Marawi City Siege and Threats of Narcoterrorism in the Philippines

MARAWI CITY SIEGE
AND
THREATS OF
NARCOTERRORISM
IN THE PHILIPPINES
GlobalLessonsLearnedandPolicyOptions
fortheDuterteGovernmentandBeyond
Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD

MarawiCitySiegeandThreatsof
NarcoterrorisminthePhilippines:
GlobalLessonsLearnedandPolicyOptions
fortheDuterteGovernmentandBeyond
Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD

Dedicated to the memory of
RODOLFO “BOOGIE” MENDOZA
my friend, my mentor, my buddy, and
the father of counter-terrorism investigation
in the Philippines!
We will continue your work and
enrich your legacy as a true patriot

Marawi City Siege and Threats of Narcoterrorism in the Philippines:
Global Lessons Learned and Policy Options
for the Duterte Government and Beyond
By Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD
Copyright@2018
by Rommel C. Banlaoi
All rights reserved.
Except for brief quotations for scholarly purposes, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, and
recordings and/or otherwise without the prior written permission of the author. You may reach the author
at rbanlaoi@pipvtr.com or rbanlaoi.pipvtr@gmail.com.
Published by
Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)
Quezon City, Philippines
www.pipvtr.com
Recommended Bibliographic Entry:
Rommel C. Banlaoi, Marawi City Siege and Threats of Narcoterrorism in the Philippines: Global Lessons
Learned and Policy Options for the Duterte Government and Beyond (Quezon City: Philippine Institute
for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2018).
ISBN 978-971-93769-2-2

CONTENTS
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
ii
PREFACE
iii
ABSTRACT
1
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism, Drugs, and the Siege of Marawi City
3
What is Narcoterrorism?
5
Narcoterrorism: Global Situation
13
Countering Narcoterrorism: Global Lessons Learned
23
Marawi City Siege and its Aftermath:
The Current State of Narcoterrorism in the Philippines
41
Countering Narcoterrorism: Policy Options and Alternatives
49
CONCLUSION
51
NOTES
57
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
59
ABOUT THE PIPVTR

Acknowledgement
Finishing this work was a difficult struggle as it came from a deep sorrow following the
unexpected demise of a dear friend and an excellent mentor, Rodolfo “Boogie” Mendoza.
Beforehisdeath,“KaBoogie”,asIfondlycalledhim,turnedovertomefilesofdocuments
and personally handwritten notes describing his long investigative work on threats of
insurgency and terrorism in the Philippines. I promised to organize these documents and
notes to come out with a scholarly paper authored by him.
Based from his notes and documents, Ka Boogie wanted me to write first a short paper
on the New People’s Army (NPA) to coincide with the 50th founding anniversary of the
NPA. Ka Boogie wanted me to underscore some changes and continuities of the NPA as a
rebel army of Filipino communists and to highlight the growing alliance between the NPA
and the Moro secessionist groups in the Southern Philippines, especially in the context of the
rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). I told him that I was finishing a publication
on narcoterrorism and I promised that the short paper he requested would be next to my
writing agenda.
Boogie passed away without seeing the short paper he would have wanted me to write.
But his instruction prompted me hurriedly finish this work on narcoterrorism so I can move
on the paper on the NPA and its inextricable link with the Moro rebellion.
I therefore thank Ka Boogie for his encouragement, support and inspiration. Without
Ka Boogie, I would not have developed a solid niche in counter-terrorism research in the
Philippines. I sincerely owe him a very deep debt of gratitude. I give to him my highest
respect not only for being a sincere best friend, a true mentor, and a reliable buddy but also
for being a genuine patriot – a trait worthy of emulation to us all.
Ka Boogie’s views were oftentimes misunderstood, if not maligned, because he was
ahead of his time. His out-of-the-box thinking spurred controversies because he was using
an unfamiliar lens that only him could use.
Like a fox, Ka Boogie could smell danger from afar. Like a fortuneteller, Ka Boogie
could foresee ominous events like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin
Tower of New York City. He also anticipated the Marawi City siege when he warned months
before that followers were planning big and bold attacks to impress ISIS in an interview with

ABS-CBN News Channel (ANC). These prompted others to describe him as too alarmist.
But he developed this one-of-a-kind attitude through many years of hard experiences as
a spy par excellence of the Philippine government. Thus, Glenda Gloria would call him a
“consummate spy”, a “bullheaded strategist and psywar expert” – an ”intelligence officer
through and through.”
For PIPVTR, Ka Boogie was our legendary James Bond, the spy who really loved this
country until the last breathe of his life. He deliberately sacrificed his personal quality time
with his family so he could offer more precious time for our country.
Ka Boogie’s high sense of patriotism does not die with him. His patriotism lives on the
younger colleagues, friends and followers who continue to believe in him and his legacies. We
thank you Ka Boogie for setting a good example for us. We will raise the torch of patriotism
that you instilled in us.
This work evolves from the policy paper I wrote in 2016 for PCSupt. Albert Ignacius
Ferro whom Ka Boogie also mentored. PCSupt. Ferro was serving then as Director of the
now defunct Anti-Illegal Drugs Group (AIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP). I
decided to update this policy paper when PCSupt. Ferro received his appointment as Director
of the Drugs Enforcement Group (DEG) of the PNP. I am very grateful to PCSupt. Ferro for
his continuing support and friendship.
I have many colleagues and friends in the academe, government and intelligence
community who also supported me in this work. I thank them all for the continuing
assistance. But I would like to render special mention to Abu Hamdie and Billy who, until
now, assist me in my counter-terrorism research activities.
Most importantly, I thank my wife, Grace, for his strong patience, and profound
understanding. Marrying an academic working on counter-terrorism research like me takes
more courage and perseverance. I admire her so dearly for the enduring and unconditional
love.
I also acknowledge our three children: Zed, Zac and Zoe for the right behavior I needed
when I was writing this work. My children always remind me to enjoy life with them.
My children taught me how to combine work and leisure and achieve the quality work-life
balance.
Of course, if there is any factual inaccuracy, lapse in judgment, and substantive error
arising from this work, the accountability is all mine.
Though his work aims to help government develop sound policies in countering
narcoterrorism, all views articulated in this work are my personal academic perspectives.
Though this work uses some government sources as references, conclusions coming from
this study do not represent any official position of the Philippine government.

Preface
This work marks the first year of the Marawi City siege that began on 23 May 2017. This
incident was the longest urban battle ever confronted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP). It took the AFP 154 days before it liberated Marawi City from armed groups that
claimed to be followers of ISIS in the Philippines.
The Marawi City siege was a game-changer in the history of Philippine counter-
insurgency operations as the main battle area was an urban terrain and not a guerilla zone
in the forested areas. For almost five decades, the Philippine government has fought armed
insurgencies in the countryside. The Marawi City siege taught the Philippine military to also
learn how to fight in the city.
The Marawi City siege was also a mind-blowing incident as it strongly demonstrated
the complex nexus of crime, insurgency and terrorism in the Philippines. For half a century
after the Second World War, the Philippine government has fought crime, insurgency and
terrorism separately from each other with a delineation of the function of the police and the
military. In the aftermath of the siege, the Philippine government has truly realized the value
of security convergence and the importance of comprehensive approach whether in the form
of “whole-of-government”, “whole-of-society”, or “whole-of-nation” approaches.
One of the major crimes exhibited during the Marawi City siege was the financing of
terrorism from illegal drug operations. Scholars and experts describe this phenomenon as
narcoterrorism where terrorism and illegal drug trafficking effectively converge.
This study examines narcoterrorism in the Philippines using the case of the Marawi
City siege. This is the first in a series of publications that the Philippine Institute for Peace,
Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) intends to publish on the Marawi City siege.
Forthcoming publications on the topic will include the role of foreign terrorist fighters and
transnational organized crimes in the Marawi City siege. PIPVTR hopes to publish these
forthcoming studies in October 2018 to mark the liberation of Marawi City from ISIS.
It is an ardent desire of PIPVTR to see this present study adding value to our knowledge
of the Marawi City siege. Through this study, PIPVTR also endeavors to contribute to policy
development in order to counter the evolving threat of narcoterrorism confronting the
Philippines and its neighbors.

Abstract
Threats of narcoterrorism have received very serious attention in the Philippine when
the Philippine government under the administration of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
vigorously raised the menace in the aftermath of the 2 September 2016 Davao City bombing
and the 23 May 2017 Marawi City siege. Though narcoterrorism has been a global problem
since the 1980s, it takes almost four decades for the Philippine government to realize the
gravity of this threat only in the aftermath of the siege of Marawi City by armed groups
claiming to be part of the Islamic State (IS), more known initially as the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS). As a result, the Duterte Administration securitized narcoterrorism in his
National Security Policy 2017-2022 and National Security Strategy 2018 declaring drugs and
terrorism as national security threats.
As a concept, narcoterrorism remains to be very nebulous. As a threat, it arguably
presents panoply of complex security challenges for law enforcement not only for the
Philippines but also for the international community.
Other countries have been combating narcoterrorism for years with mixed results
and unintended consequences. Based on great lessons learned from exemplary practices of
other countries and cognizant of the Philippines’ own unique situations and experiences, the
Duterte government needs to develop a more humane and socially responsible innovative
anti-narcoterrorism approach that applies not only a strong law enforcement but also a
decisive treatment through rehabilitation and care.

INTRODUCTION
Terrorism, Drugs, and the Siege of Marawi City
When then Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte took office on 30 June 2016 as
the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines, he declared the “war on drugs” as his
rallying cause.1
President Duterte even reiterated that the war on drugs would continue to be
the centerpiece of his policy until the “dying days of my presidency, or my life.”2
While waging the war on drugs, President Duterte inevitably confronts the continuing
battle against terrorist threats in the Philippines.3
The Davao City bombing on 2 September
2016 and the 23 May 2017 Marawi City siege have aptly unveiled the panoply of security
threats facing the Philippines involving drugs and terrorism.
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Director General Ronald “Bato” Dela Rosa,
has attributed the perpetrator of the Davao City bombing from narcoterrorism where
drug money finances terrorism. Even part of the financing of the Marawi City siege by the
Mindanao affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)4
has also been linked with
narco-politicians operating in Lanao del Sur.
The Marawi City Siege is a seminal case in the Philippines where the complex nexus of
illegal drug trade and terrorism exists. It is an epoch-making event in the Philippines that
empirically demonstrates how drug money can also finance acts of terrorism.
Because of the nexus of drugs and terrorism in the Marawi City Siege, President Duterte
has securitized his war on drugs and his war on terrorism. In the National Security Policy
2017-2022, President Duterte declares drugs and terrorism as national security threats.5
In
its national security goals and strategic objectives, the Duterte Administration intends to
launch “holistic program” to combat illegal drugs, criminality, corruption, terrorism and
transnationalcrimesinordertostrengthenpublicsafety,lawandorder,andtheadministration
of justice in the Philippines.
But what is narcoterrorism?
How serious is the threat of narcoterrorism in the Philippines?
This study describes the conceptual ramifications of narcoterrorism in order to inform
policy makers and the greater public on its various meanings and understandings. It presents
narcoterrorism not only as a domestic problem but also as a regional and global threat.
To get lessons learned from international exemplary practices, this study also illustrates
how other countries have confronted narcoterrorism. This study particularly underscores

2 MARAWI CITY SIEGE AND THE THREATS OF NARCOTERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES
the results and consequences of various counter-measures initiated by other countries in
order to provide the Philippine government vital inputs for policy development and strategy
formulation.
More importantly, this study examines the state of narcoterrorism in the Philippines
focusing on the Marawi City siege. Finally, this study proposes policy options for the
remaining years of the Duterte Administration to counter narcoterrorism in the country
based on great lessons learned from global practices and experiences of other countries.

The term narcoterrorism is oftentimes associated with the
nexus of drugs and terrorism. It also pertains to the interplay and
convergence of narcotics syndicates and terrorist organizations.
Despite its common use, it is very lamenting to underscore that there
has been no commonly acceptable definition of narcoterrorism. As
argued by a scholar specializing on the topic:
Narcoterrorism is one of today’s buzzwords in
foreign and domestic policy. It should be noted,
however, that even though the word is frequently
used and serves as the foundation of several policy
decisions, its definition is ambiguous and that it has
different focus and implications depending on what
part of the composite word is emphasized.6
But many experts agreed that former Peruvian President
Belaunde Terry originally coined the said term in 1983 to describe
terrorist attacks on his counter-narcotics police forces by rebel
forces. These rebels belonged to the Sendero Luminoso, more
known as the Shining Path, a virulent communist party in Peru.7
Eventually, the term narcoterrorism referred to violent activities
of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) or
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia. Latin American
authorities blamed the FARC and the Shining Path for perpetrating
terrorism and trafficking of prohibited drugs in the Latin American
region.8
In the 1990s, particularly after the end of the cold war, the
definition of narcoterrorism expanded to include violent activities
of both drug syndicates and rebel groups. At the turn of the 21st
century, scholars and experts used the concept of narcoterrorism to
grapple with the involvement of terrorist groups in drug trafficking,
particularly those associated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS. At present,
What is Narcoterrorism?
Despiteits
common
use,itisvery
lamentingto
underscorethat
therehasbeen
nocommonly
acceptable
definitionof
narcoterrorism.

many scholars and experts use narcoterrorism to describe the complex nexus of drugs and
terrorism, although this nexus arguably still lacks conceptual clarity and policy coherence.
Because narcoterrorism involves the twin problem of drug trafficking and terrorism, it
has acquired a “dual character” that remains to be conceptually problematic because of its
ambiguity. Narcoterrorism attempts to merge two problems under a single roof: the war on
drugs and the war on terrorism.
But the “the merger of the two phenomena” is complicating rather than facilitating,
clarification of the two concepts that narcoterrorism attempts to embody.9
There is still a
lack of satisfactory explanation on whether narcoterrorism places more emphasis on the
drug aspect of terrorism or gives more stress on the terrorist dimension of drug trafficking.
Some studies use the term narcoterrorism to describe the collaboration of terrorist groups
and drug syndicates.10
Others use narcoterrorism to explain the financing of terrorism from
drug money.11
Apparently, narcoterrorism is a highly contested concept. But the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) of the United States defines narcoterrorism as “a subset of terrorism,
in which terrorist groups, or associated individuals, participate directly or indirectly in the
cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the
monies derived from these activities.12
Simply put, narcoterrorism pertains to “terrorist/
insurgentorganizationsthatusedrugtraffickingproceedstoadvancetheirpoliticalagenda.”13
From
this view, narcoterrorism endorses the war on drugs in the context of the war on terrorism.
Thus, combating narcoterrorism is placed under counterterrorism. Institutions
responsible for counterterrorism are given the responsibility to combat narcoterrorism.
There is another view, however, using narcoterrorism to privilege more the narcotics
aspect of terrorism.14
This view pursues counterterrorism in the context of the war on drugs.
Thus, institutions responsible for counternarcotics are given the responsibility to combat
narcoterrorism.15
But others avoid this dichotomy by advocating for an interagency collaboration to
combat narcoterrorism in a holistic manner.16
To counter narcoterrorism, some countries
apply a whole-of-government approach by mobilizing the resources of the whole
government bureaucracy involved in countering terrorism and illegal use of drugs. Other
countries advocate a whole-of-nation approach to include civil societies, non-government
organizations, academic communities and policy think tanks in addressing the threat of
narcoterrorism.

Despite the lack of conceptual clarity, there is no doubt that
narcoterrorism poses serious threats to international peace and
security. The threat of narcoterrorism is real rather than imagined.
Narcoterrorism is a global threat that severely affects the Philippines.
If not swiftly abated, narcoterrorist threats in the Philippines can
also unleash adverse impact not only on Filipinos but also on the
international community.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
recognizes the growing problem of the financing of terrorism from
illicit drug profits. The UNODC says that drugs continue to provide
revenue for organized crime networks, including terrorism.17
The
UNODC also examines different forms of violence associated with
drug trafficking and its links to terrorism.18
The UNODC correlates the increased incidents of drug
trafficking to increased incidents of terrorist attacks worldwide. In
the production of opium poppy in Afghanistan, for example, the
UNODC reveals in its 2016 World Drug Report that a 25 percent
increase in the number of hectares cultivated also results in 0.15
percent increase of terrorist attacks with 1.43 percent increase in
casualties annually.19
The UNODC elaborates:
In a number of countries, resources generated
by illicit activities such as drug trafficking have
played a role in complicating and extending armed
conflicts, often increasing their overall lethality. The
connection between the illicit drug trade and non-
state armed groups has materialized in high-profile
examples such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar
and Peru. In Afghanistan, an analysis of the impact of
opium production on terrorist attacks and casualties
between 1994 and 2008 estimated that a 25 per cent
increase in the number of hectares of cultivated
opium poppy was associated with an average of 0.15
Narcoterrorism: Global Situation
Despite
the lack of
conceptual
clarity, there is
no doubt that
narcoterrorism
poses serious
threats to
international
peace and
security. The
threat of
narcoterrorism
is real rather
than imagined.

more terrorist attacks and 1.43 casualties per year.20
In May 2017, the UNODC updated its data and released its
World Drug Report 2017 where a quarter of the billion people
were reported to have used illegal drugs. The World Drug Report
2017 devotes one booklet (Booklet 5) to examine the connection
of drugs and terrorism. In this booklet, the UNODC reveals that
some terrorist groups benefit from illegal drug trades.21
Based on
some evidences it gathers from various sources on the ground, the
UNODC observes:
Some evidence suggests that Al-Qaida in the
Islamic Maghreb, which operates primarily in North
and West Africa, has been involved in cannabis
and cocaine trafficking, or at least in protecting
traffickers, though the group’s overall income
from the drug sector appears to have been rather
modest. Individual commanders of the Movement
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, which broke
away from Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, seem at
present to be directly involved in drug trafficking. In
and around the Syrian Arab Republic, seizure data
on “captagon” pills — typically amphetamine mixed
with caffeine — suggest that a manufacturing hub
exists in the area of operations of ISIL, Al-Qaida
offshoot Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as
Al-Nusrah Front) and other armed groups. ISIL and
other non-State armed groups have been linked in
media reports to the production of “captagon”.22
Despite the observation that that drug trafficking contributes
to the financing of terrorism, strong evidences linking some terrorist
groups to drug trafficking remain to be thin. There is no doubt that
terrorist groups, like the Talibans in Afghanistan, “that aspire to
control large amounts of territory need huge financial resources,
and have relied on organized crime and the illicit drug trade to fund
Despite
the observation
that that drug
trafficking
contributes to
the financing
of terrorism,
strong
evidences
linking some
terrorist
groups to drug
trafficking
remain to be
thin.

7MARAWI CITY SIEGE AND THE THREATS OF NARCOTERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES
their ambitions.”23
But existing evidences are not conclusive to claim terrorist groups as drug
traffickers. Available evidences only tell, “Income linked to the drug sector is only one of
several revenue streams for terrorist groups. If one revenue stream dries up, another can be
tapped, such as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies, sale of natural resources
or sale of cultural artifacts.”24
Global Trends in Drug Use
Source: World Drug Report
From other study, the Terrorism Knowledge Base identified 395 terrorist organizations
with involvements in various crimes from 1998 to 2005. The Terrorism Knowledge Base
discovered that 35 organizations, representing 9 percent, were engaged in drug trafficking.25
This study also found that international terrorist organizations “are more likely to engage in
drug trafficking when they have the logistical capability and the necessary network.”26
In the investigative study published in 2002 by the US Department of Defense (DOD)

in collaboration with the Federal Research Division of the Library
of Congress, several foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) were
identified to be recipients of narcotics funding.27
The Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) of the Southern Philippines was included in the
investigative study. Thus, the ASG is in the global strategic radar
of counter narcoterrorism investigations. Some narcotics funded
terrorist organizations examined and mentioned in the study are the
following:
• Al Qaeda (Afghanistan and Pakistan)
• Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna or
ETA from Basque, Spain)
• FARC (Columbia)
• Ga-mat Islamiya (Egypt)
• Hamas (Palestine)
• Hezbollah (Iran and Lebanon)
• Irish Republican Army (IRA)
• Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
• Jamat Muslimeen (from Pakistan and Bangladesh)
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
• Liberation Army of Preševo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac
(Serbia)
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE of Sri Lanka)
• National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (NMLK)
and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
• National Liberation Army of Albania and Macedonia
• Shining Path (Peru)
More often than not, international terrorist organizations
use drug trafficking routes in their operations. The interregional
trafficking flows of methamphetamine, for example, provide routes
forterroristgroupstomovearound. InSoutheastAsia,thetrafficking
route of methamphetamine coincides with the operational route of
terrorist organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand with links to drug syndicates in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
and Vietnam.28
The
intersection
between major
drug trafficking
routes and
terrorist
activities
has not been
thoroughly
studied.

The intersection between major drug trafficking routes and terrorist activities has not
been thoroughly studied. But the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
already recognized the gravity of this problem as part of non-traditional security challenges,
particularly in the context of transnational organized crime.29
As early as 1976, in fact,
the Declaration of ASEAN Concord urged for intensified regional cooperation in order to
prevent and eradicate drug trafficking and narcotics abuse in Southeast Asia.
Drugs, Terrorism and Insurgency
Source: World Drug Report 2017
At least five distinct ways have been identified to show the links between drug trafficking
and terrorism:
1. Supplying cash for terrorist operations;
2. Creating chaos in countries where drugs are produced, through which they
pass, or in which they are sold at retail and consumed — chaos sometimes
deliberatelycultivatedbydrugtraffickers—whichmayprovideanenvironment

conducive to terrorist activity;
3. Generating corruption in law enforcement, military, and other governmental
and civil-society institutions in ways that either build public support for
terrorist-linked groups or weaken the capacity of the society to combat
terrorist organizations and actions;
4. Providing services also useful for terrorist actions and movements of terrorist
personnel and materiel, and supporting a common infrastructure, such as
smuggling capabilities, illicit arms acquisition, money laundering, or the
production of false identification or other documents, capable of serving both
drug-trafficking and terrorist purposes; and,
5. Competing for law enforcement and intelligence attention.30
Methamphetamine Trafficking Routes Being Used by Terrorist Groups
Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2017

The UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch fully recognizes
that narcoterrorism is a global threat requiring “strong coordination
and cooperation within national governments and between states
and organizations at the regional and international level.”31
The
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), which publishes the
annual Global Terrorism Index, affirms that drugs not only fund
global terrorism but also induce users to commit acts of lone-wolf
terrorism.32
Many recorded terrorist incidents worldwide had
connections with drug trafficking.
But the Global Terrorism Index 2016 produced by the
Institute for Economics and Peace does not specifically use the
term narcoterrorism to describe the nexus of drugs and terrorism.
Interestingly, the Global Terrorism Index 2016 lists the Philippines
as number 12 in the ranking of countries with the most number of
terrorist incidents recorded during the year.33
For 2017, the Institute for Economics and Peace released its
Global Terrorism Index 2017 in collaboration with the Vision of
Humanity (VOH).34
The report continues to rank the Philippines
as Number 12 in the list of countries in the world with the highest
impact of terrorism.35
Terrorist activities during the year also
continued to receive funding from various illicit sources like drug
trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, extortions, illegal
mining, and money laundering among others. In countries like
India and Nigeria, terrorist groups there exhibited the profile
of narcoterrorism with the close nexus of drug trafficking and
terrorism.36
The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent
Extremism of the US Department of State, which releases the
annual Country Reports on Terrorism, has also documented not
only foreign terrorist organizations involved in drug trafficking but
also terrorist personalities using drugs for their violent extremist
activities.37
In its July 2017 Country Reports on Terrorism, the US
Government recognizes the nexus of terrorism and drugs, but it
only uses the term narcoterrorism once when it discusses in the
report the problem in Peru.38
So, like the Global Terrorism Index
of the Institute for Economics and Peace, the Country Reports
on Terrorism does not also use narcoterrorism to highlight the
Many
recorded
terrorist
incidents
worldwide had
connections
with drug
trafficking.

intersection of drug trafficking and terrorist activities. Nonetheless, both reports have
recognized the global problem of drugs and terrorism requiring international cooperation
and national capacity building involving not only state players but also civil society
organizations.
The Impact of Terrorism Worldwide:
The Philippines Ranking Number 12
Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2017

Countering Narcoterrorism:
Global Lessons Learned
The international community, particularly the United Nations (UN), has proposed
various measures to promote international cooperation in combating narcoterrorism. Many
affected countries have also implemented their own domestic counter-measures. These
counter-measures have produced mixed results and unintended consequences that the
Philippinegovernmentneedstotakeintoaccountinpolicydevelopmentandimplementation.
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS
As early as 1961, the UN already took action on global drug trafficking problem when
it passed the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The 1961 Convention endorsed
a law enforcement based approach to confront drug problem plaguing the international
community. The 1961 Convention criminalizes drug offenses and calls for a strong punitive
action against drug offenders.
In 1988, the UN passed another measure called the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
NarcoticDrugsandPsychotropicSubstancesinordertheaddresscriminalviolenceassociated
with illegal drug use. The 1988 Convention recognizes “the links between illicit traffic and
other related organized criminal activities, which undermine the legitimate economies and
threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States.”39
In 1993, the World Conference on
Human Rights reaffirms the connection between drugs and criminal violence, particularly
violence resulting from acts of terrorism, when it declares:
Theacts,methodsandpracticesofterrorisminallitsformsandmanifestations
as well as linkage in some countries to drug trafficking are activities aimed
at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy,
threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing
legitimately constituted Governments. The international community should
take the necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat
terrorism.40

In 2005, the UN General Assembly raises the alarm during its
49th Session on the growing links between drugs and terrorism.
Thus, it issues a declaration that “underlines the concern of the
international community at the growing and dangerous links
between terrorist groups, drug traffickers, and their paramilitary
gangs which have resorted to all types of violence, thus endangering
the constitutional order of the States and violating basic human
rights.”41
Towards this end, the UN urges the UNODC to promote
international cooperation and capacity building to combat the threat
of drugs and terrorism.
The UNODC has recently developed a framework for action
to combat drugs and terrorism within the rubric of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). The UNODC asserts that in order to
be “sustainable development-sensitive”, efforts to address the world
drug problem need the following:
• To be in line with the requirements of the international
human rights instruments.
• To be gender-sensitive, so as to consider the
special needs of women and their greater level of
stigmatization when designing prevention programs,
treatment interventions for drug dependence, as
well as the criminal justice response to drug-related
offences.
• To be environmentally friendly, so as to ensure that
the curtailment of the illicit supply chain for drugs
does not cause deforestation or other environmental
damage.
• To ensure that “no one is left behind”, by, for example,
considering the special needs of men who have sex
with men when targeting the spread of infectious
diseases among PWID, and the special needs of
migrants, including international as well as internal
migrants, who can be particularly vulnerable to drug
use.
• To overcome the stigmatization of drug users, as this
can lead to further marginalization.
• Tobebasedonscientificevidence,sothatdrugpolicies
can address the core aspects of social development
and public health.42
In the
aftermath of
the September
11, 2001 (9/11)
terrorist
attacks, some
countries
sustained the
war on drugs
in the context
of the war on
terrorism.

At the country level, many countries have waged the war on drugs since the US began
its vigorous campaign in the 1970s. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11)
terrorist attacks, some countries sustained the war on drugs in the context of the war on
terrorism. Addressing the duo of drugs and terrorism informs the present campaign against
narcoterrorism.
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES
The US provides many lessons learned from its wars on drugs and terrorism. When it
first initiated the war on drugs in 1971, the US under the administration of then President
Richard Nixon declared drug abuse as “public enemy number one” after discovering the
heroin addiction of around 15 percent of US servicemen in Vietnam. Nixon increased
federal resources towards the “eradication, interdiction, and incarceration” of drug abusers.
In 1973, the US established the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to replace
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Because of the growing menace of drug
abuse in the US in the 1980s, the US Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) got strongly involved in drug interdiction measures. Since then, the US adopted
more punitive approaches to deter drug use and distribution not only in its homeland but
also in other countries.43
During the administration of President George H.W. Bush, the US declared his new
version on the war on drugs by reducing funding for drug prevention and treatment and
increasing instead the federal budget for anti-drug law enforcement by almost 50 percent.44
As a result, many American drug users suffered imprisonment rather than medical
treatment as the US government viewed drug menace as a law enforcement problem rather
than a public health issue.
By 1994, around one million Americans suffered detention each year due to drug
offenses. When the US waged the war on terrorism in 2001, the figure increased to 1.5
million Americans being imprisoned each year in the 2008 estimates. The US war on drugs
suffered the unintended consequence of racial discrimination as most of those incarcerated
belonged to African-American communities. The US war on terror, on the hand, affected
many Arab-American communities.
The US war on drugs extended overseas. The US deployed the CIA abroad to operate
in drug-infested countries affecting the Americans. The US mobilized the military in
the global campaign against drugs in the context of Military Operations Other Than War
(MOOTW). The US implemented the Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, the Plan
Columbia in 1998, the Merida Initiative Mexico in 2008, and the Operation Honduras in
2012.

But in June 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy
already declared the US war on drug and terrorism as a failure
because it focused more on arrests and incarceration rather than
on treatment and rehabilitation.45
Moreover, American taxpayers
regarded the war on drugs as too costly, notwithstanding inadequate
budgetary support for treatment of drug addicts.
From 1970 to 2010, the US government spent $1.5 trillion
on the war on drugs. Critics regarded this amount as not
commensurate with the drug addiction rate during the said period.
The so-called failure on US war on drugs was also attributed to the
fact that 50 percent of detained Americans due to drug charges
were repeat offenders. As a result, the US government issued a new
Drug Policy in May 2012 calling for increased budgetary support
for research and development on global drug problems and urging
for a rethinking of an anti-drug approach that measured success on
the basis of arrests and detentions of offenders.
On the war on terror, the US spent around $1.7 trillion
from 2001 to 2014 based on the report released by Congressional
Research Service (CRS). Because of the involvement on
international terrorist groups in illegal drug trade, the US also
pursued anti-narcoterrorism campaigns to coordinate its war on
drugs and war on terror. There is still a need to examine the US
achievements and challenges in its anti-narcoterrorism campaigns.
But other countries have already supported the US in its campaign
against narcoterrorism as a growing security threat.46
As a long-
standing security ally, the United Kingdom has joined the US in its
war against narcoterrorism.
From 1970 to
2010, the US
government
spent $1.5
trillion on
the war on
drugs. Critics
regarded this
amount as not
commensurate
with the drug
addiction rate
during the said
period.

US Drug Control Spending Vis a Vis US Drug Addiction Rate 1970 - 2010
Source: Matt Groft, The Atlantic, and 12 October 2012
LESSONS FROM UNITED KINGDOM
In Europe, the UK has the highest level of illegal drug use.47
From mere 5,000 users in
1975, it grew to 281,000 in 2007. Thus, the UK also vigorously waged a war on drugs.
The US greatly influenced the development of anti-illegal drugs policy in the UK. The
US pressured the UK to pass the Drug (Regulation of Misuse) Act of 1964 and the Misuse
of Drugs Act of 1971. Like the US, the UK pursued strong punitive actions against drug
addicts. The UK also spent huge money to support its war on drugs. In 2009 alone, it was
estimated that the UK government was spending £16 billion a year in the war on drugs. The
UK followed the US model in criminalizing the illegal use of drugs.
But the UK avoided the pitfall of the US when London started investing more on
treatment programs for offenders by treating them as patients rather than criminals. In
1991, the UK passed a legislation that separated punitive and medical responses to drug
misuse. Though this legislation, the UK implemented treatment programs that tremendously
reduced the numbers of drug offenders to 48 percent based on a 2008 research report.48
As
elaborated by the Global Commission on Drug Policy:

Research carried out in the UK into the effects of
their policy of diversion from custody into treatment
programs clearly demonstrated a reduction in
offending following treatment intervention. In
addition to self-reports, the researchers in this case
also referred to police criminal records data. The
research shows that the numbers of charges brought
against 1,476 drug users in the years before and after
entering treatment reduced by 48 percent.
In 2009, the UK amended its 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. This
new legislation gives more emphasis on treatment of drug patients
rather than punishment of drug offenders. Treatment reduced drug
use and the concomitant crimes associated with drug use. Thus, the
UK reallocated more resources from incarceration of drug offenders
to treatment of drug patients. This exemplary practice from the UK
is now being studied by other countries for replication.
Because of the growing threats from narcoterrorism, the UK
also joined the US in the campaign against this menace. The UK
and the US are now pooling their resources together in waging a
war against narcoterrorism, particularly in West Africa where the
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is suspected to be using
drug money to finance its terrorist activities in the region.49
There
has been no systematic study, however, how the US and the UK are
achieving their goals in the fight against narcoterrorism, particularly
in terms of reducing illegal drug trade and preventing terrorist
attacks. But other major powers, like China, have also takes serious
counter measures to address security threats emanating from the
growing nexus of drugs and terrorism.
LESSONS FROM CHINA
China is fighting its own battle against drugs and terrorism.
Though China became the world’s famous on drug issues because
of the two Opium Wars of the 19th century, China was relatively
unaffected by international drug network at the turn of the 20th
centuryduetolimitedconsumermarketandstrongrepressiveactions
UK avoided
the pitfall of
the US when
London started
investing more
on treatment
programs for
offenders by
treating them
as patients
rather than
criminals.

of the communist government against illegal drug use.50
In the 21st
century, however, China has the largest number of illegal drug users
in Asia as the consumer market for illegal drugs has widened in the
country as a result of growing economic development and greater
openness to the outside world.
More than a million illegal drug users were recorded in China
in 2002.51
But in 2013, the total registered drug addicts reached 2.4
million. To date, China is the largest seizure state of heroin in the
world, the 2nd largest of amphetamines, the 7th largest of ecstasy, and
the 9th largest of opium.52
Most of its illegal drugs are trafficked into
China from the Golden Triangle of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand as
well as from the Golden Crescent of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan
and even from the border of North Korea. From China, illegal
drugs are trafficked to countries in Southeast Asia, particularly to
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Thus, China pursues tough measures to counter illegal drugs.
Originally, China had three government offices responsible for
countering illegal drugs: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of
Public Security, and the Customs General Administration. In 1990,
China established the National Narcotics Control Commission to
unify government efforts to fight the proliferation of illegal drugs in
the country. In 2004, the Chinese government launched the “people’s
war”53
againstillegaldrugswithgreaterfocusontheYunnanprovince
where the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia strongly operated.54
Recognizing that China could not defeat fighting illegal drugs alone,
it entered into Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAT) with 24
nations, so far, to combat the criminal aspect of illegal drugs.
To address health security issues associated with illegal drug
abuse, China also launched treatment and demand reduction
programs. Its Public Health Bureaus build rehabilitation centers
and special facilities for the re-education of illegal drug users
through alternative labor trainings. China has also pursued a more
human treatment approach like the construction of Methadone
Maintenance Therapy (MMT) clinics.
China is also facing the problem of narcoterrorism because
of the involvement of some Uyghur militants in drug trafficking to
finance the activities of the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement
To address
health
security issues
associated
with illegal
drug abuse,
China also
launched
treatment
and demand
reduction
programs.

(ETIM), a foreign terrorist organization operating in China,
particularly in Xinjiang province. China is using its war on drugs
and war on terrorism to curtail security threats emanating from
militant activities of some Uyghur groups.55
LESSONS FROM COLUMBIA
Columbia became the world’s epicenter of drug trade being the
world’s leading producer of cocaine for many decades. Drug money
financed armed conflicts in Columbia. Many big international drug
cartels originated in Columbia: the Medellin Cartel, the Cali Cartel,
Norte del Valle Cartel, and the North Coast Cartel, among others.
FARC got its financing from the money of these drug cartels. Drugs
also greatly influenced the government and politics of Columbia. It
was in Columbia where the idea of narcopolitics evolved, though
some scholars said that the idea originally came from West Africa
with the establishment of some narco-states.
The United States implemented the Plan Columbia to fight
drugs and insurgency in the country, specifically the involvement
of FARC in drug trade and armed conflicts. The Plan Columbia
was a war on drug and was a counter-insurgency campaign at the
same time. Its original purpose was to defeat the FARC and its links
with drug cartels in Columbia by using both police and military
forces. The Plan Columbia also involved development measures ala
“Marshall Plan” to rebuild Columbia as a nation from the influence
of drugs.
TheresultofPlanColumbiawasmix.56
Itcontributedimmensely
tosupplyanddemandreductionsofdrugsandwashailedasthe“most
successful nation-building project” of the United States. Drug related
crime and violence declined to 50 percent. Columbia’s free market
economy grew steadily and by 2007, it enjoyed a growth rate of 6.7
percent, one of the highest growth rates in Latin America. In 2015,
Columbia saw the increase of new millionaires not from drug money
but from legitimate entrepreneurships. But Plan Columbia’s human
rights costs were considered massive with internal displacement of
around 4 million people and the tragic death of 220,000 persons
with 80 percent coming from the civilian population.57
Columbia
became
the world’s
epicenter of
drug trade
being the
world’s leading
producer of
cocaine for
many decades.

LESSONS FROM PERU
Like Columbia, Peru experienced similar problems of drugs,
terrorism, and armed violence. It was in Peru when the idea of
narcoterrorism originated. The war on drugs in Peru was also waged
in tandem with counter-insurgency, particularly against the Shining
Path.58
With the achievements of the intensified US-backed war on
drugs in Columbia, the UNODC reported that Peru became the
world’s top cocaine producer in 2013 from a 60 percent producer in
1992.59
Mexican, Russian and Columbian drug cartels now operate
in Peru. Remnants of the Shining Path continue to have links with
illegal drug trade in the country. As a result, the war on drugs in
Peru became heavily militarized with the presence of American
troops in Peru to fight the menace.60
Achievements in the war on drugs helped improve Peruvian
economy with a GDP growth average of around 6 percent for the past
10 years. But the drug trade can undermine its present economic
growth if it continues unabated with its current trend. Peru has one
of the world’s longest wars on drug and its protracted war on drugs
can threaten its economy. As argued by an analyst, “Failing to deal
with its drug problem in the long-term will harm Peru’s continued
growth and, if its economy suffers a downturn, there is potential for
a major spike in violent crime and related activity.”61
LESSONS FROM THAILAND
In Southeast Asia, the fiercest battle against drug, thus far, was
in Thailand. During the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, Thailand waged a bloody war against drugs that began
in February 2003. At that time, 5 percent (or 3 million) of its 63
million citizens were accused of drug addiction, particularly with
the use methamphetamines, or ‘crazy pills’ as Thai users would call
it. Thaksin pursued an aggressive law enforcement campaign against
drug dealers, users, and traffickers.
Though Thaksin’s war on drugs highlighted the need to
promote public education and awareness against drugs and to treat
drug addicts as patients rather than criminals, the actual practice
Achievements
in the war on
drugs helped
improve
Peruvian
economy with
a GDP growth
average of
around 6
percent for the
past 10 years.

became a killing spree against drug users and dealers. Thaksin
ordered “shoot-to-kill” to drug offenders.
As result, the first three months of Thaksin’s war on drugs
caused the death of 2,800 persons. The huge number of killings in
few months prompted the UN Human Rights Committee in 2005 to
raise serious concerns about the situation and urged the international
community to investigate “extra judicial killings” in Thailand.62
Thaksin’s bloody crackdown on drugs in 2003 created social
and political problems in Thailand because investigations showed
that 50 percent of those who suffered deaths during the campaign
were found to have no links at all with drug trade. There were also
allegations that local Thai police officers used Thaksin’s “shoot-to-
kill” order to settle old scores. Investigations revealed that list of
persons for drug offense were flawed because:
Mostnamesaredrawnfromtheresultsofcommunity
meetings, which offered an opportunity for officials
with conflicts to enter the names of people unrelated
to the drug trade. Relatives and friends of those
accused are also lumped into the same category.
And ethnic minorities were subjected to stereotyped
beliefs that they were also involved in the drug
trade.63
At present, illegal drug use continues to rise in Thailand. From
2009 to 2014, the drugs cases doubled from 151,000 to about 347,000
while registered drug offenders rose at a similar rate from 168,000
to 366,000.64
Thaksin’s
bloody
crackdown on
drugs in 2003
created social
and political
problems
in Thailand
because
investigations
showed that
50 percent
of those who
suffered deaths
during the
campaign were
found to have
no links at all
with drug trade.

The Philippines is not spared from the problem of narcoterrorism.
Theproblemofdrugsandthethreatofterrorismposesclearandpresent
danger to the well being of the Filipino people.
According to Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
11,321 villages or 26.93 percent of 42,036 villages in the Philippines
were severely affected by drug problems. More than 3 million Filipinos
were reported to be addicted to illegal drugs in 2015 based on the 2015
Nationwide Survey on the Nature and Extent of Drug Abuse in the
Philippines conducted by the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB). In May
2017,PDEAreportedthat4.7millionofFilipinosbecameusersofillegal
drugs. This higher figure, PDEA argued, is more reflective of the real
situation on the ground.
Around 34 percent of crime incidents in the Philippines were
attributed to illegal drug use in 2013. Almost 80 percent of all heinous
crimes committed in the country were caused by drug addiction. The
UNODC reported that the Philippines became one of the key transit
pointsandmajordestinationofillegaldrugs,particularlyamphetamines,
in Southeast Asia.
Illegal drug use not only encourages violent crimes but also fuels
terrorisminthePhilippines. Somepersonalitiesassociatedwithterrorist
groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters (BIFF) were accused of either being drug addicts or
drug dealers. Lawless elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) and rouge members of the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) were also accused of the same involvements in illegal drugs. It
will not be surprising if other personalities associated with other armed
groups like the Ansar Khilafa Philippines (AKP), the Maute Group, and
the Al Khobar Group (AKG) are also involved in illegal drug activities.
Conflict-affected areas in Philippines, particularly in Central
Mindanao, were also afflicted by drug problems. The International
Theproblem
ofdrugsand
thethreat
ofterrorism
posesclearand
presentdanger
tothewellbeing
oftheFilipino
people.
Marawi City Siege and Its Aftermath:
Current State of Narcoterrorism
in the Philippines

Alert, a human rights organization, already warned that involvements of some armed groups in
illicit drugs in Mindanao could aversely affect the Bangsamoro peace process.65
The International
Alert asserts:
The illicit drug economy should be regarded as a strategic concern in the peace
process between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF). Left unchecked, the combination of drug-related
corruption and violence is likely to have an adverse effect on the governance
institutionsofthefutureBangsamoro.Stakeholdersinthepeaceprocesstherefore
need to turn their attention to the drug economy and use the implementation of
the peace agreement as an opportunity to address the drug problem. Priorities
for action include using drug enforcement as a confidence-building measure,
insulating the new Bangsamoro police from corruption, providing alternative
economic opportunities for poor communities, challenging the sense of
impunity among drug criminals, preventing money laundering, and cutting the
links between criminals and politicians.66
Drug Affected Villages (Barangays) in the Philippines
Source: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, February 2016

In the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the connivance of terrorist
groups and drug syndicates has already been investigated. The ASG’s involvement in drug
trafficking has also been studied67
and properly documented.68
Thus, there was a reason why
the PNP described the Davao City bombing on 2 September 2016 as an act of narcoterrorism.
To combat illegal drugs, the Philippines has existing counter-narcotics institutions: the
PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), and the now defunct Anti-Illegal Drugs Group
(AIDG) of the PNP. In March 2017, the PNP launched the Drug Enforcement Group (DEG) to
replace the AIDG. The Philippine Congress also has the Committee on Dangerous Drugs to
oversee the functions of PDEA, DDB and the DEG.
The PNP’s anti-illegal drugs campaign plan is called “Double Barrel”. The Lower Barrel is
dubbed “Project Tokhang” while the Upper Barrel is called “Project HVT (High Value Target)”.
There are five stages for the Project Tokhang:
1. Collection and validation of information
2. Coordination
3. House to house visitation
4. Processing and documentation
5. Monitoring and evaluation
Inter-Agency Task Force on Anti-Illegal Drugs
Source: Philippine National Police, February 2016.

The Project HVT is implemented through inter-agency coordination. Towards this
end, the Duterte government created the Inter-Agency Task Force on Anti-Illegal Drugs to
uphold the “Whole-of-Nation Approach”. A special fund was also allocated to support the
activities of the task force.
During its first 100 days in office covering the period 30 June to 7 October 2016, the
Duterte Administration reported to have conducted 7,928 anti-illegal drugs operations
with 8,428 persons arrested , 7,002 cases filed in court and a P8.21 billion worth of seized
illegal drugs. The government also dismantled several clandestine laboratories and chemical
warehouses being used for the manufacture of illegal drugs. It also arrested 538 high value
targets during the first 100 days in office of President Duterte.
Source: PDEA, 2016

Source: PDEA, 2016
Source: PDEA, 2016

But waging the war on drugs a year after, the Duterte
Administration suffered tremendous set-back when ISIS followers in
Mindanao attempted to take over Marawi City in order to establish a
wilaya or a province of the Islamic State in the Southern Philippines.69
The Philippine government disclosed that drug money financed the
Marawi City siege.70
President Duterte himself asserted that money
from illegal drugs funded terrorist activities in Mindanao.71
InhisreporttothePhilippineCongresstojustifythedeclaration
of Martial Law in Mindanao, President Duterte argued that “foreign-
based terrorist groups, the ISIS in particular, as well as illegal drug
money, provide financial and logistical support to the Maute group.”72
In his speech at the 119th Anniversary of the Philippine Navy in
Davao City, President Duterte disclosed, “there was a time and until
now that the terrorism activities in the Philippines is funded and
fueled by drug money.”73
The Philippine government claimed that drug money
significantly contributed to the financing of the Marawi City siege.
Then Presidential Spokesperson, Secretary Ernesto Abella, affirmed
this when he disclosed that “Local politicians in Mindanao adversely
affected by the government’s campaign against illegal drugs have
financed the Daesh-inspired Maute Group, whose attempt to
undermine our sovereignty resulted in the rebellion in Marawi.”74
President Duterte even openly identified at least 44 local drug
lords who provided financial support to armed groups that carried
out the Marawi City Siege.75
These drug lords belonged to a network
that President Duterte described in his so-called as LDS (Lanao del
Sur) Drug Trade Link Diagram. President Duterte elaborated the
problem of narcoterrorism in the Philippines when he presented on
22 September 2017 to the Davao City media the LDS Drug Trade
Link Diagram. In the Diagram, President Duterte revealed that
drug lords operating in Lanao Del Sur provided funds to the Maute
Group to carry out the Marawi City siege. Drug lords that President
Duterte identified were the following:
• A Filipino Chinese businessman whose daughter is married
to Johary Abinal (ex-husband of Johaira “Marimar” Abinal)
• FM Muslimen Macabatok
But waging the
war on drugs
a year after,
the Duterte
Administration
suffered
tremendous
set-back when
ISIS followers
in Mindanao
attempted
to take over
Marawi City
in order to
establish a
wilaya or a
province of
the Islamic
State (IS) in
the Southern
Philippines.
President
Duterte
revealed that
drug lords
operating in
Lanao Del Sur
provided funds
to the Maute
Group to carry
out the Marawi
City siege.

• Mayor Noron Dadayan (Buadiposo Buntong)
• Mayor Hadji Jamal Abdulsalam (Mulondo)
• Bonbola Radiamoda (Bayang, Lanao del Sur)
• Ansari Saripada Radiamoda (Lilod, Madava, Marawi City)
• Vice Mayor Noridin Adiong (Ditsaan, Ramain)
• Rangaig Mamarinta (Provincial Board Member, 1st
District, Lanao del Sur)
• Parahiman Batawi Ronda (Samer, Butig)
• Acong Domato and Haj Taha Abdullah (Barangay Baropit,
Picong)
• Gona Romoros Aba Saguiran (Barangay Bubong, Saguiran,
Novaliches, Quezon City)76
Though the list of personalities above could be challenged
legally, President Duterte asserted that the diagram was a result of
intelligence work.77
Aside from the aforementioned list, President
Duterte also named 19 drug dealers known to be town and village
officials. The diagram also revealed:
All drug trade in LDS pass to former mayor Pre and
Solitario [through] barangay chairman Aliodin,
and Vice Mayor Arafat and brother[s] Samer and
Walid, respectively… Pre and Solitario authored
the kidnapping and liquidation of all drug lords…
Arrows indicate drug trade control relationship.78
Philippine National Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana also
affirmed the problem of narcoterrorism in the Philippines when he
exclaimed, “The proceeds of the narcotics are being used for these
terroristic activities.”79
During the ASEAN Defense Ministerial
Meeting (ADMM) in Clark Field, Pampanga in September 2017,
Secretary Lorenzana highlighted the problem of drugs and terrorism
needing strong regional cooperation to counter them.80
Contrary to the public knowledge of the incident, the Marawi
City siege was not only an act of narcoterrorism. It was also the
result of various criminal acts associated with transnational
Contraryto
thepublic
knowledgeof
theincident,
theMarawiCity
Siegewasnot
onlyanactof
narcoterrorism.
Itwasalsothe
resultofvarious
criminalacts
associatedwith
transnational
organized
crimes..

LDS Drug Trade Linked Diagram
Source: President Rodrigo R Duterte, 22 September 2017

crimes.81
The Siege occurred not only because of the collective actions of most of the ISIS
followers in the Philippines but also because of the collective support of various criminal
syndicates engaged in drug trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and trafficking
of small arms and light weapons in the tri-border maritime areas of the Philippines, Malaysia
and Indonesia, particularly in the Sulu and Celebes/Sulawesi seas. Transnational organized
crimes provided the resilient support network of ISIS followers in the Philippines to mount
the Marawi City siege.
ISIS followers in the Philippines belong to another network in the country called ISIS
Philippines (ISISP) declared by the US State Department as a foreign terrorist organization on
27 February 2018.82
ISISP belongs to a unified organization called Daula Islamiya Wilayatul
Mashriq (DIWM), the so-called Islamic State Province in East Asia.
Based on the Tactical Interrogation Report of TJ Macabalang (one of the arrested
suspects in the Davao City bombing in September 2016), the organizational structure of
the group is shown in figure below. The overall Leader/Khalifa of DIWM or Daula Islamiya
(DI) for short was Isnilon Hapilon with the following sub groups in the different provinces
in Mindanao;
• Sulu; Basilan; (with unidentified leaders);
• Lanao under Abdullah Maute;
• Cotabato City under TJ Macabalang;
• Sarangani under Commander Tokboy of Ansar Khalifa Philippines (AKP); and,
• Daula Islamiya Maguindanao under Abu Turaipe who also founded a group called
Jamaatul Mujaheed Wal Ansar (JMWA)
Farhana Maute and Cayamura Maute (parents of Maute brothers) served the finance
and logistics officers. Mohammad Khayam Maute served as Intelligence and Operation
Officer.
Followers also called the DIWM as Islamic State Philippines (ISP) in their various
messages in the Telegram. The DIWM or ISP had the following sub-leaders based on the
confession of TJ Macabalang:
• Abdul Azis Maute @MADIE, brother;
• Owayda/Humam Abdul Najid, founder of Khilafa Islamiyah Mindanao (K.I.M.)
leader;
• Abdulrahman Maute @DAMAM/DAMDIE, brother;
• Ali Amintao @WHITE LAWAAN, former brigade Commander of MILF;
• @AFGHAN (TNU), former MILF sub-leader;

• @ABU SUMPA; former MILF sub-leader;
• Azzam Ampatua Taher @AZZAM;
• @ABU YAMAN/MARIPAGA, Imam of the group; and
• Fakhrudin Dilangalin @Abu Said, former leader of Cotabato based DI
LDS Drug Trade Linked Diagram
Source: Military Intelligence, March 2018
Because of the strong involvement of the entire Maute family in the establishment of
DIWM, the Philippine government inaccurately described the mastermind of Marawi City
siege as the Maute Group. In various reports, the Philippine government even described the
armed group responsible for the Marawi City siege as ISIS-Maute Group.
But the official name of the Maute Group was Daula Islamiya Fi Ranao (DIFR) or the
Islamic State of Lanao declared in September 2014 when the Maute Family pledged allegiance
to ISIS. Because of the participation of the entire Maute Family in the creation of the DIFR,
it signaled the rise of family terrorism in the Philippines.83

The DIFR served an integral part of the DIWM, which was
composed of 23 groups in the Philippines that pledged allegiance to
ISIS. The ISIS Central, also known as Daesh, calls all followers of the
DIWM as the Soldiers of the Caliphate in East Asia. These Soldiers
of the Caliphate have established support network from criminal
organizations in Asia and other restive regions involved in money
laundering and trafficking of arms, humans and illegal drugs.
Theofficialname
oftheMaute
Groupwas
DaulaIslamiya
FiRanao(DIFR)
ortheIslamic
StateofLanao.
Maute Group: Rise of Family Terrorism in the Philippines
Source: Rommel C Banlaoi, “Maute Group and the Rise of Family Terrorism”, Rappler, 15 June 2017.

Armed Groups in Southeast Asia that Pledged Allegiance to the ISIS
Source: International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, November 2017
In the 10th issue of Rumiya, the official magazine of ISIS, the cover story was Jihad in
East Asia, referring to the Marawi City siege. This issue featured an interview with Isnilon
Hapilon described as the Amir of the Soldiers of the Khilafa in East Asia.84
In the interview,
the Rumiya magazine hailed Hapilon as Shaykh Abu Abdillah Al-Mujahir who described
President Duterte as head of “taghut” (anyone who is worshiped instead of Allah) of the
Philippines. In the same interview, Hapilon declared the Armed Forces of the Philippines
as “Crusader Filipino Army.” Hapilon also conveyed his “message to the world” that a Islamic
state “has been established” in East Asia with the siege of Marawi City under his leadership.85
But the military killed Hapilon on 16 October 2017 in a special operation in Marawi City.
Prior to his death, the magazine published several photos of Hapilon and his men
while the Marawi City siege was still going on. These photos indicated that Hapilon and his
men were directly in touch with ISIS Central, which provided operational instructions and
tactical orders to Hapilon. ISIS Central, on one hand, received photos and video footages of
Marawi City siege used by ISIS in its several propaganda materials during the entire duration
of the siege. Through these photos and video footages, ISIS was able to produce several

documentary films describing the Philippines
as the “new land of jihad” and asking jihadists
worldwide to make “hijra to Marawi.”86
This was the reason why several foreign
fighters from the Arab world, Asia and Africa
joined the Marawi City siege.87
Some hostages
rescued by the military confirmed the presence
of foreign fighters in Marawi City. Even the
Philippine military validated some reports of
foreign fighters during the siege.88
Interestingly, the 10th issue of Rumiya used
theattackonResortsWorldManilaon2June2017
as its cover photo. ISIS claimed responsibility for
the attack, though the Philippine government
vehemently denied any ISIS involvement in the
incident, which the Philippine police declared
as a mere robbery with arson. But the ISIS-run
Amaq News Agency insisted that their soldiers
of Caliphate in Manila planned the attack.89
ISIS
conversations in the Telegram stated that the
attack was carried out by ISIS lone wolf attacker,
Jessie Carlos Javier, whom they described as
Khair (Khair al Luzoni).90
The Philippine police
continued to rule out terrorism in the Resorts
World Manila attack.91
10th Issue of Rumiya Featuring
Marawi City Siege
Source: Rumiya at https:// qb5cc3pam3y2ad0tm1z
xuhho-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/08/Rumiyah-ISIS-magazine-10-issue.
pd
Hapilon and His
Men During the
Marawi City Siege
Source: Rumiya at https://
qb5cc3pam3y2ad0tm1zx
uhho-wpengine.netdna-
ssl.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/08/
Rumiyah-ISIS-magazine-
10-issue.pdf

Meanwhile, ISIS Central regarded the Resorts World Manila attack and the Marawi City
siege as part of its worldwide plan to carry out several jihadist attacks during the month of
Ramadan in 2017. From its several claimed attacks from 26 May to 25 June 2017, ISIS listed
two major attacks in the Philippines: the Marawi City siege and the Resort World Manila attack.
ISIS-Claimed Attacks During the Ramadan of 2017
Source: Site Intelligence, June 2017

How could ISIS stage those attacks worldwide?
Apparently, ISIS was a well-funded terrorist organization.
The Washington Institute described ISIS as the world’s best funded
terrorist group that was richer than some small countries.92
ISIS
got its funds from extortion, robberies, smuggling, counterfeiting
and racketeering. One of the major sources of its fund was drug
trafficking. The RAND Corporation emphasized that ISIS was so
desperate to fund its terrorist activities that it resorted to illegal drug
trade to sustain itself.93
Thus, ISIS was involved in narcoterrorism
that even reached their Philippines followers who staged the Marawi
City siege.
Despite the official acknowledgement of narcoterrorist threat
in Mindanao posed by the DIWM, the Philippine government,
unfortunately, has not yet released a single document to articulate a
national strategy to counter narcoterrorism in the country. Though
the Philippine government has the National Security Policy 2017-
2022 and the Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 containing
discussionsontheproblemsofdrugsandterrorisminthePhilippines,
the government has not yet formulated a coherent strategy on how
to counter the threat of narcoterrorism in the Philippines that
integrates the war on drugs and the war on terrorism.
The Drugs Enforcement Group of the PNP has formulated a
National Drug Control Strategy that pursues demand reduction,
supplyreduction,alternativedevelopment,regionalandinternational
cooperation, and civic awareness and response. But this strategy
remains to be detached from the country’s national strategy against
terrorism that ambiguously advances the concept of PEACE
(Protect, Enforce, Advocate, Collaborate, Exercise). Based on the
so-called PEACE strategy, the ATC implements four core programs:
1) National Terrorism Prevention; 2) Capacity-Building; 3) Legal
and International Affairs; and, 4) Operational Readiness Assessment
and Compliance Monitoring.
In its National Security Strategy (NSS) 2018, the Duterte
Administration underscores the need to vigorously fight drugs and
terrorism as a result of the country’s bitter experience in the Marawi
City siege.94
ISISwasawell-
fundedterrorist
organization.
TheWashington
Institute
describedISIS
astheworld’s
bestfunded
terroristgroup
thatwasricher
thansomesmall
countries.
Despitethe
officialacknowl-
edgementof
narcoterrorist
threatinMind-
anaoposedby
theDIWM,the
Philippinegov-
ernment,unfor-
tunately,hasnot
yetreleaseda
singledocument
toarticulatea
nationalstrat-
egytocounter
narcoterrorism
inthecountry.

National Drug Control Strategy
Source: Drug Enforcement Group, Philippine National Police, and March 2018
National Anti-Terrorism Strategy
Source: Anti-Terrorism Council, Program Management Center, December 2017

But the NSS still has no coherent discussion on how
to harmonize the war on drugs and the war on terrorism in
order to develop a more credible national strategy to counter
narcoterrorism in the Philippines. In fact, the war on terror even
took the backseat momentarily as Duterte focused on the war on
drugs.95
In the aftermath of the Marawi City siege, there is a strong
realization that waging the war on drugs and the war on terrorism
should go in tandem. This calls for the development of a strong
national strategy against narcoterrorism in the Philippines.
Programs of the Anti-Terrorism Council
Source: Anti-Terrorism Council, Program Management Center, December 2017
Intheaftermath
oftheMarawiCity
siege,thereisa
strongrealization
thatwagingthe
warondrugs
andthewaron
terrorismshould
gointandem.
Thiscallsforthe
developmentof
astrongnational
strategyagainst
narcoterrorismin
thePhilippines.

Countering Narcoterrorism:
Policy Options & Alternatives

A year after the Marawi City siege, there is no doubt that combating drugs and terrorism
has been the flagship program of the Duterte government. Despite strong criticisms against
Duterte’s war on drugs due to allegations of human rights violations and extra-judicial
killings, the Third Quarter 2017 Pulse Asia Survey showed that 88% of Filipinos supported
Duterte’s war on drugs. The September 2017 Pew Research Center survey, on the other
hand, said that 78% of Filipinos supported Duterte’s handling of illegal drugs issue while
62% of Filipinos said that the Philippine government was making progress in its anti-drugs
campaign.96
However, the Duterte government’s accomplishments on the war on drugs have not
been effectively synchronized with its war on terrorism. In countering narcoterrorism, there
is still the lack of operational clarity on whether it is pursued under the war on drugs or
under the war on terrorism.
In the war on drugs, the PDEA is the lead government agency in charge of implementing
the Philippine government’s campaign against illegal drugs as directed by President Duterte
on 10 October 2017. The President also issued Memorandum Order Number 17 on 5
December 2017 directing the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Bureau of Customs (BOC), and the Philippine
Postal Corporation (PCC) “to resume in providing active support to the PDEA in the conduct
of anti-illegal drug operations.” This Order supplements the Executive Order Number 15
issued on 6 March 2017 creating the Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD)
and National Anti-Illegal Drug Task Force (NAID-TF) “to harness the entire bureaucracy to
assist in the implementation of anti-illegal drugs campaign.” Despite this arrangement, the
Duterte government has not yet clarified on how to counter narcoterrorism in the context of
its war on drugs.
Apparently, the war on drugs only pays attention to the narcotics aspects of
narcoterrorism. It is presumed that the terrorism aspect of narcoterrorism is waged under
the government’s war on terrorism led by the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) as the highest
policy-making body in the area of counter-terrorism.

Accomplishments on the War on Drugs
Source: Presidential Communications Operations Office, The Duterte Administration Year-End Report:
2017 Key Accomplishments (Manila: Malacanang Palace, December 2017).
There is, however, a need to understand that drug trafficking organizations and terrorist
groups operate differently despite their increasing collaboration. This presents tremendous
challenge for counter measures.
Legally,organizationsaccusedofdrugtraffickingandgroupsaccusedofactsofterrorism
are tried differently under existing Philippine laws. The Philippines does not have a law
to convict groups or individuals for specifically the specific act of narcoterrorism. These
groups or individuals are either charged of violating illegal drugs laws or anti-terrorism laws.
Even for acts of terrorism, law enforcement authorities avoid using anti-terrorism laws
for suspects. Philippine law enforcement authorities prefer to use the revised penal code
to convict persons for acts of terrorism because they find the Human Security Act (HSA) of
2007, the Philippines’ anti-terrorism law, as difficult to implement due to many human rights
provisions. Thus, there is a move to amend or scrap the HSA to replace it with a tougher anti-
terrorism law. There is also a proposal to enact another anti-terrorism law that is more useful
for law enforcement in order to balance the human rights provisions of the HSA.

Given the aforementioned global lessons learned in combating
narcoterrorism and the current state of narcoterrorism in the
Philippines, what are the policy options and alternatives for the
Duterte government and beyond?
For purposes of law enforcement, the Philippine government
can counter narcoterrorism by strengthening Philippine laws on
the financing of terrorism. In the Philippine case, terrorist groups
venture into illegal drugs operations to finance acts of terrorism.
Thus, it is in the area of countering the financing of terrorism that
the Philippine government can combat narcoterrorism. If groups
and individuals engage both in illegal drug operations and acts of
terrorism, the Philippine government can use applicable Philippine
laws. But available Philippine laws do not provide strong penalties
against narcoterrorism. The Philippine government can enact a
new anti-terrorism law that can encompass narcoterrorism and the
financing of terrorism.
For several decades, however, fighting terrorism and drugs
has largely been entrusted to law enforcement authorities. Many
governments, particularly in Europe and the Americas, have
encouraged strong international police cooperation in order to
counter the menace of terrorism and drugs.97
International policing
is “often invoked as the inevitable answer to global threats such as
terrorism and drug trafficking.”98
But there is a growing agreement among scholars, experts and
practitioners that to address the threat of narcoterrorism, there is
the strong imperative to transcend the law enforcement-heavy
approach. There is the urgency to adopt a more proactive measure
that privileges prevention and rehabilitation against narcoterrorism.
In2016,theTransformDrugPolicyFoundation,anindependent
international charitable organization, published the second edition
of The Alternative World Drug Report.99
This Report laments that for
the past 50 years, the approach adopted by many countries to fight
illegal drugs has not been changed. The dominant approach against
illegal drugs has been law enforcement heavy that is “predicated
upon policy and military enforcement against producers, suppliers
and users – a war on drugs in popular discourse.”100
Butthereis
agrowing
agreement
amongscholars,
expertsand
practitioners
thattoaddress
thethreatof
narcoterrorism,
thereis
thestrong
imperative
totranscend
thelaw
enforcement-
heavyapproach.
Thereisthe
urgencytoadopt
amoreproactive
measurethat
privileges
preventionand
rehabilitation
against
narcoterrorism.

While law enforcement is important to address the criminal
aspects and implications of illegal drug use, there is now “a growing
demand for a more balanced and comprehensive evaluation of the
wider impacts of current drug law enforcement strategies, and also for
evidence-based exploration of possible alternative approaches.”101
From
this Report, the Duterte government may consider the following
options and alternatives in the war on drugs:
• Fighting the war on drugs with increased ferocity –
through increasing the level of resources for enforcement
and handing down harsher punishments – with the aim of
significantly reducing or eliminating drug use;
• Incremental reforms to enforcement and public health and
treatment interventions (within the existing prohibitionist
legal framework) to improve policy outcomes. Adequate
investment in evidence-based prevention, treatment and
harm reduction should form a key pillar of drug policy
under any legal framework. However, current enforcement
approaches can undermine, rather than support, effective
health interventions. Reforms to enforcement practices
can also target some of the most harmful elements of the
criminal market to reduce key crime costs, such as violence,
from their current levels;
• A reorientation to a health-based approach and
decriminalization of personal possession and use (civil
or administrative sanctions only). Evidence suggests that
if implemented intelligently, as part of a wider health
reorientation, decriminalization can deliver criminal
justice savings, and positive outcomes on a range of health
indicators, without increasing drug use; and,
• The legal regulation of drug markets offers the potential
to dramatically reduce the costs associated with the illegal
trade outlined in this report, but requires negotiating
the obstacle of the inflexible UN drug conventions, and
managing the risks of over-commercialization. Drawing
on experiences from alcohol, tobacco and pharmaceutical
regulation, increasingly sophisticated models have now
Basedon
important
experiencesof
somecountries,
thosethat
privilegethe
hardapproach
(warondrugs,
crackdown
againstdrug
addicts,drug-
freesociety)
haveledtothe
unnecessary
criminalization,
marginalization
and
stigmatization
ofpeopleusing
drugsbutnot
harmingothers.

been proposed for regulating different aspects of the market – such as production,
vendors, outlets, marketing and promotion, and availability – for a range of products
in different environments.102
Based on important experiences of some countries, those that privilege the hard
approach (war on drugs, crackdown against drug addicts, drug-free society) have led to the
unnecessary criminalization, marginalization and stigmatization of people using drugs but
not harming others. This kind of approach, unfortunately, has enormously failed worldwide
based on scientific studies made by global experts.
According to the Global Commission on Drug Policy, “The global war on drugs has
failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world.”103
It
argues, “Vast expenditures on criminalization and repressive measures directed at producers,
traffickers and consumers of illegal drugs have clearly failed to effectively curtail supply or
consumption.”104
While some drug addicts are indeed engaged in crimes and terrorism, not all users are
criminals and terrorists. In most countries, using illegal drugs is a crime. But not all users
are criminals.
Illegal drug users engaged in violent crimes and terrorism should be given punitive law
enforcement actions (hard approach). But illegal users who are not harming others must
be treated as patients needing careful medical attention (soft approach). These users must
receive appropriate health and treatment services and not punitive and law enforcement
actions.
Treating illegal drug users as patients rather than criminals is considered a more humane
and effective approach to address the problem of illegal drug use. China, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Switzerland, and UK provide exemplary practices on how to address illegal drug
problem through public health interventions by creating more treatment facilities and
rehabilitation centers for illegal drug users. But illegal drug users involved in crimes and
terrorism must receive the full force of the law.
Findings from solid scientific studies of experts indicate that countries that have pursued
harsh actions against drug addicts, dealers, and traffickers and have implemented massive
arrest and detention of drug offenders have continued to suffer higher levels of illegal drug
use and its concomitant social problems than countries that have adopted a more tolerant,
humane and softer actions.105
While the hard approach is undoubtedly essential to fight violence and terrorism
associated with illegal drug use, the Duterte government should diligently isolate users
who are not harming others. These users need a soft approach that requires treatment,
rehabilitation and care.

In the fight against terrorism, many experts in the field have
also recommended terrorist rehabilitation. Usually implemented
in prison, terrorist rehabilitation puts individuals in a therapy
session that involves other related “cleansing” processes of trust
building, psychological counseling, religious dialogue, community
involvement, and after care programs such as family support and
post-rehabilitation employment. Existing literature indicates that
terrorist rehabilitation is an essential program for another process of
counter-terrorism called deradicalization.106
There is a tendency to define deradicalization as a reverse
process of radicalization, which is broadly understood as “the process
of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to
use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal
change.”107
With this definition of radicalization, deradicalization
is defined, on the other hand, as “the process of abandoning an
extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use
violence to effect social change.”108
In other words, deradicalization is a process that aims to remove
the ideological sources of violent extremism. Thus, this process is also
associated with preventing violent extremism (PVE) and countering
violent extremism (CVE). Deradicalization, PVE and CVE are all
interrelated processes that intend to lead an individual or group
to change extreme ideas and attitudes about violence- particularly
about the use of violence against civilians.109
While deradicalization appears to be focusing more on the
ideological approach, it also pays attention to behavioral approach.
Ideological deradicalization results from a change in belief while
behavioralderadicalizationemphasizesachangeinattitude,behavior
and action.110
Deradicalization is not synonymous with counter-
radicalization, which attempts “to dissuade individuals at risk of
radicalization – usually young people.”111
Deradicalization aims to
convince already radical individuals to abandon their radical beliefs
and leave the use of violence behind. Counter-radicalization aims to
prevent individuals from exposure to radical ideas that glorify acts
of violence.
Whilethehard
approachis
undoubtedly
essentialto
fightviolence
andterrorism
associatedwith
illegaldruguse,
theDuterte
government
should
diligently
isolateusers
whoarenot
harming
others. These
usersneeda
softapproach
thatrequires
treatment,
rehabilitation
andcare.

Finally, deradicalization is sometimes being confused with
the concept of disengagement. If deradicalization entails the
abandonment of radical ideas that endorse violence, disengagement
refers to decision of individuals to leave the use of violence behind or
to get out of groups or movements engaged in violent acts. While
deradicalization may lead to disengagement, disengagement does
not necessarily lead to deradicalization. Individuals could be
described as disengaged, but could not be automatically regarded as
de-radicalized.112
There are disengaged individuals who retain their
radical ideas while opting to traverse the path of peace.
Deradicalization has been regarded as an important soft
approach to counter terrorist threats.113
This is based on the
premise that military and police approaches cannot completely
defeat terrorism, particularly if threats are emanating from Islamist
extremist. In order to defeat terrorism from its roots, there has
been a call “to go beyond security and intelligence measures,
taking proactive measures to prevent vulnerable individuals from
radicalizing and rehabilitating those who have already embraced
extremism.”114
This soft proactive measure of deradicalization has
been implemented in Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, and Yemen,
among others. The Philippines can learn a lot of great lessons from
the exemplary practices of these countries.115
In other words, countering narcoterrorism requires the
harmonious implementation of the war on drugs and the war on
terrorism, which cannot be completely defeated through usual
military and police measures.
While law enforcement is indeed very important in countering
the violent and criminal aspects of narcoterrorism, addressing this
threat also needs measures beyond the coercive power of the state.
These measures include more humane soft approaches to balance the
morecoercivehardapproaches. Aspreviouslystressed,rehabilitation
of illegal drug users and terrorists can offer socially acceptable
alternatives and more humane ways to counter narcoterrorism.
Inorderto
defeatterrorism
fromitsroots,
therehasbeen
acall“togo
beyondsecurity
andintelligence
measures,
takingproactive
measures
toprevent
vulnerable
individualsfrom
radicalizingand
rehabilitating
thosewho
havealready
embraced
extremism.

Conclusion
Illegal drug use is a global menace. Its nexus with terrorism further exacerbates the
problem it causes to citizens of the world. Narcoterrorism has become a security problem
that if not quickly abated can undermine world peace and stability. Thus, many countries
have adopted various measures to counter the virulent threat of narcoterrorism.
The Philippines is not spared from narcoterrorism. President Duterte has recognized
the gravity of this problem. From a war on drugs, the Duterte government has launched a
war against drugs and terrorism. The Marawi City siege provided the current government a
strong justification to pursue this two-pronged war.
A war against narcoterrorism undeniably warrants a hard approach that needs strong
law enforcement actions.
But not all users are engaged in crime and terrorism. This type of users needs a soft
approach that privileges humane treatment, rehabilitation and care.
Based on the aforementioned global lessons learned and solid scientific findings of
experts, the Duterte government and his successor must adopt a more humane strategy
against terrorism and illegal drugs that applies both hard and soft approaches. In the fight
againstillegaldrugs,TheAlternativeWorldDrugReportofferspolicyoptionsandalternatives
that the Duterte government should seriously consider. In the fight against terrorism, the
Duterte government and his successor can also pay serious attention to preventing violent
extremism through the process of deradicalization, counter-radicalization, disengagement,
and terrorist rehabilitation. The Philippine government can legislate the adoption of this
approach to ensure national budgetary allocation.
Countering narcoterrorism is not a job for the slothful. The government needs a deeper
understanding of this threat in order to muster a strong political will to counter it.
Sadly, policy makers are slow to appreciate and too incremental to act on the threat
posed by the rapid transformation of groups and individuals operating in the complex
nexus of crimes and terrorism where narcoterrorism finds itself. Unless the government
learns how to innovate faster and smarter in its policy and actions, threat groups involved in
narcoterrorism will evolve into more perilous forms that will be harder to defeat.

*Original version of this study was originally
submitted to the then Director of the now defunct Anti-
Illegal Drugs Group (AIDG) of the Philippine National
Police in September 2016. It has been updated to cover the
most current developments. An abridged version of this
study has appeared in Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Threats of
Narcoterrorism in the Philippines,” Rappler, 23 September
2017.
INTRODUCTION
TERRORISM, DRUGS, AND THE
SIEGE OF MARAWI CITY
1. President Rodrigo R. Duterte, Inaugural Speech on
30 June 2016.
2. President Rodrigo R. Duterte, Speech delivered at
the ASEAN Convention Center, Fontana, Clark,
Pampanga, 7 December 2017.
3. For an initial analysis, see Rommel C. Banlaoi,
“Duterte’s Challenges: Terror, Crime and the Abu
Sayyaf,” Rappler, 13 May 2016.
4. Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL). The Arabs call it Daesh, an Arabic
acronym for “al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-
Sham”, known to its members as the Islamic State
(IS) or the Islamic Caliphate.
5. Office of the President, 2017-2022 National Security
Policy for Change and Well-Being of the Filipino
People (Manila: Malacanang Palace, 2017).
WHAT IS NARCOTERRORISM?
6. Emma Bjornehed, “Narcoterrorism: The Merger of
the War on Drugs and the War on Terror,” Global
Crime, Volume 6, Numbers 3-4 (August-November
2004), p. 306.
7. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narcoterrorism. New York: Basic
Book, 1990.
8. Libby Goodell, “Narcoterrorism: The
Growing Threat in Latin America”, Winter
2014 <https://repository.wlu.edu/bitstream/
handle/11021/27299/RG38_Goodell_LACS_2014.
pdf?sequence=1>.
9. Emma Björnehed, “Narco-Terrorism: The Merger
of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror”, Global
Crime, Volume 6, Number 3&4 (August-November
2004), pp. 306-308.
10. Christine Myers, Insurgency, Terrorism and
Drug Trade (Herzliya: International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism, 31 October 2013). Also see
Sara A. Carter, “Terrorists Teaming with Drug
Cartels,” The Washington Times (8 August 2007).
11. Rex A. Hudson, Laverle Berry, Glenn E. Curtis, Rex
A. Hudson and Nina A. Kollars, A Global Overview
of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist
Groups (A Report Prepared by the Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency
Agreement with the Department of Defense, May
2002).
12. Cited in Benoit Gomis, “Demystifying
Narcoterrorism”, Policy Brief, Number 9 (Global
Drug Policy Observatory, May 2015).
13. Brian Dodd, “The Nexus Between Drugs and
Terrorism” (A PowerPoint presentation, 2010), <
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2010homeland/Dodd.
pdf>.
14. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “A Better Strategy Against
Narcoterrorism” (MIT Center for International
Studies, January 2006).
15. Jonas Hartelus, “Narcoterrorism” (Policy Paper for
the East West Institute and the Swedish Carnegie
Institute, February 2008).
16. See for example the work of Joint Counter-
Narcoterrorism Task Force of the State of Arizona,
United States <https://dema.az.gov/joint-task-
force-arizona/joint-counter-narcotics-task-force>.
Notes

NARCOTERRORISM: GLOBAL SITUATION
17. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, World
Drug Report 2017, Booklet 2 - Global Overview of
Drug Demand and Supply: Latest Trends, Cross-
Cutting Issues (Vienna: UNODC Division for
Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, May 2017), p. 4.
Drug Report 2016 (Vienna: UNODC Division for
Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, May 2016), p.
63.
19. Ibid., p. 97.
20. Ibid.
Drug Report 2017: Booklet 5, The Drug Problem
and Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flow,
Corruption and Terrorism (Vienna: UNODC
Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs,
May 2017), pp. 10-11.
22. Ibid. p. 35.
23. Ibid., p. 11.
24. Ibid., p. 40.
25. Cited in V. Asal, H. Brinton Milward and Eric
W. Schoon, “When terrorists go bad: analyzing
terrorist organizations’ involvement in drug
smuggling”, International Studies Quarterly,
Volume 59, Number 1 (2015), pp. 112-123.
26. Ibid.
27. Rex A. Hudson, Laverle Berry, Glenn E. Curtis, Rex
A. Hudson and Nina A. Kollars, A Global Overview
of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist
Groups (A Report Prepared by the Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency
Agreement with the Department of Defense, May
2002).
28. For additional discussions, see United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, “Drug trafficking
trends & border management in South-East Asia:
Responding to an evolving context of regional
integration” (CNN Intercessional: Interactive
Lunch time discussion, Vienna, 19 November
2014) <https://www.unodc.org/documents/
ungass2016/CND_Preparations/Brown_bag_
lunch/Asia/2014.11.19_CND_preparation_for_
UNGASS_2016_final.pdf>
29. Mely Caballero-Anthony and Alistair D.B. Cook,
eds., Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Issues,
Challenges and Framework for Action (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). Also
see Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin,
eds., Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast
Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic
Studies, 2001).
30. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist
Threat: Causal Links and Implications for Domestic
Drug Control Policy (CRS Report for Congress, 20
April 2004), pp. 1-2.
31. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, “The
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and
Terrorism Prevention”, September 2016 < https://
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/>.
32. Institute for Economics and Peace, Global
Terrorism Index 2015 (New York and Sidney: IEP,
2015), p. 56.
2016).
34. To get more information about the Vision of
Humanity and its activities, see its homepage at
http://visionofhumanity.org/about/ .
2017), p. 10.
36. Ibid., p. 100.
37. Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism
2016 (Washington DC: US Department of State
Publications, July 2017).
38. Ibid., p. 296.
COUNTERING NARCOTERRORISM:
GLOBAL LESSONS LEARNED
39. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.
40. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna,
Austria, 14-25 June 1993.
41. United Nations Declaration on the 49th Session of
the UN General Assembly, 2005.
Drug Report 2016 (Vienna: UNODC Division for

Marawi City Siege and Threats of Narcoterrorism in the Philippines

Marawi City Siege and Threats of Narcoterrorism in the Philippines

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Marawi City Siege and Threats of Narcoterrorism in the Philippines