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Building Bridges:
 Forcing Hackers and
Business to “Hug it Out”

  Andrew Hay, CISSP, The 451 Group
Chris Nickerson, CISSP, Lares Consulting
About



•Andrew    Hay                 •   Chris Nickerson

 •   Senior Analyst, The 451       •   Founder & Principal
     Group                             Security Consultant,
                                       Lares Consulting
 •   Analyst, Author,
     Speaker, Blogger, and         •   Red Team and Social
     more!                             Engineering Expert
Change Log
•   History:

    •   Started as an argument a discussion
        at ShmooCon 2010

    •   Idea to turn whining discussion into a
        talk from BSidesBoston 2010

    •   Perfected Presented again at
        BSidesLasVegas in July 2010

    •   Perfected at SOURCE Barcelona in
        November 2010
Why Talk About This?
•   This talk shouldn‟t need to exist!

    •   But the industry obviously needs
        it

•   We‟re all adults (well, most of us)

•   Business leaders should
    understand their staff

•   Employees should understand
    why the business needs to do
Overview

•   The View From The Trenches

•   The View From The Business

•   The Problems

•   The Way to Fix The Problem

•   Questions?
The View From
                The Trenches
•   Management is clueless

•   They don‟t CARE about
    security

•   They will only do the “bare
    minimum”

•   They play golf and waste time
    in meetings all day
The View From
The Trenches (continued)
          •   They don‟t respond when I
              show them how important it is

          •   We…

              •   Are overworked

              •   Get all the blame

              •   Don‟t get the respect we
                  deserve
The View From
                  The Business
•   Hackers don‟t have a clue

•   They don‟t care about the
    business

•   They don‟t understand the
    economic challenges

•   They surf the Internet and talk
    to their “friends” on {IRC,
    Twitter, Newsgroups} all day
The View From
 The Business
    •   They don‟t listen when I tell
        them how dangerous it is

    •   We…

        •   Put in long hours

        •   Answer to the business
            stakeholders

        •   Don‟t get the respect we
            deserve
The Problems
•   Pure Security vs. Business Security

•   Cost vs. Completeness

•   Scope vs. “Hackers Don't Have Scope”

•   Downtime vs. Patch to Secure

•   Feature Release vs. Secure
    Development

•   Compromise Disclosure vs. Potential
    Financial Devastation

•   Compliance vs. Security
Pure Security vs.
                   Business Security
•   View from the trenches
    •   Security is an ever changing
        field/ not constrained by dated
        academic theories

    •   A secure environment is the
        goal but never really gonna
        happen

    •   Its secure when it can‟t be
        hacked

    •   It requires 24/7 support
Pure Security vs.
                   Business Security
•   View from the business
    •   Security is defined by the CIA
        triad

    •   Availability (typically) trumps
        Integrity and Confidentiality

    •   The cost of operating securely
        should not be detrimental to the
        company‟s bottom line

    •   The budget can not be
        expanded just because there
        are new threats
Cost vs.
                       Completeness
•   View from the trenches
    •   Completeness should be the
        goal

    •   Budget should be flexible to
        accommodate

    •   We must test ALL devices

    •   We must look at every level
        (Network,App,Code, etc..)

    •   The test/testers you bought
        SUCK
Cost vs.
                         Completeness
•   View from the business
    •   Fixed cost for project / no
        wiggle room

    •   Budget dictates the depth, you
        don‟t!

    •   The only thing in scope are the
        machines holding (insert here)
        <PCI,PHI,etc..> Data on them

    •   I only have to do a Web App
        test OR Code review not both. It
        says it right here in the
        standard.
Scope vs.
“Hackers Don't Have Scope”
             •   View from the trenches
                 •   Scope is a guideline / ROE may
                     need to be adjusted as required

                 •   We will attack any asset that
                     you own. What‟s on it doesn‟t
                     matter.

                 •   You must test everything on the
                     box/app, not just what that
                     dumb compliance sheet tells
                     you

                 •   SE is out of scope? WHY? Real
Scope vs.
“Hackers Don't Have Scope”
             •   View from the business
                 •   ROE non-negotiable / paid to
                     adhere to scope

                 •   We know what we want tested
                     and what is important for the
                     business

                 •   Scope creep does not benefit
                     the business

                 •   Political ramifications of
                     “testing” our people is a large
                     liability.
Downtime vs.
                        Patch to Secure
•   View from the trenches
    •   Patches need to be applied /
        that‟s why they‟re released

    •   How much revenue will be lost if
        this threat vector is exploited?

    •   Patching now may reduce
        downtime due to breach later

    •   If you are worried about
        installing the patch, test it first

    •   This is stupid, why isn‟t it
        automated?
Downtime vs.
                        Patch to Secure
•   View from the business
    •   The business can‟t afford
        downtime to patch / disrupts
        business and potential for lost
        revenue

         •   Availability is more important
             than security

    •   We have a network firewall and
        desktop AV / should be enough

    •   Attackers are on the outside

    •   We are a
        Hospital/bank/Whatever, we
        CAN‟T go DOWN!
Feature Release vs.
Secure Development
          •   View from the trenches
              •   If we fix it now, we‟re releasing
                  products that are secure out of
                  the box / don‟t have to fix later

              •   Delivery timelines can shift /
                  they‟re just dates in MS Project

              •   Saving money by fixing it now.
                  (cite post release 100x bugfix
                  increase cost)

              •   “I won‟t put my name on this
                  *tantrum* *badmouth*”
Feature Release vs.
Secure Development
          •   View from the business
              •   Delaying release may
                  jeopardize our GTM strategy

              •   Fixes can be applied in a post-
                  release hotfix or in the next
                  minor/major release

              •   Development & QA time cost
                  money / not a money maker

              •   May lose money by fixing it now

              •   Feature profits will fund future
                  security enhancements
Compromise Disclosure vs.
            Potential Financial Devastation

•   View from the trenches
    •   It‟s our duty to report exploit
        vectors to the vendors / we‟d
        want others to do the same

    •   We got hacked, we need to tell
        our customers.

    •   YOU are unethical if you don‟t
        tell anyone
Compromise Disclosure vs.
            Potential Financial Devastation
•   View from the business
    •   Disclosing weaknesses
        jeopardize our business!

    •   Let someone else report it to
        the vendors / social
        responsibility be damned!

    •   We‟re in business to make
        money, not help the vendors fix
        their problems

    •   We got hit but no sensitive
        information was accessed
Compliance vs. Security
            •   View from the trenches
                •   Compliance IS NOT Security

                •   Compliance a byproduct of
                    being secure

                •   Compliance is stupid and is
                    someone else‟s problem

                •   How can one size fit all?

                •   How does securing 10% of our
                    assets and ignoring the other
                    90% Make us secure?
Compliance vs. Security
            •   View from the business
                •   Sometimes compliance is the
                    end goal / deemed „good
                    enough‟

                •   Our customers (who pay your
                    salary) REQUIRE us to be
                    certified

                •   Achieve compliance, security
                    should follow

                •   Not enough money for both but
                    higher risk of fines for not being
                    compliant
The Way To Fix the Problem

•   Some common ground must be found

Business         Hackers           What we need
Business Needs To…
•   Understand that…
    •   Hackers are intelligent people that are responsible enough to be
        educated on the business and its issues

    •   Business has a large moving target to keep up with and need effective
        direction

    •   Hackers are their first and last line of defense / They defend your
        paycheck and require your support

•   Provide executive support, understanding, and financial
    backing for the security team or expect failure
    •   Security is just like ALL other business units, with out those things…they
        will fail.
Hackers Need To…
•   Learn more about the business, its operations, and how
    cost plays into the decision process

•   Identify the political challenges and pose their
    problems/solutions in a manner that fits

•   Talk in language that executives understand
    •   Articulate technical issues in less complex terms

    •   Pretend you‟re explaining to your mother
Both Need To…

•   Learn respect and tolerance for the others skills and
    problems

•   Recognize that both camps bring valuable information
    to the table / keep an open mind!

•   Realize that neither camp should dictate best practices
    but rather agree on best practices

•   Understand that they have the same goals but start off
    on opposite sides to get there.
Ask yourself „what have I done to bridge the
                   gap?‟


       Questions?
Thank you!
Andrew Hay                       Chris Nickerson
Senior Analyst, The 451          Founder & Principal Security
Group,                           Consultant, Lares Consulting
Enterprise Security Practice
                                 cnickerson@laresconsulting.com
ahay@the451group.com             http://www.laresconsulting.com
http://www.the451group.com       http://twitter.com/indi303
http://twitter.com/andrewsmhay   http://exoticliability.libsyn.com/

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Andrew Hay - Chris Nickerson - Building Bridges - Forcing Hackers and Business to Hug it Out

  • 1. Building Bridges: Forcing Hackers and Business to “Hug it Out” Andrew Hay, CISSP, The 451 Group Chris Nickerson, CISSP, Lares Consulting
  • 2. About •Andrew Hay • Chris Nickerson • Senior Analyst, The 451 • Founder & Principal Group Security Consultant, Lares Consulting • Analyst, Author, Speaker, Blogger, and • Red Team and Social more! Engineering Expert
  • 3. Change Log • History: • Started as an argument a discussion at ShmooCon 2010 • Idea to turn whining discussion into a talk from BSidesBoston 2010 • Perfected Presented again at BSidesLasVegas in July 2010 • Perfected at SOURCE Barcelona in November 2010
  • 4. Why Talk About This? • This talk shouldn‟t need to exist! • But the industry obviously needs it • We‟re all adults (well, most of us) • Business leaders should understand their staff • Employees should understand why the business needs to do
  • 5. Overview • The View From The Trenches • The View From The Business • The Problems • The Way to Fix The Problem • Questions?
  • 6. The View From The Trenches • Management is clueless • They don‟t CARE about security • They will only do the “bare minimum” • They play golf and waste time in meetings all day
  • 7. The View From The Trenches (continued) • They don‟t respond when I show them how important it is • We… • Are overworked • Get all the blame • Don‟t get the respect we deserve
  • 8. The View From The Business • Hackers don‟t have a clue • They don‟t care about the business • They don‟t understand the economic challenges • They surf the Internet and talk to their “friends” on {IRC, Twitter, Newsgroups} all day
  • 9. The View From The Business • They don‟t listen when I tell them how dangerous it is • We… • Put in long hours • Answer to the business stakeholders • Don‟t get the respect we deserve
  • 10. The Problems • Pure Security vs. Business Security • Cost vs. Completeness • Scope vs. “Hackers Don't Have Scope” • Downtime vs. Patch to Secure • Feature Release vs. Secure Development • Compromise Disclosure vs. Potential Financial Devastation • Compliance vs. Security
  • 11. Pure Security vs. Business Security • View from the trenches • Security is an ever changing field/ not constrained by dated academic theories • A secure environment is the goal but never really gonna happen • Its secure when it can‟t be hacked • It requires 24/7 support
  • 12. Pure Security vs. Business Security • View from the business • Security is defined by the CIA triad • Availability (typically) trumps Integrity and Confidentiality • The cost of operating securely should not be detrimental to the company‟s bottom line • The budget can not be expanded just because there are new threats
  • 13. Cost vs. Completeness • View from the trenches • Completeness should be the goal • Budget should be flexible to accommodate • We must test ALL devices • We must look at every level (Network,App,Code, etc..) • The test/testers you bought SUCK
  • 14. Cost vs. Completeness • View from the business • Fixed cost for project / no wiggle room • Budget dictates the depth, you don‟t! • The only thing in scope are the machines holding (insert here) <PCI,PHI,etc..> Data on them • I only have to do a Web App test OR Code review not both. It says it right here in the standard.
  • 15. Scope vs. “Hackers Don't Have Scope” • View from the trenches • Scope is a guideline / ROE may need to be adjusted as required • We will attack any asset that you own. What‟s on it doesn‟t matter. • You must test everything on the box/app, not just what that dumb compliance sheet tells you • SE is out of scope? WHY? Real
  • 16. Scope vs. “Hackers Don't Have Scope” • View from the business • ROE non-negotiable / paid to adhere to scope • We know what we want tested and what is important for the business • Scope creep does not benefit the business • Political ramifications of “testing” our people is a large liability.
  • 17. Downtime vs. Patch to Secure • View from the trenches • Patches need to be applied / that‟s why they‟re released • How much revenue will be lost if this threat vector is exploited? • Patching now may reduce downtime due to breach later • If you are worried about installing the patch, test it first • This is stupid, why isn‟t it automated?
  • 18. Downtime vs. Patch to Secure • View from the business • The business can‟t afford downtime to patch / disrupts business and potential for lost revenue • Availability is more important than security • We have a network firewall and desktop AV / should be enough • Attackers are on the outside • We are a Hospital/bank/Whatever, we CAN‟T go DOWN!
  • 19. Feature Release vs. Secure Development • View from the trenches • If we fix it now, we‟re releasing products that are secure out of the box / don‟t have to fix later • Delivery timelines can shift / they‟re just dates in MS Project • Saving money by fixing it now. (cite post release 100x bugfix increase cost) • “I won‟t put my name on this *tantrum* *badmouth*”
  • 20. Feature Release vs. Secure Development • View from the business • Delaying release may jeopardize our GTM strategy • Fixes can be applied in a post- release hotfix or in the next minor/major release • Development & QA time cost money / not a money maker • May lose money by fixing it now • Feature profits will fund future security enhancements
  • 21. Compromise Disclosure vs. Potential Financial Devastation • View from the trenches • It‟s our duty to report exploit vectors to the vendors / we‟d want others to do the same • We got hacked, we need to tell our customers. • YOU are unethical if you don‟t tell anyone
  • 22. Compromise Disclosure vs. Potential Financial Devastation • View from the business • Disclosing weaknesses jeopardize our business! • Let someone else report it to the vendors / social responsibility be damned! • We‟re in business to make money, not help the vendors fix their problems • We got hit but no sensitive information was accessed
  • 23. Compliance vs. Security • View from the trenches • Compliance IS NOT Security • Compliance a byproduct of being secure • Compliance is stupid and is someone else‟s problem • How can one size fit all? • How does securing 10% of our assets and ignoring the other 90% Make us secure?
  • 24. Compliance vs. Security • View from the business • Sometimes compliance is the end goal / deemed „good enough‟ • Our customers (who pay your salary) REQUIRE us to be certified • Achieve compliance, security should follow • Not enough money for both but higher risk of fines for not being compliant
  • 25. The Way To Fix the Problem • Some common ground must be found Business Hackers What we need
  • 26. Business Needs To… • Understand that… • Hackers are intelligent people that are responsible enough to be educated on the business and its issues • Business has a large moving target to keep up with and need effective direction • Hackers are their first and last line of defense / They defend your paycheck and require your support • Provide executive support, understanding, and financial backing for the security team or expect failure • Security is just like ALL other business units, with out those things…they will fail.
  • 27. Hackers Need To… • Learn more about the business, its operations, and how cost plays into the decision process • Identify the political challenges and pose their problems/solutions in a manner that fits • Talk in language that executives understand • Articulate technical issues in less complex terms • Pretend you‟re explaining to your mother
  • 28. Both Need To… • Learn respect and tolerance for the others skills and problems • Recognize that both camps bring valuable information to the table / keep an open mind! • Realize that neither camp should dictate best practices but rather agree on best practices • Understand that they have the same goals but start off on opposite sides to get there.
  • 29. Ask yourself „what have I done to bridge the gap?‟ Questions?
  • 30. Thank you! Andrew Hay Chris Nickerson Senior Analyst, The 451 Founder & Principal Security Group, Consultant, Lares Consulting Enterprise Security Practice cnickerson@laresconsulting.com ahay@the451group.com http://www.laresconsulting.com http://www.the451group.com http://twitter.com/indi303 http://twitter.com/andrewsmhay http://exoticliability.libsyn.com/