Slideset 2 from a 10-part Cognitive Security course at CanSecWest 2022

1. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Session2:
information and
response
environments
Disinformation/Malign Influence Training
Disarm Foundation | 2022
1
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2. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Course structure
Understand environment
1: Introduction
2: Information and response
3: Threats
Set up project
4: Project setup
5: Data collection
Manage components
6: Influence
7: Narratives
8: Behaviours
Manage risk
9: Risk assessment
10: Risk measurement
Hotwash
Module 2: Information and response
● Managing environments
● History of information
● Information landscape
● Influence landscape
● Response landscape
Exercise: build information & response
landscapes
● Example desk survey
● Example assessment
● Example interview plan
2

3. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Managing environments
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4. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
CogSec: Managing the whole system
Information
Landscape
• Information seeking
• Information sharing
• Information posting
• Information sources
• Information voids
Harms
Landscape
• Motivations
• Sources/ Starting points
• Effects
• Misinformation narratives
• Hateful speech narratives
• Crossover narratives
• Tactics and Techniques
• Artifacts
Response
Landscape
•Monitoring organisations
•Countering organisations
•Coordination
•Existing policies
•Technologies
•etc
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5. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Building Landscapes
Activities
● Define subject & region
● Map landscapes
○ Information landscape
○ Threat landscape
○ Response landscape
● Map landscape interactions
● Suggest landscape patches
Inputs
● Desk surveys
● Data analysis
● Interviews
● Workshop(s)
Outputs
● Landscape slideset
● Landscape report
● Connections
● Response recommendations
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6. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
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2022
History of information
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7. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
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2022
History of information
Propaganda is as old as time
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8. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
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2022
History of information
The written word
● Limited signal generation
● Limited transmission
● Limited ability to receive
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9. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
History of information
Movable type
● Increased transmission (audience)
● Increased reception
● Unintended second order effects
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10. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
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2022
History of information
Telegraph
● Increase range
● Increase speed
● Limited transmission and reception
Radio
● Increase range
● Increased reception
● Limited transmission
● Misinformation and disinformation
ncidents...
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11. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
History of information
Television
● Increase range
● Increase speed
● Limited transmission and reception
● Disinformation incidents
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12. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
History of information
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13. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Information landscape
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14. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
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2022
Information Environment
Digital harms
● Physical, economic, psychological,
reputational, social, societal
Inaccurate information
● Rumours, misinformation,
disinformation, conspiracy theories
Too much information
● Big data’s “3 Vs”: velocity, volume,
variety
Trust management
● Shift from increasing trust to
managing trust and its erosion
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15. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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2022
Channels
Lots of channels:
Where people seek, share, post
information
Where people are encouraged to
go
Image: https://d1gi.medium.com/the-election2016-micro-propaganda-machine-383449cc1fba
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16. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Geopolitics
Democracy
● Require common political knowledge
○ Who the rulers are
○ Legitimacy of the rulers
○ How government works
● Draw on contested political knowledge to
solve problems
● Vulnerable to attacks on common political
knowledge
Autocracy
● Actively suppress common political
knowledge
● Benefit from contested political
knowledge
● Vulnerable to attacks on the monopoly of
common political knowledge
See https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/11/information_att.html 16

17. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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2022
Influencers
Users or accounts with influence over a
network
● Not the most followers
● The most influence
● Might be large influence over
smaller groups.
17
Image: SJ Terp

18. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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2022
Groups
Social media groups created to create or
spread disinformation
● Often real members, fake creators
● Lots of themes
● Often closed groups
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Image: https://accountabletech.org/campaign/stop-group-recs/

19. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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2022
Messaging
Narratives designed to spread fast and be “sticky”
● Often on a theme
● Often repeated
Image: https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/analysis/false-text-messages-part-of-larger-covid-19-disinformation-campaign
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20. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Example Information Landscape
Channels: seek, share, post behaviours in…
• Traditional Media
• Newspapers
• Radio - including community radio
• TV
• Social Media
• Facebook
• Whatsapp
• Twitter
• Youtube/ Telegram/ etc
• Others
• Word of mouth
Influencers
Groups
Messages
Image: https://twitter.com/marcosviladomiu/status/1243997911521857536 20

21. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
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2022
Influence landscape
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22. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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2022
Existing Influencers
User experience designers
Friends, family etc
Advertisers
Political campaigns Psyops, mis/disinfo etc
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23. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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2022
Marketing: sales funnels
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Image: https://revenuehunt.com/build-sales-funnel-shopify-store/
Image: https://www.autogrow.co/the-evil-isis-sales-funnel-deconstructed/

24. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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Marketing: Customer segmentation and targetting
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● Image: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Customer_Segmentation.png

25. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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AdTech: microtargeting
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Image: https://www.adexchanger.com/venture-capital/ecosystem-map-luma-partners-kawaja/

26. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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Politics: ad (non) transparency
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Image: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/19/more-americans-are-using-social-media-to-connect-with-politicians/
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library

27. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Psyops: Most cyberspace operations are based on
influence
Force an adversary to make a decision or take an action based on:
● Information I hide
● Information I give
● Information I change
● Information I deny/degrade
● Information I destroy
Enable my decisions based upon knowing yours
“Operations to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and
objectives reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals”
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28. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
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2022
Response landscape
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29. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
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2022
Response considerations
Responders
● Responder types
● Misinformation response groups
● Disinformation response groups
● Within-group information sharing
Response communities
● Response types they can implement
● Response types they do implement
● Specialisations
● Between-group information sharing
Responses
● “First, do no harm”
● Narrative-based responses
○ countermessaging
○ prebunking
○ debunking
● Behaviour-based responses
● Influence-based responses
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30. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
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|
2022
Response Groups
● Government/ LE
● Platform
● Corporation
● Media
● Educator
● Nonprofit
● General Public
● Community group
● Influencer
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Image: DISARM foundation

31. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
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2022
Response Group Types
Disinformation SOCs
Large actors
• ISAOs
• Platforms
• Other large actors
Event-specific
• War rooms
• Agencies
Disinformation
Teams
Disinformation “desk"
• In existing SOC
• Standalone unit
Investigators
• Journalists
• Academics
• Independent journalists
Other Responders
Policymakers
Law enforcement
Corporations
Influencers
Nonprofits
Educators
Individual researchers
Concerned citizens
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32. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
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|
2022
Group capabilities and limits
● Readiness
○ Experience
○ Existing processes
○ Training
● Resources
○ Size / funding
○ Access to knowledge
○ Access to communities
○ Connections
● Sharing mechanisms
○ Data storage/use
○ API/RSS/feed capabilities
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● Disaster cycle coverage
○ Mitigation
○ Preparation
○ Response
○ Recovery
● Limitations
○ Type of response (so much fact
checking)
○ Focus (women, media etc)
○ Legal restrictions

33. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
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|
2022
Activities: mitigation
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Training
● General public
● Influencers
○ Media
○ Individuals
○ Organisations
● Responders
Landscape improvement
● Removing spoof accounts
● Muting superspreaders
● Reducing repeat rates
● Improving positive influencer effectiveness

34. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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2022
Activities: responses
Environment responses
● Account / message removal
● Rate limiting / soft blocking
● Search engine changes (TikTok, Google etc)
● Hashtag flooding / jacking (kPop etc)
● Honeypots
● Domain white/blacklisting
● Rebuilding communities / connections
● Expire ability to “like” / reshare
Active responses
● Remove troll farm ability to act
● Cut off banking access
● Seize botnet servers
● Lawsuits
● etc
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35. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Typical configuration
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Image: SJ Terp

36. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Example Response Landscape:
Needs / Work / Gaps
Risk Reduction
● Media and influence
literacy
● information
landscaping
● Other risk reduction
Monitoring
● Radio, TV, newspapers
● Social media platforms
● Tips
Analysis
● Tier 1 (creates tickets)
● Tier 2 (creates
mitigations)
● Tier 3 (creates reports)
● Tier 4 (coordination)
Response
● Messaging
○ prebunk
○ debunk
○ counternarratives
○ amplification
● Actions
○ removal
○ other actions
● Reach
36

37. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Example Responder Behaviours
● C00009: Educate high profile influencers on best practices
● C00008: Create shared fact-checking database
● C00042: Address truth contained in narratives
● C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
● C00093: Influencer code of conduct
● C00193: promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”
● C00073: Inoculate populations through media literacy training
● C00197: remove suspicious accounts
● C00174: Create a healthier news environment
● C00205: strong dialogue between the federal government
and private sector to encourage better reporting
37
Image: DISARM foundation

38. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Most useful activity: Improve the information/influence
environment
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https://www.demdigest.org/a-better-way-to-counter-astroturfing-disinformation-technology-and-democracy-in-transition/

39. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Exercise: build
information and response
landscapes
39

40. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Your task: initial desk survey for your project
Describe the information environment
● Demographics
○ Languages used
○ Population size
○ Major cities etc
● Seeking/Sharing/Posting channels:
○ Traditional Media
○ Social Media
○ Messaging systems
○ Websites
○ Others
● Influence
○ Influencers
○ Groups
○ Websites
○ Information routes
Describe the response environment
● Active response groups in this area
○ Risk reduction
■ Training
■ Environment
■ Other
○ Monitoring
■ Which media?
○ Analysis
■ Tier 1, 2, 3, 4
○ Incident response
■ Narrative based
■ Action based
● Limits on response
○ Legislative
○ Safety
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41. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
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|
2022
Desk survey questions
Information landscape
● What’s the population size? Demographic profile?
● How many people are online, on phones, on social media. Which social media?
● What are people searching for online
● Are they looking mainly internally, or at other countries’ outputs?
Risk analysis
● Is this country in existing known disinfo groups and sites
● What’s the chatter like here around known disinformation narratives
● Are there networks of disinfo sites here yet?
● What are the hot-topic issues that disinfo could use?
● Who are the major influencers?
Big questions
● How many people are online
● What are they looking at and for?
● What are the main sources of information and disinformation
● What’s from inside the country vs what’s coming in from outside (e.g. Nigeria)
More sensitive questions are around partnering: are there sources of friction amongst responders, are government
agencies compromised etc.
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42. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Desk Survey Sources
● Information landscape
○ facebook/twitter/mobile use: Datareportal.com
○ Reuters digital news report
○ Languages: wikipedia “languages in <countryname>”
○ https://worldpopulationreview.com
○ https://data.humdata.org
● Response landscape
○ Active responders: AMITT lists of groups and tools and map
○ Larger groups: DFRlab, EuVsDisinfo
○ Google searches
● Harms landscape
○ Disinformation incidents: OII 2020
○ Websites: Mediabiasfactcheck
○ Google searches, e.g. Country/cities + mis/disinformation
● Activities
○ AMITTs: Red and Blue
○ Assessment questions: Cognitive Security ecosystem assessment
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43. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Next activity: Data analysis
Create narratives list
Create search terms list
● For this area
● This/these communities
● This/these languages
● This topic
Do social media reach analysis on influencers
Use google search as input on what people are
looking for
43
Use channels list to gather data. Use:
○ APIs
○ Web scrapes
○ By hand
Analyse data for new:
● Search terms
● Topics / concerns
● Influencers
● Incidents

44. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
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2022
Annex:example first desk
survey
44

45. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Republic of Moldova / Medical / Coordinator
45
Information environment
General
● Languages: official language is Romanian. Other languages include Russian, Gagauz, and Ukrainian.
● Population of about 4 million, in South Caucasus and Western CIS region. Country code is “MD”.
Media and social media use:
● The most common social media channels are Facebook, Instagram, and Odnoklassniki
● The most common communication tools are TV, Viber, and Telegram
Risk environment
● Disinformation channels include facebook and instagram.
● Disinformation tactics include fake accounts pretending to be individuals or organisations, memes, flooding web forums, trolls
manipulating online debate, “grain of truth” narratives.
● Disinformation routes include translations of material from Russian to Moldovan.

46. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Moldova/ Medical/ Coordinator
46
Response environment
Disinformation response groups include:
● StopFals: disinformation watchdog.
● Asociatia Presei Independente (API):
● Regional: East StratCom Task Force
Response tactics include
● Fact-checking - StopFals.
● The “Adopt a Troll” campaign, paying individuals to expose troll factories.
● The Trolless online tool for spotting inauthentic accounts. Trolless appears to have originated in a hackathon.
Other organisations that could be helpful to infodemic response in Moldova include:
● Watchdog.md: Moldovan organisation that covers research and public policy.
● DFRlab has investigated disinformation in Moldova.
● Facebook took down a set of facebook and instagram accounts in Feb 2019.
● Development organisations’ country offices: these include WHO and UNICEF.

47. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Moldova/ Medical / Coordinator
47
Covid19 Specific
Covid19 narratives seen in Moldova include:
● Deaths from other causes are being registered as Covid19 - StopFals
● Masks are toxic (made from hazardous waste, cause sideeffects etc) - StopFals
● Masks contain worms – StopFals
● President refusing to be vaccinated; president was secretly vaccinated in January - StopFals
● EU considering Sputnik vaccines - StopFals
● Doctors refusing to be vaccinated – StopFals
● Coronavirus is a bacterium - StopFals
Background reading
Moldova is covered in the OII case studies for 2019 and 2020.
● https://datareportal.com/digital-in-moldova
● OII case study 2019
● OII case study 2020

48. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Annex: example
assessment
48

49. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Example Information Landscape
• Traditional Media
• Newspapers
• Radio - including community radio
• TV
• Social Media
• Facebook
• Whatsapp
• Twitter
• Youtube/ Telegram/ etc
• Others
• Word of mouth
49

50. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Example Threat Landscape
Motivations
● Geopolitics mostly absent
● Party politics (internal, inter-party)
Actors
● Political parties
● Nationstates
● Entrepreneurs
Activities
● Manipulate faith communities
● discredit election process
● Discredit/discourage journalists
● Attention (more drama)
Harms / severities
● Assassination
● Voting reduction
Sources
● WhatsApp
● Blogs
● Facebook pages
● Online newspapers
● Media
Routes
● Hijacked narratives
● Whatsapp to blogs, vice versa
● Whatsapp forwarding
● facebook to whatsapp
● Social media to traditional media
● Social media to word of mouth
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51. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Creator Behaviours
● T0007: Create fake Social Media Profiles /
Pages / Groups
● T0008: Create fake or imposter news sites
● T0022: Conspiracy narratives
● T0023: Distort facts
● T0052: Tertiary sites amplify news
● T0036: WhatsApp
● T0037: Facebook
● T0038: Twitter
51
Image: DISARM Foundation

52. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Example Response Landscape: Needs / Work /
Gaps
Risk Reduction
● Media and influence
literacy
● information
landscaping
● Other risk reduction
Monitoring
● Radio, TV, newspapers
● Social media platforms
● Tips
Analysis
● Tier 1 (creates tickets)
● Tier 2 (creates
mitigations)
● Tier 3 (creates reports)
● Tier 4 (coordination)
Response
● Messaging
○ prebunk
○ debunk
○ counternarratives
○ amplification
● Actions
○ removal
○ other actions
● Reach
52

53. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Responder Behaviours
● C00009: Educate high profile influencers on best practices
● C00008: Create shared fact-checking database
● C00042: Address truth contained in narratives
● C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
● C00093: Influencer code of conduct
● C00193: promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”
● C00073: Inoculate populations through media literacy training
● C00197: remove suspicious accounts
● C00174: Create a healthier news environment
● C00205: strong dialogue between the federal government
and private sector to encourage better reporting
● C00009: Educate high profile influencers on best
practices
● C00008: Create shared fact-checking database
● C00042: Address truth contained in narratives
● C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth
based)
● C00093: Influencer code of conduct
● C00193: promotion of a “higher standard of journalism”
● C00073: Inoculate populations through media literacy
training
● C00197: remove suspicious accounts
● C00174: Create a healthier news environment
● C00205: strong dialogue between the federal
government and private sector to encourage better
reporting
53
Image: DISARM Foundation

54. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Practical: Resource Allocation
• Tagging needs and groups with DISARM labels
• Building collaboration mechanisms to reduce lost tips and repeated collection
• Designing for future potential surges
• Automating repetitive jobs to reduce load on humans
54
Image: SJ Terp

55. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Annex: example
interview plan
55

56. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
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Foundation
|
2022
Interviews and workshop(s)
● List stakeholders
● Find active and potential responders
● Desk survey on responders
● Interview each responder
● Write up
● Cross-check with workshop
56

57. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
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2022
Interviews
Start with who you are and what you’re doing…
Short interview questions
Long interview questions
Sector-specific interview questions
● Election / health etc
● Influencers, e.g. bloggers
● Media
● Response team
57

58. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
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|
2022
Short interview questions
● Where do people get their news in <area of interest>
● What information sources do people use - offline and online
● Which languages do people use with each other - offline and online
● How do people connect to each other online?
○ Which social media do they use
○ Which messaging apps - and are they 1:1 or in groups
● Have you seen any misinformation or hate speech?
○ Which channels is it on - social media, URLs etc
○ Are there well-known disinformation or fake news “influencers”? Where do
they output information?
58

59. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Long interview questions: Environment
● Where do people get their news in <area of interest>
○ What information sources do people use - offline and online
● Which social media sites do people use most?
● How do people find material?
○ Hashtags?
○ Country name?
○ Following influencers?
○ Traditional news organisations online?
● How do people connect to each other online?
○ Which social media do they use
○ Which messaging apps do they use? (e.g. SMS, Whatsapp, Telegram etc)
○ If messaging apps are used, are there public groups on the messaging apps?
● Which languages do people use with each other - offline and online
● Who are the online influencers?
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60. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Long interview questions: Threat
● Have you seen any misinformation or hate speech?
● Where does misinformation come from?
○ Is it in radio, newspapers, on TV?
○ Is it online? If so, which channels is it on - social media, URLs etc
○ Are there well-known disinformation or fake news “influencers”? Where do they
output information?
● Does disinformation appear to be well-structured?
○ Are there fake news sites and accounts in <area>? Are there networks of them?
● <check for response-related threats>
○ E.g. what do you think of legislation related to the online space
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61. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Long interview questions: response
We’re looking for skills and evidence in 3 areas:
● Identification - finding potential disinformation
● Factchecking - assessing identified information though
cross-checking, reverse search etc.
● Response - combatting disinformation through
counter-messaging, debunking etc
Our big questions are:
● Does your organisation do any of these things?
● Who else is doing this work in the country (or in
neighbouring countries, if their techniques could be
useful here)?
● What do disinformation, misinformation and hate speech
look like in <area>.
61
For both your area of interest, and in general:
Identification
● Are there any misinformation tiplines in the country already?
●
Factchecking
● Which information sources do people use for factchecking?
Response
● If you see disinformation, what do you do in response?
● Who is responding to disinformation? How?
● Do debunking pages exist already?
Process
● How quickly do you go from finding disinformation, to responding to it?
● If I was a member of the public looking for help on misinformation,
where would I look?
● Do you use identification, fact checking, or response tools? If so, which
ones?
Actors’ capacity:
● How many staff at secretarial level? How many members?
● Existing initiatives ongoing? How many staff involved?
● Budget sources and timelines?
● Interactions with other stakeholders in this field?

62. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Specific interview questions: elections
General
● Which misinformation narratives have you seen around elections?
● Who counters these narratives?
● How?
Stages
● Voter registration
● Campaigning
● Voting and polling stations
● Vote counting
● Win declarations
For a slow start: have you seen these narratives?
● Voter suppression: None of the parties care about your demographic, so don’t vote
● How to vote: e.g. listing the wrong methods (‘text this phone number’), or downplaying valid methods like mail-in voting
● Polling stations: Which polling stations are open and/or closed, voting machines are switching votes,
● Voter fraud: people are voting twice, non-voters (children, immigrants etc) are voting, dead people are voting,
● Vote counting: opposition votes are being thrown away or replaced, ballot stuffing (extra votes are being created), who you
voted for isn’t private information,
● Winners: a different candidate won,
● Languages: spreading disinformation in a language and/or demographic that isn’t being tracked, or reported in.
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63. Disinformation/Malign
Influence
Training,
Disarm
Foundation
|
2022
Specific interview questions: media regulator
● Do people try to fake your members’ websites, broadcasts, social media accounts?
● How many stations are licensed? un licensed?
● How do people report on disinfo?
● Do people trust the traditional media?
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