2. • A general rule of interpretation is that if a word used in a
statute excludes certain cases in its common meaning, it
should not be constrained unnecessarily to include those
cases.
• An exception to this rule is that when the objectives of the
statute are not met by excluding the cases, then the word
may be interpreted extensively so as to include those cases.
• When a statute is meant for the benefit of a particular class,
and if a word in the statute is capable of two meanings, one
which would preserve the benefits and one which would not,
then the meaning that preserves the benefit must be
adopted.
• where the court has to choose between a wider mean that
carries out the objective of the legislature better and a
narrow meaning, then it usually chooses the former.
4. Provision of Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 says:
S.5 Right to payment of maternity benefit.-
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every
woman shall be entitled to, and her employer shall
be liable for, the payment of maternity benefit at the
rate of the average daily wage for the period of her
actual absence, that is to say, the period
immediately preceding the day of her delivery, the
actual day of her delivery and any period
immediately following that day.
5. Facts:
• Ms.X was working in a Estate belonging to the
appellant was allowed leave of absence on maternity
leave.
• After her delivery, the appellant paid her on account of
maternity benefit an amount equivalent to what she
would have earned on the basis of her average daily
wages in 72 working days falling within 12 weeks of the
maternity period excluding 12 Sundays being wageless
holidays which fell during the period of the
respondent's actual absence immediately preceding
and including the day of her delivery and the 6 weeks
immediately following that day.
• In this case, a woman who used to work 6 days a week
was paid for only 6x12=72 days instead of 7x12=84
days.
6. • High Court held that 12 weeks for which
maternity benefit is provided for in s. 5 of the
Act must be taken to mean 12 weeks of work
and the computation of the benefit had to be
made with reference to the actual days on
which the woman would have worked but for
her inability.
7. SC held that:
• The Act does not contain any definition of the word
"week".
• It has to be understood in its ordinary dictionary meaning.
• In the context s. 5 of the Act, the term has to be taken to
signify a cycle of 7 days including Sundays.
• By using the words, namely, "for the period of her actual
absence immediately preceding and including the day of
her delivery and for the 6 weeks immediately following
that day's the Legislature intended that computation of
maternity benefit is to be made for the entire Period of
the woman worker's actual absence, that is, for all the
days including Sundays which may be wageless holidays
failing within that period and not only for intermittent
period of 6 days thereby excluding Sundays failing within
that period.
• Appeal Dismissed
8. • In interpreting provisions of beneficial pieces
of legislation which is intended to achieve the
object of doing social justice to woman
workers employed in the plantations and
which squarely fall within the purview of
Article 42 of the Constitution, the beneficent
rule of construction which would enable the
woman worker not only to subsist but also to
make up her dissipated' energy, nurse her
child, preserve her efficiency as a worker and
maintain the level of her previous efficiency
and output has to be adopted by the Court.
10. Provision of Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940
says:
• s. 7(1) -Employer shall keep his shop closed on
the day which he had himself chosen as a "
close day ".
11. Facts:
• The appellant who was a shopkeeper was
convicted for the second time by the
Additional District Magistrate for contravening
the provisions of s. 7(1) of the Punjab Trade
Employees Act, 1940
12. • He raised the plea that the Act did not apply
to his shop as he did not employ any stranger
but that himself alone worked in it and that
the application of s. 7(1) to his shop would be
violative of his fundamental rights under Arts.
14, 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution and
also that the restriction imposed was not
reasonable within Art. 19(6) as it was not in
the interest of the general.
13. • Held, that the main object of the Act was the
welfare of the employees and to protect their
as well as the employers' health by preventing
them from over work. Such a restriction being
in the interest of the general public was
reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19(6) of
the Constitution.
• The provisions of s. 7(1) were constitutionally
valid and were justified as for securing
administrative convenience and avoiding
evasion of those provisions designed for the
protection of the workmen.
15. Provision of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 says:
14 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the
recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by
any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a
tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made
to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of
the following grounds only, namely:
XX XX XX
(d) that the premises were let for use as a residence and
neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been
residing therein for a period of six months immediately
before the date of the filing of the application for the
recovery of possession thereof;"
16. Facts:
• Mr. X took the premises on rent on May 12, 1961 at a
monthly rental of Rs. 95/-.
• At the time when the tenancy started, the tenant was
living in the tenanted house with his father, mother,
two sisters and a brother.
• The tenant himself was at that time a bachelor but
seems to have married subsequently.
• In 1971 the tenant went to Canada followed by his wife
and children.
• It is alleged that after having gone to Canada, the
husband along with his wife took up some employment
there and did not return to India after 1971.
• While leaving for Canada the tenant had left his
mother and brother in the house who were regularly
paying rent to the landlord.
17. • The landlord filed an application for ejectment
of the tenant on the ground of s. 14 and
pleaded that with the exit of the tenant from
the house it became vacant and his mother
and brother who were left behind could not
be treated as members of the family. Hence,
in the eye of law the tenanted premises must
be deemed to have fallen vacant.
18. SC held:
• The word 'family' has to be given not a restricted
but a wider meaning so as to include not only the
head of the family but all members or
descendants from the common ancestors who
are actually living with the same head.
• More particularly, in our country, blood relations
do not evaporate merely because a member of
the family-the father, the brother or the son-
leaves his household and goes out for some time.
• The stress is not so much on the actual presence
of the tenant but it is more on whether the
tenanted premises have been completely vacated
by the tenant.
• Allowed appeal, set aside the judgment.
20. • Provision of Probation of offenders Act 1958 says:
"6. Restriction on imprisonment of offenders under
twenty-one years of age." (1) When any person
under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of
having committed an offence punishable with
imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life),
the court by which the person is found guilty shall
not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is
satisfied, that having regard to the circumstances of
the case including the nature of the offence and the
character of the offender, it would not be desirable
to deal with him u/s. 3 or section 4, and if the court
passes any sentence of imprisonment on the
offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so."
21. • The object of S. 6 of the Act, broadly speaking,
is to see that young offenders are not sent to
jail for the commission of less serious offences
mentioned therein because of grave risk to
their attitude to life to which they are likely to
be exposed as a result of their close
association with the hardened and habitual
criminals who may happen to be the inmates
of the jail.
22. • An accused committed a crime when he was
less that 21 years of age.
• He was later convicted when he was more
than 21 years of age.
• Can he be entitled to the benefit of s.6?
23. • SC held that even if the date of birth of the
accused is held to be less than 21 years of age
as alleged by him in the petition, on the date
of delivery of judgment of conviction and
sentence on by the Additional District &
Sessions Judge he was more than 21 years of
age and thus was not entitled to the benefit
under S. 6 of the Act.
