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POWER, POWDER AND
PATRIOTISM:
A Comparative Sociological Investigation
into the Origins of Nationalism
Candidate Number: HJDP5
Word Count: 9999
Dissertation submitted in part-fulfilment of the Masters Course in International
Public Policy, UCL, September 2015.

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Abstract
The modern era has witnessed a profound shift in global ethnic composition.
Industrialisation and the rapid increase in state bureaucratic capability have
coincided with a significant rise in national ethnic affiliation at the expense of
previously dominant forms of ethnic affiliation like those of region and religion.
This paper seeks to answer the questions of how and why national ethnicity
came to supersede other ethnic ties in the period. To answer these questions, I
primarily intend to explore the very nature of ethnicity itself; how it is
constructed, maintained and transformed. This paper shall primarily
investigate the role of both the state and ‘chauvinistic elites’ in forming these
ethnic boundaries. Preliminarily I argue that national ethnicity, rather than
deriving from ontologically given facts, is instead the result of social
construction. During the modern period, states increasing capabilities allowed
them to expropriate power from rival actors enabling them to exercise
hegemony within their borders. This process of expropriation also enabled
states to weaken the powers of rival ‘chauvinistic elites’, enabling them to build
dominant national ethnic identities to ensure greater levels of legitimacy over
their subjects.

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Table of Contents
Abstract............................................................................................................................2
Table of Contents...........................................................................................................3
Chapter 1 – Introduction...............................................................................................5
Chapter 2 – Literature Review.....................................................................................8
2.1 – The Primordialist Approach ................................................................................8
2.2 – The Modernist Approach .....................................................................................9
2.3 – Research Context..................................................................................................12
Chapter 3 – Methodological Considerations..........................................................14
3.1 – A Comparative Sociological Framework .........................................................14
3.2 – Research Methodology........................................................................................15
Chapter 4 – State Power Consolidation...................................................................18
4.1 – A Sociological Synthesis .....................................................................................18
4.2 – Power and the State.............................................................................................21
4.3 – Agrarian Bureaucratisation ................................................................................22
4.4 – National-Legal Authority ...................................................................................25
Chapter 5 – Constructing Nations ............................................................................29
5.1 – A Fluid Concept ...................................................................................................29
5.2 – Superstructural Chauvinism..............................................................................31
5.3 – Power, Powder and Patriotism..........................................................................33
Chapter 6 – A House Divided: The Case of the USA............................................38
6.1 – The Empire of Liberty .........................................................................................38
6.2 – Cotton and Commerce ........................................................................................40
6.3 – The Long Road to Appomattox .........................................................................42
6.4 – A Nation Reborn ..................................................................................................43
Chapter 7 – From Bushidō to Bureaucracy: The Case of Japan...........................46
7.1 – Boshin Sensō.........................................................................................................46

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7.2 – Restoration and Rebellion...................................................................................49
7.3 – Empire of the Sun ................................................................................................51
Chapter 8 – Concluding Remarks.............................................................................54
Bibliography.................................................................................................................57

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Chapter 1
Introduction
The emergence of a multitude of relatively new nation-states in Eastern Europe
and the Balkans following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia respectively, has resulted in an growing level of academic literature
on the nature and origins of nationalism in recent decades. This paper shall
primarily deal with several key questions that have continued to stimulate and
divide theorists within contemporary nationalist studies, namely: how and why
did ‘nationality’ come to supersede previously dominant forms of affiliation in
the post-agrarian societies of Western Europe, the Americas and parts of Asia?
My research will employ Moore’s comparative historical approach, primarily
comparing the processes of state power consolidation and national construction
in the cases of the USA during the Civil War era, and Japan during the Boshin
War and subsequent Meiji Restoration. I have chosen these cases as both
represent intriguing examples of states which successfully evolved from
ethnically diverse and relatively decentralised entities into fully fledged nation-
states in the 19th
century. In each of these cases, I believe a national ethnicity
was constructed through an expropriation of power from rival elites during
periods of violent upheaval. I intend to examine each case in detail to analyse

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the processes by which national ethnicity gained supremacy at the expense of
previous forms of ethnic affiliation.
Additionally, the substantial variances between the cases make the comparison
all the more fascinating and empirically fruitful with one beginning its
centralisation as a former colony with a predominantly planted population and
an advanced bourgeois capitalist economy, and the other as an ancient
civilisation with a long-standing native population and a comparably
feudalistic economy. A further reason for this case selection is that too often
studies of this nature have relied upon Europe’s ancien régimes as the basis of
their theoretical models. This study seeks to somewhat address this imbalance
by examining two examples of non-European nation-states.
The vast and growing discourse on nationalism continues to defy all
generalisation, encompassing a wealth of theoretical approaches and passions
with perhaps the only common theme being a scholarly appreciation of
historical narrative. This theoretical and methodological diversity has certainly
been a great strength of nationalism, making it both an engaging and divisive
topic however it has come at the cost of conceptual clarity. Terms like the
‘nation’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘ethnicity’ have all proved notoriously difficult to pin
down in the field. With a topic so often plagued with conceptual irregularity it
is perhaps most pertinent to initially address the issue of conceptualisation. In

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the interest of clarity my paper will primarily treat the subjects of nationality
and ethnicity as one and the same. As I will elaborate upon in subsequent
discussion, I present both as artificially constructed senses of affinity between
individuals. In my analysis, nationality shall refer to ethnic ties on the basis of a
shared loyalty among individuals to states.
Theoretically, this work shall primarily be a work of synthesis, combining a
range of contributions from the field of historical sociology with those of
contemporary national debate. Rather than presenting nationalism as a cause of
state formation, my paper shall instead depict it as a consequence of it. It will
demonstrate that by utilising their extensive infrastructural powers, the powder
of their superior military ordnance and a keenly constructed patriotic narrative,
post-agrarian states were able to overcome internal rivals to their territorial
hegemony and build a uniquely modern entity based upon a mass-produced
sense of national ethnic affiliation; the ‘Nation-State’.

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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The question of how nationality came to supersede all other forms of affiliation
in the post-agrarian world has been has been subject to increasing academic
scrutiny in recent decades. This section shall seek to briefly examine several of
the key theoretical divisions within nationalist studies and provide an
indication of where my contributions will lie.
2.1 – The Primordialist Approach
The first of these primary schools of nationalist theory is the primordialist
approach. As Storey (2001) notes, primordialists contend that the origins of
nationalism lie in ancient ‘primordial’ roots and feelings like race, linguistic
heritage and traditions that date back to early civilisation. For primordialists,
nationality is formed on the basis of attachment to the ‘cultural givens’ of
society (Smith, 2013). Clifford Geertz reflected this position stating that
“congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable,
and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves” (1973: 259). As
Hearn (2006) states, primordialists emphasise the organic evolution of smaller
ethnic groups into nations with representations of nationality focussing upon
these shared roots and traditions. The sociobiological school is a notable

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subfield of primordialism. According to Ozkirimli (2010: 53), at its most
fundamental, the sociobiological view of ethnicity and nationalism is that they
are defined by common biological decent and maintained by endogamy. Pierre
van den Berghe (1981) is perhaps the most noted proponent of this approach,
arguing that individuals, motivated by the primal need to protect their gene
pools, pursue strategies of biological ‘nepotism’. Nationality is understood as a
protracted and diminished version of kinship real enough to form the basis of
modern sentiments like nationalism and racism (Ozkirimli, 2010). My research
is however concerned with explaining the rapidly changing nature of ethnic
and national affiliation in the post-agrarian world. The primordial framework,
with its emphasis upon ancient and biological ties, remains ill-equipped to the
task of explaining the dynamic and changing nature of identity (Beatty, 1999).
Primordialism cannot effectively account for the specific transformations of
identity that occurred particularly in the modern era and therefore my paper
will not dwell much further on its contributions.
2.2 – The Modernist Approach
Standing in stark contrast to the primordialist approach is the broad and
increasingly dominant ‘modernist’ school of nationalism. As their name
suggests, modernists commonly believe that nations and nationalism are
products of the modern era. Within this broad church of theorists, exists a

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multitude of differing theories regarding the specific causal mechanisms of
these modern entities and I will look at the contributions of several of the most
significant theorists.
The first of these is Hans Kohn (1944) who sought to depict nationalism as
initially a response from the political elite to the diminishing authority of
monarchy during the Enlightenment. Miroslav Hroch (1985) further contributed
to the field by incorporating early modernist work into an original three-stage
model of nationalist development. According to Hroch, individuals are integral
to the creation of nations with activists laying the foundations for national
identity through the research and invention of shared cultural, social, linguistic
and historical traits. In the second phase, Hroch documents the emergence of a
new generation of activists who seek to utilise these ‘discovered’ traits to forge
national consciousness. Hroch’s final phase was the formation of a mass
national movement which gradually branches throughout civil society. Marxist
historian Eric Hobsbawn (1992) adapted Hroch’s three stages into his own
model of national development. Hobsbawn’s model emphasises the critical role
of lasting political entities, established cultural elites and state capacity for
conquest in this process yet I would contend its true merits lie in its detailed
historical demonstrations of each phase of his model.

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Another body of nationalist writers have chosen to focus upon the role of
communication systems and information dissemination in the rise of
nationalism. Karl Deutsch’s Nationalism and Social Communication (1953) was
perhaps the first work of this type to receive widespread recognition.
According to Deutsch, national membership “consists in the ability to
communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with
members of one large group than with outsiders” (1953: 71). Communication is
therefore central in national construction and his work identifies the national
mobilisations that accompanied processes like industrialisation, urbanisation
and the advent of mass communication. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined
Communities (1983) is perhaps the most influential work of this vein.
Advocating a social constructivist approach, Anderson defined a nation as an
“imagined political community - and imagined as both limited and sovereign”
(1983: 15). In Anderson’s model, identity is a fluid concept which was
‘imagined’ though a number of ways (maps, speeches, newspaper articles for
instance), invariably preceded by an intellectual class that develops a national
narrative. He argues that the advent of print capitalism and mass vernacular
literacy were instrumental in the nationalising process as they "created the
possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic
morphology set the stage for the modern nation" (1983: 49).

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Ernest Gellner’s (1964, 1983) theory of nationalism is one of the most
comprehensive in the modernist field. He argued that nationalism must be
understood in the context of industrialisation. Gellner argues that industrialised
states required spatially ductile labour forces (Stokes 1986: 594) and nationalism
provided the linguistic, legal and political integration required for efficient,
modern economies. While nations were purely modern phenomena to Gellner,
he did recognise that often post-industrial national pioneers drew upon the
myths and traditions of pre-existing cultures in the creation of their narrative.
In modernist nationalist scholarship, there have been several works which have
sought to place the process of national formation within a detailed historical
context. Eugen Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen (1976) is a masterpiece of this
style. In wonderful detail, Weber outlines the specific homogenising processes
which resulted in the transformation of France from a diverse system of
agrarian societies into a modern nation-state. Weber argues that the French
nation resulted from construction by the Parisian elite and exogenous shocks
but in particular he emphasises the role of linguistic homogenisation in the
process.
2.3 – Research Context
This research will locate itself within the broad ‘modernist’ category of
nationalist study. It will distinguish itself from other works of this vein though

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with its deep synthesis and integration of contributions from the field of
historical sociology. While some of the aforementioned theorists have flirted
with historical sociological contributions (Hobsbawn’s being a notable
example), most have chosen to focus upon the role played by systems of
communication and elite-led social construction in the formation of national
identity. Both of these latter factors will continue to play an important role in
my model although they will be supplemented with a myriad of contributions
from noted historical sociologists like Max Weber who will form the basis of my
original state-orientated model of nationalism. In this sense, this work can be
described as a Weberian one. It can be further characterised as ‘Weberian’ in
that it aims to provide a rich contextualisation of theory through historical case
examinations inspired by Max Weber’s namesake Eugen Weber’s Peasants into
Frenchmen (1976). Generally speaking, modernist scholars have typically
remained somewhat euro-centric in their theoretical focus. I have again chosen
to differentiate myself from the literature by examining the cases of Japan and
the USA. The relative omission of both historical sociology and case
examinations of non-European cases in the literature I believe provides
sufficient justification for this individual research project.

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Chapter 3
Methodological Considerations
For the basis of my methodological approach, I will look to several of the
contributions from within the field of historical sociology. As a scholarly
tradition, it arose as an attempt by theorists from various disciplines to generate
both a historically sensitive and generally applicable analysis of many of the
core features of the modern world like industrial capitalism and the rational
bureaucratic state (Hobson, Lawson, and Rosenberg, 2010: 3357).
3.1 – A Comparative Sociological Framework
The historical sociological tradition is best characterised by the collective
assertion of its members that there is room for both general theory and
narrative in the explanation of historical phenomena (Calhoun, 1998: 86). As
such, historical sociology seeks to develop innovative models capable of
shedding greater light upon historical patterns and changing societal structures
(Bonnell, 1980: 161). Employing a distinctive comparative methodology
(Calhoun, 1996: 327), historical sociology sought to reliably establish whether a
theoretical assertion applicable to one case retains validity when applied to
additional cases (Bonnell, 1980: 160). Sociologists of this vein seek general laws
that relate specific historic conditions with specific later outcomes (Goldstone,

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1998: 842) in a single case, a limited class of cases, or universally (Bonnell, 1980:
161). The comparative historical method represents “an intrinsic part of the
historical-sociological enterprise” (ibid: 160) and this paper shall utilise this
method to construct an original explanatory model regarding the origins and
proliferation of nationalism.
Perhaps the most acclaimed example of this comparative work of historical
sociology is Barrington Moore’s magnum opus; Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy (1966). Challenging prevailing developmental scholarship, Moore
contended that societies follow a diverse range of developmental paths
explained not in terms of ‘laws’ but in terms of the comprising class actors and
their complex strategies (Mouzelis, 1994: 32). Moore deploys his framework to
account for social change in not just one society but six (England, France, the
United States, Japan, China, and India) (Smith, 1984: 327). ‘Social Origins’ in
many senses revolutionised comparative historic research setting the standard
against which subsequent research in the field was measured. Taking
inspiration from Moore, my research will employ a similar comparative
methodology in its investigation into the origins of nationalism.
3.2 – Research Methodology
My research process began with a theoretical synthesis of many of the key
works of historical sociology to generate a model linking the macro-dependent

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variable of ‘nationalism’ to the macro-independent variable of ‘state power
consolidation’. This paper will however recognise, as King and Sznajder (2006:
766) argue, that the research value of comparative social science does ”not lie
only in the proving or disproving of various macrocausal theories with
reference to these macrovariables” but instead in the ‘thick’ analysis of critical
cases it provides. The concept of thick analysis I derive from the Geertzian
method of thick description so favoured by contemporary ethnographers. In his
seminal work, The Integration of Cultures, Clifford Geertz (1973) argues that a
key responsibility of an ethnographer is to intensively observe and analyse
small-scale cases or small numbers of cases to provide dense descriptions of
social life that allow for broader interpretations and generalisations to be
formed (Marshall, 1998).
This paper will analyse the link between nationalism and state power
consolidation through an examination of two ‘thick cases’. It will employ a
more historically focussed version of Geertz’s method, utilising multiple voices
and sources to attempt to provide a compelling narrative of the processes
taking place in each case. Selecting two deeply contrasting cases (USA and
Japan) which both witnessed a supersession of nationality over other forms of
ethic affiliation in the 19th
century, this paper will undergo a parallel
examination and contextualisation of my original theory.

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Following my initial theoretical synthesis, my research subsequently involved a
familiarisation of the historical and cultural contexts of both cases. Once
effectively familiar, I then proceeded to locate evidence and testimony relating
to the topic and cases from a multitude of library sources, organisational
records and historical contributions, both primary and secondary in nature.
From this data, I began to observe key patterns to ascertain a compelling
narrative that was true to the source material and subjects. I then re-read all of
the material to critique and refine this narrative before disseminating my
findings.

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Chapter 4
State Power Consolidation
One perhaps fair criticism that has been directed at the two most prominent
comparative historical sociological works: Moore’s ‘Social Origins’ (1966) and
Skocpol’s subsequent States and Social Revolutions (1979) is that they often suffer
crises of identity. The extensive reliance upon the explanatory power of the
individual Marxist concept of class struggle and downplaying the contributions
of other theoretical approaches overlooks crucial factors like power and state
capacity. On the other hand, they distance themselves too far from the rest of
the theoretical tradition of Marxism leaving their theories too isolated and thus
weakening their assertions. Firstly I will seek to address the latter of these
weaknesses by placing the process of national formation within the broader
societal framework of Marxism. I will then synthesise sociological works by
theorists like Tilly, Mann and Weber to introduce the pivotal role played by the
state and its process of power consolidation in the formation of national
identity.
4.1 – A Sociological Synthesis
Karl Marx remains perhaps the most innovative analyst of historical
phenomena in political science, yet of all the phenomena he discussed, it is his

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dissection of nationalism and the nation-state that is the least satisfactory
(Avineri, 1991: 638). Indeed much of his theory remains limited to winks and
innuendo as he never truly addressed the subject on individual terms. That said
I will not disregard his writings in the formation of my theories on the subject
as I believe that many Marxist concepts remain useful in a contextual and
explanatory sense. Instead the task with Marx becomes one of adaptation and
supplementation, incorporating his concepts into a broader theory on the
origins and nature of nationalism.
Human society in its broadest sense, for Marx, was divided into two
fundamental components: Base and Superstructure (1859). Here the base or
‘mode of production’ refers to the economic system in existence (for instance
capitalism or feudalism), encompassing both the forces and relations of
production. At a societal level, Marx states “the mode of production of material
life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life” (ibid).
Upon this economic structural foundation “arises a legal and political
superstructure” (ibid), the realm of political activity, institutions, culture and
the state. Here it appears that Marx is advocating a rigidly deterministic view of
history whereby economics has solitary dominion over all aspects of social life
and this interpretation has become an essential aspect of orthodox Marxist
cultural study (Williams, 1973). I would argue that this Orthodox interpretation

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is an unjust one. Marx’s close collaborator Friedrich Engels gives the most
damning assessment of this interpretation stating that it reduced Marx’s
original proposition into an abstract, meaningless, senseless argument (Engels,
1999). Marx in other works (see Marx, 2008) presents a more balanced and
accommodating model of social relations where both the economic base and
political superstructure, continually ‘condition’ one other. Here Marx is not
disregarding other factors but simply giving primacy to the mode of
production. It is this more nuanced interpretation of base and superstructure
that I will employ as the foundation of my model regarding nationalism.
Vandergeest and Buttel identify that Marxism in development sociology faces
many conceptual limitations at both a theoretical and metatheoretical level
(1988: 691). It has become increasingly apparent that some relation exists
between the emergence and consolidation of state power and the emergence of
nationalism. The incorporation of Weberian sociology into our existing Marxist
framework can provide the additional concepts necessary to facilitate an
effective analysis of this relationship (ibid.). Here I shall therefore synthesise
Marx’s superstructure with Weber’s analysis of the state in his work ‘Politics as a
Vocation’ (1919). Weber fundamentally asserts that a state is a political entity
which successfully claims “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force” (1919). He expresses that states achieve this monopoly through the

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expropriation of rival ‘private’ agents’ means of violence and power (1919).
Placing this concept of the state into Marx’s theory we can begin to view the
superstructure of a society as a battleground between rival power interests with
one interest inevitably coming to establish a monopoly and therefore a state
(Tilly, 1985). The primary goal of any state therefore is to maintain this
superstructural monopoly. Weber however is somewhat vague in his
explanations of how and why states achieve this and I intend to build upon his
relatively brief allusions.
4.2 - Power and the State
“The State” for Weber, was the institutional matrix of modern politics, a
historically and structurally specific organization of the rule of men over men
(Dusza, 1989: 74). More specifically, Redner highlights that his concept of the
state consists of three partial definitions: the expropriation of the means of
power from autonomous domestic actors; the attainment of a monopoly of the
legitimate use of the means of violence; and legitimacy through advanced
principles of legitimation (1990: 639). Our comprehension of the state is
inextricably linked to our comprehension of societal power. State power
capacity is defined as the ability of the state to dominate, i.e. coax compliant
behaviour from, the individuals of a given territory (McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly, 2001: 78). Sociologist Michael Mann separates state power into two broad

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categories: despotic power and infrastructural power (1984: 189). The former is
more in line with traditional perceptions of power relating mainly to the state’s
capacity to extract revenues and natural resources, conscript manpower and
coerce through military capacity. Infrastructural power, Mann conceives, relates
to the capacity of the state to penetrate society and to implement logistically
political decisions throughout its territory (Ibid.). He argues that the modern
state is characterised by its growing capacity for the latter. I shall analyse the
processes which have resulted in the formation of the contemporary state and
the factors which have led to this dramatic increase in power particularly of the
infrastructural variety.
4.3 – Agrarian Bureaucratisation
Here we return to Weber’s hypothesis; that the state emerges through the
expropriation of parallel, “private” agents and their means of power. Against
the backdrop of feudalism (from which the modern state emerged), Tilly
vividly depicts the events which characterised this expropriation. He states:
“In an idealized sequence a great lord made war so effectively as to become dominant in
a substantial territory, but that war making led to increased extraction of the means of
war – men, arms, food, lodging, transportation, supplies, and/or the money to buy them
– from the population within that territory. The building up of war-making capacity
likewise increased the capacity to extract. The very activity of extraction if successful,

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entailed the elimination, neutralization, or co-optation of the great lord’s local rivals;
thus, it led to state making” (1985: 183).
Here Tilly describes the more ‘despotic’ means of power used by societal actors
to establish their dominance. Once established, these actors and their means of
power came to form the fundamental structure of the state. I argue in line with
Marx that changes in the economic base of societies played a critical role in
determining the outcomes of this superstructural rivalry. The rapid growth of
trade and commerce that occurred during the high middle-ages had resulted in
a shift in economic power from the feudal favouring land-based interests
towards the fledging exchange-orientated interests who typically favoured a
mercantilist approach. Mercantilism contends that the goal of economic policy
should be state autonomy and power relative to other states in order to protect
trade and colonial interests (Davies, 2011: 19). Often these mercantilist interests
placed their backing behind a powerful actor well-placed to establish a
superstructural monopoly and therefore a state. This base-superstructure
relationship was a reciprocal one as often base transformations required a
revolutionary break with the past involving a superstructural weakening of
actors supporting more antiquated economic systems. Evolving states were
dependent on the support of a budding commercial bourgeoisie who in turn
benefited by consolidating their position and influence (Szirmai, 2015: 48). As

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mercantilism grew in influence, so did the power of this actor encouraging
centralisation during the period.
Innovations in military tactics and technology were further instrumental in this
process of centralisation. The introduction of gunpowder weapon technology
provided a decisive edge to rulers who could afford them allowing them to out-
gun rivals and consolidate power (Noordam, 2012: 169). The maturation of the
heavy cannon in the 15th
century, significantly undermined the strategic value
of castles leaving weaker lords more vulnerable defensively and more
susceptible to expropriation (Bean, 1973). Gunpowder also raised the
importance of infantry over heavy cavalry, making manpower the more
decisive factor in combat (ibid.). This benefited leaders of larger populaces, thus
aiding centralisation.
Larger armies placed greater strain on populations, requiring considerable
administration to fund and staff (Roberts, 1956). Tilly goes on to argue that
through despotic expropriation, powerful war-lords created state organisation
in the form of tax-collection bodies, police forces, judicial systems, exchequers,
account keepers; thus again leading to state making (1985: 183). Emerging states
absorbed their competitors and small neighbours by merger or conquest, thus
becoming increasingly irresistible until the most effective state became the
solitary state within a political realm (Bean, 1973). As Brilmayer comments,

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“prior to state formation there existed in essence a group of small kingdoms
with each owner of territory essentially possessing governmental power over
his or her property” (1989: 15). Through expropriation, typically rural and
feudal communities underwent significant centralisation, resulting in the build-
up of a state apparatus with the establishment of one organisation’s monopoly
in these societies. This process I shall term ‘agrarian bureaucratisation’ but for
Weber, this crude model of state formation through expropriation is
inadequate. Unlike Tilly, Weber does not propound an entirely militaristic
theory of state formation; a belief which is underlined by his linking of a state’s
monopoly of the means of violence with the concept of legitimacy (Redner,
1990: 640).
4.4 – National-Legal Authority
Legitimacy constitutes Weber’s third fundamental definition of the modern
state (Ibid.). Lipset defines this state legitimacy as its capacity to “maintain the
belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper
ones for the society” (1983: 64). Legitimacy is instrumental in securing a state’s
emergence and consolidation. Leaders and governments that achieve a degree
of legitimacy can ensure higher levels of compliance with their instructions and
regulations (Levi and Sacks, 2007). Legitimatised leaderships can induce
compliance and sacrifice from their subjects and citizens more easily and so use

26. ~ 26 ~
fewer resources on monitoring and enforcement. (Levi et al, 2009). In the
context of the superstructural rivalry, legitimised actors therefore enjoy a
comparative advantage over competitors and are more likely to become the
most powerful or to achieve a monopoly to form a state.
Weber highlights three ideal forms of political authority (Legitimised power)
which I shall incorporate into my model: charismatic, traditional and rational-
legal (1919). These ideal types were conceptually systemised versions of the
general institutional patterns of societies (Hamilton and Kao, 1987: 295). In the
first of these, ‘Charismatic authorities’, legitimacy results from a quality
credited to a spectacular exercise of authority by an individual (Shils, 1965: 199),
a quality which produces complete personal devotion to said individual (Pope,
Cohen and Hazelrigg, 1975: 422). ‘Traditional authorities’ are bodies which
derive their legitimacy from historically accepted societal customs. These
authorities are typically absolutely monarchical and theocratic in nature.
Finally, ‘rational-legal authority’ relates to the legitimisation of actor power
through bureaucratic power and the propagation of legal norms. Under
bureaucratic systems, tasks and interactions tend to become rationalized and
routinized in terms of means-efficiency (Allan, 2005: 172). As Weber states,
rational-legal authority implied “a belief in the legality of patterns of normative
rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue

27. ~ 27 ~
commands” (1947: 328). In rational-legal entities, loyalty was not given to a
specific individual but rather a set of legalistic principles enforced by a
bureaucracy that enjoyed a monopoly on legislation and violence.
In his model, these categories of political leadership tend to appear in a
hierarchical developmental order. Following Weber, contemporary sociologists
have charted the progress by which charismatic authority has become
routinized into traditional authority, which gives way in turn to rational legal
authority (Schaar, 1981: 15). The emergence and growth of bureaucratic
capability has resulted in a significant decline in the roles of both traditional
and charismatic legitimacy.
Nevertheless, Weber’s definition of this legal-rational bureaucratic authority
remains ambiguous. He convincingly identifies the shifting importance from
individual and traditional forms of authority towards bureaucratic forms in the
modern era. His explanation of the factors which result in their emergence is
however imprecise. In an attempt to provide a more robust account of this
transformation I modify Weber’s final typology, arguing instead that instead
stable modern states are characterised by the ‘national-legal authority’ they
exude over their populaces. In addition to the legitimising effect of legal norms
and legislative monopoly, modern nation-states came to derive legitimacy from
the constructed sense of affinity generated by nationalism. At this point I shall

28. ~ 28 ~
address the issue of nationalism, placing it as a concept within the context of
this process of state power consolidation. In the subsequent chapter, I shall
provide a constructivist interpretation of nationalism. I will additionally
examine the role of rival chauvinistic elites, technology and territory in its
construction and maintenance.

29. ~ 29 ~
Chapter 5
Constructing Nations
“There has never been nationhood without falsehood.”
Felipe Fernández-Armesto (2003)
5.1 – A Fluid Concept
Few concepts within political science have the level of ambiguity as that of
ethnicity and nationality. They are terms which are highly malleable,
‘situationally variable and negotiable’ (Jenkins, 1997: 50). Weber highlights this
intricacy even at a formative level stating that ‘any cultural trait, no matter how
superficial, can serve as a starting point for the familiar tendency to
monopolistic closure’ (1978: 388). As I briefly alluded to in my introduction, this
paper will interpret nationality and ethnicity as largely one in the same. In line
with Anderson (1983), I present both as ‘imagined’ senses of community
between individuals. As Anderson states, they are “imagined because the
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion” (ibid: 6). Irrespective of the real levels of inequality
and exploitation that exist within each, these communities are “always
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (ibid: 7). The distinction that I

30. ~ 30 ~
will make in this research is that nationality shall refer more specifically to an
imagined community between members of a territorially demarcated state and
nationalism to the transcendence of nationality above other more localised
forms of affiliation among the broader population.
With greater levels of recent historical scrutiny on nationalism and ethnicity
more broadly, it has become increasingly apparent that human identity has
always been in a state of relative flux, shifting from the more localised affinities
of primitive and feudal societies towards the more extensive affiliations of
modern nation-states. More rigid assumptions regarding ethnicity favoured by
primordialists are ill-equipped to explain this dynamic reality. In order to
develop a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics we must
therefore utilise a theoretical approach which appreciates that ethnicity is
neither “static nor monolithic” (Jenkins, 1997: 51). As Balibar states, “no nation
possess an ethnic base naturally”, however as social formations are
nationalised, populations within become ethnicised, and are represented as a
natural community with its own “identity of origins, culture and interests
which transcends individuals and social conditions” (1990: 349). My research
shall utilise a constructivist approach portraying nationalism as a result of
geography, political interests and ability, which replaced older religious and
dynastic interests with grander more secular visions (Beatty, 1999). It will then

31. ~ 31 ~
place these dynamics within the context of state power consolidation in an
effort to explain the proliferation of nationalism in the modern era.
5.2 – Superstructural Chauvinism
At this point, I shall incorporate Wimmer’s (2008) dynamic process model of
ethnicity into my synthesis. It is a theory which emphasises the reciprocal
relationship between the macrostructural and individual levels of societies
(Wimmer, 2008: 972-973). His theory asserts that the institutional framework
and power hierarchy of societies define which kind of ethnic boundaries can be
drawn and how the individual chooses to ethnically differentiate (ibid: 973).
Placing this assertion within the context of my model, I argue that the ethnic
outcomes of a territory are determined by the power dynamics of its
superstructure. Returning to Marx’s relationship between base and
superstructure, I hypothesise that these ethnic dynamics are conditioned by
variations in a society’s economic base. To understand the origins of
nationalism in modern polities, we must therefore examine the changes that
occurred within both their base and superstructure.
Within this framework I intend to incorporate Kaufman’s theory of symbolic
politics (2006). Kaufman’s theory provides an insightful analysis of ethnic
mobilisation within modern polarised regions, yet I believe his assertions
remain equally applicable to historical cases. Kaufman effectively bridges the

32. ~ 32 ~
gap between primordial and constructivist discourse arguing that while we
must acknowledge the malleable nature of ethnicity, we must appreciate that its
origins often remain rooted in both history and culture (2006: 50). Kaufman
separates the cultural entrepreneur who develops and perpetrates the cultural
myths of an ethnicity from the political elites who exploit it (2006: 50). Instead
he introduces the concept of ‘Chauvinistic elites’ who primarily respond to
rather than shape the cultural and political landscape of ethnic communities.
These elites tap into the powerful emotive myths of ethnicity in the aim of
redefining ethnic dynamics, often as a struggle for group survival and status
(2006: 51). The inclusivity of this ethnic category is determined by the elites
political alliances; a process which may lead to the encompassing consensus at a
societal level hence influencing its macrostructural dynamics (Wimmer, 2008).
Within my sociological synthesis, I argue that these chauvinistic elites are the
principal drivers of ethnic mobilisation and radicalisation primarily to satisfy
their own individual interests. To maximise their superstructural position, the
elites legitimise their power over populations through the construction of
localised senses of affinity, generating illusory historical narratives of tradition
and collectiveness that emphasise a sense of continuity throughout history
(Balibar, 1990). This legitimacy, as stated earlier, allowed elites to more
effectively control and extract from their subjects.

33. ~ 33 ~
5.3 – Power, Powder and Patriotism
In ancient and feudalistic societies due to technological and bureaucratic
limitations, this ethnic mobilisation and demarcation took place on a smaller
scale with authority often restricted to an individual who derived it from
charisma or tradition. That leader subsequently acted to maximise their
superstructural position, through fealty, alliances, dynastic unions and conflict.
Over several centuries though, we notice a radical reduction in the number of
these smaller political entities. In 1500 A.D. we can observe hundreds of
independent polities in Europe yet by 1900 only 25 remained (Linz, 1993: 356).
In antiquated societies, no prince could act without the support of the majority
his vassals yet by 1600 most could be confident of suppressing all but the most
extensive rebellions (Bean, 1973: 203). This section shall examine the processes
by which nationalism came to ascend above these more localised ethnic
affinities.
As I discussed in my section on agrarian bureaucratisation, through an
expropriation of rival actors’ sources of power, powerful lords and monarchs
often came to establish superstructural monopolies with power centralised in
bureaucratic machines. Changes in the economic bases of early-modern
societies towards more state dependent industries (mercantilism in Europe) and
rapid military innovation were critical in the expedition of this process. Actors

34. ~ 34 ~
who enjoyed bourgeois support commanded vast armies and with increased
manpower and the powder of modern weaponry, they swiftly consolidated
their position. This process of state power consolidation was an essential
prerequisite for modern nationalism. Rival chauvinistic elites to the state were
eradicated, removing the primary driving forces behind the construction of
localised ethnic affinities. However, this consolidation had a profound effect
upon legitimacy in states. By 1500 A.D. European countries faced significant
crises of identity as the traditional social order collapsed (Greenfield, 1992).
A new legitimate authority was required and the answer manifested itself in a
national-legal form. Gradually, states and loyal elites began the process of ‘state
nation’ building (Linz, 1993). Proponents of nationalism in each case redefined
the ‘nation’, a term which had previously referred to exclusively high-status
groups, as ‘the people’ (Greenfield, 1992). Nationalism was essentially an
imposition of a high culture on the wider populace and commonly those who
were its historic agents were not aware of the implications of their actions
(Gellner, 1983: 49, 57). On other occasions, it was often a deliberate outcome
manipulated by an intelligentsia who seized the cultural resources of their
communities for the geo-cultural aim of legitimising the state and facilitating an
expansion of territory and influence (Smith, 1989). As Breuilly argues, national
identity arose “out of the need to make sense of complex social and political

35. ~ 35 ~
arrangements” (1982: 343). The bourgeois intelligentsia turned to mass-
mobilisation utilising populist myth-making regarding race, language and
history among other topics (Nairn, 1977), thus generating a nationalist narrative
that emphasised the nation’s continuity throughout history and into the future.
National languages (distinct from sacred languages like Latin) were developed
for the purposes of administration and adopted by high society (Balibar, 1990).
The growing significance of manufacturing and industrialisation had resulted
in a significant growth of urban areas in the post-feudal world. The influence of
the state was at its greatest in the administrative centres and the closer
proximity and familiarity between populations in denser urban areas
encouraged linguistic and therefore national assimilation (Weber, 1976).
Military conscription had a similar effect. Linguistic standardisation and
absorption united the masses into an educated ‘public’, capable of
communicating “more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with
members of one large group than with outsiders” effectively demarcating the
nation (Deutsch, 1953: 71). Linguistic homogeneity accompanied by the
growing significance of print capitalism with the advent of the printing press,
had vastly increased the circulation and projection of nationalist discourse,
further reinforcing cultural assimilation (Anderson, 1983). The growth of state

36. ~ 36 ~
organised mass-schooling further cemented this linguistic and cultural
assimilation (Ramirez and Boli, 1987).
Language and narrative were not in themselves sufficient characteristics to
effectively distinguish the nation from ‘others’. The territorial definition of a
nation resulting from cartography played a significant role in the legitimisation
of state power (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995). From this establishment of state
borders emerged the global principle of state sovereignty. Originating in
Europe, particularly following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, sovereignty was
the external recognition of states as the foremost claimant to power within their
established territories, each with the right to manage without external
interference (Kossler, 2003: 22). Nationalistic rhetoric asserted that nationality
passed from generation to generation functioning like a racial identity for the
occupants of this territory (Balibar, 1990). Gradually territorial occupants
became ethnicised with nationality taking on an almost biological form.
Historically, it is evident that this process of nation-building contributed to
instability and frequently, the demise of states (Linz, 1993: 357). When processes
of state mobilisation outpaced nationalism, counter-state activity was often
likely to follow (Cederman, 2002). States that were successful in generating
collective senses of nationality within their borders better overcame such
counter-state forces and managed to achieve a new national-legal authority

37. ~ 37 ~
over their populaces. As Weber (1947) argued, modern states with their
monopolised legislatures and rationalised behaviour exuded an aura of
legitimacy. It was however the transformation of the state into the ‘nation-state’
that cemented this legitimacy. The state became the physical embodiment of the
nation and its protector. My paper shall now examine in more empirical terms,
the emergence of the nation in two cases, the USA and Japan to further
illustrate and comprehend this critical phenomenon of modern history.

38. ~ 38 ~
Chapter 6
A House Divided: The Case of the
USA
"Strange, (is it not?) that battles, martyrs, blood, even assassination should so condense
— perhaps only really lastingly condense — a Nationality."
Walt Whitman (1879)
The USA represents a fascinating case of nationalist emergence worthy of
scrutiny. As a post-medieval ‘New World’ country with a predominantly
planted population, it has often proved difficult to incorporate into existing
models of nationalism, particularly for primordialists. This paper shall employ
my model to analyse the emergence of nationalism in the USA focussing upon
one particular period where the processes of state power consolidation and
nation-building were at their height; The American Civil War.
6.1 – The Empire of Liberty
American nationalism remained but a weak suggestion until an escalation prior
to the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783). The presence of a common
enemy in the form of ‘Old England’ enabled the rebellious colonists to construct
a nationalism that, ironically, relied upon English philosophy (Waldstreicher,
1995: 61). A union of English liberal radicalism and French rationalism, gave the

39. ~ 39 ~
Americans their raison d'être (Kohn, 1957), as a new Empire of Liberty
(Jefferson, 1780). Following independence, the new United States began the
process of nation-building. Unlike their European forebears, the country’s
chauvinistic elites did not have the option of plundering medieval history to
generate a national narrative. By rewriting their colonial past and elevating
their founding fathers and revolution to a near mythic status, elites formed the
basis of a modern national story (Grant, 1998). The Revolution provided
nationalist proponents with the initial myths, symbols and history required for
nationhood (Mitchell, 1988: 1-2).
The federal government subsequently pursued a neo-mercantilist economic
policy to support commercial expansion (Weeks, 1994: 88), providing impetus
for the nation-building process. The process was however met with significant
obstacles, particularly in the fledging republic’s formative years. The colonists’
aversion to a British-style centralised fiscal-military state, heightened by their
experiences of the Revolutionary War, had led to political resistance to federal
centralisation which only began to diminish during the second British war of
1812 (Heideking, 2000: 222). Territorial expansion had furthermore pressed a
geographic strain on the resources of the state who could not effectively
exercise a Weberian monopoly far beyond New England.

40. ~ 40 ~
6.2 – Cotton and Commerce
By the mid-19th century, this monopoly remained elusive for the federal
government. The United States of this period was best characterised as a loose
geographic alliance of ‘states’ in the classic Weberian sense, each exercising a
monopoly over their territories. The majority of the occupants of Virginia were
Virginians first, Americans second (Sheehan-Dean, 2007) and this this was
characteristic of many states. It was especially pronounced in those outside of
the urban New English core where the federal government’s power was
stretched and local chauvinistic elites relatively strongest. Not only this, but a
distinctive regional pattern had begun to develop between the economic bases
of these states. Repressive agricultural methods and slavery had dissipated in
the northern states, becoming limited to states south of the Mason-Dixon Line
(Gunderson, 1974: 946). The North had pursued a bourgeois developmental
path, favouring an economy based upon manufacturing, industrialisation and
commercialised agriculture. The concept of free labour was a necessary
component of such a bourgeois system and production in the South relied upon
an incompatible slave-labour model (Runkle, 1964). Northern states favoured
protectionist economic measures as a method of developing their nascent
manufacturing industries whereas the South favoured lower tariffs to aid the

41. ~ 41 ~
export of its most lucrative commodity, cotton (Thornton and Ekelund, 2004:
21).
Divergences in the economic base between North and South had a decisive
impact upon the superstructural dynamics of the country. Each system
produced an ideology and expansionism that clashed with one another over
control of the land (Ransom, 1989). Gradually abolitionist fervour grew in the
North just as pro-slavery political elites came to dominate southern politics. The
1854 Kansas–Nebraska Act resulted in a series of violent confrontations
between pro and anti-slavery activists in Kansas (Etcheson, 2004). John Brown’s
failed attempt to mobilise a slave rebellion in 1859 galvanised the South
transforming its localised military forces into “a viable instrument as the
Southern militias begin to take a true form” (Ed Bearss quoted in The Civil War,
1990). The election of anti-slavery politician Abraham Lincoln was the final
straw for secessionists. Lincoln’s election was perceived as a threat to the
economic base of the South and its way of life. Paludan argues that in the South,
“Tradition, psychology, and economics all spoke clearly the same message –
without slavery we cannot survive” (1972: 1013). In December 1860, South
Carolina seceded from the Union and was swiftly followed by the other slaver
states to form the Confederacy.

42. ~ 42 ~
6.3 – The Long Road to Appomattox
Beginning in 1861, the American Civil War became the bloodiest war in US
history resulting in the deaths of more of its citizens than all other American
wars combined (McPherson, 1988: 19). Changes in the societal base had
motivated a consolidation of federal superstructural power which had outpaced
the nation-building process. The federal state was met with a confederate
response by elites who sought to contest its monopoly over their territories. The
Union had a distinct advantage in both power and powder, boasting superior
numbers and firepower than their Confederate adversaries.
The Confederate’s tactical superiority and mastery of their lands provided them
with their own alternative sources of power aiding their resistance. Following
victories in Bull Run (1861), Shiloh, Fredericksburg (1862) and Chancellorsville
(1863), the confederate army under General Robert E Lee was on the cusp of
achieving independence. The British state, reliant upon cotton imports for its
textile industries, believed that Southern exports must not be disturbed (Marx,
1861: 19) and contemplated intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. Yet in
1863 with the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln (1863) declared that all
slaves “shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free.” Emancipation shifted
European perception of the war making it almost politically impossible for the
abolitionist British to intervene (Steele, 2005). The tide of the war was turning.

43. ~ 43 ~
By late 1862, the industrial north had begun to direct their full capacity towards
the means of war (Runkle, 1964) with the Confederacy’s agrarian economy
failing to match its mobilisation for total war. Innovations like rapid-fire rifles,
Ironclad Warships and the telegraph had strengthened the Northern advantage
(Wheeler, 2006). After the Confederates’ crushing defeat at Gettysburg (1863)
had broken Lee’s army, Union Generals Grant and Sherman devised a strategy
of ‘exhaustion’ to choke the Confederacy’s economic base culminating in 1864
with Sherman’s ‘March to the Sea’ (Hattaway and Jones, 1983). The capitulation
of the Confederacy was completed with General Lee’s surrender at Appomattox
Court House in 1865.
6.4 – A Nation Reborn
The Civil War revolutionised America, representing the most concentrated
episode of state power consolidation and national-construction in the country’s
history. The labourers and capitalists of the North had undermined the power
of the South’s planting aristocracy (Beard and Beard, 1927: 54), transforming the
federal government into a truly Weberian state capable of exercising a
superstructural monopoly over its territory.
Sectional tension had however undermined the resonance of the revolutionary
myths and symbols pushing the nation to breaking point (Grant, 1998).
Throughout the conflict, ‘self-conscious nation-builders’ set about producing a

44. ~ 44 ~
newly transcendent American nationalism (Lawson, 2002: 11-12). Emancipation
was not only morally and strategically significant. As Smith demonstrates,
Union elites “transformed emancipation into an aspect of nation-building:
slavery must die because it threatened the life of the nation” (2006: 141-143). As
Guelzo (2015) highlights, “the promoters of emancipation were not bent on
promoting a revolution so much as they were intent on snuffing one out – a
backward-looking, aristocratic revolution.” This is supported by Lincoln’s
(1862) own admission at the height of the war that:
“If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it
by freeing all the slaves I would do it.”
Yet Lincoln publically, through masterful oratory weaved an alternative
exceptionalist narrative of America, reworking its nationalist identity. With
emancipation, the public cause of the federal government and the nation could
now be committed to both union and freedom (Ross, 2009). The war’s
transformation from a bitter dispute regarding economics and power into a
holy crusade (Grant, 1998) allowed the state to portray itself as a vanguard of
the most resonant of ‘national’ traits; liberty. Lincoln’s assassination in 1865 by
confederate John Wilkes Booth was an act designed to end the Union but it only
affirmed its indestructibility by creating a martyr of the physical embodiment of
the state and this new national narrative (Schwartz, 2000).

45. ~ 45 ~
The crippling of the South’s chauvinistic elite during the war removed the
greatest obstacle to federal power consolidation and enabled proponents of
American nationalism to disseminate their narrative almost without contest.
The Civil War’s aftermath allowed federalists to build a sense of nationality that
superseded regional and local affinity therefore legitimising the national state
(Lawson, 2002). The legacy of the war is perhaps most fittingly described by
American historian Shelby Foote (quoted in The Civil War, 1990) who stated:
“Before the war, it was said ‘the United States are.’ Grammatically, it was spoken that
way and thought of as a collection of independent states. And after the war, it was
always “the United States is,” as we say to day without being self-conscious at all. And
that’s sums up what the war accomplished. It made us an ‘is.’”

46. ~ 46 ~
Chapter 7
From Bushidō to Bureaucracy: The
Case of Japan
“The stake that sticks out gets hammered down”
Japanese Proverb
At first glance, the case of Japan represents a difficult example to reconcile with
my theoretical model and concepts. Commonly, scholars have portrayed pre-
modern Japan as an ethnically homogenous country with a clear geographic
territory, common language, religion and social structure under an Imperial
figurehead. Scholarship on Japanese nationalism has frequently assumed that
these characteristics have been in place long before capitalism and state
centralisation. This mono-ethnic perception of Japan remains a prominent factor
in developing contemporary theories of Japanese identity (see Smith, 1986: 91)
(Yoon, 1997). This paper shall take an alternative view.
7.1 – Boshin Sensō
Pre-modern Japan is actually better described as a collection of clan-based
communities populated by individuals who frequently had a lesser conception
of the nation than their position in feudal society (Nish, 2000: 82). From 1603 to
1867 real power in Japan had been held by the Tokugawa Shogunate who (in

47. ~ 47 ~
theory) derived authority from the Emperor. The Shogunate exercised
decentralised control over around 250 semi-autonomous domains (han) each
governed by a feudal lord (daimyo). The han were the true state structures, each
with their own military, bureaucracies and sources of authority (Totman, 1982:
275). Dissimilarities between han were genuine and clear, especially between
the older and larger domains and recently historians have highlighted the
distinct customs, traditions, dialects and myths as evidence of this (ibid: 276).
The han’s chauvinistic elite were instrumental in moulding and sustaining this
popular awareness of regional distinctiveness. Under the daimyo, Tokugawan
society was characterised by a four-tiered class structure with merchants at the
bottom, artisans above that, farmers on the second tier and the powerful
warrior (samurai) class at the top. The samurai were commonly instructed to
obey the laws of Bushidō, a code of moral principles that stressed values like
chivalry, righteousness and loyalty to their individual daimyo (Nitobe, 1969) as
opposed to the nation.
During the late Tokugawa period, transformations in the economic base of the
han had a profound impact upon the superstructural dynamics of Japan.
Commercialisation had initially been encouraged and became more
pronounced in particular han over time (Honjo, 1932: 51). A notable example is
that of the Satsuma han under Daimyo Shimazu Nariakira. As a scholar of

48. ~ 48 ~
Western history, Nariakira instigated the transition from agrarianism,
encouraging industrial and manufacturing expansion and the modernisation of
military methods in his domain (Haraguchi, 1995: 129). Commodore Perry’s
diplomatic mission, culminating in the 1854 Japan–US ‘Treaty of Peace and
Amity’, opened Japan’s economy to the USA and eventually other major
powers. The initial trade deal was heavily weighted in favour of the Americans
and living standards fell, leading to widespread discontent. Many han took an
exclusionist position to western interaction however the Satsuma maintained
western trade and weapons imports through Nagasaki, building a large stock-
pile of modern weapons and finance (ibid). In 1866 an alliance was brokered
between the Satsuma and the fiercest of anti-Shogunate han, the Chōshū.
The Shogun, believing that his regime could not resist both domestic and
international pressure, strategically resigned his position in 1867, hoping to
retain significant powers in a new Imperial court (Ike, 1948). The Imperial court
had however become dominated by the Satsuma and Chōshū and the
Shogunate was stripped of its powers (ibid). The Shogun resisted and the
resulting Boshin war (Boshin Sensō) changed the country. In 1868 Imperial
armies of the Satsuma-Chōshū alliance advanced upon the Tokugawa forces
meeting at the Battle of Toba-Fushimi. Although outnumber 3:1, the Imperial
forces with their superior Armstrong howitzers, Minié rifles and Gatling guns

49. ~ 49 ~
achieved a stunning victory leading many daimyo to switch allegiance from the
Shogunate (Houya, 2007). Gradually through power and powder, their better-
armed and organised armies defeated the larger Tokugawa forces overthrowing
the Shogun (Hacker, 1977).
7.2 – Restoration and Rebellion
Boshin Sensō like the earlier US Civil War, created the circumstances whereby a
Weberian state could emerge through the removal of localised power structures
and chauvinistic elites. It may have represented “a struggle for power, not a
war of ideologies” as Beasley (1972: 300) stated, yet it came to revolutionise the
very fabric of Japanese society. Loyal daimyo and powerful industrialists were
incorporated into a ruling oligarchy, forming an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition
to pursue modernisation (Moore, 1966: 275). The ancien régime was replaced by
a modern state. During what came to be known as the ‘Meiji Restoration’,
power was formally ‘restored’ into the hands of the Emperor Meiji but privately
wielded by the oligarchy (Doak, 1997: 286). Local chauvinistic elites were either
removed or wedded to the state. The oligarchy quickly pursued a neo-
mercantilist economic policy undergoing significant industrialisation and
employing protectionist measures. This economic strategy and lack of national
legitimacy provided fresh impetus for the exercise of nation-building.

50. ~ 50 ~
The Japanese nation was conceived by Meiji policy-makers as a community
similar to a family with the Emperor acting as patriarch. In this national
narrative, the Emperor embodied the absolute values of the nation, while the
state apparatus monopolised power (Maruyama, 1963). Furthermore,
nationalist discourse strongly emphasised the exclusionary and genealogical
nature of national membership (Yoon, 1997).
Meiji nation-builders set about politicising the dominant Shinto faith of the
population, disseminating a reconstructed doctrine of state-Shinto. The state
organised this polytheistic faith into a monotheistic structure stressing complete
reverence to the Emperor (Shibata, 2008: 354). In 1869, the new order was
welcomed in a series of ceremonies emphasising the imperial continuity
throughout Japanese history and power was concentrated in the former
Tokugawa capital of Tokyo which served as a new national capital (Kokaze,
2011: 137). Multiple diplomatic missions were sent to Western countries to
observe their bureaucracies, institutions and armies in a governmental effort to
modernise the state structure and capability (Nish, 2000: 83).
In 1871 the government seeking to modernise the economy, abolished the four-
tier class structure resulting in significant upheaval. The government harnessed
a tremendous energy unleashed by the passing of the samurai class through a
reinterpreted form of bushidō linking nationalism and honour (Eiko, 1995).

51. ~ 51 ~
These reforms were met with considerable resistance and several samurai
revolts but the most significant threat to the oligarchy’s monopoly was the
Satsuma rebellion of 1877. Field Marshall Takamori Saigo led a 20,000 samurai
strong revolt against the regime protesting modernisation and centralisation.
Following a series of confrontations, the better-equipped Imperial forces
eventually emerged victorious. Saigo committed a ritualistic suicide to preserve
his honour (Seppuku), receiving an Imperial pardon posthumously.
7.3 – Empire of the Sun
The Meiji reforms were successful in the aims. By 1890 the apparatus of the
state was firmly established with a parliament, cabinet, modern bureaucracy
and western-style education system in place (Nish, 2000: 84). Legislative and
institutional reform helped establish the legalistic and rational norms that,
when fused with nationalist zeal, provided the state with national-legal
authority; superseding previous charismatic and traditional authoritative
forms. The 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education ordered the assertion of
‘national’ values on education, stressing the importance of Shinto Emperor-
Worship and loyalty (Sharma, 1996: 113). Throughout public education,
indoctrination was widespread with the ritualistic singing of nationalist songs,
reading of patriotic texts and saluting of the recently adopted Rising Sun flag
becoming commonplace (Shibata, 2008).

52. ~ 52 ~
From a communications perspective, the political and economic reforms of the
Meiji government had a significant homogenising effect. Following
bureaucratic, political and educational centralisation, Japanese society had
become more densely integrated (Yoshino, 1995: 85). Agrarian individuals were
drawn into administrative centres where the state’s influence and narrative was
strongest. This urbanisation facilitated linguistic and cultural homogenisation, a
process accelerated by the rapid emergence of print capitalism. Growing
nationalist discourse and urban centres contributed to the emergence of
Japanese mass culture and a collective nationalism (Radtke, 2010: 61).
By the turn of the century, Japanese nationalism permeated all aspects of
society. Boshin Sensō and the Meiji restoration were pivotal episodes in this
national awakening. In these periods localised power structures were
expropriated and a new national narrative and state structure developed. The
Imperial oligarchy through a process of consolidation and national construction
began to cultivate a form of national-legal authority. This nationalist fervour
eventually came to legitimise the expansionist policies pursued by the
oligarchical state that ultimately culminated in global conflicts in the 20th
century; conflicts that shaped contemporary Japan, Asia and indeed the world.
Understanding these events of the 19th century is therefore crucial in

53. ~ 53 ~
comprehending the causes of the great tragedies of the 20th century and this
paper has sought to provide some fresh insight in this respect.

54. ~ 54 ~
Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
This paper has sought to explore how and why ‘nationality’ came to supersede
previously dominant varieties of affiliation in the post-agrarian societies of
Europe, the Americas and parts of Asia. Synthesising my theories and existing
academic works, I have constructed an original state-orientated model of
nationalism to establish a relationship between the process of state-power
consolidation and national emergence. Taking inspiration from several of the
great historical sociological works, this paper has sought to substantiate the
assertions of this model through comparative historical analysis of two
profoundly different cases, the USA and Japan.
I find that both cases demonstrate each of the fundamental components of my
theoretical model. In each, the state’s removal of rival chauvinistic elites
through military and bureaucratic superiority and establishment of a monopoly
on legitimate violence was a critical prerequisite for national emergence and
ascendance above localised ethnic forms. Changes in the economic base of both
societies from feudal and labour repressive systems to bourgeois economies
expedited this state consolidation of this superstructural monopoly. Nation
builders in the both the USA and Japan manipulated and manufactured myths,

55. ~ 55 ~
history and traditions to construct new national narratives to legitimise these
Weberian monopolies.
Although American and Japanese nationalist emergence involved all of these
common themes, due to the differing contexts and events analysed, each case
provides a stronger empirical demonstration of certain aspects of the general
model than others. The American case study is particularly useful in
demonstrating the importance of transformations of the economic base in
conditioning the process of superstructural power consolidation and the
removal of rival chauvinistic elite. The Japanese case is a strong demonstration
of the role of power and powder in the process and societal integration in
establishing nationalism as a mass culture. Comparative analysis of the two
cases has allowed me to provide thick description of each of these aspects of my
model.
This paper has chosen to limit its focus to nationalist emergence and
supersession of localised identity. In the interest of brevity, it has avoided the
important question of why this nationalism manifested itself in different ways,
resulting in a liberal form in America and an expansionist imperial form in
Japan. This is indeed a fascinating subject but it is one worthy of research in its
own right. Additionally, further analysis of the events following this emergence

56. ~ 56 ~
and supersession of nationality in these cases might prove fruitful for future
investigation.
I believe the findings of this work have many implications for our
understanding of historic and contemporary nationalism. With regards to the
present, we can observe that very few post-colonial states in Africa and the
Middle East particularly, can be characterised as nation-states. Rarely have
these states been able to establish monopolies on legitimate violence or achieve
nation-legal authority due to the widespread endurance of localised ethnic
affiliations. As I have alluded to, national-legal authority is an important aspect
in supporting economic development and legitimising the state. My model
emphasises the crucial role of the state expropriation of power in the transition
from historic authoritative forms. In the USA and Japan such expropriation
resulted in considerable violence between the state and its superstructural
rivals. The question of whether nationalities or state monopolies can be forged
without bloodshed will continue to hang over our 21st century world.
Unfortunately in this respect, I believe that the outlook remains somewhat
bleak.

57. ~ 57 ~
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Yes very, I ended up sleeping for nearly a day after. I then found out I had to do
compulsory interviews with my supervisor and submit a report so I’ve been in
the department all day and I’ve only just finalised it!