1. GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE – COURSEWORK ASSIGNMENT
Should developing countries resist further cuts in emissions in the absence of commitments to
major cuts by developed countries?
There is little doubt that climate change is becoming an increasingly significant factor in our
lives. There are concerns of its effects due to an expanding body of compelling scientific
evidence of anthropogenic climate change with regular reports from the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change – henceforth IPCC – in addition to concerns at the rate of progress
achieved so far towards the goal of reducing emissions in order to alleviate the most damaging
effects of climate change. The established targets of limiting global temperature rise to 2 °C or
less, so as to mitigate the most serious effects of climate change, require substantial emissions
cuts: often up to 80% in the cases of some developed countries (Rogelj et al. 2009). This target
also exists to reduce the likelihood of a runaway warming effect where rising temperatures
simultaneously increase greenhouse gas emissions – such as through the feared defrosting of
methane hydrates – whilst destroying the planet’s natural mechanisms of removing greenhouse
gases from the atmosphere – notably through ocean acidification (Lynas 2008). A stumbling
block of sorts in achieving these reductions and meeting the targets is that frankly, current
national targets and trends fail to cut the mustard (Rogelj et al. 2009). The harsh reality facing
our planet currently is that there is a marked disconnect between current emissions trends and
what our climate is capable of withstanding without serious consequences to ourselves. This
threat is far from one which is a technological or scientific impossibility as the principle
obstacle to tackling this disconnect is political reluctance from governments (Compston and
Bailey 2008).
Early climate conferences indicated that one such political obstacle was the discord
between the Global North and the Global South, particularly in terms of how emissions
reduction in developing countries would manifest itself (Davenport 2008, p. 50). This essay
seeks to examine the reasoning of developing countries behind making or resisting further cuts
in emissions if, as would currently seem the case, there is an absence of meaningful
commitments to emissions reduction by developed countries. In doing so, this essay explores
the most suitable course of action for developing countries, whilst also being aware of the
relationship between domestic climate policy and the issues which are influencing the wider
political situation of climate change. The predicaments that developing countries are presented
with question whether or not their owns efforts to reduce emissions are in fact serving the best
interests of their country, and how a fragmented international response to climate change
further complicates the development of effective climate policy in tandem with the
development of its citizens’ quality of life. What becomes clear is that a lack of major emissions
cuts by developed countries highly complicates the situation as developing countries find
themselves having to balance decisions made for their general benefit and for the climate
against the possibility that their actions may prove to be in vain if global consensus on climate
change is not forthcoming. However, with an understanding of some of the forces that are the

2. source of the ‘absence’ of major cuts by developed countries, it seems that it would be unwise
for developing countries to actively make themselves a part of the climate problem rather than
the climate solution so as to remember what is ultimately in the best interests of all countries:
the alleviation of the worst effects of climate change.
Scientific consensus indicates that the majority of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions,
past and present, and for the ensuing rise in average global temperature lies with developed
countries. Unfortunately, the nature of atmospheric emissions means that irrespective of where
the emissions originate, the consequences manifest themselves across the global climate and
thus developing countries find themselves highly implicated in a delicate climate situation that
is little of their own doing. Whilst this does raise interesting philosophical debates on climate
justice for developing countries (Page 2006 pp.167-8), in reality they find themselves in a
precarious position. Emissions must be brought under control at a global level in order to make
progress to minimise temperature rises, meaning that a potentially comprehensive climate
policy agreement adopted by developing countries – in the continued absence of major action
from the developed world – could be ultimately in vain. The difficulties therefore facing
developing countries are whether or not they can suitably commit themselves to take steps to
further reduce emissions or if resistance presents a less unattractive alternative.
Development – through goals like poverty reduction and energy security – will always
come first for developing countries; their challenge is to harmonise these needs with
environmentally sound policies (Reddy 2009). However, there are complex and multi-faceted
obstacles in trying to achieve these complementary aspects to form appropriate policy due to
the particular situations of many states. For example, an issue such as deforestation is estimated
to account for nearly one-fifth of total greenhouse emissions; it is developing countries, notably
Brazil and Indonesia, who are the most significant actors in this regard (Buys et al. 2009 p. 13).
The problem is that whilst this represents a significant opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, the challenges of arresting the sheer scale of deforestation and then offsetting what
represents a significant part of industrial activity in such countries would not be a
straightforward process for developing countries; one which is made no easier by the likely
absence of substantial assistance from the developed world. This demonstrates how an issue
like climate change can arguably be neglected by developing countries who are principally
more engaged with their own development ambitions. This also effectively illustrates the
notion of ‘unfavourable stakes’ of countries in emissions reduction efforts (Buys et al. 2009 p.
24). Whilst there are many developing nations who are highly inclined to be open to further
reducing greenhouse gas emissions – generally as they are the most vulnerable to the effects of
climate change – other developing nations such as China and India are not so inclined due to
in part their current reliance and availability of fossil fuel energy sources (Buys et al 2009 p.
22). This serves to reinforce the notion that the particularities of developing countries, which
are by definition not uniform, can have an adverse effect on their likelihood of making further
emissions cuts; a position which is not helped by similar stakes on the part of developed
countries.
Another aspect which presents challenges to the balance between climate change and
development policy is industrialisation. Its main features are that it is typically an emissions
intense practice which also represents the classic means by which development is both achieved
and judged, making it a desirable strategy in development terms that simultaneously

3. discourages ambitions to reduce emissions (Zhang 2011). Aside from this immediate discord
with climate change, the process of industrialisation can reduce poverty – a key concern in a
climate change affected world (IPCC 2013) – and ultimately vulnerability to the ill effects of
climate change in the way that it diversifies a country’s economy: ‘by broadening the range of
exports of a developing economy, helping to develop infrastructure and institutions, and
enhancing urbanisation’ (Zhang 2011). It should be noted that with industrialisation comes the
opportunity to decarbonise industrial activity in the long run which can be a positive means to
reduce emissions, particularly with a sectoral approach focussing on certain industrial sectors
at an international level (Meckling and Chung 2009). However, this inherently indicates a
carbon intense practice to industrialise in the first place, a likelihood further increased if
international assistance were not forthcoming; thus feeding into the pressure on developing
countries to slow down the rate of their industrialisation, or perhaps to deindustrialise, for the
purpose of mitigating climate change (Zhang 2011). This highlights the point of general
development goals sometimes being at odds with goals to reduce emissions in developing
countries, and factoring in the positions of developed countries, as the prospect of resisting
further emission cuts can increase: ‘risks are compounded by the potential tension between
China’s drive for economic growth and its climate change targets; without strong and effective
intervention, it seems likely that investment in traditional fossil fuels will continue to grow
faster than renewable energy’ (Sullivan 2011 p. 19).
In light of the demonstrated difficulties that developing countries may have in deviating away
from emissions-intense practices for the sake of development, it is important to evaluate the
potential for other ‘green’ policies to be beneficial to developing countries and judge their
relative merits. What arises is the notion that practice which has great potential to address
climate change and development on paper often fail to make the transition into significant
policy for developed and developing countries alike; ultimately the hindrance of meaningful
international collaboration playing a role once more. Many market-based measures certainly
fall into this category, particularly due to the way they simultaneously do good for developing
countries and a global climate change agenda. Be it through businesses subsidising particular
sectors’ progress towards best practices as already mentioned, or be it through the highly
lucrative prospect of emissions trading (Reddy 2009). The ability for certain firms, public or
private, to avoid the potential fines for failing to hit emissions targets and mitigate this through
the purchase of what are in essence averted emissions generates significant capital, leading to
advocates indicating that the trading of carbon emissions has the potential to be a global
commodity in the same was as oil, food, and metals (Layfield 2012). The benefits for
developing countries are clear, as they stand to gain the most from being able to sell their
emissions and attract investment. However, the fundamental issue with such a practice is the
transition from a political effort of international collaboration to a financial effort of marketing
emissions; questions of the overall effectiveness of emissions trading as a means to reduce
emissions are therefore undeniable when they are piecemeal in implementation (Layfield
2012). Whilst this does not directly constitute a resistance to further emissions cuts by
developing countries, it is by no means a great stride towards combatting climate change.
In addition, a closer examination of some of the principle formulas for climate
agreement does little to encourage the notion that developing countries are going to take steps
to further reduce their emissions, as this climate agreement process is almost totally dependent

4. upon global action. This has already been illustrated with regards to a sectoral approach, and a
top-down Kyoto-esque climate agreement is almost totally dependent on the requirement of
strong, legally binding, global coordination (Hare et al. 2010). The international status quo
currently represents a bottom-up arrangement where countries volunteer emissions reduction;
this has already been identified as something which promises little in effectively combatting
climate change (Hare et al. 2010) and goes some way to illustrating the absence of major
commitments to emissions cuts by developed countries. One approach which puts significantly
less pressure on many developing countries is one of contraction and convergence: the proposal
that a strict threshold of emissions is set requiring large emitters to make cuts but not preventing
many developing countries from increasing their emissions – possibly through industrialisation
– to an acceptable limit (Meyer 2004). Whilst this does represent a highly workable plan for
low emitting developing countries, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, it comes across the same
obstacles as a top-down approach in that major emitters have to make major cuts to emissions.
Thus ensues the familiar scenario of developing countries being less likely to reduce their own
emissions in light of the current failing trajectory of global climate consensus.
So far, several cases have been highlighted to illustrate the scenario that in the absence of
developed countries’ major cuts, developed countries are likely to pursue policies that do not
endorse further reductions in emissions. Whether it be down to the difficulties pertaining to
prioritising climate change policy over other development goals or a country’s inherently
unfavourable stakes that make further cuts less straightforward, a recurring theme throughout
has been the issue of absence on the part of developed countries. As a matter of fact, all
countries are extremely reluctant to pursue climate change favoured policies unilaterally, which
highlights the requirement for a global consensus (Compston and Bailey (B) 2008).
Multifaceted arrangements of assistance would go a long way to help the harmonisation of
development and climate change policy, such as through investment in renewable energy
sources instead of fossil fuels in developing countries (Sullivan 2011); granted there are still
risks involved but these risks would be somewhat alleviated by the international nature of the
effort. Therefore, when it comes to evaluating the question of what should developing countries
do and how they should act in the absence of meaningful action from the developed world, an
understanding of the reasons behind this absence is essential. To advocate the developing
countries should resist further emissions cuts would be to insinuate that the absence of major
cuts by developed nations is definite, and in the extreme would be to imply that climate change
is an unsolvable problem. In order to avoid such suggestions, it is necessary to further delve
into the significance of the absence of developed action so as to determine the most salient
course of action for developing nations in light of the ultimate general goal of averting the most
serious effects of climate change. Developing countries may not be responsible for the majority
of current levels of emissions, but assuming little action is taken, current trends indicate that
within the coming decades they will become significant emissions actors (C2ES 2013).
In order to conclude on what developing countries should do in the current absence of major
emissions cuts by developed countries, it is worthwhile to examine the nature of the obstacles
that lead to such an absence so as to better understand the possibility of more vigorous climate
action (Compston and Bailey (B) 2008). It would be unfair to say that developed countries do
not care about climate change, they are currently just not prepared to make the commitments

5. demanded by scientific analysis; whilst there are interesting psychological preconditions that
result in our species being better suited to dealing with short-term threats (Lynas 2008), the
focus here is more on the political manifestations of climate change barriers. Some of the
principle barriers include: scepticism of unilateral climate action, influence of climate sceptics,
lack of appropriate technological solutions compared to fossil fuels, issues of competitiveness
reduction, electoral restrictions, and intragovernmental obstacles (Compston and Bailey (B)
2008 pp. 264-267). The first issue mentioned is of particular relevance to our question about
developing countries’ course of action: scientific certainty affirms that climate change is a
global problem that requires a global solution. The adverse effect of this is that the lack of
current global agreement makes it difficult for countries to justify climate action that could
frankly be ineffective; this can create an unfortunate cycle of demotivation to tackle climate
issues in an international system where the biggest emitters fail to take the lead on hitting
scientific targets for emissions reduction.
The obstacles and fears of making radical, although necessary, emissions reductions are
not going to disappear overnight, nor at the Paris 2015 Climate Change Conference. However,
the process of greater international participation in climate change, such as through the
membership of Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations, can have the effect of
‘greening’ the negotiating positions of countries (Grundig 2009) and thus taking important
steps to addressing the aforementioned unfavourable stakes of developed and developing
nations alike. An additional natural consequence of wider participation is the general
gravitation towards a more optimal climate agreement through the potential for uniformity in
the application of mechanisms, such as emissions trading (Grundig 2009). The potential
progress that can be made with greater participation in climate change is worth pursuing. Whilst
the recent Copenhagen conference may well exist to mask the lack of global climate protocol
in light of Kyoto’s shortcomings along with the identified difficulties in the negotiating
progress, climate policy is making positive advances nonetheless (Dimitrov 2010). The notion
that developing countries would actively resist further cuts in emissions in the absence of major
cuts is a troubling one in what is likely to be an incremental process to tackling climate change.
In doing so, developing countries would be forming an additional, active part of the climate
negotiation problem rather than the solution. This undoubtedly presents significant policy
challenges – particularly for the biggest emitters – amongst developing countries in order to
balance their own fundamental objectives with effective climate change strategy; on some
occasions the more suitable option may not be the greenest. Such a process would detract far
less from the global climate negotiation effort than a strategy of resistance to emissions cuts.
However, given the ever more urgent need to tackle an issue which arguably threatens
developing countries the greatest, to indicate that developing countries should resist further
emissions cuts is improper. It is through collaborative effort that climate change will ultimately
be addressed, and collaborative effort also seeks to address some of the difficult decisions
developing countries must make; to erode such effort through active resistance and to hinder
the global effort would be ill-advised.
In conclusion, developing countries should not resist further cuts in emissions in the absence
of major cuts by developed countries. However, this must not be mistaken to indicate that any
‘green’ policy is the most effective course of action for developing countries, as their particular
situations can be more complex. Whilst standing to lose the most in a climate change affected

6. world, certain countries have unfavourable stakes when it comes to climate negotiation, the
potential alleviation of which is diminished by the lack of international agreement on assistance
practices. In addition, the fundamental goal of development in developing states with the lowest
incomes is one which does not always harmonise with efforts to combat climate change.
Correspondingly, this must not be equally mistaken to propose resistance to further emissions
cuts and in fact places the onus on the international community to work alongside developing
countries as part of the climate solution. What is therefore likely overall is that some developing
countries may have legitimate concerns leading to practices that are not ostensibly geared
towards short-term emissions reduction. However, this should be done in such a way that global
participation can progress in order to ultimately take steps towards alleviating climate change;
a policy of active emission cuts resistance is not overall in the short, nor long-term interests of
developing countries.

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