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Secure Development On
Kubernetes
Security Meetup by SBAResearch
10.06.2020
Andreas Falk
andreas.falk@novatec-gmbh.de / @andifalk
https://www.novatec-gmbh.de/beratung/agile-security
Introduction
Andreas Falk
Novatec Consulting
2
Agenda
1. What Can Go Wrong?
2. Application Security
3. Container Security
4. Kubernetes Security
5. Kubernetes Secrets
3
Look here:
https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes
4
Where are the Slides and theCode?
Introduction
5
What can go wrong?
Severe Vulnerability in Kubernetes
Source: https://blog.aquasec.com
6
Crypto Mining Via K8sDashboard
Source: https://blog.heptio.com
7
Open ETCD Portsin Kubernetes (1)
https://shodan.io
8
Open ETCD Portsin Kubernetes (2)
9
$ etcdctl --endpoints=http://xx.xx.xx.xx:2379
cluster-health
member b97ee4034db41d17 is healthy: got healthy
result
from http://xx.xx.xx.xx:2379
cluster is healthy
https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/releases
Vulnerable Docker Images
Source: The state of open source security report (snyk.io)
10
All is Root
11
Application- / Docker- /K8s-Security
12
Sowhat can WE do as
Developers?
The Path for Secure Development on K8s
Application
Security
Container
Security
Kubernetes
Security
Kubernetes
Secrets
13
The Path for Secure Development on K8s
Security
ApplicationContainer
Security
Kubernetes
Security
Kubernetes
Secrets
14
Application Security
15
WebApplication
Authentication
Authorization
SQLInjection
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Data Protection (Crypto)
...
Application Security
16
Iteration 1: Application Security
https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes
Live Demo: Show me thecode
17
â–Ș Input Validation for ALL types of input
â–Ș Output Encoding to preventXSS
â–Ș Use only Parameterized Queries/Prepared Statements
â–Ș Enforce Authentication &Authorization
â–Ș Never implement your own Crypto orSession-Management
â–Ș Check 3rd Party Dependencies for Vulnerabilities
â–Ș Use Static & Dynamic Application SecurityTesting
18
Application Security 101
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten
https://owasp.org/www-project-proactive-controls
The Path for Secure Development on K8s
Application
Security
Container
Security
Kubernetes
Security
Kubernetes
Secrets
19
OWASP DockerTop 10
20
1. Secure User Mapping
2. Patch Management Strategy
3. Network Segmentation and Firewalling
4. Secure Defaults and Hardening
5. Maintain Security Contexts
6. Protect Secrets
7. Resource Protection
8. Container Image Integrity and Origin
9. Follow Immutable Paradigm
10. Logging
https://github.com/OWASP/Docker-Security
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-190
https://github.com/OWASP/Container-Security-VeriïŹcation-Standard
https://www.bsi.bund.de
Virtual Machine (VM) Basics
Physical Hardware
Hypervisor (VMM)
Guest OS Guest OS
Guest Apps Guest Apps
Physical Hardware
Host OS
Guest OS Guest OS
Guest Apps Guest Apps
VMM
Type 1 Virtual MachineMonitor Type 2 Virtual MachineMonitor
ESXi
Workstation
21
Container (Security) Basics
Linux Namespaces
Control Groups (cgroups)
Capabilities
Mandatory Access Control
Secure Computing Mode
Secrets Management
Container
Linux Namespaces
Control Groups (cgroups)
Capabilities
Mandatory Access Control
Secure Computing Mode
Secrets Management
Container
LXD
Linux Host (LinuxKernel)
22
â–Ș Process IDs
â–Ș Network
â–Ș Mount Points
â–Ș Inter-Process Communications (IPC)
â–Ș User & Group IDs
â–Ș Unix Timesharing System (UTS): hostname & domainnames
â–Ș Control groups (cgroups)
23
Linux Kernel Namespaces
$ man namespaces
$ sudo lsns
Linux Control Groups (cgroups)
â–Ș Resource Limits
− CPU
− Memory
− Devices
− Processes
− Network
24
For Java this only works with container aware
JDK versions as of OpenJDK 8u192 or above
Recommendation: Use Java 11
â–Ș Break up privileges into smallerunits
− CAP_SYS_ADMIN
− CAP_NET_ADMIN
− CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
− CAP_CHOWN
− ...
25
Linux Capabilities
http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
$ man capabilities
$ docker run --cap-drop=ALL --cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE
â–Ș Restrict System Calls
− Secure Computation Mode (seccomp)
− Google gVisor
26
â–Ș Linux Kernel Security Modules (MAC)
− AppArmor
− Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux)
Linux Mandatory AccessControl & System Calls
https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/seccomp
https://apparmor.net
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux
https://gvisor.dev/docs
Docker Images
Linux Host
...
cgroups
namespaces
Base Image (Alpine, 
)
DockerïŹle
Application
Container Image
Base Image (Alpine, 
)
DockerïŹle
Application
Container Image
Container Registry
docker run
27
USERdirective in DockerïŹle
Say No To Root (1)
FROM openjdk:11-jre-slim
COPY hello-spring-kubernetes-1.0.0-SNAPSHOT.jar app.jar
EXPOSE 8080
RUN addgroup --system --gid 1002 app && adduser
--system --uid 1002 --gid 1002 appuser
USER 1002
ENTRYPOINT java -jar /app.jar
https://opensource.com/article/18/3/just-say-no-root-containers
28
Use JIB and Distroless Images
29
Say No To Root (2)
https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/jib
plugins {
id 'com.google.cloud.tools.jib' version '...'
}
jib {
container {
user = 1002
}
}
Container Image Security
DockerïŹle
Application
Container Registry
Container Image
Base Image (Alpine, 
)
Image Security
Scanner
Vulnerable 3rd party
dependencies
OSvulnerabilities
OSvulnerabilities
30
https://anchore.com/opensource/
https://github.com/coreos/clair
https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy
https://www.docker.com/blog/announcing-scanning-from-snyk-for-docker
https://www.docker.com/press-release/Docker-Snyk-Announce-Partnership-Container-Vulnerability-Scanning
31
Iteration 2: Container Security
https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes
Live Demo: Show me thecode
32
â–Ș Learn Linux (Security) Basics
â–Ș Load Images from Trusted RegistriesOnly
â–Ș Scan Images for Vulnerabilities (inCI/CD Pipeline)
â–Ș Say No To Root & Run with --security-opt=no-new-privileges
â–Ș Do NOT hardcode Secrets into a ContainerImage
â–Ș Limit resources (memory, CPU,processes, ...)
â–Ș Use Linux Security Module (seccomp, AppArmor,SELinux)
33
Container Security 101
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Docker_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html
https://docs.docker.com/engine/security
https://blog.aquasec.com/docker-security-best-practices
https://blog.aquasec.com/devsecops-with-trivy-github-actions
The Path for Secure Development on K8s
Application
Security Security
Security
Container Kubernetes Kubernetes
Secrets
34
Kubernetes Basics
Ingress Service Deployment Replica Set
Pod
Pod
Pod
https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts
https://www.aquasec.com/wiki/display/containers/70+Best+Kube
rnetes+Tutorials
35
36
Source:
Kubernetes Security, O’Reilly, 2018
Kubernetes attack vectors
Operational / Development Kubernetes Security
37
https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/overview/#the-4c-s-of-cloud-native-security
https://learnk8s.io/production-best-practices/
K8s Development Security
TLS
Auth
Authz
Master Node
API Server Scheduler
Etcd Controller
Manager
TLS
Auth
Authz
Worker Node
Kubelet Container
Runtime
Kube Proxy
K8s Operational Security
Kubernetes Security
Kubernetes Auditing
Network Policies
Role BasedAccess
Control (RBAC)
Resource Limits
Pod Security Context
Pod Security Policy
Open Policy Agent
Resource Limits
39
https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/assign-cpu-resource
https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/assign-memory-resource
spec:
...
containers:
resources:
limits:
cpu: "1"
memory: "512Mi"
requests:
cpu: 500m
memory: "256Mi"
...
Pod/Container Security Context
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
containers:
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
privileged: false
runAsNonRoot: true
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/security-context
40
Pod Security Policy (Still In Beta!)
apiVersion: policy/v1beta1
kind: PodSecurityPolicy
metadata:
name: no-root-policy
spec:
privileged: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
requiredDropCapabilities:
- ALL
runAsUser:
rule: 'MustRunAsNonRoot'
...
https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy
41
Kubernetes Role Based AccessControl (RBAC)
ClusterRole ClusterRoleBinding
Role RoleBinding
SubjectAPI Groups
Resources
Verbs
Cluster-Wide
42
Namespace
- User
- Group
- ServiceAccount
https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/
Kubernetes Role Based AccessControl (RBAC)
43
https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/
apiGroups extensions, apps, policy, ...
resources pods, deployments, conïŹgmaps, secrets,nodes,
services, endpoints, podsecuritypolicies, ...
verbs get, list, watch, create, update, patch, delete, use,...
Open Policy Agent
44
https://www.openpolicyagent.org
https://play.openpolicyagent.org
Open Policy Agent -Kubernetes Gatekeeper
45
https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper
Helm 3 Is Here!
46
https://v3.helm.sh
https://helm.sh/docs/faq/#removal-of-tiller
Iteration 3: Kubernetes Security
https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes
Live Demo: Show me thecode
47
â–Ș Follow Container Security 101
â–Ș Use a Managed Kubernetes Cluster
â–Ș Enable Audit Logs
â–Ș Enforce Authentication & Role Based Access Control
â–Ș Use Pod Security Policies / Open Policy Agent
â–Ș Upgrade to Helm Version 3.x(Remove Tiller)
â–Ș Monitor your Kubernetes Cluster
48
Kubernetes Security 101
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten
https://owasp.org/www-project-proactive-controls
The Path for Secure Development on K8s
Application
Security
Container
Security Security
Kubernetes
Kubernetes
Secrets
49
Kubernetes Secrets
Secrets
KMS
Secrets
Secrets
Etcd
Kubernetes Secrets
51
https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/conïŹguration/secret
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: hello-spring-cloud-kubernetes
namespace: default
type: Opaque
data:
user.username: dXNlcg==
user.password: azhzX3VzZXI=
admin.username: YWRtaW4=
admin.password: azhzX2FkbWlu
â–Ș Encrypt Secret Data at Rest & inTransit
− Only Base64 encoded by default inEtcd!
â–Ș Restrict interactions with secretsAPI (RBAC)
â–Ș Mount secrets instead of ENV Mapping
52
Kubernetes Secrets - BestPractices
https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/conïŹguration/secret/#best-practices
https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data
Encryption Layers
53
Envelope Encryption On Kubernetes
54
https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/envelope-encryption
https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kms-provider
Key Management System (KMS)Providers
â–Ș Azure Key Vault
â–Ș Google Cloud KMS
â–Ș AWS KMS
â–Ș Hashicorp Vault
â–Ș ...
https://github.com/Azure/kubernetes-kms
https://github.com/Azure/kubernetes-keyvault-ïŹ‚exvol
https://cloud.google.com/kms
https://aws.amazon.com/de/kms
https://learn.hashicorp.com/vault/kubernetes/external-vault
55
What about Secretsin
56
â–Ș Sealed Secrets
â–Ș Helm Secrets
â–Ș Kamus
â–Ș Sops
â–Ș Hashicorp Vault
https://learnk8s.io/kubernetes-secrets-in-git
https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets
https://github.com/futuresimple/helm-secrets
https://github.com/Soluto/kamus
https://github.com/mozilla/sops
https://www.vaultproject.io
Summary
57
â–Ș Kubernetes is Complex - CheckAlternatives!
â–Ș Follow Application Security 101
â–Ș Follow Container & Kubernetes Security 101
â–Ș Ensure your secrets are encrypted inK8s
â–Ș Never store secrets in Source Control(Git, 
)
â–Ș Check out the Demos:
https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes
58
Summary / KeyInsights
Books and OnlineReferences
59
â–Ș Kubernetes Security, O’Reilly, 2018, ISBN: 978-1-492-04600-4
â–Ș Container Security, O’Reilly, 2020, ISBN: 978-1492056706
â–Ș https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes
â–Ș Crafty Requests: Deep Dive Into Kubernetes CVE-2018-1002105 - Ian Coldwater(Video)
â–Ș Ship of Fools: Shoring Up Kubernetes Security - Ian Coldwater(Video)
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/overview/#the-4c-s-of-cloud-native-security
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/securing-a-cluster
â–Ș https://opensource.com/article/18/3/just-say-no-root-containers
â–Ș https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/jib
â–Ș https://anchore.com/opensource/
â–Ș https://github.com/coreos/clair
â–Ș https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy
â–Ș https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Docker_Top_10
60
Books and Online References(1)
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/assign-cpu-resource
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/assign-memory-resource
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/security-context
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/conïŹguration/secret
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data
â–Ș https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/envelope-encryption
â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kms-provider
â–Ș https://github.com/Azure/kubernetes-kms
â–Ș https://cloud.google.com/kms
â–Ș https://aws.amazon.com/de/kms
61
Books and Online References(2)
Andreas Falk
62
Managing Consultant
Mobil: +49 151 46146778
E-Mail: andreas.falk@novatec-gmbh.de
Novatec Consulting GmbH
Dieselstraße 18/1
D-70771 Leinfelden-Echterdingen
T. +49 711 22040-700
info@novatec-gmbh.de
www.novatec-gmbh.de

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Secure development on Kubernetes by Andreas Falk

  • 1. Secure Development On Kubernetes Security Meetup by SBAResearch 10.06.2020 Andreas Falk
  • 3. Agenda 1. What Can Go Wrong? 2. Application Security 3. Container Security 4. Kubernetes Security 5. Kubernetes Secrets 3
  • 6. Severe Vulnerability in Kubernetes Source: https://blog.aquasec.com 6
  • 7. Crypto Mining Via K8sDashboard Source: https://blog.heptio.com 7
  • 8. Open ETCD Portsin Kubernetes (1) https://shodan.io 8
  • 9. Open ETCD Portsin Kubernetes (2) 9 $ etcdctl --endpoints=http://xx.xx.xx.xx:2379 cluster-health member b97ee4034db41d17 is healthy: got healthy result from http://xx.xx.xx.xx:2379 cluster is healthy https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/releases
  • 10. Vulnerable Docker Images Source: The state of open source security report (snyk.io) 10
  • 12. Application- / Docker- /K8s-Security 12 Sowhat can WE do as Developers?
  • 13. The Path for Secure Development on K8s Application Security Container Security Kubernetes Security Kubernetes Secrets 13
  • 14. The Path for Secure Development on K8s Security ApplicationContainer Security Kubernetes Security Kubernetes Secrets 14
  • 15. Application Security 15 WebApplication Authentication Authorization SQLInjection Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Data Protection (Crypto) ...
  • 17. Iteration 1: Application Security https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes Live Demo: Show me thecode 17
  • 18. â–Ș Input Validation for ALL types of input â–Ș Output Encoding to preventXSS â–Ș Use only Parameterized Queries/Prepared Statements â–Ș Enforce Authentication &Authorization â–Ș Never implement your own Crypto orSession-Management â–Ș Check 3rd Party Dependencies for Vulnerabilities â–Ș Use Static & Dynamic Application SecurityTesting 18 Application Security 101 https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten https://owasp.org/www-project-proactive-controls
  • 19. The Path for Secure Development on K8s Application Security Container Security Kubernetes Security Kubernetes Secrets 19
  • 20. OWASP DockerTop 10 20 1. Secure User Mapping 2. Patch Management Strategy 3. Network Segmentation and Firewalling 4. Secure Defaults and Hardening 5. Maintain Security Contexts 6. Protect Secrets 7. Resource Protection 8. Container Image Integrity and Origin 9. Follow Immutable Paradigm 10. Logging https://github.com/OWASP/Docker-Security https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-190 https://github.com/OWASP/Container-Security-VeriïŹcation-Standard https://www.bsi.bund.de
  • 21. Virtual Machine (VM) Basics Physical Hardware Hypervisor (VMM) Guest OS Guest OS Guest Apps Guest Apps Physical Hardware Host OS Guest OS Guest OS Guest Apps Guest Apps VMM Type 1 Virtual MachineMonitor Type 2 Virtual MachineMonitor ESXi Workstation 21
  • 22. Container (Security) Basics Linux Namespaces Control Groups (cgroups) Capabilities Mandatory Access Control Secure Computing Mode Secrets Management Container Linux Namespaces Control Groups (cgroups) Capabilities Mandatory Access Control Secure Computing Mode Secrets Management Container LXD Linux Host (LinuxKernel) 22
  • 23. â–Ș Process IDs â–Ș Network â–Ș Mount Points â–Ș Inter-Process Communications (IPC) â–Ș User & Group IDs â–Ș Unix Timesharing System (UTS): hostname & domainnames â–Ș Control groups (cgroups) 23 Linux Kernel Namespaces $ man namespaces $ sudo lsns
  • 24. Linux Control Groups (cgroups) â–Ș Resource Limits − CPU − Memory − Devices − Processes − Network 24 For Java this only works with container aware JDK versions as of OpenJDK 8u192 or above Recommendation: Use Java 11
  • 25. â–Ș Break up privileges into smallerunits − CAP_SYS_ADMIN − CAP_NET_ADMIN − CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE − CAP_CHOWN − ... 25 Linux Capabilities http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html $ man capabilities $ docker run --cap-drop=ALL --cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE
  • 26. â–Ș Restrict System Calls − Secure Computation Mode (seccomp) − Google gVisor 26 â–Ș Linux Kernel Security Modules (MAC) − AppArmor − Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) Linux Mandatory AccessControl & System Calls https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/seccomp https://apparmor.net https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux https://gvisor.dev/docs
  • 27. Docker Images Linux Host ... cgroups namespaces Base Image (Alpine, 
) DockerïŹle Application Container Image Base Image (Alpine, 
) DockerïŹle Application Container Image Container Registry docker run 27
  • 28. USERdirective in DockerïŹle Say No To Root (1) FROM openjdk:11-jre-slim COPY hello-spring-kubernetes-1.0.0-SNAPSHOT.jar app.jar EXPOSE 8080 RUN addgroup --system --gid 1002 app && adduser --system --uid 1002 --gid 1002 appuser USER 1002 ENTRYPOINT java -jar /app.jar https://opensource.com/article/18/3/just-say-no-root-containers 28
  • 29. Use JIB and Distroless Images 29 Say No To Root (2) https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/jib plugins { id 'com.google.cloud.tools.jib' version '...' } jib { container { user = 1002 } }
  • 30. Container Image Security DockerïŹle Application Container Registry Container Image Base Image (Alpine, 
) Image Security Scanner Vulnerable 3rd party dependencies OSvulnerabilities OSvulnerabilities 30 https://anchore.com/opensource/ https://github.com/coreos/clair https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy https://www.docker.com/blog/announcing-scanning-from-snyk-for-docker
  • 32. Iteration 2: Container Security https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes Live Demo: Show me thecode 32
  • 33. â–Ș Learn Linux (Security) Basics â–Ș Load Images from Trusted RegistriesOnly â–Ș Scan Images for Vulnerabilities (inCI/CD Pipeline) â–Ș Say No To Root & Run with --security-opt=no-new-privileges â–Ș Do NOT hardcode Secrets into a ContainerImage â–Ș Limit resources (memory, CPU,processes, ...) â–Ș Use Linux Security Module (seccomp, AppArmor,SELinux) 33 Container Security 101 https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Docker_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://docs.docker.com/engine/security https://blog.aquasec.com/docker-security-best-practices https://blog.aquasec.com/devsecops-with-trivy-github-actions
  • 34. The Path for Secure Development on K8s Application Security Security Security Container Kubernetes Kubernetes Secrets 34
  • 35. Kubernetes Basics Ingress Service Deployment Replica Set Pod Pod Pod https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts https://www.aquasec.com/wiki/display/containers/70+Best+Kube rnetes+Tutorials 35
  • 36. 36 Source: Kubernetes Security, O’Reilly, 2018 Kubernetes attack vectors
  • 37. Operational / Development Kubernetes Security 37 https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/overview/#the-4c-s-of-cloud-native-security https://learnk8s.io/production-best-practices/ K8s Development Security TLS Auth Authz Master Node API Server Scheduler Etcd Controller Manager TLS Auth Authz Worker Node Kubelet Container Runtime Kube Proxy K8s Operational Security
  • 38. Kubernetes Security Kubernetes Auditing Network Policies Role BasedAccess Control (RBAC) Resource Limits Pod Security Context Pod Security Policy Open Policy Agent
  • 40. Pod/Container Security Context spec: securityContext: runAsNonRoot: true containers: securityContext: allowPrivilegeEscalation: false privileged: false runAsNonRoot: true readOnlyRootFilesystem: true capabilities: drop: - ALL https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/security-context 40
  • 41. Pod Security Policy (Still In Beta!) apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: no-root-policy spec: privileged: false allowPrivilegeEscalation: false requiredDropCapabilities: - ALL runAsUser: rule: 'MustRunAsNonRoot' ... https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy 41
  • 42. Kubernetes Role Based AccessControl (RBAC) ClusterRole ClusterRoleBinding Role RoleBinding SubjectAPI Groups Resources Verbs Cluster-Wide 42 Namespace - User - Group - ServiceAccount https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/
  • 43. Kubernetes Role Based AccessControl (RBAC) 43 https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/ apiGroups extensions, apps, policy, ... resources pods, deployments, conïŹgmaps, secrets,nodes, services, endpoints, podsecuritypolicies, ... verbs get, list, watch, create, update, patch, delete, use,...
  • 45. Open Policy Agent -Kubernetes Gatekeeper 45 https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper
  • 46. Helm 3 Is Here! 46 https://v3.helm.sh https://helm.sh/docs/faq/#removal-of-tiller
  • 47. Iteration 3: Kubernetes Security https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes Live Demo: Show me thecode 47
  • 48. â–Ș Follow Container Security 101 â–Ș Use a Managed Kubernetes Cluster â–Ș Enable Audit Logs â–Ș Enforce Authentication & Role Based Access Control â–Ș Use Pod Security Policies / Open Policy Agent â–Ș Upgrade to Helm Version 3.x(Remove Tiller) â–Ș Monitor your Kubernetes Cluster 48 Kubernetes Security 101 https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten https://owasp.org/www-project-proactive-controls
  • 49. The Path for Secure Development on K8s Application Security Container Security Security Kubernetes Kubernetes Secrets 49
  • 51. Kubernetes Secrets 51 https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/conïŹguration/secret apiVersion: v1 kind: Secret metadata: name: hello-spring-cloud-kubernetes namespace: default type: Opaque data: user.username: dXNlcg== user.password: azhzX3VzZXI= admin.username: YWRtaW4= admin.password: azhzX2FkbWlu
  • 52. â–Ș Encrypt Secret Data at Rest & inTransit − Only Base64 encoded by default inEtcd! â–Ș Restrict interactions with secretsAPI (RBAC) â–Ș Mount secrets instead of ENV Mapping 52 Kubernetes Secrets - BestPractices https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/conïŹguration/secret/#best-practices https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data
  • 54. Envelope Encryption On Kubernetes 54 https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/envelope-encryption https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kms-provider
  • 55. Key Management System (KMS)Providers â–Ș Azure Key Vault â–Ș Google Cloud KMS â–Ș AWS KMS â–Ș Hashicorp Vault â–Ș ... https://github.com/Azure/kubernetes-kms https://github.com/Azure/kubernetes-keyvault-ïŹ‚exvol https://cloud.google.com/kms https://aws.amazon.com/de/kms https://learn.hashicorp.com/vault/kubernetes/external-vault 55
  • 56. What about Secretsin 56 â–Ș Sealed Secrets â–Ș Helm Secrets â–Ș Kamus â–Ș Sops â–Ș Hashicorp Vault https://learnk8s.io/kubernetes-secrets-in-git https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets https://github.com/futuresimple/helm-secrets https://github.com/Soluto/kamus https://github.com/mozilla/sops https://www.vaultproject.io
  • 58. â–Ș Kubernetes is Complex - CheckAlternatives! â–Ș Follow Application Security 101 â–Ș Follow Container & Kubernetes Security 101 â–Ș Ensure your secrets are encrypted inK8s â–Ș Never store secrets in Source Control(Git, 
) â–Ș Check out the Demos: https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes 58 Summary / KeyInsights
  • 60. â–Ș Kubernetes Security, O’Reilly, 2018, ISBN: 978-1-492-04600-4 â–Ș Container Security, O’Reilly, 2020, ISBN: 978-1492056706 â–Ș https://github.com/andifalk/secure-development-on-kubernetes â–Ș Crafty Requests: Deep Dive Into Kubernetes CVE-2018-1002105 - Ian Coldwater(Video) â–Ș Ship of Fools: Shoring Up Kubernetes Security - Ian Coldwater(Video) â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/overview/#the-4c-s-of-cloud-native-security â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/securing-a-cluster â–Ș https://opensource.com/article/18/3/just-say-no-root-containers â–Ș https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/jib â–Ș https://anchore.com/opensource/ â–Ș https://github.com/coreos/clair â–Ș https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy â–Ș https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Docker_Top_10 60 Books and Online References(1)
  • 61. â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/assign-cpu-resource â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/assign-memory-resource â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/conïŹgure-pod-container/security-context â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-policy â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/ â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/conïŹguration/secret â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data â–Ș https://cloud.google.com/kms/docs/envelope-encryption â–Ș https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/kms-provider â–Ș https://github.com/Azure/kubernetes-kms â–Ș https://cloud.google.com/kms â–Ș https://aws.amazon.com/de/kms 61 Books and Online References(2)
  • 62. Andreas Falk 62 Managing Consultant Mobil: +49 151 46146778 E-Mail: andreas.falk@novatec-gmbh.de Novatec Consulting GmbH Dieselstraße 18/1 D-70771 Leinfelden-Echterdingen T. +49 711 22040-700 info@novatec-gmbh.de www.novatec-gmbh.de