-part track identified by Gramlich.20
In 1970, shortly before the operation’s demise, Esquire Magazine wrote, in what
was likely Atlantis’s most significant instance of media recognition, ―Operation Atlantis
is a real mind-blower, for they’re not just interested in a floating community, but an
honest-to-god independent country. They are reportedly well-financed, well-managed,
and very serious. How are they going to do it? They’re going to build an island, baby, in
the middle of the ocean.‖21
The Seasteading Institute
The Seasteading Institute, founded in 2008 by Patri Friedman and Wayne
Gramlich seeks to accomplish what the above seasteads have failed to do: obtain absolute

10. 9
sovereignty, autonomy and global recognition.22
Friedman, a former software engineer
for Google and outspoken libertarian idealist, and Gramlich, author of ―Seasteading:
Homesteading the High Seas‖ intend to avoid the fates of their predecessors. Whereas
Minerva and Operation Atlantis were prompted by sheer libertarian idealism, The
Seasteading Institute is putting forth a far more pragmatic and extensively researched
effort. Already, TSI has attracted the interest of billionaire Pay-Pal cofounder, and
libertarian radical, Peter Thiel. Thiel, has already entrusted Friedman with an initial
$500,000 grant to fund early research and development of the first feasible seastead.23
Unlike earlier seasteading outfits, TSI has been afforded substantial credibility.
Major news outlets like CNN and Fox Business Network have interviewed Friedman and
discussed his ambitions at some length. Friedman, born in 1976, expects to have a fully
functioning and globally significant seastead up and running within his lifetime.
Harnessing the Freedom of the Seas
Despite mankind’s obsession with ownership, one realm of the natural Earth has
continually eluded his dominion: the ocean. For millennia, its vast expanses have
welcomed explorers, fugitives and refugees seeking adventure, freedom and safety by
braving the wildest parts of the world. To date, mankind has a better understanding of the
surface of the planet Mars than the depths of Earth’s oceans.24
Unconstrained, unoccupied and universally accessible, the open oceans offer an
ideal landscape for ambitious seasteaders to embark on their quest for adventure and
unbridled liberty. The third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS

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III) offers perhaps the most powerful and comprehensive assurance of the freedom of the
high seas:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-
locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions
laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international
law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked
States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject
to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other
installations permitted under international law, subject to
Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down
in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI
and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard
for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this
Convention with respect to activities in the Area.25
Because existing States have no authority to govern the goings on of others on the
high seas, it is the ideal realm for the establishment of an independent nation.
Historically, oppressed individuals and businesses have sought refuge on the high seas in
order to carry out restricted operations or indulge in prohibited activities. Seasteaders
hope the same principles that allowed others to bypass governmental regulations will
apply in even greater measure to their own operations. While the core purpose of
seasteading is not to freely engage in otherwise illegal activity, seasteaders do hope to
free themselves from what they consider excessive governmental entanglement in the
personal lives of individuals.26
The question of whether life on the high seas will provide

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the degree of liberty sought can be answered, to some extent, through analyzing previous
offshore efforts to bypass governmental restrictions.
Past Efforts to Evade the Law using International Waters
The high seas have long been viewed as a refuge from modern law, offering a safe
haven for behaviors which may otherwise be illegal, or at least frowned upon.27
The 2012
film, Pirate Radio, chronicled the anarchist efforts of a radio station to escape censorship
laws by broadcasting from international waters. During the 1920s and 1930s, gambling
barges anchored off the United States’ west coast, just outside the territorial waters,
allowed patrons the quench their thirst for gambling. With a demonstrated history of
relative ―untouchability,‖ the high seas offer a promising home for grander unregulated
endeavors like seasteading.
Pirate Radio
From the advent of radio up through the 1970s, pirate radio DJs operated on the
fringes of European law to supply uncensored music to British audiences. As more pirate
radio stations began springing up, the competition intensified and pirate DJs continued to
become more sophisticated and clever. Danish radio entrepreneurs Ib Fogh and Peter
Jansen, who had been monitoring the United Nations conventions on the Law of the Sea
anxiously awaited the ratification of the conventions, which severely reduced the reach of
a given nation’s jurisdiction to the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Pirate Radio
stations were able to escape the jurisdiction of their audience States by registering their
vessels in ambivalent nations, like Nicaragua and Panama. Because the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) dictates that regulation of vessels outside
a State’s contiguous zone is subject only to the exercise of jurisdiction of its flag state,

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this meant that only Nicaragua had control over Fogh and Jansen’s operations.
Unfortunately for Fogh and Jansen, Nicaragua’s government caved to Sweden’s pressure
and shut down their radio station.28
However, buoyed by their entrepreneurial spirit, the
Danes simply took their business to Panama. Unable to directly shut down the pirate
radio stations, governments were required to take a more indirect approach, essentially
cutting off their bloodlines. ―[G]overnments struck back, with new laws that made it
illegal for companies to supply pirates or advertise with them. Within a decade, most
pirate stations were history—but not before forcing major changes on the radio
industry.‖29
Gambling Barges
From 1926 through 1948, California law makers struggled to exercise jurisdiction
over the operations of free-floating gambling halls which allowed visitors to engage in
gambling practices like those allowed on Native American reservations.30
However, the
government ultimately succeeded in introducing the Gambling Ship Act, prohibiting
American citizens from ownership or operation of vessels whose primary purpose was to
be used as a gambling establishment. As discussed above, this is one of the reasons why
successful seasteads of the future will likely be permanent platforms rather than floating
vessels.
Women on Waves: Offshore Abortions
In 1999, the nonprofit group, Women on Waves (―WOW‖), began operating
floating abortion clinics in the international waters off the coast of the Netherlands in
order to skirt the country’s anti-abortion laws. Over the next 10 years, WOW expanded to
Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Spain. On at least one occasion, the organization’s vessels

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were blocked from entering port. Dr. Rebecca Gomperts, one of WOW’s founders
explained in an interview with DemocracyNow that when attempting to dock in Spain,
the ship received a fax stating it was not allowed to enter port and was later met by
military ships. WOW brought an action in the European Court of Human Rights and
won.31
As of 2015, WOW continues to operate and expand.32
Legislative (Domestic Law) Responses
In response to the numerous offshore efforts to evade the laws of coastal states,
legislative action has repeatedly been taken to curtail aquatic nonfeasance. Some of these
efforts have been successful (Gambling Ship Act) while others have failed (Netherlands
Criminalization of offshore abortions). The determining factor for the efficacy of these
legislative responses has hinged on how directly the legislation seeks to curtail the
activity. Historically, the most successful legislative actions have indirectly effected some
hardship on the economic feasibility of the practices. Pirate Radio and Gambling Barges
were forced out of business because fringe, but necessary, on-shore activities became
unsustainable in the wake of predatory legislation. Conversely, the Netherlands’
criminalization of Women on Waves’ practices had no practical effect since it could not
be enforced. Whether the Netherlands will impose legislation impairing the ability of its
citizens to own, operate, or maintain vessels used for such practices remains to be seen.
However, for the time being, it appears that efforts to impede illegal activity on the high
seas via domestic law have largely failed.
Prominent Seasteading proponent Brad Taylor of The Seasteading Institute has
expressed disinterest in trying to anticipate the legal troubles to be faced, concluding that
the feasibility of the endeavor can realistically only be proven through trial and error.33

15. 14
Legal Impediments to Seasteading
Jorge Schmidt, legal advisor to The Seasteading Institute, foresees an array of unknowns
with regards to the law governing future seasteaders. Schmidt says his basic advice to
seasteaders is, ―get your seastead out of the 12-mile range that countries claim full
sovereignty over, don't mess with resources in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone that
most nations also assert, and emulate existing ships in international waters by arranging
with some nation to obtain a "flag of convenience" marking seasteads as under its
protection. In open waters, only nations have rights. Individuals without a stable flag are
considered pirates and outlaws.‖34
Jurisdictional Limits
The first obstacle faced by prospective seasteaders is navigating jurisdictional
boundaries throughout the oceans. The most substantial body of law governing these
jurisdictional limits is the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), which came into effect in 1994, establishing a variety of sea areas and the
degree of control which coastal states may exercise over them.
The areas are as follows:
The Territorial Sea
The territorial sea extends from the baseline of the coastal state outward 12
nautical miles. Within this area, the coastal state has plenary power over the use and
resources, though vessels, both foreign and domestic, were granted the right of innocent
passage unless security protection requires a suspension of such rights.
Because sea zones are a product of a convention of the United Nations, only
member nations may regulate their territorial waters in accordance with UNCLOS. Thus,

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until a seastead is able to achieve membership in the UN, it is unlikely the international
community will recognize or respect its surrounding waters.35
The Contiguous Zone
From the outer edge of the territorial sea, out an additional 12 nautical miles
comprises the contiguous zone. Within this zone, coastal states are afforded limited
jurisdiction over the activities of passing vessels.36
This limited jurisdiction applies to
issues of customs, taxation, immigration and pollution, so long as the conduct to be
regulated was initiated within the state’s territorial waters, or is likely to continue into the
territorial waters pursuant to the doctrine of hot pursuit (see further discussion below).
The Exclusive Economic Zone
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), extend from the outer edge of the territorial
sea out to 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers; 230 miles) from the coastal state’s
baseline. Within the EEZ, the coastal nation has, as the name implies, exclusive rights to
the exploitation of all natural resources. Vessels belonging to foreign nations are afforded
the rights of navigation, overflight and operation of submarine cables within other
countries’ EEZs, so long as these activities do not constitute direct interference with the
coastal nation’s economic prospects in the area.37
While every coastal state is entitled to an EEZ, not all coastal land masses
necessarily command an EEZ. Artificial islands and uninhabitable rocky islands are not
contemplated in the drawing of EEZs.
UNCLOS provides in Articles 55 and 57 that every coastal State enjoys an
exclusive economic zone (―EEZ‖) adjacent to its coast, extending as far as 200 nautical
miles from the territorial sea baselines. As in the case of the continental shelf, however,

17. 16
not all islands, as defined in Article 121(1), may be used to delimit an EEZ. Article
121(3) states that ―[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone.‖38
Continental Shelf
Article 76 of UNCLOS III defines the continental shelf as ―The continental shelf
of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend
beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge
of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.‖39
Because the area prescribed by the convention on the Continental Shelf is
subsumed by the convention concerning the EEZ, the effects on Seasteads would be
essentially identical. The one exception worth noting with regards to the Continental
Shelf, is that in some instances, States may be entitled to an extended – up to 350 nautical
mile – claim over continental shelves where the edge of the continental margin is outside
the general 200 nautical mile boundary. Similar to the EEZ, the coastal State is entitled to
exclusive rights over the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf.40
In order to avoid any competing territorial claims, Seasteaders should be sure to
check with the United Nations Secretary General to determine whether prospective
Seastead locations might lie within the waters above a sovereign continental shelf.
International Waters
International waters, also called the high seas, are defined, by default, as all areas
of the ocean not falling within any degree of control by a coastal state.

18. 17
41
This map shows areas of the sea falling within coastal states’ EEZs in dark
shading while international waters are identified by light shading. As discussed in this
article, seasteads would be outside the jurisdiction of any other state if established in the
lightly shaded areas of this map.
Effect of UNCLOS on Seasteads
UNCLOS creates both significant problems and substantial opportunities for
Seasteaders. On the one hand, UNCLOS, as explained above, grants member States a 200
nautical mile EEZ extending outward from their territorial baseline, severely limiting the
amount of available habitable aquatic zones. On the other hand, UNCLOS restricts its
member states from exerting control outside of these prescribed areas. Similar to the
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, the specificity of the powers expressly granted
create a separate set of rights by virtue of inverse implication. Thus, while UNCLOS
restricts the use of the dark areas in the map above, it creates a significant unclaimed
region for Seasteaders to claim.42

19. 18
While this unclaimed area of the High Seas is expansive, its is important to note
that in the absence of large land masses nearby to form currents and continental shelves
to reduce wave swells, the open waters of the high seas are tempestuous and uninviting.
The solution to this problem would seemingly be to establish the seastead closer to
another land mass. But this would invite the obvious problem of legal disputes in the
EEZ. Thus, in order to have any chance at total, undisputed
sovereignty, seasteads will need to be at least 200 nautical
miles away from the nearest mainland and capable of
withstanding the full magnitude of the ocean’s hostility. Of
course, this is more a matter of practicality than legality, and
should be left to engineers, not lawyers.
Application in Sea Zones
43
UNCLOS defines the extent of jurisdiction coastal
states may exercise over the activities of foreign States within
close proximity to the coastal state. The ability of coastal states
to exercise jurisdiction over seasteads will depend on the
seastead’s proximity to the coastal state and the activity which
the coastal state seeks to enforce. Based on the foregoing discussion of the various Sea
Zones, seasteads will obviously have the greatest autonomy in International Waters
where other States have no right of regulation over the activities of the seastead.44
However, a seastead erected within 200 nautical miles of an existing state will be deemed
within that state’s EEZ and is thus precluded from exploiting the natural resources of the
waters or the continental shelf extending 200 nautical miles from the State’s baseline.

20. 19
Additionally, the fishing of fish stocks which migrate in and out of another State’s EEZ
may form the basis for legal action. While highly impractical, operation of a seastead
would technically be feasible within another State’s EEZ so long as the seastead in no
way infringed on the coastal State’s economic interests in the resources in its EEZ.
Operation of a seastead within 24 nautical miles of a coastal state would be
impractical and unsustainable. Although the contiguous zone only offers limited
jurisdiction to the coastal State, this power easily would be sufficient to exclude
seasteading practices. A fortiori, ongoing operations within a coastal State’s territorial
waters would be impossible.
Jurisdiction over Seasteads
The exercise of jurisdiction by an existing nation over a seastead will depend on a
number of factors. The first of these factors, which must be settled first and which
conveys the greatest import, is whether the seastead is a permanent platform, or a free-
floating vessel.
Permanent Platforms
Permanent platforms, while more difficult to establish than free-floating platforms
that can be fabricated on land and then piloted into the high seas, offer the better
foundation for the long-term goal of achieving UN membership. Most importantly,
permanent platforms are far more likely to be viewed as ―land‖ than free-floating vessels,
thus satisfying one of the threshold requirements for membership in the UN.
However, UNCLOS III’s current treatment of artificial islands, which would
likely govern platform-based seasteads, will likely be a major obstacle for seasteaders
hoping to establish a globally recognized nation.

21. 20
UNCLOS III Article 121 delineates the role played by islands, both natural and
artificial, in international maritime law.45
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide.46
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial
sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf of an island are determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention
applicable to other land territory.47
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf. 48
Artificial islands, installations and structures
in the exclusive economic zone:
8. Artificial islands, installations and structures do
not possess the status of islands. They have no
territorial sea of their own, and their presence does
not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the
exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.49
Based on the existing conventions on artificial islands, Seasteads will fail to
command their own EEZs. Even more damning, UNCLOS III’s non-recognition of
artificial islands as legal territories could be problematic for Seasteads’ efforts to achieve
recognition and membership in the international community. Unless UNCLOS is
amended to either revise the rules pertaining to artificial islands or to grant seasteads
some alternate designation, it will be extremely difficult for permanent seasteads to
achieve any kind of economic autonomy, much less a seat at the U.N.

22. 21
Floating Seasteads (vessels)
Floating Seasteads, on the other hand will face a different set of problems.
Although exponentially easier to get up and running than a fixed platform, the free-
floating variety of seastead lacks the ability to ever command an EEZ or hope to achieve
membership in the international community. However, if the seasteaders only goal is to
temporarily escape the laws of the mainland, taking to see on a vessel registered with a
relaxed State could do the trick.50
While building seasteads on ships on land would be easier in the short term than
hauling the materials out into international waters to assemble a permanent structure, the
legal tangles over floating vessels would likely be unsustainable.51
One such issue is the registration requirement. All vessels must fly the flag of the
State where registered. Under UNCLOS, jurisdiction over vessels exists only as to the
vessel’s flag state. What then, of vessels without a flag? UNCLOS dictates that stateless
vessels are subject to the laws of all member states. That is, any member of the UN may
impose its own laws over such a vessel and its occupants.52
The rationale underpinning this law goes straight to the heart of the entire
question of Seasteading’s legality: who regulates an unregulated sovereignty? The answer
is simple: anyone who doesn’t like it. A country will only expend its resources to impede
the practices of a sovereign state if those practices somehow constitute a detriment to it.
Tonga, for example, shut down the Republic of Minerva because it was infringing on its
fishing industry.53
Some researchers assert that regardless of the effect of a stateless
entity, the laws of natural human tendency and need for universal regulation will result in
the exercise of control over such vessels.54

23. 22
Thus, there is no inherent problem with being stateless, so long as the economic,
preservation, sanitation, or law enforcement rights of other nations are not being
adversely affected.55
However, until a seastead is prepared to undertake the potential of
enforcement by any disillusioned State, it will surely benefit from flying a flag of
convenience.56
Domestic Admiralty Jurisdiction
Unlike the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which represents a collective legislative
effort to prescribe a body of international law governing navigational rights, fishing and
mineral exploitation, and degrees of jurisdiction in coastal waters, domestic admiralty
law is primarily concerned with the exercise of power of a state over its citizens and
vessels flying its own flag. In some circumstances, states may exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction, and impose restrictions or sanctions on individuals or vessels operating
beyond their territorial waters. Such extraterritorial jurisdiction may only properly be
exercised where the vessel is flagged with that state or flying no flag at all, or when the
flag state consents.57
The United States, for instance established its jurisdiction over admiralty and
maritime matters into its Constitution.58
Until the 1900s, admiralty law was largely
viewed as a domestic issue, with individual nation states applying vastly different legal
regimes within their many individual and poorly demarcated jurisdictions. However, with
the increase in trade and more sophisticated ports, these legal jurisdictions became
evermore intertwined and confused, ultimately leading to the current preference for
multilateral treaties, which more effectively govern issues of safety, pollution and crime
at sea.59

24. 23
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Domestic Admiralty laws extend over all vessels flying that nation’s flag.
Additionally, United Nations member States may enforce UN conventions over other
member states beyond. In the absence of express legal authority over certain practices,
alternative recourse often exists. The doctrine of hot pursuit, for instance, allows the
operation of jurisdiction over a vessel or individual who committed some offense while
within the jurisdiction, but has since fled.60
Extraterritorial jurisdiction may also arise
where some agreement exists between the nations involved, such as a treaty or
international convention. In the absence of any such prescribed measures, the doctrine of
jus cogens provides something of a catchall – a rule that transcends written law and exists
in the realm of basic morality. 61
Customary International Law
Generally, sovereign nations must consent in order to be bound by a particular
treaty or legal norm. UNLCOS is a perfect example of customary international law. Each
of the parties to the convention have voluntarily subscribed to its rights and restrictions,
agreeing amongst the pertinent international community to police and be policed under its
authority.
In the case of seasteads, membership to the international community will likely be
vital to the viability of the endeavor. Despite the deeply libertarian mindset underpinning
the very notion of seasteading, membership in the international community and
involvement in the legal regimes associated therewith are something of a ―necessary
evil.‖ At first blush, it would seem that subjection to customary international law, such as
UNCLOS would restrict the absolute freedom sought by seasteaders, but the opposite is

25. 24
true. As discussed above, the negative implications of international conventions are at
least as significant as the express provisions. To this end, by subscribing to international
conventions, seasteads would be afforded all the rights not specifically listed by the
international agreements – which are actually quite limited and more focused on
economic prospect than individual freedom.
Once a functioning member of the international community, seasteads would be
able to achieve a degree of freedom paralleling their autonomy. That is to say, to the
extent of power another nation could exercise over a seastead would be limited primarily
by the seastead’s commercial dependence on it. Beyond such regulations imposed based
on geo-economics, the only other limitation on Seasteaders’ absolute liberty would be jus
cogens.
Jus Cogens Laws
Unlike customary law, the subjection to which must be voluntary, and which are
based on specific written bodies of law, jus cogens laws find their foundation in general
concepts of human decency. Due to the inherent impossibility of specifically identifying
a list of what constitutes an offense of human decency or a breach of humanity’s moral
code, the enforcement of jus cogens is deeply controversial. This point was crystallized
during the Nuremberg trials following the second world war. Nazi officers were tried and
convicted of numerous violations despite an obvious lack of jurisdiction. While these
trials operated under the auspices of some form of international due process, in actuality,
the outcome was nothing more than the war’s victor executing the enemy’s officials –
just in a more evolved, less barbaric way.

26. 25
With regards to Seasteads, jus cogens laws operate essentially as the outermost
restriction on absolute freedom. If each nation were a house, and each house had a
backyard representing freedom, countries like the United States would have a fairly
decent back yard with substantial room to run around before encountering barriers like
taxes, criminalized drug use, etc. For libertarians hoping for a bigger back yard, the high
seas offer something more akin to an expansive ranch, with miles of landscape. However,
even the biggest ranches have fences, and while Seasteaders find freedom in their
substance intake and lack of taxes, there will always be a fence. Torture, human sacrifice,
body mutilation, and other patently inhumane conduct will always exist beyond some
type of fence. Jus cogens, in essence, is that fence.
The Quest for Independence
International Recognition
As touched on earlier, it seems counterintuitive for seasteaders to seek recognition
from some other authority when the entire purpose of establishing the seastead is to
escape from authority. In order for seasteads to maintain ongoing viability through trade
with more established nations and avoidance of military installation or interference, they
will need to gain the trust and respect of the United Nations. The first step in this
endeavor will be to earn recognition.
i. The United Nations
There are 193 United Nations (UN) member states, and each of them is a member
of the United Nations General Assembly. As demonstrated by the map below (showing
all the member states to the UN in dark shading), recognition by the UN essentially

27. 26
equates to recognition by the world. By joining this community, Seasteaders would be
afforded all the same rights and privileges of every other member nation and would have
a say in the establishment of future regulations.62
The United Nations Charter, Chapter II, Article 4 prescribes the criteria for
admission of new member states. To be considered for admission, candidates must be
peace-loving, accepting of the UN’s Charter, and willing to carry out its obligations. The
final determination of whether or not to admit a state is determined through the General
Assembly following a recommendation by the Security Council.63
A recommendation for admission from the Security Council requires affirmative
votes from at least nine of the council's fifteen members, with none of the five permanent
members voting against. The Security Council's recommendation must then be
subsequently approved in the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote.
These criteria for admission, though, are seemingly meaningless unless the
threshold issue of what constitutes a ―State‖ is clarified. Thomas Grant’s ―Admission to
the United Nations: Charter Article 4 and the Rise of Universal Organization‖ explains,
―One criterion of admission contained in Charter Article 4 remained – to be admitted, the
applicant has to be a State. The focal point of most (but not quite all) controversies over
admission of new members, after 1955-1956, thus would be the identity of the applicant
as a State. Insofar as admission practice bore relevance to general international law, it did
so from then on in connection with questions of statehood, rather than in connection with
any putative rules governing the conduct of States in fields like human rights or
democracy.‖64

28. 27
Grant explains that the UN has been struggling with applications from scattered
islands near Taiwan who have applied for recognition but have yet to be admitted
because of challenges to their sovereignty. Applying these concerns to the hypothetical,
but likely inevitable, application for UN membership to be put forth by seasteads, it is
foreseeable that membership will be denied, or at least not granted, so long as there is any
challenge to the seastead’s sovereignty by an existing State. Based on this analysis, the
issue of statehood and UN membership becomes seemingly paradoxical – a chicken and
egg sort of situation. In order to become a UN member State, the seastead must attain
statehood. In order to gain statehood, the seastead must gain international recognition and
acceptance – something that UN membership would readily supply.
In lieu of simply being given a stamp of approval by an international organization,
the likely route to statehood and subsequent UN membership will simply be a practical
demonstration of viability. As Brad Taylor, spokesperson for The Seasteading Institute,
points out, it is futile to try to anticipate and assess the legal constraints and issues of
international law during the development stage.65
Perhaps as population continues to
inflate and the concept of seasteading gains further traction resulting in a successful and
sustainable sovereign seastead, the international community will be forced to confront the
reality that seasteads satisfy all the meaningful criteria for statehood.
Sovereignty
As the most successful micronation and the closest existing entity to the proposed
seasteads of tomorrow, Sealand offers arguably the best look at the road ahead for
aspiring seasteaders. Paddy Roy Bates, the self-crowned Prince of Sealand, declared
sovereignty for the micronation in 1967 and insisted on its sovereignty until his death in

29. 28
2012, citing Britain’s refusal to prosecute him as proof of what he called de facto
recognition.
Despite Bates’s insistence on having achieved some form of recognition, Sealand
still has yet to gain any official recognition –either from the UN itself, or from a single
member state of the UN In its rejection of Sealand’s membership application, the UN
noted that Sealand technically sits in British waters.66
The UN cited a similar reason for
denying admissions to other micronations, like Lovely, a ―start up sovereign‖ created in
an apartment building in Britain for the television show ―How to Start a Country.‖67
The lack of independent soil, then, appears to be the linchpin for a determination
of sovereignty. As such, in order to achieve the end goal of independence and autonomy,
seasteads must first succeed in demonstrating dominion over a territory. This territory
must exist in international waters and the operations on the territory must not influence
the ecology or resources of nearby waters within another state’s EEZ.68
By holding land
and existing beyond the claims of any other nation, seasteads may then rightfully make a
claim of sovereignty, opening the door for recognition in the international community
and ultimately membership in the United Nations.
Conclusion
Seasteading has the appearance of a new and original concept. Most books and
articles written on the subject frame it as a bold endeavor into the unknown. But while
the terminology and aesthetics may be new, from a legal perspective, there is nothing
particularly novel about seasteading. The possibility of starting a new country on the high
seas is not so much an issue of legality as an issue of practicality. To be clear, there are

30. 29
obvious issues of comporting with UNCLOS regulations over the limitations on using
waters within the exclusive economic zones of other countries and abiding by law of the
flag state with whom a floating seastead would be originally registered.69
However, once
the vessel is transformed into a fixed platform in international waters, no country can
directly regulate most actions on that seastead under traditional jurisdiction and
customary international law.70
The greatest dilemmas instead will likely arise from
disapproving States restricting trade and support of the Seastead, cutting off mainland
supplies and forcing the seastead to ally with other nations or fend entirely for itself
against pirates. But as noted earlier, these are concerns of practicality, not legality.
Based on the above examinations of domestic and international law and treaties,
seasteads boasting lax regulation and no taxation are entirely legal, assuming they can be
permanently established in international waters. However, the degree of freedom
seasteaders actually realize will always be proportionate to the degree of autonomy the
seastead is able to establish.
1
Neumeyer, Ken: ―Sailing the Farm‖ 1981.
2
TSI 2008, (http://www.seasteading.org/about/visionstrategy/)
3
―Seasteading is the establishment of permanent, autonomous communities on the ocean – homesteading
the high seas.‖ Friedman, Patri. ―Seasteading.‖ 2010.
4
K. Mangu-Ward, ―Hope Floats‖ Reason Magazine (2008), 40(4), 72.
5
―[Seasteading] could be done on modified ships or, in the longer term, on innovative designs resembling
oil platforms.‖ Friedman, Patri; Taylor, Brad. ―Competitive Governments on the Ocean.‖KYKLOS, Vol.
65 – May 2012.
6
Balloun, infra
7
―By contrast, structures permanently attached to the land, either over or underwater, are generally not
vessels unless they serve as navigational aids. Moreover, permanent structures that are tantamount to
artificial islands are not vessels and do not invoke admiralty law.‖ Dillard, Carter. ―The Primary Right.‖
Pace Environmental Law Review, Spring 2012, Volume 29, Issue 3, (citing Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 395 U.S. at 359–60).

31. 30
8
―A micronation is a piece of land that claims to be an independent or sovereign nation, but is not officially
recognized by the governments of the world.‖ Hanna, Laurie. ―The United Nations of Eccentricity.‖ The
Daily Mail. 9 February 2015.
9
Id.
10
―The most well-known proto-seasteading effort is the Principality of Sealand, which has managed to
acquire a certain degree of international recognition as a country. Founded on an abandoned sea fort off the
coast of England, Sealand has been home to a pirate radio station and the data haven business HavenCo.‖
(Grimmelmann, forthcoming; Strauss, 1984, pp. 132–138). (Friedman: competitive governments on the
ocean)
11
Lyon, Andrew H. E. ―The Principality of Sealand and its Case for Sovereign Recognition.‖ Emory
International Law Review, 2015.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
UNCLOS III Part 5, Article 57
15
UNCLOS III Part 6, Article 76
16
Doberty, Brian. ―20,000 Nations Above the Sea.‖ Reason Magazine. July 2009, Vol. 41 Issue 3, p38-47.
17
Id.
18
―Patri, 31, hopes to dodge the curse that has beset other watery "new country" projects such as Minerva
Reef, an uninhabited dredged island "invaded" by neighboring Tonga and eventually more or less
reclaimed by the sea.‖ Mangu-Ward, infra.
19
Gramlich, Wayne. ―Seasteading - Homesteading on the High Seas.‖ Self-published. 1998.
20
Fateh, Ryan H. ―Is Seasteading the High Seas a Legal Possibility?‖ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational
Law, 2013, Vol. 46:899.
21
Gardner, Hugh. ―Your Global Alternative: Communes, Experiments, Jails and Hidey-Holes.‖ Esquire
Magazine. September, 1970.
22
―The vision of seasteading is an urgent one. We can already see that existing political systems are
straining to cope with the realities of the 21st century. We need to create the next generation of governance:
banking systems to better handle the inevitable financial crises, medical regulations that protect people
without hindering innovation, and democracies that ensure our representatives truly represent us.‖ TSI,
<http://seasteading.org/about/>.
23
―Silicon Valley Billionaire Funds Plans for Artificial Island Nations.‖ International Business Times. 16
August 2011.
24
―Oceans: The Great Unknown.‖ NASA, 8 October 2009. < http://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-
8/features/oceans-the-great-unknown-58.html>.
25
UNCLOS III, Part 7, Articles 86-88.
26
See Friedman, Supra.
27
―With these plans to move away from states entirely, TSI seeks to use the extraterritorial status of
international waters to generate an even more extreme experience of escape from terrestrial norms, laws,
and constraints than the original Burning Man could hope to accomplish.‖ Steinberg, Philip E.; Nyman,
Elizabeth; Caraccaoli, Mauro J. ―Atlas Swam: Freedom, Capital, and Floating Sovereignties in the
Seasteading Vision.‖ Antipode, 2012.

32. 31
28
See Fingleton, Infra.
29
―But then governments struck back, with new laws that made it illegal for companies to supply pirates or
advertise with them.‖ Fingleton, Eamonn, ―Seasteading: The Great Escape.‖ Prospect Magazine, 26 March
2010, (Published in April 2010 Issue).
30
―As of 1926, to satisfy continuing cultural demand for gambling, entrepreneurs were transporting patrons
in excursion boats to casino vessels off the West Coast just beyond the three-mile limit of the United
States’ territorial sea (and California state waters).20 Casino vessels were groups of anchored barges that
could hold as many as 600 gambling guests at a time. ―O. Shane Balloun, American Law Enforcement on
the High Seas (2012) citing John Ryan Et Al., Micronations: The Lonely Planet Guide to Nations (2006).
31
―Well, when the ship was on its way to Portugal, the minister of defense, who was a fundamentalist
religious, right-wing minister, he claimed that the ship was violating the security of the state of Portugal,
and he sent a fax to the ship that they were not allowed to enter the port. And at the same time, they sent
warships to prevent the ship from sailing in. So, it was interesting because—in that, you know, it was so
unprecedented, because it’s a European ship, and Europe has all these agreements that you cannot just
block the ship of a friendly nation to enter your ports. So, it became an enormous scandal. The European
Union, there were debates in the European Union. The Dutch minister of foreign affairs had to intervene.
And, well, in the end, it didn’t solve the situation, because the ship couldn’t sail in. But we challenged this
decision of the Portuguese minister of defense in the European Court of Human Rights, and we won that
case.‖ Gomperts, 2015, (http://www.democracynow.org/2015/1/15/women_on_waves_meet_the_dutch)
32
Early this century, the Dutch non-profit group Women on Waves set out to provide safe and legal
abortion outside territorial waters in countries where abortion is illegal. The group developed a mobile
gynecological unit which can be easily loaded on a ship which can then sail to wherever it is needed
(Gomperts, 2002).10 There have been a number of other proposals to use ships anchored just outside
territorial water to provide services which are illegal or heavily-regulated on land, ranging from brothels to
floating euthanasia clinics. (Friedman: competitive governments on the ocean)
33
In a paper titled "Governing Seasteads: An Outline of the Options," published on the Seasteading
Institute's website, research associate Brad Taylor argues that "attempting to anticipate concrete rules is
pointless and against the spirit of seasteading, since we will only learn what works through trial and error."
Brad Taylor, Governing Seasteads: An Outline of the Options‖ (2010).
34
Doberty, supra, at page 7.
35
UNCLOS III, Part 2.
36
Id.
37
UNCLOS III, Part 5.
38
Id, at Article 121.
39
UNCLOS III, Part 6, Article 76.
40
Id, at Paragraph 6.
41
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone#/media/File:Territorial_waters_-_World.svg
42
The biggest problem is that the world’s most habitable watery real estate is already spoken for. The 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Seas grants each country with a coastline an exclusive economic zone
extending 200 nautical miles from its shore. (Prospect magazine: great escape)
43
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7d/Zonmar-en.svg/300px-Zonmar-en.svg.png
44
―Friedman notes that the first 12 miles offshore constitute a territorial contiguous zone that is bound by
the same laws as those prevailing on land. The next 12 miles are subject to national laws involving
smuggling, immigration, taxation, and sanitation. And every coastal nation has exclusive economic rights
in the zone extending 200 miles off its shores, meaning that all the gas, oil, fish, and other resources are

33. 32
under its control.‖ Adam Piore, Start-Up Nations on the High Seas, 2012.
45
UNCLOS III, Part 5, Article 121.
46
UNCLOS III, Part 8
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Yet there is a loophole—the same one that spawned the ―flag-of-convenience‖ shipping industry, in
which most of the world’s oil tankers and cargo ships are registered in obscure countries like Liberia. In
much the same way, seasteaders might build structures legally classified as ships and registered in places
like Panama. So long as the ―ships‖ keep moving, however slowly, and stay at least 12 miles from land,
they would be free from most forms of terrestrial oversight. (Prospect magazine: great escape)
51
―Nevertheless, TSI has stated a preference for free-floating designs over fixed-position designs because
floatation allows for migration away from a particular location destabilized by a nation-state’s claim over
the area. What this preference does not account for is that the broad definition of vessel in American
maritime law is very likely to subsume any free-floating seastead. Thus, assuming additional elements of
maritime jurisdiction are met—based on whether the controversy is contractual, in tort, or criminal—the
United States could exercise jurisdiction over any free-floating seastead or related supply-chain vessel
nearly anywhere on seventy-one percent of the surface of the earth.‖ Balloun, Supra, citing Oceans and
Seas, The Encyclopedia of Earth, http://www.eoearth.org/topics/view/49523/ (2012).
52
―Unrelated nations can interfere with, i.e., search and seize, these so-called stateless vessels with
impunity because vessels do not have direct standing under international law to protest the interference, and
stateless vessels have no nation on an equal footing with the interfering nation to advocate for them.‖
Balloun, supra, citing David F. Matlin, Re-evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience Under
International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1017, 1022–23, 1023 n.27 (1991).
53
See Mangu-Ward, supra.
54
―As nature abhors a vacuum, international law abhors the nonexistence of jurisdiction with respect to
vessels.‖ Ted L. McDorman, Stateless Fishing Vessels, International Law and the U.N. High Seas
Fisheries Conference, 25 J. MAR. L. & COM. 531, 538 (1994).
55
UNCLOS III Part 4, Article 33.
56
In order to eschew the regulations and standards that coincide with flying the flag of certain larger, more
developed countries, flying a flag from a country with loose registration standards, or open registry, allows
the greatest potential for autonomy while adrift on the high seas. However, flying a flag on open registry
carries both a historical stigma and high potential for legal conflict. It does appear that the solution of flying
flags on open registry is a temporary solution to a permanent problem: how do we claim sovereignty and
live under a self-created government on artificial land? (Lyon, Andrew: The Principality of Sealand and its
claim for Sovereignty, Emory International Law Review)
57
See Fingleton, supra.
58
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (―The judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.‖); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006); see also Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
359–81 (1959) (broadly discussing the history and nature of federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction).

34. 33
59
Hoffman, Michael L. ―Ship Organization Nears final Form; UN Maritime Body Expected to Have 3
Principal Organs – Panama in Opposition.‖ New York Times. March 1948.
60
Definition: The right of a coastal state to pursue onto the high seas a foreign vessel that violated its laws
while within its waters. The doctrine is based on both conventional and customary law. (Craig Allen,
Washington Law Review 1989)
61
Hasmath, Reza, ―The Utility of Regional Jus Cogens.‖ University of Oxford. 2 September 2012.
62
See Lyon, supra, at p.649.
63
―Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out
these obligations. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by
a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.‖ (U.N. Charter)
64
Grant, Thomas, ―Admission to the United Nations: Charter Article 4 and the Rise of Universal
Organization.‖ Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009. Pp. 334.
65
Piore, Adam, ―Start-Up Nations on the High Seas.‖ Discover. September 2012, p48-50.
66
―What is clear is that Bates’s teenage son, Michael, fired warning shots over the bow of a vessel in order
to assert Sealand’s territorial sea.The next time Roy and Michael stepped onto land, they were arrested for
violation of British weapons laws. Surprisingly, British court did not convict the Bateses, ruling that British
firearms laws were inapplicable in international waters, and that because Sealand was beyond Britain’s
territorial waters, the laws were not applicable to the Bates family at the time of the incident.‖ Balloun,
supra.
67 John Ryan Et Al., ―Micronations: The Lonely Planet Guide to Nations.‖ The Lonely Planet, (2006).
68
See Doberty, supra.
69
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 92(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 133 U.N.T.S. 397.
70
Under the ―floating territory doctrine,‖ a vessel’s flag determines the exclusive jurisdiction over it . See
Matlin, supra.