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Invest	
  in	
  security	
  
to	
  secure	
  investments	
  
5	
  real	
  ways	
  to	
  destroy	
  business	
  
by	
  breaking	
  SAP	
  applica8ons	
  
Alexander	
  Polyakov.	
  CTO,	
  ERPScan	
  
About	
  ERPScan	
  
•  The	
   only	
   360-­‐degree	
   SAP	
   security	
   soluBon:	
   ERPScan	
   Security	
  
Monitoring	
  Suite	
  for	
  SAP	
  
•  Leader	
  by	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  acknowledgments	
  from	
  SAP	
  (	
  150+	
  )	
  
•  60+	
  presenta8ons	
  at	
  key	
  security	
  conferences	
  worldwide	
  
•  25	
  awards	
  and	
  nomina8ons	
  
•  Research	
  team	
  –	
  20	
  experts	
  with	
  experience	
  in	
  	
  different	
  areas	
  
of	
  security	
  
•  Headquarters	
  in	
  Palo	
  Alto	
  (US)	
  and	
  Amsterdam	
  (EU)	
  
	
  
	
  
2	
  
Large	
  enterprise	
  sectors	
  
•  Oil	
  &	
  Gas	
  
•  Manufacturing	
  
•  LogisBcs	
  
•  Finance	
  
•  Nuclear	
  Power	
  
•  Retail	
  
•  TelecommunicaBon	
  
•  etc.	
  
3	
  
•  The	
  role	
  of	
  business	
  applicaBons	
  in	
  a	
  typical	
  work	
  environment	
  
•  The	
  need	
  to	
  control	
  them	
  to	
  opBmize	
  business	
  processes	
  
•  Scope	
  for	
  enormous	
  reducBon	
  in	
  resource	
  overheads	
  and	
  other	
  
direct	
  monetary	
  impact	
  
•  PotenBal	
  problems	
  that	
  one	
  can’t	
  overlook	
  
•  The	
  need	
  to	
  reflect	
  on	
  security	
  aspects	
  –	
  is	
  it	
  overstated?	
  
•  Why	
  is	
  it	
  a	
  REAL	
  and	
  existent	
  risk?	
  
4	
  
Business	
  applica8ons	
  
•  Espionage	
  
–  The]	
  of	
  financial	
  informaBon	
  
–  Corporate	
  secret	
  and	
  informaBon	
  the]	
  
–  Supplier	
  and	
  customer	
  list	
  the]	
  
–  HR	
  data	
  the]	
  	
  
•  Sabotage	
  
–  Denial	
  of	
  service	
  
–  Tampering	
  of	
  financial	
  records	
  and	
  accounBng	
  data	
  
–  Access	
  to	
  technology	
  network	
  (SCADA)	
  by	
  trust	
  relaBons	
  
•  Fraud	
  
–  False	
  transacBons	
  
–  ModificaBon	
  of	
  master	
  data	
  
	
  
5	
  
What	
  can	
  the	
  implica8ons	
  be?	
  
SAP	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Вставьте	
  рисунок	
  на	
  слайд,	
  скруглите	
  верхний	
  левый	
  и	
  нижний	
  правый	
  угол	
  
(Формат	
  –	
  Формат	
  рисунка),	
  добавьте	
  контур	
  (оранжевый,	
  толщина	
  –	
  3)	
  
6	
  
•  The	
  most	
  popular	
  business	
  applicaBon	
  
•  More	
  than	
  263000	
  customers	
  worldwide	
  	
  
•  83%	
  Forbes	
  500	
  companies	
  run	
  SAP	
  
•  Main	
  system	
  –	
  ERP	
  
•  Main	
  pla|orms	
  
‒  SAP	
  NetWeaver	
  ABAP	
  
‒  SAP	
  NetWeaver	
  J2EE	
  
‒  SAP	
  BusinessObjects	
  
‒  SAP	
  HANA	
  
‒  SAP	
  Mobile	
  Pla|orm	
  (SUP)	
  
SAP	
  Security	
  
	
  
•  Complexity	
  	
  
	
  Complexity	
  kills	
  security.	
  Many	
  different	
  vulnerabiliBes	
  in	
  all	
  
levels,	
  from	
  network	
  to	
  applicaBon	
  
•  Customiza8on	
  
	
  Cannot	
  be	
  installed	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  box.	
  A	
  lot	
  of	
  (up	
  to	
  50	
  %)	
  custom	
  
code	
  and	
  business	
  logic	
  
•  Risky	
  	
  
	
  Rarely	
  updated	
  because	
  administrators	
  are	
  scared	
  of	
  crashes	
  
and	
  downBme	
  
•  Unknown	
  	
  
	
  Mostly	
  available	
  inside	
  the	
  company	
  (closed	
  world)	
  
	
  
	
  
h‚p://erpscan.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/pres/Forgo‚en%20World%20-­‐%20Corporate%20Business%20ApplicaBon%20Systems%20Whitepaper.pdf	
  
7	
  
Risk	
  1:	
  Credit	
  card	
  data	
  theQ	
  
•  Risk:	
  credit	
  card	
  data	
  theQ	
  
•  Affects:	
  Companies	
  storing	
  and	
  processing	
  PCI	
  data:	
  Banks,	
  
Processing,	
  Merchants,	
  Payment	
  Gateways,	
  Retail	
  
•  Type:	
  Espionage	
  
•  Module:	
  SD	
  (Sales	
  and	
  DistribuBon)	
  –	
  part	
  of	
  ERP	
  	
  
•  A‚acker	
  can	
  get	
  access	
  to	
  mulBple	
  tables	
  that	
  store	
  credit	
  card	
  
data:	
  VCKUN,	
  VCNUM,	
  CCARDEC,	
  about	
  50	
  other	
  tables.	
  Credit	
  
card	
  data	
  the]	
  means	
  direct	
  monetary	
  and	
  reputaBon	
  loss	
  
8	
  
Risk	
  1:	
  Credit	
  card	
  data	
  theQ	
  
•  There	
  are	
  mulBple	
  ways	
  for	
  an	
  a‚acker	
  to	
  access	
  CC	
  data	
  
•  Even	
  if	
  it’s	
  encrypted,	
  one	
  can:	
  
–  Use	
  FM	
  to	
  decrypt	
  it	
  –	
  CCARD_DENVELOPE	
  
–  Use	
  report	
  to	
  get	
  decrypted	
  	
  
–  Or	
  use	
  another	
  report	
  to	
  find	
  some	
  info:	
  RV20A003	
  
•  SoluBon:	
  ConfiguraBon	
  Checks,	
  Patch	
  Management,	
  Access	
  
Control,	
  Code	
  Scanning	
  
•  Defense	
  
–  DecrypBon	
  of	
  credit	
  card	
  data	
  in	
  SD	
  –	
  SAP	
  Note	
  766703	
  	
  
–  DecrypBon	
  of	
  credit	
  card	
  data	
  for	
  the	
  whole	
  ERP	
  –	
  SAP	
  Note	
  1032588	
  
–  Credit	
  card	
  data	
  in	
  report	
  RV20A003	
  –	
  SAP	
  Note	
  836079	
  
9	
  
Risk	
  1:	
  Credit	
  card	
  data	
  theQ	
  (DEMO)	
  
10	
  
Risk	
  2:	
  Compe88ve	
  intelligence	
  
•  Risk:	
  Compromise	
  of	
  bidding	
  informa8on	
  
•  Affects:	
  Companies	
  using	
  SRM	
  for	
  bidding	
  
•  Type:	
  Espionage	
  
•  Module:	
  SRM	
  
•  Compe1tors’	
  intelligence	
  (Espionage)	
  
•  SAP	
  SRM	
  systems	
  are	
  accessible	
  through	
  the	
  Internet.	
  So	
  unfair	
  
compeBtors	
  have	
  a	
  sufficient	
  loophole	
  to	
  spy	
  privileged	
  pricing	
  
informaBon	
  and	
  propose	
  compeBBve	
  pricing	
  to	
  win	
  a	
  tender	
  
11	
  
Risk	
  2:	
  Compe88ve	
  intelligence	
  
•  SAP	
  Cfolders	
  applicaBon	
  for	
  document	
  exchange	
  is	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  
SRM.	
  It	
  has	
  some	
  vulnerabiliBes	
  and	
  insecure	
  configuraBon	
  
problems,	
  resulBng	
  in	
  access	
  to	
  official	
  pricing	
  informaBon	
  
•  This	
  means	
  that	
  the	
  compeBtor’s	
  documents	
  could	
  be	
  
completely	
  removed	
  from	
  the	
  systems,	
  or	
  the	
  informaBon	
  
might	
  be	
  manipulated	
  to	
  win	
  a	
  tender	
  
•  A‚ack	
  successfully	
  simulated	
  during	
  penetraBon	
  tests	
  
•  Program	
  vulnerabiliBes	
  that	
  can	
  aid	
  an	
  a‚acker:	
  
–  h‚p://erpscan.com/advisories/dsecrg-­‐09-­‐014-­‐sap-­‐cfolders-­‐mulBple-­‐stored-­‐xss-­‐vulnerabilies/	
  	
  
–  h‚p://erpscan.com/advisories/dsecrg-­‐09-­‐021-­‐sap-­‐cfolders-­‐mulBple-­‐linked-­‐xss-­‐vulnerabiliBes/	
  	
  
•  Defense:	
  SAP	
  Notes	
  1284360,	
  1292875	
  
12	
  
Risk	
  3:	
  Inten8onally	
  causing	
  manufacturing	
  defects
•  Risk:	
  Inten8onally	
  causing	
  manufacturing	
  defects	
  (Sabotage)	
  
•  Affects:	
  Manufacturing	
  sector	
  such	
  as	
  AviaBon,	
  Aerospace	
  
AutomoBve,	
  TransportaBon,	
  Consumer	
  Products,	
  Electronics,	
  
Semiconductor,	
  Industrial	
  Machinery	
  and	
  Equipment	
  
•  Type:	
  Sabotage	
  
•  Module:	
  SAP	
  PLM	
  
•  Access	
  to	
  SAP	
  PLM	
  systems	
  could	
  allow	
  unauthorized	
  changes	
  in	
  
product	
  creaBon	
  schemaBcs,	
  as	
  SAP	
  PLM	
  is	
  usually	
  integrated	
  
into	
  CAD.	
  One	
  small	
  change	
  could	
  result	
  in	
  a	
  defecBve	
  batch	
  of	
  
products,	
  causing	
  serious	
  financial	
  and	
  reputaBonal	
  losses	
  and,	
  
someBmes,	
  harm	
  to	
  life	
  and	
  limb	
  
13	
  
•  FDA	
  recalled	
  the	
  whole	
  batch	
  of	
  1200	
  tracheostomical	
  devices	
  
because	
  of	
  3	
  deaths	
  caused	
  by	
  technical	
  problems	
  
•  IKEA	
  had	
  to	
  recall	
  the	
  enBre	
  batch	
  of	
  10000	
  beds	
  with	
  steel	
  rods	
  
that	
  had	
  caused	
  physical	
  trauma	
  to	
  kids,	
  claiming	
  it	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  
designer’s	
  mistake	
  
•  Toyota	
  was	
  forced	
  to	
  recall	
  3	
  large	
  batches	
  of	
  passenger	
  cars	
  of	
  
up	
  to	
  500000	
  each	
  because	
  of	
  wide	
  ranging	
  construcBon	
  
problems	
  with	
  airbags,	
  thro‚le,	
  and	
  other	
  parts	
  of	
  the	
  car	
  	
  
•  US	
  staBsBcs	
  from	
  FDA	
  reveal	
  such	
  recalls	
  occurring	
  frequently.	
  A	
  
similar	
  situaBon	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  observed	
  with	
  consumer	
  products	
  	
  
Financial	
  losses	
  caused	
  by	
  traumas	
  reach	
  one	
  trillion	
  dollars	
  a	
  year	
  
*	
  Those	
  examples	
  are	
  not	
  caused	
  by	
  misusing	
  SAP!	
  
14	
  
Risk	
  3:	
  Crea8ng	
  defects	
  in	
  products	
  inten8onally	
  	
  
•  Risk:	
  Salary	
  data:	
  unauthorized	
  data	
  manipula8on	
  
•  Affects:	
  Every	
  company	
  
•  Type:	
  Fraud	
  
•  Module:	
  HCM	
  
•  Access	
  to	
  the	
  SAP	
  HR	
  system	
  allows	
  insiders	
  to	
  manipulate	
  wage	
  
figures.	
  The	
  direct	
  change	
  can	
  be	
  easily	
  detected,	
  but	
  the	
  risk	
  
lies	
  in	
  the	
  potenBal	
  manipulaBon	
  of	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  addiBonal	
  
working	
  hours	
  to	
  be	
  processed,	
  which,	
  in	
  turn,	
  affect	
  the	
  wages.	
  
This	
  fraud	
  is	
  extremely	
  difficult	
  to	
  detect	
  
15	
  
Risk	
  4:	
  Salary	
  data	
  unauthorized	
  access	
  
•  Users	
  can	
  find	
  out	
  a	
  colleague’s	
  salary	
  details	
  (PA30	
  transacBon)	
  
→	
  DemoBvaBon	
  
•  Also,	
  an	
  a‚acker	
  may	
  do	
  this	
  by	
  direct	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  tables	
  
PA0008,	
  PA0014,	
  PA0015	
  
•  DEMO	
  (PA30)	
  
16	
  
Risk	
  4:	
  Salary	
  data	
  unauthorized	
  access	
  
•  Users	
  can	
  modify	
  their	
  own	
  salary	
  	
  
–  TransacBon	
  PA30	
  is	
  responsible	
  for	
  salary	
  access	
  
–  A‚acker	
  can	
  change	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  hours	
  using	
  this	
  transacBon	
  
•  DEMO	
  
17	
  
Risk	
  4:	
  Salary	
  data	
  unauthorized	
  access	
  
•  Risk:	
  Industrial	
  sabotage	
  and	
  disaster	
  
•  Affects:	
  Every	
  company	
  with	
  ICS/technology	
  network.	
  Oil	
  and	
  
Gas,	
  UBliBes,	
  Manufacturing	
  
•  Type:	
  Sabotage/Fraud	
  
•  Module:	
  SAP	
  EAM	
  /	
  SAP	
  XMII	
  
•  SAP	
  EAM	
  system	
  can	
  have	
  technical	
  connecBons	
  to	
  facility	
  
managements	
  systems.	
  By	
  accessing	
  EAM,	
  one	
  can	
  hack	
  facility	
  
management/SCADA/Smart	
  Home/Smart	
  Grid	
  systems	
  as	
  well	
  
and	
  actually	
  change	
  criBcal	
  parameters,	
  like	
  heat	
  or	
  pressure,	
  
which	
  can	
  lead	
  to	
  disaster	
  and	
  potenBal	
  death	
  
18	
  
Risk	
  5:	
  Industrial	
  sabotage	
  
•  Technology	
  systems	
  are	
  usually	
  insecure	
  and	
  based	
  on	
  obsolete	
  
operaBon	
  systems.	
  The	
  only	
  security	
  for	
  them	
  is	
  a	
  firewall,	
  
which	
  totally	
  isolates	
  them	
  from	
  corporate	
  network	
  
•  Except	
  for	
  those	
  systems	
  which	
  need	
  connecBon	
  for	
  data	
  
transfer,	
  such	
  as	
  SAP	
  EAM	
  
•  How	
  they	
  a‚ack:	
  
–  RFC	
  connecBons	
  
–  Shared	
  database	
  or	
  other	
  resources	
  
–  Same	
  passwords	
  for	
  OS/DB/ApplicaBon	
  
–  Same	
  domain	
  
–  Simply	
  exploit	
  ICS	
  vulnerabiliBes	
  
19	
  
Risk	
  5:	
  Industrial	
  Sabotage	
  
•  Risk	
  6:	
  Delayed	
  salary	
  payout	
  in	
  HR	
  
•  Risk	
  7:	
  Forgery	
  of	
  business-­‐criBcal	
  data	
  (Asset	
  management)	
  
•  Risk	
  8:	
  MisappropriaBon	
  of	
  material	
  resources	
  in	
  MM	
  
•  Risk	
  9:	
  Tampering	
  with	
  banking	
  informaBon	
  data	
  
•  Risk	
  10:	
  ModificaBon	
  of	
  reports	
  in	
  BI	
  
•  Risk	
  11:	
  Remote	
  illegal	
  updates	
  upload	
  
•  Risk	
  12:	
  A‚ack	
  from	
  the	
  Internet	
  
•  Risk	
  13:	
  Remote	
  Denial	
  of	
  Service	
  via	
  Portal	
  
20	
  
Bonus	
  
•  3000+	
  vulnerabiliBes	
  in	
  all	
  SAP	
  products	
  
•  2368	
  vulnerabiliBes	
  in	
  SAP	
  NetWeaver	
  ABAP	
  based	
  systems	
  
•  1050	
  vulnerabiliBes	
  in	
  basic	
  components,	
  which	
  are	
  the	
  same	
  
for	
  every	
  system	
  
•  About	
  350	
  vulnerabiliBes	
  in	
  ECC	
  modules	
  
21	
  
1	
   1	
   13	
   10	
   10	
   27	
   14	
  
77	
  
130	
  
833	
  
731	
  
641	
  
364	
  
161	
  
322	
  
0	
  
200	
  
400	
  
600	
  
800	
  
1000	
  
2001	
   2002	
   2003	
   2004	
   2005	
   2006	
   2007	
   2008	
   2009	
   2010	
   2011	
   2012	
   2013	
   2014	
  
How	
  they	
  can	
  do	
  this?	
  
SAP	
  NetWeaver	
  ABAP	
  –	
  Sta8s8cs	
  
2363	
  
22	
  
2363	
  
vulnerabili8es	
  
SAP	
  NetWeaver	
  J2EE	
  –	
  Sta8s8cs	
  
23	
  
513	
  
vulnerabili8es	
  
 
24	
  
76	
  
vulnerabili8es	
  
SAP	
  BusinessObjects	
  –	
  Sta8s8cs	
  
25	
  
14	
  
vulnerabili8es	
  
SAP	
  HANA	
  –	
  Sta8s8cs	
  
26	
  
SAP	
  a`acks	
  
•  EAS-­‐SEC:	
  Recourse	
  which	
  combines	
  	
  
–  Guidelines	
  for	
  assessing	
  enterprise	
  applicaBon	
  security	
  
–  Guidelines	
  for	
  assessing	
  custom	
  code	
  
–  Surveys	
  about	
  enterprise	
  applicaBon	
  security	
  
27	
  
Defense	
  
•  CriBcal	
  networks	
  are	
  complex	
  
•  System	
  is	
  as	
  secure	
  as	
  its	
  most	
  insecure	
  component	
  
•  HolisBc	
  approach	
  
•  Check	
  out	
  eas-­‐sec.org	
  
•  Check	
  out	
  erpscan.com	
  	
  
	
  
28	
  
Conclusion	
  
We	
   devote	
   a=en>on	
   to	
   the	
   requirements	
   of	
   our	
   customers	
   and	
   prospects,	
   and	
  
constantly	
  improve	
  our	
  product.	
  If	
  you	
  presume	
  that	
  our	
  scanner	
  lacks	
  a	
  par>cular	
  
func>on,	
   you	
   can	
   e-­‐mail	
   us	
   or	
   give	
   us	
   a	
   call.	
   We	
   will	
   be	
   glad	
   to	
   consider	
   your	
  
sugges>ons	
  for	
  the	
  next	
  releases	
  or	
  monthly	
  updates.	
  
29	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
About	
  
228	
  Hamilton	
  Avenue,	
  Fl.	
  3,	
  
Palo	
  Alto,	
  CA.	
  94301	
  
	
  
USA	
  HQ	
  
Luna	
  ArenA	
  238	
  Herikerbergweg,	
  	
  
1101	
  CM	
  Amsterdam	
  	
  
	
  
EU	
  HQ	
  
	
  
www.erpscan.com	
  
	
  info@erpscan.com	
  

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5 real ways to destroy business by breaking SAP applications

  • 1. Invest  in  security   to  secure  investments   5  real  ways  to  destroy  business   by  breaking  SAP  applica8ons   Alexander  Polyakov.  CTO,  ERPScan  
  • 2. About  ERPScan   •  The   only   360-­‐degree   SAP   security   soluBon:   ERPScan   Security   Monitoring  Suite  for  SAP   •  Leader  by  the  number  of  acknowledgments  from  SAP  (  150+  )   •  60+  presenta8ons  at  key  security  conferences  worldwide   •  25  awards  and  nomina8ons   •  Research  team  –  20  experts  with  experience  in    different  areas   of  security   •  Headquarters  in  Palo  Alto  (US)  and  Amsterdam  (EU)       2  
  • 3. Large  enterprise  sectors   •  Oil  &  Gas   •  Manufacturing   •  LogisBcs   •  Finance   •  Nuclear  Power   •  Retail   •  TelecommunicaBon   •  etc.   3  
  • 4. •  The  role  of  business  applicaBons  in  a  typical  work  environment   •  The  need  to  control  them  to  opBmize  business  processes   •  Scope  for  enormous  reducBon  in  resource  overheads  and  other   direct  monetary  impact   •  PotenBal  problems  that  one  can’t  overlook   •  The  need  to  reflect  on  security  aspects  –  is  it  overstated?   •  Why  is  it  a  REAL  and  existent  risk?   4   Business  applica8ons  
  • 5. •  Espionage   –  The]  of  financial  informaBon   –  Corporate  secret  and  informaBon  the]   –  Supplier  and  customer  list  the]   –  HR  data  the]     •  Sabotage   –  Denial  of  service   –  Tampering  of  financial  records  and  accounBng  data   –  Access  to  technology  network  (SCADA)  by  trust  relaBons   •  Fraud   –  False  transacBons   –  ModificaBon  of  master  data     5   What  can  the  implica8ons  be?  
  • 6. SAP                         Вставьте  рисунок  на  слайд,  скруглите  верхний  левый  и  нижний  правый  угол   (Формат  –  Формат  рисунка),  добавьте  контур  (оранжевый,  толщина  –  3)   6   •  The  most  popular  business  applicaBon   •  More  than  263000  customers  worldwide     •  83%  Forbes  500  companies  run  SAP   •  Main  system  –  ERP   •  Main  pla|orms   ‒  SAP  NetWeaver  ABAP   ‒  SAP  NetWeaver  J2EE   ‒  SAP  BusinessObjects   ‒  SAP  HANA   ‒  SAP  Mobile  Pla|orm  (SUP)  
  • 7. SAP  Security     •  Complexity      Complexity  kills  security.  Many  different  vulnerabiliBes  in  all   levels,  from  network  to  applicaBon   •  Customiza8on    Cannot  be  installed  out  of  the  box.  A  lot  of  (up  to  50  %)  custom   code  and  business  logic   •  Risky      Rarely  updated  because  administrators  are  scared  of  crashes   and  downBme   •  Unknown      Mostly  available  inside  the  company  (closed  world)       h‚p://erpscan.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/pres/Forgo‚en%20World%20-­‐%20Corporate%20Business%20ApplicaBon%20Systems%20Whitepaper.pdf   7  
  • 8. Risk  1:  Credit  card  data  theQ   •  Risk:  credit  card  data  theQ   •  Affects:  Companies  storing  and  processing  PCI  data:  Banks,   Processing,  Merchants,  Payment  Gateways,  Retail   •  Type:  Espionage   •  Module:  SD  (Sales  and  DistribuBon)  –  part  of  ERP     •  A‚acker  can  get  access  to  mulBple  tables  that  store  credit  card   data:  VCKUN,  VCNUM,  CCARDEC,  about  50  other  tables.  Credit   card  data  the]  means  direct  monetary  and  reputaBon  loss   8  
  • 9. Risk  1:  Credit  card  data  theQ   •  There  are  mulBple  ways  for  an  a‚acker  to  access  CC  data   •  Even  if  it’s  encrypted,  one  can:   –  Use  FM  to  decrypt  it  –  CCARD_DENVELOPE   –  Use  report  to  get  decrypted     –  Or  use  another  report  to  find  some  info:  RV20A003   •  SoluBon:  ConfiguraBon  Checks,  Patch  Management,  Access   Control,  Code  Scanning   •  Defense   –  DecrypBon  of  credit  card  data  in  SD  –  SAP  Note  766703     –  DecrypBon  of  credit  card  data  for  the  whole  ERP  –  SAP  Note  1032588   –  Credit  card  data  in  report  RV20A003  –  SAP  Note  836079   9  
  • 10. Risk  1:  Credit  card  data  theQ  (DEMO)   10  
  • 11. Risk  2:  Compe88ve  intelligence   •  Risk:  Compromise  of  bidding  informa8on   •  Affects:  Companies  using  SRM  for  bidding   •  Type:  Espionage   •  Module:  SRM   •  Compe1tors’  intelligence  (Espionage)   •  SAP  SRM  systems  are  accessible  through  the  Internet.  So  unfair   compeBtors  have  a  sufficient  loophole  to  spy  privileged  pricing   informaBon  and  propose  compeBBve  pricing  to  win  a  tender   11  
  • 12. Risk  2:  Compe88ve  intelligence   •  SAP  Cfolders  applicaBon  for  document  exchange  is  a  part  of   SRM.  It  has  some  vulnerabiliBes  and  insecure  configuraBon   problems,  resulBng  in  access  to  official  pricing  informaBon   •  This  means  that  the  compeBtor’s  documents  could  be   completely  removed  from  the  systems,  or  the  informaBon   might  be  manipulated  to  win  a  tender   •  A‚ack  successfully  simulated  during  penetraBon  tests   •  Program  vulnerabiliBes  that  can  aid  an  a‚acker:   –  h‚p://erpscan.com/advisories/dsecrg-­‐09-­‐014-­‐sap-­‐cfolders-­‐mulBple-­‐stored-­‐xss-­‐vulnerabilies/     –  h‚p://erpscan.com/advisories/dsecrg-­‐09-­‐021-­‐sap-­‐cfolders-­‐mulBple-­‐linked-­‐xss-­‐vulnerabiliBes/     •  Defense:  SAP  Notes  1284360,  1292875   12  
  • 13. Risk  3:  Inten8onally  causing  manufacturing  defects •  Risk:  Inten8onally  causing  manufacturing  defects  (Sabotage)   •  Affects:  Manufacturing  sector  such  as  AviaBon,  Aerospace   AutomoBve,  TransportaBon,  Consumer  Products,  Electronics,   Semiconductor,  Industrial  Machinery  and  Equipment   •  Type:  Sabotage   •  Module:  SAP  PLM   •  Access  to  SAP  PLM  systems  could  allow  unauthorized  changes  in   product  creaBon  schemaBcs,  as  SAP  PLM  is  usually  integrated   into  CAD.  One  small  change  could  result  in  a  defecBve  batch  of   products,  causing  serious  financial  and  reputaBonal  losses  and,   someBmes,  harm  to  life  and  limb   13  
  • 14. •  FDA  recalled  the  whole  batch  of  1200  tracheostomical  devices   because  of  3  deaths  caused  by  technical  problems   •  IKEA  had  to  recall  the  enBre  batch  of  10000  beds  with  steel  rods   that  had  caused  physical  trauma  to  kids,  claiming  it  to  be  a   designer’s  mistake   •  Toyota  was  forced  to  recall  3  large  batches  of  passenger  cars  of   up  to  500000  each  because  of  wide  ranging  construcBon   problems  with  airbags,  thro‚le,  and  other  parts  of  the  car     •  US  staBsBcs  from  FDA  reveal  such  recalls  occurring  frequently.  A   similar  situaBon  can  also  be  observed  with  consumer  products     Financial  losses  caused  by  traumas  reach  one  trillion  dollars  a  year   *  Those  examples  are  not  caused  by  misusing  SAP!   14   Risk  3:  Crea8ng  defects  in  products  inten8onally    
  • 15. •  Risk:  Salary  data:  unauthorized  data  manipula8on   •  Affects:  Every  company   •  Type:  Fraud   •  Module:  HCM   •  Access  to  the  SAP  HR  system  allows  insiders  to  manipulate  wage   figures.  The  direct  change  can  be  easily  detected,  but  the  risk   lies  in  the  potenBal  manipulaBon  of  the  number  of  addiBonal   working  hours  to  be  processed,  which,  in  turn,  affect  the  wages.   This  fraud  is  extremely  difficult  to  detect   15   Risk  4:  Salary  data  unauthorized  access  
  • 16. •  Users  can  find  out  a  colleague’s  salary  details  (PA30  transacBon)   →  DemoBvaBon   •  Also,  an  a‚acker  may  do  this  by  direct  access  to  the  tables   PA0008,  PA0014,  PA0015   •  DEMO  (PA30)   16   Risk  4:  Salary  data  unauthorized  access  
  • 17. •  Users  can  modify  their  own  salary     –  TransacBon  PA30  is  responsible  for  salary  access   –  A‚acker  can  change  the  number  of  hours  using  this  transacBon   •  DEMO   17   Risk  4:  Salary  data  unauthorized  access  
  • 18. •  Risk:  Industrial  sabotage  and  disaster   •  Affects:  Every  company  with  ICS/technology  network.  Oil  and   Gas,  UBliBes,  Manufacturing   •  Type:  Sabotage/Fraud   •  Module:  SAP  EAM  /  SAP  XMII   •  SAP  EAM  system  can  have  technical  connecBons  to  facility   managements  systems.  By  accessing  EAM,  one  can  hack  facility   management/SCADA/Smart  Home/Smart  Grid  systems  as  well   and  actually  change  criBcal  parameters,  like  heat  or  pressure,   which  can  lead  to  disaster  and  potenBal  death   18   Risk  5:  Industrial  sabotage  
  • 19. •  Technology  systems  are  usually  insecure  and  based  on  obsolete   operaBon  systems.  The  only  security  for  them  is  a  firewall,   which  totally  isolates  them  from  corporate  network   •  Except  for  those  systems  which  need  connecBon  for  data   transfer,  such  as  SAP  EAM   •  How  they  a‚ack:   –  RFC  connecBons   –  Shared  database  or  other  resources   –  Same  passwords  for  OS/DB/ApplicaBon   –  Same  domain   –  Simply  exploit  ICS  vulnerabiliBes   19   Risk  5:  Industrial  Sabotage  
  • 20. •  Risk  6:  Delayed  salary  payout  in  HR   •  Risk  7:  Forgery  of  business-­‐criBcal  data  (Asset  management)   •  Risk  8:  MisappropriaBon  of  material  resources  in  MM   •  Risk  9:  Tampering  with  banking  informaBon  data   •  Risk  10:  ModificaBon  of  reports  in  BI   •  Risk  11:  Remote  illegal  updates  upload   •  Risk  12:  A‚ack  from  the  Internet   •  Risk  13:  Remote  Denial  of  Service  via  Portal   20   Bonus  
  • 21. •  3000+  vulnerabiliBes  in  all  SAP  products   •  2368  vulnerabiliBes  in  SAP  NetWeaver  ABAP  based  systems   •  1050  vulnerabiliBes  in  basic  components,  which  are  the  same   for  every  system   •  About  350  vulnerabiliBes  in  ECC  modules   21   1   1   13   10   10   27   14   77   130   833   731   641   364   161   322   0   200   400   600   800   1000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   2013   2014   How  they  can  do  this?  
  • 22. SAP  NetWeaver  ABAP  –  Sta8s8cs   2363   22   2363   vulnerabili8es  
  • 23. SAP  NetWeaver  J2EE  –  Sta8s8cs   23   513   vulnerabili8es  
  • 24.   24   76   vulnerabili8es   SAP  BusinessObjects  –  Sta8s8cs  
  • 25. 25   14   vulnerabili8es   SAP  HANA  –  Sta8s8cs  
  • 27. •  EAS-­‐SEC:  Recourse  which  combines     –  Guidelines  for  assessing  enterprise  applicaBon  security   –  Guidelines  for  assessing  custom  code   –  Surveys  about  enterprise  applicaBon  security   27   Defense  
  • 28. •  CriBcal  networks  are  complex   •  System  is  as  secure  as  its  most  insecure  component   •  HolisBc  approach   •  Check  out  eas-­‐sec.org   •  Check  out  erpscan.com       28   Conclusion  
  • 29. We   devote   a=en>on   to   the   requirements   of   our   customers   and   prospects,   and   constantly  improve  our  product.  If  you  presume  that  our  scanner  lacks  a  par>cular   func>on,   you   can   e-­‐mail   us   or   give   us   a   call.   We   will   be   glad   to   consider   your   sugges>ons  for  the  next  releases  or  monthly  updates.   29           About   228  Hamilton  Avenue,  Fl.  3,   Palo  Alto,  CA.  94301     USA  HQ   Luna  ArenA  238  Herikerbergweg,     1101  CM  Amsterdam       EU  HQ     www.erpscan.com    info@erpscan.com