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CNIT 128


Hacking Mobile Devices
8. Identifying and Exploiting 

Android Implementation Issues

Part 2 Updated 3-11-2020
Topics
• Part 1


• Reviewing Pre-installed Applications


• Exploiting Devices


• Start through "Explanation of Privilege
Levels" (up to p. 402)
Topics
• Part 2


• Exploiting Devices


• "Practical Physical Attacks" (p. 375)
through


• "Polaris Viewer Memory Corruption" (up to
p. 402)
Topics
• Part 3


• Exploiting Devices


• "Injecting Exploits for JavaScript
Interfaces" (p. 402) and following


• Infiltrating User Data
Practical Physical Attacks
Bypassing Lock Screen
• Getting ADB Shell
Access: Two Ways


• USB Debugging


• Unlocked
Bootloaders
USB Debugging
• adb shell


• Usually turned off by
default


• Exposes data and
can be used to install
new packages


• User must approve it


• Not possible if
screen is locked
Bug
• In Android 4.2.2 up to 4.4.2


• Navigating to emergency dialer or lock screen
camera


• Shows the USB debugging authorization
prompt


• With the screen locked
Privilege Levels
• /default.prop file controls ADB privileges


• By default: ro.secure=1


• Adb runs as the shell user


• If ro.secure=0


• adbd runs as root
ALLOW_ADBD_ROOT
• From Android 4.3 onwards


• ADB won't run as root unless it's compiled with
the ALLOW_ADBD_ROOT flag


• Even if ro.secure=0


• To get root, compile a custom version of adbd
and overwrite the binary on the device
Unlocked Bootloaders
• First boot phone into Fastboot mode


• Hold down power and volume keys while
turning on the phone


• or adb reboot bootloader


• Then flash or boot a custom image


• Not possible with Genymotion, Nox, or
Bluestacks


• They have no recovery partition
Unlock Bootloader
• Forces factory
reset


• Wipes all user
data


• To stop thieves
Unlocked Bootloader
• If user unlocked the bootloader and left it
unlocked


• Boot into ClockworkMod Recovery ROM
(not updated since 2014)


• Get a root ADB shell
Bypassing Lock Screens
• Using the DISABLE_KEYGUARD Permission


• Allows an app to remove the lock screen


• App code:


KeyguardManager kgm =
((KeyguardManager)getSystemService("keyguard"));
 

KeyGuardManager.KeyguardLock kgl =
kgm.newKeyguardLock("mahh");
 

kgl.disableKeyguard(); Even though the
KeyguardManager.KeyguardLock
Custom Drozer Agent
drozer agent build --permission
android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUAR
D

• Install agent with adb, launch it, and bypass
screen lock


• Works on Nox (Android 5.1.1)


• Fails on Genymotion (Android 9.0)
Removing Key Files
• Pattern lock screen uses data from


• /data/system/gesture.key


• PIN or password lock uses data from


• /data/system/password.key


• Removing these files disables lock screen
entirely
Removing Key Files
• But that requires running as system or root


• Privilege escalation
Abusing Android
Application Issues
• On Android 4.3 and earlier, this intent unlocks
the phone from an adb shell in any context:


shell@android:/ $ am start -n 

com.android.settings/
com.android.settings.ChooseLockGeneric 

--ez confirm_credentials false 

--ei lockscreen.password_type 0 --activity-clear-task
 

Starting: Intent { flg=0x8000
cmp=com.android.settings/.ChooseLockGeneric (has
extras)
}
Using Logic Flaws that
Don't Require Shell Access
• Some actions are allowed when a phone is
locked


• Make emergency phone calls


• Receive phone calls


• Allow third-party apps to temporarily disable
the lock screen


• Or place an activity in front of it
Motorola Droid
• Phone the locked device


• Answer the call


• Press Back button


• Escape the lock screen
Viber
• Messaging and calling app


• Place a Viber call


• Answer it


• Press the back button multiple times


• Escape the lock screen
Using Legitimate Lock
Screen Reset Functionality
• You can bypass a
lock screen if you
have the use's
Google credentials


• Entering the PIN
five times incorrectly


• Connects to a linked
Google account


• But only for Android
4 and earlier
Android Device Manager
• Allows lock
screen to be
bypassed from a
Google account


• Not active by
default--user
must enable it


• And it erases all
your data (link
Ch 8b)
Practical Remote Attacks
Remote Exploits
• Launched over the Internet


• Three modes of exploitation:


• Loading a drozer JAR that loads a limited
agent


• Installing and starting a rogue drozer agent
by abusing INSTALL_PACKAGES


• Loading a drozer JAR that is passed
Context
Browser Memory
Corruption
• The most technical method


• Reverse shells via buffer overflow, etc.


• Becoming rarer as the browser becomes more
secure
Polaris Viewer


Memory Corruption
• Office and PDF file viewer


• Pre-installed on some devices


• Exploited in 2012 with a crafted DOCX file


• Using a stack-based buffer overflow


• App also had INSTALL_PACKAGES
permission
Android Browser JavaScript
Interface
• All WebViews using JavaScriptInterface


• And targeting API before 17


• Are vulnerable to code execution flaws


• Includes all stock Android browsers on Android
4.1.1 and below


• Can get Context and use full permissions of
browser
Use Metasploit
• Link Ch 8c
Privilege Escalation
• Exynos driver exploit on some devices


• Drozer has a exploit.mmap_abuse module


• Tries to get root by abusing the map device
operation


• Similar to the exynos exploit


• Dangerous: may cause a kernel panic and
reboot the device
Maintaining Access
• Must install a special su binary bundled with
Drozer, called "minimal su"


• Allows every app to escalate to root


• Without alerting the user
Man-in-the-Middle Exploits
• Getting in the middie


• Host a wireless network


• ARP Poisoning


• Use Burp
Man-in-the-Middle Exploits
• Intercepting SSL requires the ability to get a
root CA certificate


• Only nation-states or very rich attackers


• But many apps ignore this defense and allow
MITM attacks anyway
CNIT 128 8. Android Implementation Issues (Part 2)

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CNIT 128 8. Android Implementation Issues (Part 2)

  • 1. CNIT 128 Hacking Mobile Devices 8. Identifying and Exploiting 
 Android Implementation Issues Part 2 Updated 3-11-2020
  • 2. Topics • Part 1 • Reviewing Pre-installed Applications • Exploiting Devices • Start through "Explanation of Privilege Levels" (up to p. 402)
  • 3. Topics • Part 2 • Exploiting Devices • "Practical Physical Attacks" (p. 375) through • "Polaris Viewer Memory Corruption" (up to p. 402)
  • 4. Topics • Part 3 • Exploiting Devices • "Injecting Exploits for JavaScript Interfaces" (p. 402) and following • Infiltrating User Data
  • 6. Bypassing Lock Screen • Getting ADB Shell Access: Two Ways • USB Debugging • Unlocked Bootloaders
  • 7. USB Debugging • adb shell • Usually turned off by default • Exposes data and can be used to install new packages • User must approve it • Not possible if screen is locked
  • 8. Bug • In Android 4.2.2 up to 4.4.2 • Navigating to emergency dialer or lock screen camera • Shows the USB debugging authorization prompt • With the screen locked
  • 9. Privilege Levels • /default.prop file controls ADB privileges • By default: ro.secure=1 • Adb runs as the shell user • If ro.secure=0 • adbd runs as root
  • 10. ALLOW_ADBD_ROOT • From Android 4.3 onwards • ADB won't run as root unless it's compiled with the ALLOW_ADBD_ROOT flag • Even if ro.secure=0 • To get root, compile a custom version of adbd and overwrite the binary on the device
  • 11. Unlocked Bootloaders • First boot phone into Fastboot mode • Hold down power and volume keys while turning on the phone • or adb reboot bootloader • Then flash or boot a custom image • Not possible with Genymotion, Nox, or Bluestacks • They have no recovery partition
  • 12. Unlock Bootloader • Forces factory reset • Wipes all user data • To stop thieves
  • 13. Unlocked Bootloader • If user unlocked the bootloader and left it unlocked • Boot into ClockworkMod Recovery ROM (not updated since 2014) • Get a root ADB shell
  • 14. Bypassing Lock Screens • Using the DISABLE_KEYGUARD Permission • Allows an app to remove the lock screen • App code: KeyguardManager kgm = ((KeyguardManager)getSystemService("keyguard")); KeyGuardManager.KeyguardLock kgl = kgm.newKeyguardLock("mahh"); kgl.disableKeyguard(); Even though the KeyguardManager.KeyguardLock
  • 15. Custom Drozer Agent drozer agent build --permission android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUAR D • Install agent with adb, launch it, and bypass screen lock • Works on Nox (Android 5.1.1) • Fails on Genymotion (Android 9.0)
  • 16. Removing Key Files • Pattern lock screen uses data from • /data/system/gesture.key • PIN or password lock uses data from • /data/system/password.key • Removing these files disables lock screen entirely
  • 17. Removing Key Files • But that requires running as system or root • Privilege escalation
  • 18. Abusing Android Application Issues • On Android 4.3 and earlier, this intent unlocks the phone from an adb shell in any context: shell@android:/ $ am start -n 
 com.android.settings/ com.android.settings.ChooseLockGeneric 
 --ez confirm_credentials false 
 --ei lockscreen.password_type 0 --activity-clear-task Starting: Intent { flg=0x8000 cmp=com.android.settings/.ChooseLockGeneric (has extras) }
  • 19.
  • 20.
  • 21. Using Logic Flaws that Don't Require Shell Access • Some actions are allowed when a phone is locked • Make emergency phone calls • Receive phone calls • Allow third-party apps to temporarily disable the lock screen • Or place an activity in front of it
  • 22. Motorola Droid • Phone the locked device • Answer the call • Press Back button • Escape the lock screen
  • 23. Viber • Messaging and calling app • Place a Viber call • Answer it • Press the back button multiple times • Escape the lock screen
  • 24. Using Legitimate Lock Screen Reset Functionality • You can bypass a lock screen if you have the use's Google credentials • Entering the PIN five times incorrectly • Connects to a linked Google account • But only for Android 4 and earlier
  • 25. Android Device Manager • Allows lock screen to be bypassed from a Google account • Not active by default--user must enable it • And it erases all your data (link Ch 8b)
  • 27. Remote Exploits • Launched over the Internet • Three modes of exploitation: • Loading a drozer JAR that loads a limited agent • Installing and starting a rogue drozer agent by abusing INSTALL_PACKAGES • Loading a drozer JAR that is passed Context
  • 28. Browser Memory Corruption • The most technical method • Reverse shells via buffer overflow, etc. • Becoming rarer as the browser becomes more secure
  • 29. Polaris Viewer Memory Corruption • Office and PDF file viewer • Pre-installed on some devices • Exploited in 2012 with a crafted DOCX file • Using a stack-based buffer overflow • App also had INSTALL_PACKAGES permission
  • 30. Android Browser JavaScript Interface • All WebViews using JavaScriptInterface • And targeting API before 17 • Are vulnerable to code execution flaws • Includes all stock Android browsers on Android 4.1.1 and below • Can get Context and use full permissions of browser
  • 32.
  • 33. Privilege Escalation • Exynos driver exploit on some devices • Drozer has a exploit.mmap_abuse module • Tries to get root by abusing the map device operation • Similar to the exynos exploit • Dangerous: may cause a kernel panic and reboot the device
  • 34. Maintaining Access • Must install a special su binary bundled with Drozer, called "minimal su" • Allows every app to escalate to root • Without alerting the user
  • 35. Man-in-the-Middle Exploits • Getting in the middie • Host a wireless network • ARP Poisoning • Use Burp
  • 36. Man-in-the-Middle Exploits • Intercepting SSL requires the ability to get a root CA certificate • Only nation-states or very rich attackers • But many apps ignore this defense and allow MITM attacks anyway