Dissertation

Department of Politics, History and International
Relations
The Middle East, Women’s Rights
and Secularisation
Does increasing women’s rights in the Middle
East lead to secularisation?
Samantha Hill
Dissertation
Loughborough University

The Middle East, Women’sRightsandSecularisation
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Table of Contents
Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4
Chapter 1: Secularism and Islam ……………………………………………………………………….11
Chapter 2: Women’s rights, a Secular and Islamic Feminist approach………………17
Chapter 3: The Turkish Case Study……………………………………………………………………..21
Chapter 4: Iran …………………………………………………………………………………………………….31
Chapter 5: Discussion ………………………………………………………………………………………….41
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..46
Glossary…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………48
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….49

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Abstract
This dissertation has been used to examine whether or not increasing women’s
rights has led to secularisation taking place in the Middle East. It does this by
analysing two case studies; Turkey and Iran. By focusing on universal human
rights such as education and suffrage, it analyses the influence that the majority
religious denomination has on each state’s policies. It begins by examining what
the theory of secularisation is, its relevance to Islam and its two main religious
sects; Sunni and Shia Islam. Throughout, I use secular and Islamic feminist
arguments to understand how each policy on the rights of women has been
construed by different women at the time. The reasons behind these policies are
also examined in relation to religious and secular aspirations.
This paper argues that increasing women’s rights has not led to secularisation
taking place because women’s rights are not truly a religious or non-religious
matter. Religion has simply been used as a tool to enforce state policies and
patriarchy to achieve the aims of the state. It has done this in the Middle East by
being the main interpreters of Islamic texts since the Prophet Muhammad in
622CE. Due to this reason, as women’s rights have advanced they have been
able to use religion to their advantage. By reinterpreting sacred texts, women
have been able to combat the patriarchal order of society, and campaign for
increased rights in both the secular and the Islamic sphere.

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Introduction
According to the United Nations Human Development Reports ‘Gender inequality
remains a major barrier to human development’ (Gender Inequality Index
2014). Despite great advances in women’s rights since the late nineteenth
century, women are still treated unequally to men. Many women throughout the
globe face discrimination on a day-to-day basis on issues which should be their
human right to pursue; education, political representation, and freedom of
religion (Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Religion has frequently
featured in many debates concerning women’s rights due to it historically
intertwining with politics. Some scholars argue that religion has been
systematically used to legitimise female oppression by justifying patriarchal
demands in religious texts. Others argue that it is religion that will liberate
women from their oppression.
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse whether or not increasing women’s
rights is compatible with religion or if it will ultimately lead to secularisation. The
focus will be on two case studies in the Middle East: Turkey and Iran. These two
case studies have been chosen because until the early twentieth-century, Islam
featured heavily in their state governance (Sunni Islam in Turkey, Shia Islam in
Iran). Throughout the past century, both states have undergone secular and
religious changes which can be seen in their policies concerning the rights of
women.
Research questions:
1). Must Islam and secularisation be in constant conflict?
2). Do all women in the Middle East want the same rights?

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3). Does Sunni or Shia state dominance effect women’s rights?
Methodology:
Two terms are being used throughout this dissertation which need clarification.
The first is the ‘Middle East’. The Middle East has been used to described the
region of land between the Far East (India and Asia), and the base (Britain)
during the British colonial era. This area is also frequently known as the Arab
world or the Islamic arena. The second is ‘women’s rights’. As has been noted in
the research question, what is a women’s right needs clarification and this will be
examined as part of the main body of this dissertation.
There has been a lot of literature composed around this research question
however much research on women’s rights has been conducted from a western
perspective and has been written and published in the West. To overcome this
problem I have sought out both primary and secondary sources which are
specific to each case study, for example, I have used an article written by a
women’s magazine in Turkey on education in Turkey as well as an American
journal discussing the same issue. I have also used historical and contemporary
sources to see if opinions and facts have evolved over time. Quantitative data
has also been used to identify how women’s rights have evolved over a
predetermined time frame using statistics to support or disprove claims.
Chapter Structure
Chapter 1: The first chapter aims to set the foundation of this dissertation by
explaining the theory of secularisation and how it relates to the Middle East and
Islam. It also seeks to explain the vital differences between Sunni and Shia
Islam.

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Chapter 2: The second chapter aims to address the divide over what are and
are not women rights’. It does this by drawing on both secular and Islamic
feminist arguments.
Chapter 3: The third chapter is the Turkish case study. Here, women’s rights in
a Sunni Muslim majority state under a secular government will be examined.
Chapter 4: The fourth chapter is the Iranian case study. Here, women’s rights
will be analysed pre and post–Iranian Revolution, where the Shia Muslim
majority state transitioned from a secularising government to an Islamic one.
Chapter 5: The final chapter will serve as a discussion to the points raised
throughout the Dissertation.
Conclusion: The conclusion will answer the research questions and bring this
dissertation to a close.
Literature review:
The subject of women’s rights and Islam is not a new area of study and as a
result there is much literature available. However, the underlying theme of my
dissertation focuses on the different interpretation of women’s rights by secular
and Islamic feminists. There have been five authors that I have found extremely
useful as a reference point throughout my research. Margot Badran’s article
‘Between Secular and Islamic Feminism/s: Reflection of the Middle East and
Beyond’ provided me with clear definitions and examples of the differences and
similarities between secular and Islamic feminists. This article helped me to
understand the importance of relativity; what may appear as ‘Islamic feminism’
from a western perspective may appear secular to a more religious person.
Ahmed-Ghosh’s journal ‘Dilemmas of Islamic and Secular Feminists and

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Feminism’ is complementary to Badran’s article but expands on collaborative and
hybrid feminisms in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries. Unlike Badran,
Ahmed-Gosh does not see secular and Islamic feminists as static but rather in a
constant state of evolution in accordance with their environment.
As Islamic theology is predominantly written in Arabic I have had to rely on
interpretations and translations of the literature. Three pieces of literature have
greatly enabled me to understand Islamic feminism which uses Islamic theology
to promote women’s rights. Isabelle Coleman’s book Paradise beneath her feet
was a great gateway for me to understand the Islamic feminist perspective.
Coleman uses case studies to show how Islamic verses can be used to promote
economic, political and educational opportunities for women. Both Fatima
Mernissi’s Women and Islam: A Historical and Theoretical enquiry and Amina
Wadud’s Inside the Gender Jihad provide examples as to how the Qur’an can be
used to address Islamic feminists concerns. However Wadud’s work highlights
the fact that Islamic theology; the Qur’an and subsequent hadiths for example,
have all historically been interpreted by men. Therefore if women have the
opportunity to interpret these texts for themselves, they may find the answers
they seek for their own liberation.
Mernissi argues that the history of misogyny stems from interpretations of
hadiths being used to combat female influence. For example, she explains that
the hadith “those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know
prosperity” has been frequently cited to justify male dominance. The origin of
this hadith has become sceptical; it was recalled by Abu Bakr over a quarter of a
century after the death of the Prophet and has been used to contest the
influence A’isha (the Prophet Muhammad’s third wife) was showing in regards to

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the Battle of the Camel (Mernissi 1991). Less than two centuries after the
Prophets death, Al-Bukhari (a Persian Muslim scholar) set about methodically
calculating which hadiths could be falsified, and found that there were ‘already
596,725 false Hadith in circulation’ (Mernissi 1991: 44).
A second main theme for research in my dissertation has been what the theory
of secularisation entails. The term ‘secularisation’ gained momentum in the
1950s and 60s when it was used to describe religious decline produced by
modernity. For many intellectuals at the time this was taken as the assumed
natural course pursued by states. Although this theory was ultimately disproved
by the Iranian Revolution and evidence of religious resurgence particularly in the
Middle East, the works conducted in the mid- twentieth century by Peter Berger,
Bryan Wilson and David Martin have provided a great base for working on an
argument against their theories. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart’s book
Sacred and Secular: Religion and World Politics Worldwide explains how the
theory of secularisation did not materialise as was predicted,
“This thesis of the slow and steady death of religion has come under growing
criticism; indeed secularization theory is currently experiencing the most
sustained challenge in its long history” (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 1).
According to Norris and Inglehart, secularisation has been taking place in
pockets throughout the world such as; China, France and the United States.
Although states have evidence of secularisation, Norris and Inglehart challenge
whether or not ‘secular states’ can ever be truly secular when there are
frequently religious movements such as the Christianity and Protestantism in the
United States.

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Throughout my research I have found that there has been much less research
conducted on Turkey in regards to Islam and gender. Authors such as Coleman,
Badran and Mernissi have tended to miss-out completely or only briefly touch
upon gender and Islam issues in Turkey. Instead their focus has historically been
drawn towards Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is understandable, due to
the broad nature of Islamic states, that not every country can be targeted for
analysis in every piece of research; however, it is of my opinion that Turkey has
been systematically forgotten due to its apparent status of a secular state. To
overcome this lack of Islamic feminist literature on Turkey, I have found one
book in particular that focuses on Turkish women specifically to be particularly
helpful; Zehra Arats’ Deconstructing Images of ‘The Turkish Woman’. This text is
a compilation of various scholars’ work and has been systematically used by Arat
to provide an understanding of how women in Turkey’s lives and beliefs have
evolved since the decline of the Ottoman Empire.
In contradiction to the Turkish case, there is a wide expanse of literature
concerning Islam and gender in Iran. I found Shirin Ebadi’s biography Iran
Awakening extremely powerful to read because it displaced a presumption that I
had when approaching the subject of Iran and women’s rights; that the motive
of the majority of women participating in the Iranian Revolution was for Islamic
resurgence. After reading Islamic feminists such as Ziba Mir-Hosseini’s work on
Islam and Gender, the Islamic element of the Iranian Revolution appeared
almost unavoidable and even necessary. In contradiction, Ebadi describes the
Iranian revolution as slightly anarchic; Iranians participated in the Iranian
revolution not to bring a new government to power or to increase the power of
the religious elite, but to simply dissolve the existing system of governance.

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Throughout this dissertation I have used various governmental and non-
governmental research results. When approaching this I have been sceptical of
some of the results due to possible biases and have tried, when possible, to
source my information from non-partisan groups such as the Pew Research
Centre. The statistics by some of the government websites in both Iran and
Turkey (although this is most likely the case with all national governments) have
shown obvious biases to benefiting the current regime.
Limitations to this dissertation
This dissertation has been limited to analysing only a few aspects of women’s
rights; education and suffrage. Although it aims to cover the majority of factors
which affect these rights, it has been clear from the start that of this research
project that this would be improbable to do within the allocated word count so
some factors have been made systematically absent. The time frame for
examining women’s rights in relation to secularisation has also been restricted
from the 1920’s until 2009. This time frame has been chosen because the early
twentieth century marked two historical events in both Turkey and Iran (the fall
of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the Pahlavi era respectively), and a
cut-off point was needed to provide a complete investigation.

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Chapter 1: Secularisation and Islam
The theory of secularisation
Secularisation is the “process by which sectors of society and culture are
removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Berger
1967).
From the beginning of the Enlightenment period in seventeenth-century Europe,
many social scientists and assorted western intellectuals have claimed that a
process of secularisation in modernising societies would be inevitable.
Intellectuals such as; Thomas Woolston in the eighteenth-century; Thomas
Jefferson and Friedrich Engels in the nineteenth-century; and Marx Weber and
Sigmund Freud in the twentieth-century have claimed that modernity will
triumph over faith because ‘the rise of modern science, pluralism, and
consumerism is sure to usher in the decline of religion’ (Coffey 2011). Following
the end of World War Two, many social scientists argued that developing
societies would shift culturally to post-traditional values as a way of
modernisation. Inglehart and Baker claimed that “The world is changing in ways
that erode traditional values. Economic development almost inevitably brings the
decline of religion, parochism and cultural differences” (Inglehart and Baker
2000). Rodney Stark explored this further when he stated that “modernisation is
the casual engine dragging the God’s into retirement” (Stark and Finke 2000).
Secularisation was therefore the assumed natural progression adopted by states,
replacing religious authority with reason, and has thus become the normative
standard.
The religious resurgence towards the end of the 20th
Century, most notably in
the Middle East, was a largely unpredicted phenomenon by many social

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scientists. The Iranian revolution of 1979 forced many intellectuals to re-
evaluate their previous stance on the inevitability of secularization. Peter Berger
told the New York Times that by “the 21st Century, religious believers are likely
to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist worldwide secular
culture”. However, in 1999 he re-evaluated his argument due to the obvious
religious resurgence that was taking place and stated that the assumption that
we live in a secularised world is false, “The world today, with some exceptions…
is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever”
(Berger 1999).
Secularisation, Islam and the Middle East
Islam originated in 622CE in the Arabia Peninsula when Muhammad received the
call to be God’s messenger during laylat al-qadar (the Night of Power). Islam is
the now world’s second-largest religion, with around 23% of the global
population identifying as Muslim (1.6 billion). The Middle East-North Africa
Region has the highest concentration of Muslims of any region in the world: 93%
of its approximately 341 million inhabitants follow Islam (Desilver 2013).
Although Islam is a monolithic religion, it is not simply a set of concepts and
practices related to its followers and God, it is also a political system. The
Prophet Muhammad, the Qur’an and the subsequent hadiths, dictate a whole set
of ‘social, economic, and moral policies according to which the Islamic
community is to be governed’ (Tabari 1982: 20).
Halim Barakat, a sociologist, stated in the mid 1990’s that “secularism continues
to be one of the most controversial and sensitive notions in the Arab world,
particularly in terms of Islamic resurgence” (Baraka 1993: 138). The marriage of
politics and religion in Islam makes secularisation extremely difficult because

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“opinion is almost unanimous that Islam is opposed to secularism by its very
nature” (Baraka 1993: 138). The Lebanese Council of Ulama declared in 1976
that ‘Secularism has no place in the life of a Muslim; either Islam is to exist
without secularism or secularism is to exist without Islam’.
Secularisation would explicitly challenge the first of the five pillars of Islam; the
Shahadah. The Shahadah constitutes the core principle of Islam which declares
that there is no god but God (Allah). All Muslims must follow the message of
Allah as was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and recorded in the Qur’an and
subsequent hadiths. Conflict can arise between Islamic followers and the state
when the state tries to impose secular laws on its citizens because “legislation
belongs to Allah and not to human mortals” (Tabari 1982: 20). In countries
where the state claims allegiance to Islam, its Islamic political order cannot be
ignored, following secular laws over Islamic laws would be seen as blasphemous
and in direct opposition to the will of Allah (Tabari 1982: 20). If this situation
arises, it is a Muslim’s religious duty to follow Sharia and reject the state. Ernest
Gellner has written that “no secularization has taken place in the world of Islam”
(Geller 1991: 2) and in a recent Pew report published in 2013, a series of face-
to-face interviews were conducted with over 38,000 Muslims in 39 countries and
found that in the Middle East-North Africa region, 74% of those asked were in
favour of enshrining Sharia as official law (Desilver 2013).
Islam and Secularisation
Like all religions, Islam is very diverse and consists of many different sects
which follow their own religious interpretations. All followers of Islam maintain
that Allah is the only God and that Muhammad was his Prophet however, there
are the two dominant sects within Islam; Sunni and Shia Muslims. Sunnis and

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Shiites share ‘most basic religious tenets however their differences sometimes
have been the basis for religious intolerance, political infighting, and violent
confrontations’ (Blanchard 2005). Not only are Sunni and Shia beliefs engaged
with on the individual, personal level, but they can also be seen at state level in
the government policies of Sunni and Shia majority countries. These different
approaches will be analysed in the following case studies using Turkey as the
Sunni Muslim example and Iran as the Shia Muslim example.
The Sunni and Shiite Muslim divide occurred after the Prophet Muhammad died
in 632 AD without proclaiming his successor. Muslims were divided over whether
or not the next leader of Islam should be awarded to ‘a qualified and pious
individual who would lead by following the customs of the Prophet or to preserve
the leadership exclusively through the Prophet’s bloodline’ (Blanchard 2005).
Sunni Muslims held that Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s close friend and advisor (who
was eventually declared as Caliph), was the rightful successor. Shiites in
contrast maintained that Ali ibn Abi Talib - the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law,
husband of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima- should have succeeded Muhammad.
This divide is important when looking into the policies and beliefs of each sect.
Sunnism
The majority of Muslims today are Sunni’s making up 87-90% of the Muslim
population compared to the estimated 10-13% of the world’s Muslim population
which associates with Shiism (Pew Forum 2009). Sunnism originated from the
meritocratic system which elected Abu Bakr as the first of four Caliphs to
succeed the Prophet Muhammad. Abu Bakr was chosen due to his position in
society and his previous experience. Sunni’s do not bestow upon human beings a
divine power which entitles them to lead, such as the Prophets in the Qur’an,

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and instead focus more on credentials that they have earned throughout their
lives, and whether or not this makes them equipped to lead. As a result of this,
many Sunni religious teachers have historically been under the control of the
state. In theory, Sunnis believe that the leader (imam) of the Muslim community
should be selected on the basis of communal consensus, on the existing political
order, and on a leader’s individual merits. It would be expected, therefore, that
Sunni’s do not have a strong religious hierarchical system and tend to be more
flexible in allowing lay persons to serve as prayer leaders and preachers. This
flexible approach can be seen in Sunni majority countries which have allowed
women to actively participate in religious activities such as leading prayer
service and also leading Muslims on the hajj.
Shiism
In contrast to Sunni’s, Shiites believe in a spiritual association that is passed
down between religious leaders. Shiite’s maintain that the Prophet’s rightful
successor should have been Ali ibn Abi Talib. According to Shiism and Twelver
Shiism- which is the dominant thesis within Shiisms – the twelve Imams who
preceded Ali ibn Abi Talib had been chosen by Allah through Muhammad as they
were blood line descendants. As a result, Shia’s believe that the imams were
sinless and free from error so should be revered. Since the first imam, each
religious leader has chosen a successor and, according to Shiite beliefs, has
passed down a type of spiritual knowledge. Due to this spiritual association
imams have previously served as both spiritual and political leaders in the Middle
East. However, as Sunni Muslim rulers began to win the political battles of the
region, imams focused on developing a spirituality that would be at the core of
Shiite religious practices and beliefs. When the line of imams directly descended

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from Ali ibn Abi Talib ended (the twelfth imam), mujtahids (religious leaders)
gained the right to interpret Islamic theology and distribute the religious and
legal ramifications to the wider Shia community. The most learned and superior
of the mujtahids became known as ayatollahs (‘signs of God’); there is a divine
association with those proclaimed as Ayatollah or Grand Ayatollah that is specific
to Shia Muslims.
Sunni, Shia and Secularisation
Within both Shiism and Sunniism there are further divides however it is the
differences between, rather that within these sects that is most relevant to this
study. The importance of analysing the difference between the Sunni and Shia
sects of Islam is extremely important when looking into the relationship between
Islam and the state. It is clear that Sunni Islam has taken a more democratic
approach as it maintains that religious leaders must earn their places, as such, it
does not enforce a predetermined, divine right to lead, as does the Shiite sect.
This separation can also be seen in the inclusive demeanour of Sunni Islam.
Sunniism is the majority Islamic religion in the Middle East and a reason for this
could be because it has the ability to grow alongside more western principles
such as democracy and gender equality. Due to the meritocratic and non-divine
association Sunnism has with it leaders, the western principles described here
would be easier to consolidate.
In contrast to this, Shia Islam can be seen as more conservative and traditional.
Its focus on the divine right of imam’s to lead leaves little room for interpretation
and movement to embrace the wider strands of society. Shiisms belief in the
sinless nature of its divine leaders can almost be seen as unwavering devotion to
its religious elite which was evidenced in Iran after the Iranian Revolution.

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Chapter 2: Women’s rights, a Secular and Islamic Feminist approach
Women’s rights and feminism
The term ‘feminism’ originates from the late 1880s in France when Hubertine
Auclert used it to ‘criticise male pre-dominance (domination) and to make claims
for women’s rights and emancipation promised by the French revolution’ in her
journal, La Citoyenne (Badran 2009: 242). Since, feminism has been used to put
a name to the ‘set of beliefs and ideas that belong to the broad social and
political movement to achieve greater equality for women’ (Owen 1994: 413).
Although the term feminism has remained the same over the past century, its
significance and meaning has been constantly adapted and challenged. There
are many different aspects to consider when looking at women’s rights and
therefore different types of feminisms have been produced in particular places
and articulated in local terms (Badran 2009: 243).
Women’s rights, feminism and Islam
Similar to Islam and secularisation in the previous chapter, Islam and feminism
are sometimes seen as an oxymoron. The Qur’an is quite explicit at times about
the rights of men over women,
“Men are managers of the affairs of women, for that God has preferred in bounty
one of them over another, and for that they have expended of their property.
Righteous women are therefore obedient” (Qur’an, ‘Women’ verse 38)
While many Muslim women agree with the fundamental aspects of feminism;
seeking legal, political, and social equality, fighting discrimination, and
awareness of the feminine identity, they typically depart from the larger feminist

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movement on issues of family and sexuality (Caha 2014). As a result of this, two
feminisms have become dominant in the Middle East; secular and Islam
feminisms. Both seek to advance women’s rights but the rights they campaign
for and the tactics that they use are different.
Secular feminism
Secular feminism in the Middle East originated after new national identities were
created during western colonisation of the region in the early twentieth-century.
These new identities were created based on culture and history rather than
religion. Secular feminists have argued that to have a strong and prosperous
nation state, all aspects of society need to be developed. Capitalising on the
arrival of the printing press and the spread of literacy among women at this
time, secular feminists were able to pair ‘their own liberation and advance with
that of the nation’ (Badran 2005 and 2009). Together these phenomena gave
rise to a new female writing and reading public who now had the means to
explore their own oppression and show how women’s oppression was a barrier to
societal progress; various United Nations Development Programmes (2002 and
2005) have cited that one of the reasons for the lack of economic and
technological prosperity among some Arab states is because of the “lack of
freedom, lack of knowledge and the lack of women empowerment” (Coleman
2010: 29).
Secular feminists argue that state decisions should be made on economic and
political levels, irrespective of religion. Although some secular feminists argue
that religion should be confined to the private sphere, other secular feminists,
such as Leila Ahmed, Erica Friedl, and Fatima Mernissi have concluded that
Islam and feminism are unconditionally incompatible. Moghadam states that

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“Women’s rights and human rights are best promoted and protected in an
environment of secular thought and secular institutions”(Ahmed-Ghosh 2008).
They maintain that Islam and all religions have been used to exploit certain
cultural aspects of societies to propagate patriarchy. In combination with the
human rights discourse, secular feminists maintain that to achieve full equality
in both the public and private sphere, there needs to be a complete separation
of state and religion (Badran 1998).
Islamic feminism
Islamic feminists, in contrast, have used religion to seek their emancipation from
‘the rubrics of Islamic patriarchy’ within the global umma (Ahmed-Ghosh 2008).
By the end of the twentieth-century ‘education had reached more women than
ever before…women were also gaining access to education in the highest levels
in the religious sciences’(Badran 2009: 303). Increased literacy rates enabled a
wider portion of the population to read and interpret religious texts themselves,
rather than having interpretations dictated and recited.
“In the Arab world traditional patriarchal culture never promoted the reading of
the Qur’an, even after it became widely available following the introduction of
printing in the nineteenth century. To this day it is still recited, chanted, and
repeated by heart but not, or rarely, read. Interpretation has remained the
monopoly of specialists or religious officials, whose exegesis, moreover, derives
less from the sacred text than traditional commentaries on it” (Sharabi 1988:
87) (Bouroujderi).
Islamic Feminists argue that the Prophet Muhammad advocated gender equality
and social justice rather than the patriarchal structure women are subjected to
now. They seek their emancipation through Islam and not western or secular

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feminism. By engaging with Islamic theology, Islamic feminists have ground
their arguments in new interpretations of the religious teachings and are able to
highlight the way that, previously, the Qur’an has been ‘impeded or subverted
by patriarchal ideas and practices’ by males who had historically been the sole
interpreters (Badran 2009: 247).
Secular and Islamic Feminism
Secular and Islamic feminists represent at least two different types of women in
the Middles East so it is important to understand the similarities that unite them,
as well as the differences which divide them. In Morocco in 2004, secular and
Islamic feminists worked together to collect over one million signatures from
Moroccans all over the country to campaign for the reformation of the family
code (mudawana); raising the marriage age to 18, restricting polygamy and
settling divorces in court (Coleman 2013). Although this campaign ran fairly
smoothly and was determined as a success, many similar feminist movements
such as ‘The One Million Signature Campaign’ in Iran have been met with
hostility and sometimes violence. The main divide between secular and Islamic
feminism occurs over religion, whereas Islamic feminism views Islam as a way
to end their oppression, secular feminists see religion as yet another layer which
stands in the way of female freedom. This difference in view point is significant
because what may be seen as liberation by one group of women may be seen as
oppression by the other thus, creating more opposition towards, as well as
within the women’s rights movement.

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Chapter 3: The Turkish case study
Until the creation of an independent Turkish Republic in 1923, after the breakup
of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic policies had been present in almost all aspects of
Turkish life; both private and public. Although Islam had been used as a uniting
feature under the Ottoman Empire, it had also created barriers which proved
detrimental to the Turkish economy, the ‘superstitions, dogmas and ignorance’
propagated by religion prevented the Turkish people from ‘becoming modern
and prosperous’(Daver). In the newly formed Turkish Republic, General Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, looked to ‘strong and prosperous western states’ for inspiration
and was strongly influenced by the French idea of laïcité, which demands that
religion be kept separate from state affairs. ‘The Turkish intelligentsia led by
Atatürk sought secularism as a modernizing principle’ and, post-independence,
nationalism, rather than class, religion or ideologies became the ruling principle
of the newly formed Republic. This case study aims to examine whether
secularisation has been maintained in Turkey and how women’s rights
movementshave evolved in accordance to this.
The Turkish Republic
In 1922 Ataturk’s government began a process of nationalism and state
secularisation in Turkey by placing religion under state control. Unlike the Euro-
Pacific states that Ataturk modelled his policies on; France, the United States of
America and the United Kingdom, secularisation was not created by a popular
movement by the people but was state administered and enforced by military
forces. The Sultanate was abolished and the Ottoman Caliphate became merely
a historic symbol in 1924 when its powers were transferred to the Grand
National Assembly (Turkish Cultural Foundation). The Directorate of Religious

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Affairs was also established in 1924 to administer mosques and religious
schools, as well as to supervise all religious leaders. The Turkish language was
exalted into all aspects of Turkish society, and in 1932, the Adhan (Muslim call
to prayer) was rewritten from Arabic to Turkish. With the ‘modernizing reforms
that were initiated in the early years of the Republic, the constitution was
stripped of all religious references in 1928, and in 1937, secularism was
introduced as a constitutional principle’ (Erdogan 1999: 378). Typical Islamic
dress such as the fez, turban and hijab were banned and instead Turkish citizens
were encouraged to adopt western style clothing (Baran 2010: 94). The Turkish
calendar was also changed from Islamic, based on the hijrah, to the Georgian
calendar. These changes mentioned here are only a few enforced by the Turkish
state throughout the 1920’s and 1930s in a bid to create a stronger, more
economically stable Turkey, by removing Islam from the public sphere.
As was mentioned previously, the secularisation in Turkey was part of Turkish
nationalism and Islamic views concerning women’s fitrat (nature) was another
barrier to national progression, as it stopped women from actively engaging in
the public domain as equal citizens. “If a society does not wage a common
struggle to attain a common goal with its women and men, scientifically there is
no way for it to get civilised or developed” (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) and there
has been strong correlation of countries with gender equality being the most
economically competitive. One way Ataturk wanted to do this was by increasing
Turkish access to education and improving rates of literacy.

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Women’s Education
‘Literacy is one of the principal goals of education around the world. The ability
to read and write is considered almost a basic human right’ (King and Hill
1997:2). Education is essential to economic and social development and is
therefore frequently a priority issue for many developing states. In 1922 Ataturk
overhauled the educational system by making education; free, secular and co-
educational. Primary school education was made compulsory for all school
children aged between six and fourteen and Ataturk encouraged women to
actively pursue higher education for the good of the nation “Win for us the battle
of education and you will do yet more for your country than we have been able
to do” (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk). The larger and more educated the workforce,
the faster and more efficiently the national economycould develop,
“… Circumstances today require the advancement of our women in all respects.
Therefore, our women, too, will be enlightened and learned, and like all men,
will go through all educational stages. Then, women and men, walking side by
side, will be each other’s help and support in social life” (Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk)(Arat 1999: 160).
Increasing and encouraging women’s access to education at the start of the
republic worked in correlation with the secularisation of the education process.
Women who were previously blocked from education due to patriarchal
opposition evident in all societies, coupled with Islamic views on women’s fitrat,
were liberated as the newly formed Turkish Republic recognised the benefits of
educating the entire nation. However, although equality of education has been
ratified in the constitution since 1928, it is clear from various studies that
equality has not been completely enforced. The focus on girl’s education has

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been systematically different to the education that boys received. In the 1940’s
the goals of primary schooleducation included “taking measures according to
the characteristics of each sex”, this included “training village girls to acquire the
knowledge and habits that would make the family life more hygienic, better and
happier” and a report on the village institutes said that the laundry was done by
female students so they tended to “miss their classes and lag behind” (Arat
1999). This gender specific curriculum helped propagate the patriarchal systems
whereby women were being educated, but for the purpose of learning how to
better serve their husband or family and not being allowed an education in their
own right, so although women’s rights to education have increased, they were
not being taught or treated the same as their male counterparts. Although the
prevalence of gender specific education has greatly decreased, according to
UNICEF, in 2003, the literacy and enrolment rate for males was still noticeably
higher than females in Turkey (93.9% and 80.6%, and 100% and 91.8%
respectively). Compared to some other countries, these literacy and enrolment
rates seem high however they highlight that women are being held back by
social constraints, after being declared equal before the law almost a century
earlier. These social constraints will be analysed later in this case study.
Article 42 in the Turkish constitution states that,
“Education shall be conducted along the lines of the principles and reforms of
Atatürk, based on contemporary scientific and educational principles, under the
supervision and control of the State. Educational institutions contravening these
principles shall not be established” (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey).
As part of Ataturk’s secularisation of education, public secular schools were
created and Madrasas were closed, and were replaced in 1924 by regulated

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Islamic schools – Iman Hatip (used to train Sunni religious prayers leaders
(Imams) and preachers (Hatips))( Baran 2010: 94)(Ozgur 2012). Although the
Turkish constitution states that the focus of education should be on a secular
curriculum, in recent years there has been a call for an increase in religious
education and to create a ‘pious generation’ sought by Prime Minister Erdogan.
Islam is still prominent in many parts of Turkish society, most notably rural
villages, and as women’s access to education has increased, there appears to be
a reversion to more religious education, by both government policies and
student preference. Buket Turkmen, a sociologist at Istanbul's Galatasaray
University who has studied the role of women in Turkish Islam, says that ‘for
many women who come from traditional homes where they would normally be
limited in what they are allowed to do, religious education becomes a path to a
certain kind of independence’. “It's very paradoxical, but by choosing Islam, they
can gain their individuality and their emancipation” (Schleifer 2005). In this
context, Islam means liberation. In 1976 female students gained the right to
attend Imam Hatip schools which opened up access to education for more
conservative female Muslims. These schools allow girls to be veiled, a right they
do not have in other public schools and therefore overcomes one barrier which
can be used to stop girls attending school- the ‘harem’ act of unveiling seen by
some conservative Muslims (Wilson 2006). 60% of the curriculum in these
schools now comprises of non-religious studies which enables both boys and
girls who would not have previously attended a public, secular school, to learn
about secular and religious education side by side. It is clear that the popularity
of these more religiously oriented schools is growing as their number has
increased by 90% since 2010 (Wilson 2006).

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Turkish women and girls are increasingly engaging with religious education
“attending Qur’an courses over holidays….has become a tradition for Turkish
girls. Female participation in the Qur’an courses far exceeds that of males and
has steadily increased since 1980” (Wilson 2006) and as a result, women in
Turkey have gained more religious authority. In Istanbul, the mufti’s office has
583 women teaching courses on the Qur’an to women across the city, in 2003
two women were appointed for the first time to lead a group of Turks making
their pilgrimage to Mecca, and in 2004 150 women were added to the Diyanet
which brought the number of female preachers in the country up to 400. Women
now also make up the majority of students in the theology departments of
several Turkish universities (Tapper 1991:145–70).
In contradiction to the above, the reintroduction of religious studies into
education may be seen by secular feminists as a tool to repress women (and
one-half of Turkish citizens) once more as a way for the ruling party to re-
establish its dominance. As women in Turkey became more educated they began
to question the parts of Turkish life that were still oppressing them. Fatima
Mernissi argues that ‘the increase in urbanization and women’s education means
Muslim women are coming to diagnose their problems as being political – a
disturbing claim for those in power’(Mernissi 1987). As women realise that it is
not Islam that is the cause of their problems, they have begun to look to the
state. Historically ‘the vanguard of feminist activism in Turkey were educated,
mostly professional middle-class women who had personal links to feminists
abroad and were exposed to feminist literature through friends or connections’
and are therefore in a good position to challenge the patriarchal system which
still oppresses them (Arat 1998:191). It is clear from the reforms introduced by
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2000 that they advocate a recall

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to more Islamic policies and a highly educated female population would be
extremely troublesome against a patriarchal government.
Universal suffrage
Turkey was one of the first countries in Europe to expand the role of women in
politics from spectators to active participants. Two Kemalist reforms were
particularly important in this. Firstly, the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in
1926 (replacing the Majalla) which recognised women as individuals within the
polity; forbade polygamy; instituted civil marriage; allowed the initiation of
divorce proceedings by either partner; and guaranteed equality of women before
the law. Secondly, the Amendment to the Electoral Law in 1935 granted
universal suffrage which finally gave women the chance to lawfully engage in
politics.
Although the first free election in Turkey was not held until 1950, the
introduction of universal suffrage enabled women to participate politically.
However, since 1935 women’s participation in politics has not been as wide as
secular feminists expected. Although 18 female MPs were elected to Parliament
in 1935, this number sharply decreased immediately afterwards. There have
been six female political party leaders in the history of the Turkish Republic; the
first was Behice Boton who led the Workers Party of Turkey in 1970. As well as,
one female Prime Minister, Tansur Ciller. Tansur Ciller was the leader of the True
Path Party from 1993-1996 and then the Turkish Prime Minister from 1993 –
2002. Under Tansur Ciller’s government, the number of female MPs rose (from
13MPs in 1995 to 78MPs in 2011) and has continued to do so ever since.
Although the number of female MPs is now on the rise, there have been many
invisible barriers which have stopped women from fully exercising their political

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powers. In a study conducted by Tekaki in the 1940’s, there is evidence that
married couples have tended to vote the same way (83%), with wives generally
following their husbands (Kandiyoti 1948: 40)(Keskin 1997). In another study
conducted two decades later, Ozankaya found that in the four Turkish villages
that he researched, 75.4% of husbands said that they told their wives who to
vote for, with only 18.5% leaving them a free choice (Keskin 1997). At least
until the 1980’s there is evidence that although Turkish women were legally
politically independent, they were still controlled by the patriarchal systems in
the private sphere.
From the 1990s onwards women have been become increasingly involved in the
political system. This may be due to powerful female figures such as Cillers who
was not only praised by Libya’s leader Muammar Qadhafi as a ‘model for all
Islamic Women’ but was also described by some European newspapers as “The
symbol of Modern Turkey”(Reinart 1999). Figures such as Ciller were examples
of how increasing women’s rights and engaging with women as political equals
did not signify the end of religion in its entirety. In fact, as women’s rights have
increased in Turkey there seems to have been an increased advocating for the
introduction of more religious rule. The Justice and Development Party (AKP),
which has been described as ‘arguably the most successful Islamic-inspired
democratic party in the world’ has been democratically elected since 2002. As
women now make up almost half of the Turkish electorate, it is clear that
women have voted for an increasingly religious government. In contradiction to
what may have been expected, increasing women’s rights along secular lines
does not mean a more secular party will be elected into government. The AKP
opposes many of the secular Kemalist policies; has reintroduced mandatory
religious education, has called for ending the banning of the veil (which had

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been enforced under Ataturk as a modernising policy) and has won the support
of the Turkish public.
Conclusion
To conclude, it can be seen in the Turkish case study that although women’s
rights have increased since the 1920’s, secularisation has only been successful
when it has been enforced by the state. Increasing women’s rights in Turkey
have so far only been pursued when the state is able to benefit. Under Ataturk,
“The underlying aim of these reforms was to position women securely in the
public sphere, to make them active and competitive in education, employment,
and all aspects of social life. In consequence, many women in Turkey were able
to get educated, have careers and jobs, become economically independent and
participate in politics” (Turkish Culture Foundation).
Until the late twentieth-century, there had been an overwhelming focus on
women’s rights from a secular perspective; as a result Islamic feminists may
have had their rights limited. With the free elections from 1950, and most
notably in the past decade, there has been an increase in the number of votes
that the more religiously orientated political parties have received. Since the
AKP won its first general election in 2002 and Erdogan became the Prime
Minister in 2003, Turkey has fallen 20 spots in the Global Gender Report; falling
from 105 in 2006 to 125 in 2012, and is ranked 135 on the UN Equality Index.
Although Erdogan’s controversial policies such a lifting the headscarf ban in state
institutions in 2013 may be seen by some as attempting to Islamize the country,
it is also affords more religiously conservative women the opportunity to
participate more actively in society. Increasing women’s access to education and
suffrage throughout the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries has

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resulted in the most religiously motivated government since the Ottoman
Caliphate, being democratically elected. This may increase the rights for the
Islamic feminist movement in Turkey whilst restricting secular feminists.

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Chapter 4: The Iranian Case Study
Shia Islam has been the official state religion of Iran since the 16th
Century.
Under the Safavid dynasty, Shah Isma’il described himself as a descendent, on
his father’s side, of the Prophet Muhammad, and embarked on a process of
proselytization in a predominately Sunni Islam part of the world. Like all states
and religions, the prominence of Shiism (Twelver) in Iran has ebbed and flowed
over the past century. Under the Pahlavi era (1925-79)there was evidence that
Iran was modernising in lines with more secular and western policies. However,
the resurgence of religion in Iran has been witnessed growing alongside the
revolutionary movements of the 1970’s, culminating in the Iranian revolution in
1979. Post- revolution, Iran has since become the Islamic Republic of Iran,
governed by the Imam and the Ulama, religion has been embedded into every
aspect of society. This case study aims to analyse whether or not women’s rights
have been increased in Iran and if so, if this has led to secularisation, or aided in
the Islamic resurgence.
Women’s rights under the Shah
During the Pahlavi era (1925-79) women’s rights gradually increased in
accordance with secular feminist values. In the late 1920s and early 1930’s, the
Reza Shah began to secularise the educational system by ending the monopoly
of all mullahs over education and created the Ministry of Education to regulate
all public and private schools (Paidar 1995: 313). Public schools, which had
taught a secular curriculum based upon the French model since the late 1920’s,
became free for both boys and girls to attend. The Reza Shah saw increasing
literacy as a way to promote nationalism as well as educating the population.
The women’s movement at this time also used nationalism to call for revisions

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on; education, veiling, enfranchisement and the seclusion of women, arguing
that ‘education would make Iranian women aware of their legitimate rights and
give them additional strength for a more vigorous national struggle’ (Yeganeh
1982: 30).
Women’s rights at this time not only increased alongside nationalism, but also
celebrated more western values. The first Iranian university was created in
1936, admitting both men and women; women’s hejab was banned in 1938; and
universal suffrage was introduced in 1963. These policies and those that were
similar were seen as a great success in the eyes of secular feminists in the
region but the banning of hijab was also seen as a political statement. The veil,
to many westerners, was seen as a tool to repress women, and the removing of
the hijab was linked with modernisation, no longer would it be used to
‘legitimate physical borders of women’s existence in society’ (Tabari 1982: 22).
In 1932, Iran held the Congress of Women and invited a great number of
women without hijab from other countries ‘during the congress, which was
headed by Reza Shah’s daughter, Shams Pahlavi, the lack of hijab was
mentioned as a sign of civilization and huge propaganda hype was launched
around it’ (Mirrazavi 2013).
As has been mentioned the ‘liberation’ and advancement of women’s rights
under the Pahlavi era was a great success for women who associated with more
secular feminist discourse. In contradiction, traditional and religious women were
restrained as they were often torn between accepted family norms and pressure
to adapt to the new environment. As young women from more traditional and
conservative families “began to go to universities or work in hospitals or
government offices, all these traditional values and concepts came under daily

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attack from ‘alien’ surroundings, where women mixed with men” (Tabari 1982:
10). The liberation and subsequent banning of hijab created a cultural crisis for
some Islamic women as “they could not be veiled at work nor could they leave
home unveiled” (Tabari 1982: 10).
Women’s role in the revolution
Although the Iranian Revolution is frequently known as the Islamic Revolution,
religion was not the only reason why Iranians, including women revolted in
1979. Opposition against the Shah included ‘secular nationalists, socialists, and
Marxists, among its ranks’, many Iranians joined the revolution because they
were dissatisfied with the Shah, not necessarily for the creation of an Islamic
Republic (Ebadi 2006: 34). Due to the nationalist reforms introduced by the
Shah, women were able to participate in the political movements as Iranians,
and not simply as women. By 1978, women were active in politics (333 women
served on elected local councils, 22 women sat in parliament), one-third of
university students were female and two million women were in the work force,
more than 146,000 of them in the civil service (Esfandiari). Women’s
integration into society meant that ‘women did not participate in the revolution
as ‘women’ but as members of different political and social forces’ and therefore
their reasons for joining the revolution were just as varied. Although some
women’s rights were increased under the Shah, some still felt that as human
beings they were being repressed (Ebadi 2006: 34) Shiria Ebadi, a pro-
revolutionary judge embodies this when she explained her reason for joining the
revolution, “I would rather be a free Iranian than an enslaved attornet” (Ebadi
2006: 34).

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A great source of dissatisfaction featured around the Shah’s ‘western’ policies.
The Shah’s white revolution in 1963 was seen by some as ‘an American-inspired
package of measures designed to give his regime a liberal and progressive
façade’ (Iran Chamber Society). Women had been at the forefront on the Shah’s
westernisation attempts; unveiling, encouragement of western fashion, universal
suffrage, and a reformed educational system. However, not all women saw these
policies as liberating,
“As often happens under such circumstances of imposed rapid change, two
reactions developed. There are those that resolve their dilemma in the direction
of modifying their traditional concepts, and those who fall back on their
traditional concepts as a defensive mechanism” (Tabari 1982: 10).
Islam was used as a mobilising tool for some, among the opposition groups ‘the
mullahs voices were the loudest; it was the clergy, whose network of mosques
spread out across the country, who had standing centres from which to raise
their voices and organise’ (Tabari 1982:10).
However, when women in the Revolution wore a scarf or chador,
“It was purely a sign of opposition to the Shah. It did not signify to them or to
any political force within the movement an acceptance of Islam in total, because
Islam in totality did not exist then” (Ebadi 2006: 37).
Instead, it was the Shah’s rule, not secularisation that was being rejected in the
revolution.
It did ‘not seem alarming that the Mullah’s would take the lead’ (Ebadi 2006:34).
Although it was not the case for all women during the Iranian revolution, many
women did support resurgence in religion. The reforms introduced by the Shah

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increased the rights of women in secular and westerns terms but they hindered
women’s rights under the Islamic sphere, as will be discussed later in this
chapter.
Women after the revolution
“It took scarcely a month for me to realise that in fact, I had willingly and
enthusiastically participated in my own demise. I was a woman, and this
revolutions victory demanded my defeat” (Ebadi 2006: 38).
The Islamic Republic of Iran was created soon after the Shah fled to Egypt on
January 16, 1979. Although religion may not have been the only factor in the
Iranian revolution, it was the one that took hold the country after 1979.Less
than a month later, Ayatollah Khomeini became “the undisputed leader of the
clerical establishment that ultimately came to rule Iran” (Voirst, 1995: 68).
Women’s active, political role in the Iranian revolution has since been praised by
Shia clergy as similar to the political role played by Zeynab (the daughter of the
first Shia imam Ali Ali ibn Abi Talib and the Prophet Muhammad's daughter,
Fatima) and her response to the Kabala battle. Although this may seem as praise
by some Islamic feminists, secular feminists saw this as undermining women’s
role in the revolution. Instead of women participating as Iranians, they were
once again thought of as a gender (Paidar 1995: 219). Within a month of
Khomeini’s return to Iran from exile he began to Islamize women’s position in
society by declaring that women should wear hejab in accordance with Islamic
tradition (Yeganeh 1982:26).
Women had become increasingly politically active in the lead up to the Iranian
revolution and protested some of the Khomeini’s more oppressive and
undemocratic policies during a protest rally on International Women’s Day 1979.

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The demonstration was not merely to protest the veil, but the ‘beginning of a
whole series of measures that would lead logically to the seclusion of women
from social, political and economic activity’ (Ebadi 2006: 14). This demonstration
attracted over 20,000 female participants and signified the political strength that
women had in Iran, post-revolution (Winter 1999). The government attempted
to appease the situation by claiming that Khomeini had been misunderstood.
Khomeini’s rapid Islamization was halted; however, the government merely
adopted a gradual process and established much tighter control over street
demonstrations. Although the hejab was not originally enforced, it was expected
to be observed, “The head-scarf ‘invitation’ was the first warning that this
revolution might eat its sisters” (Ebadi 2006: 39). Whereas during the
revolution, the veil was seen as an act of defiance against the Shah, under
Khomeini, the veil became a symbol of ‘not Western, not Eastern, but Islamic’
and by 1981 hijab became compulsory for all women in Iran (Tabari 1982: 6).
The new theocracy, according to secular feminists ‘systematically rolled back five
decades of progress in women’s rights’ (Tabari 1982: 14). Women were
encouraged to forget about ‘Western’ concepts of equality and seek their
emancipation through Islam. Although the Islamic revolution instituted
repressive measures for women, it did also liberate women too (Tabari 1982).
Whereas women had previously struggled to marry their traditionalism with the
more modern, secular part of society, the enforcement of hejab allowed women
to participate more actively in the public sphere by making “public space morally
correct in the eyes of traditionalist families, it legitimised women’s public
presence”(Mir-Hosseini 2000: 7).

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Women’s right to education was also altered by the Islamic Republic. The
‘cultural revolution’ in 1979 brought the mainstream education system under
Islamic control, ‘universities were closed down in order to eradicate un-Islamic
influences and sexual segregation was enforced’ (Paidar 1995: 313). Co-
education became banned and girls were forced to attend all-girl high schools
which were ultimately of a lower educational standard than their male
counterparts ‘the shortage of teachers and school premises meant that more
often than not segregation led to the dismissal of girl pupils from mixed schools
in the absence of allocation of additional resources to girl’s schools’ (Paidar
1995: 315).
Although the Prophet Muhammad said “education is an obligation for every man
and women”, under the Islamic Republic, women’s education was adapted to the
requirements of the Islamic family (Paidar 1995: 314).
‘One of the contrasts between the Islamic and Western schooling systems is that
the latter trains boys and girls in the same way, but the Islamic system is
conscious of male-female differences while considering them equal in creation’
(Zan Ruz, 37) (Paidar 1995: 316).
The education system was restructured in such a way to train men and women
in accordance with their ‘different natures and capabilities’ and the distinct roles
which they were supposed to play in society (Paidar 1995). As a result, women
were encouraged to pursue traditionally female professions such as teaching and
nursing, and were banned from the more masculine professions, such as judges.
However, since the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), women’s education and suffrage
have been increasing. Sexual segregation at universities was abandoned as
impractical and now women outnumber men at University in Iran. The rise of

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sharia law also enabled women to become active in some fields of work which
were previously closed to them, for example, the medical profession. The focus
on preserving women’s modesty in Islam prioritises women treating women
medically. This demand for female medical personal increased the number of
women in the profession and now one-third of medical students are women.
Although in the early years of the Islamic Republic most women in decision-
making roles were dismissed, given early retirement or demoted, women have
remained politically active. Since the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) women have
voted in substantial numbers for Presidential candidates who were more
pragmatic on women’s issues; President Rafsanjani and President Khatami.
Under their Presidencies women have benefited from many changes; female-
positive reform of the personal status law, reintroduction of female
representation in international sports competitions, and the number of girls in
schools and universities also greatly increased. Women have also been
appointed to posts within the government; Masoumeh Ebtekar (Vice President
for the environment) and Zahra Rahnavard (the first woman chancellor of an
Iranian university).
Under the Presidency of Ahmadinejad, women’s more liberal rights have been
restricted; the government closed down Zanan (the country’s leading feminist
magazine), police enforced more stringent penalties on women for dress code
violations, and fewer women were elected to political positions of authority; local
councillors or ministers. However, women’s rights movements have continued to
combat the more restrictive policies by using campaigns such as; protesting
gender inequality at the Tehran University in 2005 and the One Million
Signatures Campaign in 2006. Both activities sought to highlight the gender

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inequalities which are seen as the norm in Iran, and ‘to transform the societal
and cultural norms which have kept discriminatory laws in place’ (Tavaana
2015). In the 2009 Presidential elections all four candidates developed positions
on women’s issues and for the first time, candidates had women advising and
campaigning for them in public (Esfandiari). This inclusivity of women in the
political system shows how sensitive the issues of gender equality and the roles
of women are.
Conclusion
It is clear from this case study that although women’s rights have increased over
the past century in Iran, religion has remained a constant feature in Iranian
politics. Secular and Islamic feminist rights have been stressed under different
governments. Under the Pahlavi era, women’s rights increased in relation to
more secular, liberal policies, however, they oppressed women in the Islamic
sphere. In accordance to Shia Islam, women are, “presumed different,
biologically, psychologically, and intellectually from men, it would be unfair to
ask for the equality of basically unequal beings” (Tabari 1982: 14). With this in
mind it is comprehendible why Shia Muslims maintain that men and women have
different rights and responsibilities which should be respected as they are
deemed to be have been created by Allah (in accordance with the Qur’an).
During the Islamic republic, under the leadership of the imam and clergy,
women’s rights were liberated under the Islamic sphere from secular and
western oppression,
“all partial changes towards secularization of the state achieved since the
Constitutional Revolution, have been attributed to colonial plots for enslavement

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of Muslims, and steps have been taken to reverse this trend and to rebuild a
sectarian state according to Islamic precepts” (Tabari 1982: 20-21).

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Chapter 5: Discussion
It is clear from the previous chapters that a lot of different factors effect
women’s rights in the Middle East, and the extent of which these have led to
secularisation. This chapter will serve as a discussion to examine the different
factors which have been raised within the two case studies. The path to women’s
liberation and the reasons for their emancipation will also be analysed in regards
to the case studies. This discussion chapter will then provide an explanation as
to how the religious denomination of the states examined continues to affect
women’s rights within the secular and Islamic feminist discourses.
The reasons behind women’s liberation
There are many underlying reasons that affect which women’s rights issues have
been pursued and targeted for change by states at specific moments in time. In
both case studies it is clear that processes of secularisation have taken place
throughout the past century as part of modernisation and nationalism. The post-
world war one era (post-1918) saw an increase in women’s rights across the
western hemisphere during the spread of neo-liberalism and nation-building. The
effects of neo-liberalism on the Middle East can be seen in the more secular
policies introduced under Ataturk and the creation of the Turkish Republic (1923)
and the rule of the Shah’s throughout the Pahlavi era (1925-79). There was a
great focus on increasing national prosperity via economic policies. As has been
previously noted, increasing women’s rights goes hand-in-hand with national
prosperity as it can almost double the workforce; six of the top ten performing
countries in this year’s Global Competitive Index also feature in the top twenty
of the Global Gender Gap Index.

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Due to the increase in women’s rights, coupled with the arrival of modern
technology such as the printing press and the internet, women have been able
to share their ideas on a national and global scale and therefore have been able
to increase their influence. As women’s education increased in Turkey and Iran,
their understanding of other cultures also developed as did their ideological
aspirations. This can be seen in the One Million Signatures campaign in Iran
Islamic being influenced by the One Million Signatures Campaign in Morocco.
Women were able to share tactics and information across national borders.
Concurrently, Islamic feminists were able to witness secular policies which they
were not supportive of such as, not observing hejab in France. Due to these
reasons women have actively participated in their own emancipatory efforts by
protesting government decisions that they do not accept or agree with; the
Iranian women’s protest on International Women’s Day and women’s role in the
Turkish government since the 1990’s are great examples of this.
As has been noted, in Iran, women’s rights were increased by policies of
secularisation pursued by the Shah in a process of nationalism; however, this
rapid enforcement of secular and western measures was met by hostility from
the majority of the Iranian population. Women were able to use what rights and
knowledge they had acquired under the Pahlavi era to take part in the revolution
as citizens and not just part of a segregated gender. It is argued by Islamic
feminists that women’s Islamic rights were oppressed under the Shah’s more
secular policies and that they were liberated under the Islamic Republic.

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Barriers to women’s rights
From the case studies it is clear that one problem secularisation and women’s
rights has faced is the constant linkage between secularisation and
westernisation. There is a fear amongst the anti-western in the Middle east, that
secularisation is merely a plot to enforce western colonisation on a large and
legal scale. “Woman, the pillar of the family, is the perfect target for
conspirators” and therefore they must be ‘protected’ and the western export of
‘freedom, ethic, technique, culture, art and pornography’ must be stopped (Al
Shariati) (Yeganeh 1982). By secularising societies, it dissolves one of the last
layers that states have as a unifying bond against western colonialism.
In this dissertation, inadvertently, secularisation has been discussed in two
different spheres. Turkey has been discussed in the western sphere, whereby
economic prosperity takes precedence. The importance the Turkish state places
on nationalism takes priority of state decisions and the state has used advancing
women’s rights for the national interest. In contradiction to this, Iran has been
discussed in the Islamic sphere due to its apparent rejection of the west and the
inclusive nature of Shia Islam which is attaches to the Islamic Republic.
Iran is no longer a nation state in the Westphalian sense of the word as its
policies and reforms have become focused on raising the prominence of Islam,
rather than Iran. Iran’s apparent lack of interest in liberalism and western
states, compared to that of Turkey, has been mirrored in women’s rights
reforms since the Iranian Revolution. It has been argued that when the Islamic
Republic restricted women’s access to education in the 1970’s it was to enable
women and girls to focus on their natural and Islamic rights- the right to be
mothers and wives- as increasing women’s rights along more secular lines- as

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evidenced by the Pahlavi era- had led to discrepancies over what the role of
women should be. As has been seen in the Iranian case study, in the mid-1980s,
women were encouraged to pursue education, as long as it was religiously
dominant and would enabled them to become better mothers and wives. For Ali
Shariati - a prominent Shia theologian who has been described as the ‘hero of
Iranian religious opposition to the Shah’ - the role of women within Shiism
should be modelled on Fatima Zahra (daughter of Muhammad, wife of Ali and
mother of Hasan and Husayn). Fatima was “a ‘woman’ as true Islam conceives
her… ideal as a daughter; ideal as a wife; ideal as a mother; ideal as a
responsible and militant women for her society” (Al Shariati) (Yeganeh 1982:
51).
Women’s rights: Islamic and secular feminisms
From analysing the case studies, it is clear that the states of Iran and Turkey
have both approached the issue of women’s rights in different ways over the last
century. Turkey has increased women’s rights in accordance with more secular
policies such as education and suffrage, as the country itself went through a
process of secularisation. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism has
taken precedence over religion in Turkey and the state has become more secular
as a result. Although Ataturk was said to be inspired by the French principle of
Laïcité, secularism in Turkey was progressively enforced on the Turkish
population by the state and military forces. Secularisation was not initiated on
the demand of the Turkish public via a revolution, as was the case in France. As
a result of this top-down approach, although religion was removed from the
public sphere, Sunni Islam is still widely practised by many people in Turkey in
the private sphere. Due to these reasons, Turkey could be seen as being more

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45
accepting of secular feminist values which advocate the removal of religion out
of the public sphere but understand its importance in the private sphere.
In Iran, more liberal policies on women’s rights were also increased by the
secularisation process encouraged under the Shah. The reasons for doing so and
the tactics that he used were ultimately complimentary to Ataturk’s in Turkey; to
create a stronger, more prosperous nation state, by using the military to enforce
the new laws. However, when secularisation was enforced in Iran by the state,
Iranians revolted in rejection of this enforcement and oppression. Sacralisation
was used as a uniting tool to over throw an unwanted ruler (the Shah) by the
majority of the Iranian population. Although ultimately in Iran, Islam has been
enforced by the state and the police, it was called for by the majority of the
population.

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Conclusion
To conclude this dissertation, it is clear that religion still plays a large part in
politics in both Iran and Turkey. Their religious denomination, although both
Islamic, is a determining factor as to how the government is run. It is also a
determining feature as to which women’s rights are prioritised. Whether or not
the women themselves believe more secular or Islamic rights benefit them the
most is also an important factor in how the state approaches women’s rights and
religion. As can be seen in Turkey, women predominately wanted more secular
rights and have historically rejected the state when it has tried to Islamatize
them, in contradiction to this, women in Iran actively took part in the Iranian
Revolution when the Shah tried to secularize as well as westernise them.
It is clear from this study that women’s rights have historically been used as a
tool by national governments to enforce their policies. Women have been
liberated at times when it is in the best interest of the state, and then repressed
when they are no longer of any value. Using religion has been a great way to
validate government abuses of power because until the mass increase in literacy
in the mid-1950, the national and religious elites were rarely challenged.
Islamic feminists have proven that women’s oppression by Islam has merely
been due to the misogynistic interpretation used to enforce patriarchy. Secular
feminists have also proven that secularism has also been used to enforce the
patriarchal system when it has been used to advance male dominance over
women.
As has been seen in the case studies; a government has the ability to take away
a women’s right to attend school but it cannot take away her quest for

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knowledge; it may be able to enforce her to wear Islamic dress and attend
prayer service every day, but it cannot change her belief.

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Glossary
Diyanet: The Turkish state body that oversees the Islamic faith; the
appointment of imams and writing of sermons.
Hadith: The collection of the reports of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the
Islamic prophet Muhammad.
Hajj: An annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca which is mandatory for all Muslims
to be carried out at least once in their lifetime.
Qur’an: The central religious text of Islam. It is believed to be the word of God
as dictated to Muhammad by the archangel Gabriel and written down in Arabic
Mullah: A title of respect for a person who is learned in, teaches, or expounds
the sacred law.
Ulama: The group of Muslim scholars who are recognised as having specialist
knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology.
Word count: 11,638

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