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CNIT 152:
Incident
Response
12 Investigating Windows System
s

(Part 2)
Updated 11-10-22
Ch 12 Part 2
Ch 12 Part 3
The Windows Registry
Purpose
• The registry contains con
fi
guration data for
the Windows operating system and
application
s

• Many artifacts of great forensic value
Hive Files
• Binary
fi
les that store the Registr
y

• Five main registry hives in
%SYSTEMROOT%system32con
fi
g

• SYSTEM, SECURITY, SOFTWARE, SAM, DEFAUL
T

• User-speci
fi
c hive
fi
les in each user's pro
fi
le
director
y

• UsersusernameNTUSER.DA
T

• UsersusernameAppDataLocalMicrosoft
WindowsUSRCLASS.DAT
Windows Pro
fi
les
• Created the
fi
rst time a user interactively logs
on to a syste
m

• Users who connect over the network don't
create a pro
fi
le folder
Terms
Keys Values Data
The Five Root Keys
HKEY_USERS
Virtual Key Paths
• Dynamically created in a running syste
m

• Not visible on a registry captur
e

• HKEY_Current_Use
r

• Links to HKEY_USERS{SID}
• HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSe
t

• Links to HKLMSYSTEMControlSetNN
N

• HKEY_CLASSES_ROO
T

• Merges two subkeys
Registry Timestamps
• Only one: LastWriteTim
e

• Stored on a key, not valu
e

• Changed when any value under the key is
added, removed, or change
d

• But not when subkeys' values are modi
fi
ed
Example
• Run key: programs that launch on system startu
p

• Cannot determine when these three Run items
were added, without other evidence
More Limitations
• Windows frequently updates the
LastUpdateTime for large swaths of registry
key
s

• During updates, and sometimes even from
a reboo
t

• Attackers cannot easily change registry
timestamps, although SetRegTime can do
thi
s

• Link Ch 12o
Registry Re
fl
ection and
Redirection
• 64-bit Windows allows 32-bit software to ru
n

• 32-bit programs are redirected by the W0W64
sybsystem to alternate registry keys, lik
e

• HKLMSOFTWAREWoW6432Nod
e

• This means 32-bit forensic software won't see
the whole Registry
Important Registry Keys
System Con
fi
guration
Registry Keys
Basic System Information
• Computer Nam
e

• HKLMSystemCurrentControlSet
ControlComputernam
e

• Windows Versio
n

• HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NT
CurrentVersio
n

• Time Zon
e

• HKLMSystemCurrentControlSet
ControlTimeZoneInformation
Basic System Information
• List of Installed Application
s

• HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows
CurrentVersionUninstall{Appname}
• Mounted Devices (with drive letters
)

• HKLMSystemMountedDevices
USBSTOR
• Shows every USB device that has been
connecte
d

• A forensic examiner should look here
fi
rst, to
fi
nd out what other devices should be
requested for discovery, by court order or
search warrant
Network Information
• Network adapter con
fi
guratio
n

• Wireless networks previously use
d

• Share
s

• Firewall settings
User and Security
Information
• Audit polic
y

• Pro
fi
le folder pat
h

• Group membership
Shim Cache
Shim Cache
• Also called "Application Compatibility Cache
"

• Used to track special compatibility settings
for executable
fi
les and script
s

• May include
:

• File name, path, and siz
e

• Last modi
fi
ed dat
e

• Whether the
fi
le actually ran on the system
Shim Cache
• Maintained in memory, written to the registry
on shutdow
n

• Maintains up to 1024 entrie
s

• More than Prefetch (128
)

• includes apps that haven't executed ye
t

• Next two slides from link Ch 12a
Ch 12b-1
Common Auto-Run Registry
Keys
Auto-Run Keys
(Auto-Start Extensibility Points)
• Load programs on system boot, user login,
and other condition
s

• Commonly used by malware to attain
persistenc
e

• Windows provides hundreds of registry-
based persistence mechanism
s

• Some are still undocumented
Services
• Most common and widely used persistence
mechanis
m

• Services run in the backgroun
d

• Usually under one of these login account
s

• Local System (most powerful
)

• Network Syste
m

• Local Service
Services in the Registry
• Each service has its own subkey unde
r

• HKLMCurrentControlSetservicesservicenam
e

• With this information
:

• DisplayName and Descriptio
n

• ImagePat
h

• How service start
s

• Type of service, such as driver or process
ServiceDLL
• Most services are DLL, not EXE
fi
les
Service Control Manager
• Services.ex
e

• Launches Windows services upon startu
p

• Command-line "sc" command lets you
examine, start, stop, and create services
sc at Command line
Services GUI
One EXE Can Run Several
Services
Four Common Run Keys
Active Setup
• Facilitates software installation and update
s

• Subkeys named with GUIDs (long random-looking
numbers
)

• Malware authors often re-use GUIDs so Googling them
can be usefu
l

• StubPath points to an EXE that will run on startup
AppInit_DLLs
• DLLs that will be automatically loaded whenever
a user-mode app linked to user32.dll is
launche
d

• Almost every app uses user32 to draw
windows, etc. (link Ch 12p)
AppInit_DLLs
• Starting in Windows 8, the AppInit_DLLs
infrastructure is disabled when secure boot is
enable
d

• Secure boot is a UEFI protocol and not a
Windows 8 feature.
LSA (Local Security
Authority) Packages
• Load on startu
p

• Intended for authentication packages, but can
be used to launch malware
Browser Helper Objects
(BHOs)
• Add-ons or plug-ins for Internet Explore
r

• Such as toolbars, adware, scarewar
e

• No longer supported in Edge
Shell Extensions
• Like Browser Helper Objects, but for
Windows Explore
r

• Add context items when right-clicking a
fi
l
e

• Found at
:

• HKCRCLSID{CLSID}InprocServer32


• HKCR{sub-key}shellex
Shell Extensions
Winlogon Shell
• The shell that loads when a user logs o
n

• Normally set to Explorer.ex
e

• Can be set to any executable
fi
le
Winlogon Userinit
• Loads logon and group policy scripts, other
auto-runs, and the Explorer shel
l

• Attackers can append additional executables
to this value
Identifying Malicious
Auto-Runs
• Eyeball it, looking for suspicious
fi
les or
paths, spelling errors, broken English, etc
.

• Risky; real commercial software is often
sloppily made, and some attackers are
carefu
l

• Next slide: which item is malicious?
A
B
C
D
Real DLL is iprip.dll
Spelling error but genuine
No description, runs from Temp, but genuine
Recommended Steps
1. Exclude persistent binaries signed by trusted
publishers (but not all signed binaries
)

2. Exclude persistent items created outside the
time window of interes
t

3. Examine paths of remaining persistent binarie
s

• Attackers tend to use Temp folders or
common directories within %SYSTEMROOT
%

• Not deeply nested subdirectories speci
fi
c to
obscure third-party applications
Recommended Steps
4. Research MD5 hashes for remaining
persistent binaries on VirusTotal, Bit9, etc
.

5. Compare remaining unknowns against a
known "gold image" used to install the
systems
Best Tool
• Sysinternals AutoRuns
Signed Malware
• Attackers have been stealing code-signing
signatures, and signing malwar
e

• Also, not all legitimate persistent
fi
les, even
Windows components, are signe
d

• Sometimes updates remove signatures
Ch 12b-2
User Hive Registry Keys
Personalization
• User hive registry keys contain
personalization settings for each use
r

• First priority: examine compromised
account
s

• Acquire NTUSER.DAT and USRCLASS.DA
T

• Check machine accounts, such as
NetworkService and LocalSyste
m

• May also contain evidence
Most Helpful User-Speci
fi
c
Keys
• Shellbag
s

• UserAssis
t

• MUICach
e

• Most Recently Used (MRU
)

• TypedURL
s

• TypedPaths
Shellbags
• Used to remember size,
position, and view settings of
window
s

• Persist even if a directory is
delete
d

• Saved in a user’s pro
fi
le
registry hive
Shellbags Contain
• Full directory paths accessed via Explore
r

• Date and time of acces
s

• Modi
fi
ed, Accessed, and Created times of
each path recorded when the access
occurre
d

• Such historical records are very useful to
track attacker actions
Example Shellbags
• Link Ch 12q
UserAssist
• Tracks applications a user has launched through
the Windows Explorer shel
l

• Populates Start menu with frequently launched
programs
UserAssist v. Prefetch
• UserAssist only tracks items opened via
Explore
r

• Including from the Run box and Start men
u

• But not from the command promp
t

• Prefetch
fi
les don't identify which user
executed a program
Obfuscated with ROT13
MUICache
• Multilingual User Interfac
e

• Another list of programs executed by a use
r

• HKEY_USERS{SID}_ClassesLocalSettingsSoftware
MicrosoftWindowsShellMuiCache
Most Recently Used
(MRU) Keys
• Used by
many
application
s

• No standard
registry
path or
value
naming
convention
MRU-Blaster
• Clears
the MRU
lists
(link Ch
12r)
Explorer Open and Save
MRU
• Files and folders most recently accessed in
the Open and Save dialog menu
s

• RegRipper can
fi
nd the data
Start Menu Run MRU
• Programs recently launched from the Run bo
x

• Human-readabl
e

• HKEY_USERS{SID}SoftwareMicrosoftWindows
CurrentVersionExplorerRunMRU
RecentDocs
• Recently opened documents (any
fi
le
extension
)

• Used to populate File menu of various
application
s

• HKEY_USERS{SID}SoftwareMicrosoft
WindowsCurrentVersionExplorer
RecentDocs
Internet Explorer
TypedURLs & TypedPaths
• Used to populate the address bar drop-down
list in Internet Explore
r

• May contain URLs and paths to local
fi
le
s

• HKEY_USERS{SID}SoftwareMicrosoft
InternetExplorerTypedURL
s

• HKEY_USERS{SID}
SoftwareMicrosoftInternetExplorer
TypedPaths
Proves Intent
• User typed (or pasted) these URLs into the
address ba
r

• Didn't just click a link
Remote Desktop MRU
• Used to remotely control Windows machine
s

• Maintains history of recent connections and
con
fi
guration dat
a

• May tell you where a user connected and who
they attempted to log in as
Registry Analysis Tools
All-In-One Tools
• RegRipper (link Ch 10m
)

• Windows Registry Decoder (link Ch 12s
)

• AutoRun
s

• Velociraptor
Single-Purpose Utilities
• ShimCacheParse
r

• Shellbags.p
y

• sba
g

• UserAssis
t

• Nirsoft Registry Analysis Tools
Ch 12b-3

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12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)

  • 1. CNIT 152: Incident Response 12 Investigating Windows System s (Part 2) Updated 11-10-22
  • 2. Ch 12 Part 2 Ch 12 Part 3
  • 4. Purpose • The registry contains con fi guration data for the Windows operating system and application s • Many artifacts of great forensic value
  • 5. Hive Files • Binary fi les that store the Registr y • Five main registry hives in %SYSTEMROOT%system32con fi g • SYSTEM, SECURITY, SOFTWARE, SAM, DEFAUL T • User-speci fi c hive fi les in each user's pro fi le director y • UsersusernameNTUSER.DA T • UsersusernameAppDataLocalMicrosoft WindowsUSRCLASS.DAT
  • 6. Windows Pro fi les • Created the fi rst time a user interactively logs on to a syste m • Users who connect over the network don't create a pro fi le folder
  • 10. Virtual Key Paths • Dynamically created in a running syste m • Not visible on a registry captur e • HKEY_Current_Use r • Links to HKEY_USERS{SID} • HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSe t • Links to HKLMSYSTEMControlSetNN N • HKEY_CLASSES_ROO T • Merges two subkeys
  • 11. Registry Timestamps • Only one: LastWriteTim e • Stored on a key, not valu e • Changed when any value under the key is added, removed, or change d • But not when subkeys' values are modi fi ed
  • 12. Example • Run key: programs that launch on system startu p • Cannot determine when these three Run items were added, without other evidence
  • 13. More Limitations • Windows frequently updates the LastUpdateTime for large swaths of registry key s • During updates, and sometimes even from a reboo t • Attackers cannot easily change registry timestamps, although SetRegTime can do thi s • Link Ch 12o
  • 14. Registry Re fl ection and Redirection • 64-bit Windows allows 32-bit software to ru n • 32-bit programs are redirected by the W0W64 sybsystem to alternate registry keys, lik e • HKLMSOFTWAREWoW6432Nod e • This means 32-bit forensic software won't see the whole Registry
  • 17. Basic System Information • Computer Nam e • HKLMSystemCurrentControlSet ControlComputernam e • Windows Versio n • HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NT CurrentVersio n • Time Zon e • HKLMSystemCurrentControlSet ControlTimeZoneInformation
  • 18. Basic System Information • List of Installed Application s • HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows CurrentVersionUninstall{Appname} • Mounted Devices (with drive letters ) • HKLMSystemMountedDevices
  • 19. USBSTOR • Shows every USB device that has been connecte d • A forensic examiner should look here fi rst, to fi nd out what other devices should be requested for discovery, by court order or search warrant
  • 20. Network Information • Network adapter con fi guratio n • Wireless networks previously use d • Share s • Firewall settings
  • 21. User and Security Information • Audit polic y • Pro fi le folder pat h • Group membership
  • 23. Shim Cache • Also called "Application Compatibility Cache " • Used to track special compatibility settings for executable fi les and script s • May include : • File name, path, and siz e • Last modi fi ed dat e • Whether the fi le actually ran on the system
  • 24. Shim Cache • Maintained in memory, written to the registry on shutdow n • Maintains up to 1024 entrie s • More than Prefetch (128 ) • includes apps that haven't executed ye t • Next two slides from link Ch 12a
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 29. Auto-Run Keys (Auto-Start Extensibility Points) • Load programs on system boot, user login, and other condition s • Commonly used by malware to attain persistenc e • Windows provides hundreds of registry- based persistence mechanism s • Some are still undocumented
  • 30. Services • Most common and widely used persistence mechanis m • Services run in the backgroun d • Usually under one of these login account s • Local System (most powerful ) • Network Syste m • Local Service
  • 31. Services in the Registry • Each service has its own subkey unde r • HKLMCurrentControlSetservicesservicenam e • With this information : • DisplayName and Descriptio n • ImagePat h • How service start s • Type of service, such as driver or process
  • 32. ServiceDLL • Most services are DLL, not EXE fi les
  • 33. Service Control Manager • Services.ex e • Launches Windows services upon startu p • Command-line "sc" command lets you examine, start, stop, and create services
  • 36. One EXE Can Run Several Services
  • 38. Active Setup • Facilitates software installation and update s • Subkeys named with GUIDs (long random-looking numbers ) • Malware authors often re-use GUIDs so Googling them can be usefu l • StubPath points to an EXE that will run on startup
  • 39. AppInit_DLLs • DLLs that will be automatically loaded whenever a user-mode app linked to user32.dll is launche d • Almost every app uses user32 to draw windows, etc. (link Ch 12p)
  • 40. AppInit_DLLs • Starting in Windows 8, the AppInit_DLLs infrastructure is disabled when secure boot is enable d • Secure boot is a UEFI protocol and not a Windows 8 feature.
  • 41. LSA (Local Security Authority) Packages • Load on startu p • Intended for authentication packages, but can be used to launch malware
  • 42. Browser Helper Objects (BHOs) • Add-ons or plug-ins for Internet Explore r • Such as toolbars, adware, scarewar e • No longer supported in Edge
  • 43. Shell Extensions • Like Browser Helper Objects, but for Windows Explore r • Add context items when right-clicking a fi l e • Found at : • HKCRCLSID{CLSID}InprocServer32 • HKCR{sub-key}shellex
  • 45. Winlogon Shell • The shell that loads when a user logs o n • Normally set to Explorer.ex e • Can be set to any executable fi le
  • 46. Winlogon Userinit • Loads logon and group policy scripts, other auto-runs, and the Explorer shel l • Attackers can append additional executables to this value
  • 47. Identifying Malicious Auto-Runs • Eyeball it, looking for suspicious fi les or paths, spelling errors, broken English, etc . • Risky; real commercial software is often sloppily made, and some attackers are carefu l • Next slide: which item is malicious?
  • 49. Real DLL is iprip.dll Spelling error but genuine No description, runs from Temp, but genuine
  • 50. Recommended Steps 1. Exclude persistent binaries signed by trusted publishers (but not all signed binaries ) 2. Exclude persistent items created outside the time window of interes t 3. Examine paths of remaining persistent binarie s • Attackers tend to use Temp folders or common directories within %SYSTEMROOT % • Not deeply nested subdirectories speci fi c to obscure third-party applications
  • 51. Recommended Steps 4. Research MD5 hashes for remaining persistent binaries on VirusTotal, Bit9, etc . 5. Compare remaining unknowns against a known "gold image" used to install the systems
  • 53. Signed Malware • Attackers have been stealing code-signing signatures, and signing malwar e • Also, not all legitimate persistent fi les, even Windows components, are signe d • Sometimes updates remove signatures
  • 56. Personalization • User hive registry keys contain personalization settings for each use r • First priority: examine compromised account s • Acquire NTUSER.DAT and USRCLASS.DA T • Check machine accounts, such as NetworkService and LocalSyste m • May also contain evidence
  • 57. Most Helpful User-Speci fi c Keys • Shellbag s • UserAssis t • MUICach e • Most Recently Used (MRU ) • TypedURL s • TypedPaths
  • 58. Shellbags • Used to remember size, position, and view settings of window s • Persist even if a directory is delete d • Saved in a user’s pro fi le registry hive
  • 59. Shellbags Contain • Full directory paths accessed via Explore r • Date and time of acces s • Modi fi ed, Accessed, and Created times of each path recorded when the access occurre d • Such historical records are very useful to track attacker actions
  • 61. UserAssist • Tracks applications a user has launched through the Windows Explorer shel l • Populates Start menu with frequently launched programs
  • 62. UserAssist v. Prefetch • UserAssist only tracks items opened via Explore r • Including from the Run box and Start men u • But not from the command promp t • Prefetch fi les don't identify which user executed a program
  • 64. MUICache • Multilingual User Interfac e • Another list of programs executed by a use r • HKEY_USERS{SID}_ClassesLocalSettingsSoftware MicrosoftWindowsShellMuiCache
  • 65. Most Recently Used (MRU) Keys • Used by many application s • No standard registry path or value naming convention
  • 67. Explorer Open and Save MRU • Files and folders most recently accessed in the Open and Save dialog menu s • RegRipper can fi nd the data
  • 68. Start Menu Run MRU • Programs recently launched from the Run bo x • Human-readabl e • HKEY_USERS{SID}SoftwareMicrosoftWindows CurrentVersionExplorerRunMRU
  • 69. RecentDocs • Recently opened documents (any fi le extension ) • Used to populate File menu of various application s • HKEY_USERS{SID}SoftwareMicrosoft WindowsCurrentVersionExplorer RecentDocs
  • 70. Internet Explorer TypedURLs & TypedPaths • Used to populate the address bar drop-down list in Internet Explore r • May contain URLs and paths to local fi le s • HKEY_USERS{SID}SoftwareMicrosoft InternetExplorerTypedURL s • HKEY_USERS{SID} SoftwareMicrosoftInternetExplorer TypedPaths
  • 71.
  • 72. Proves Intent • User typed (or pasted) these URLs into the address ba r • Didn't just click a link
  • 73. Remote Desktop MRU • Used to remotely control Windows machine s • Maintains history of recent connections and con fi guration dat a • May tell you where a user connected and who they attempted to log in as
  • 75. All-In-One Tools • RegRipper (link Ch 10m ) • Windows Registry Decoder (link Ch 12s ) • AutoRun s • Velociraptor
  • 76. Single-Purpose Utilities • ShimCacheParse r • Shellbags.p y • sba g • UserAssis t • Nirsoft Registry Analysis Tools