Prisoners of Faith: A study about Prisoner Radicalization in Kosovo

Prisoners of Faith
A study about Prisoner Radicalization in Kosovo
by
Roland Bartetzko
© 2015, Roland Bartetzko, All Rights Reserved

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Introduction
In the past weeks and months the public in Kosovo has become more aware of the threat
that radical Islam poses, not only to Western and Arab countries far away, but also to the
Southwest European region and specifically Kosovo itself. Questions are being asked
about how and why a part of their youth has become involved with radical Islamic groups
and what can be done to prevent these phenomena or even reverse them.
In the light of the experience of other countries that struggled with these problems for a
longer time it becomes obvious that certain institutions play a key role in winning new
recruits for Islamic groups. Apart from the more obvious role that the Islamic Community,
Mosques, Islamic clerics and Islamic Relief Organizations have, there are two other
institutions that became a breeding ground for radical Islamists and have been neglected in
this regard so far: Kosovo’s universities and its prisons. The following study tries to shed
light on what is happening in Kosovo’s correctional institutions.
In January 2015 I started a research in Peja Detention Center focused on this subject,
initially to collect data for my bachelor thesis titled “Islamic Extremism and the Kosovo
Correctional System.”1The following study is mainly based on the materials I gathered
during this research, but it includes also additional material that wasn’t suitable for use in
a scientific thesis. Therefore this study is more practice oriented and is directed at persons
working in the field of corrections and law enforcement.
The purpose of this work is to demonstrate what Kosovo’s authorities can do to tackle the
Islamic radicalization of prisoners and detainees. The aim is to provide an overview on the
current situation in Kosovo’s prisons and how the problem of prisoner radicalization is
dealt with. Based on this knowledge this work will recommend steps and measures that
can be taken to stop further Islamic radicalization of prisoners and shows how to prevent
and eventually reverse the process.
To obtain the data presented in this paper I have conducted a small survey with prisoners
and some of their relatives, prison staff and prison management personnel, as well as with
experts on the fields of healthcare, psychologists, and social workers who are familiar with
the matter.
The threat that prisoner radicalization poses to open and democratic societies is described
with examples from France, Denmark and Kosovo. It is explained why this problem
should be of particular importance to every government. Information about the processes
of prisoner deradicalization is offered; what are the key elements, and how they are
applied in already existing deradicalization programs in Western countries.
1 FAMA College “Islamic Extremismand the Kosovo Correctional System- Threats and Chances”, a thesis
submitted to the faculty of Law in partial fulfillmentof the requirements for the Bachelor’s Degree,
Mitrovicë,June 2015

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My main focus has been on the actual situation in Kosovo. In this study you can find a
short overview about the problem of radical Islam in Kosovo and a more detailed
prescription of prisoner radicalization in Peja Detention Center and Dubrava prison. The
actual situation in Kosovo’s prison system is assessed and it is shown how small, but
effective steps can be taken to stop prisoners from getting radicalized. An outlook is given
about what should be done in the near, midterm and long future, not only to stop prisoners
from getting radicalized, but also how to start implementing a deradicalization program.
The special situation in Kosovo in regard to radical Islam
Before we start to talk about prisoner radicalization in Kosovo, a few words have to be
said about the situation in Kosovo
- Kosovo has a total population of 1,804,944.2 About 90% of them are ethnic
Albanians and 10% belong to minority groups.
- 95, 6% of the population are Muslim, 1,5% are Orthodox and 2,2%
Catholic.3
- From the Muslim population the majority is Sunni Muslim, but there is
also a small Shia minority.
All the radicalized persons mentioned in this study are Sunni Muslims. It has to be said
that the relationship between the Muslim majority in the ethnic Albanian population and
the ethnic Albanian Catholics has been historically characterized by mutual respect and
tolerance. The vast majority of Sunni Muslims in Kosovo practice a form of moderate
Islam and live a western lifestyle.
Most Albanians in Kosovo are pro Western. Public opinion is that the United States and
their Western allies saved the Albanian people in Kosovo from annihilation during the
1999 NATO air campaign.
However in recent years there have been growing numbers of violent and non-violent
incidents which are related to persons that pursue a more extreme view of Islam than the
main stream population. The number of these incidents is still growing and gives reason to
be concerned. The reason for this radicalization of at least a part of the Sunni Muslim
population is often attributed to external factors, especially to a number of Islamic non-
governmental organizations that provided relief to the Kosovo population after the 1999
war.
Additionally, since the escalation of the Civil War in Syria in 2012 there has been a
number of Kosovars that has joined radical Islamic groups fighting there, especially the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant organization. The research on these developments is
2 Kosovo Agency of Statistics,population estimate,2014
3 The Government of the United States, The Central IntelligenceAgency, CIA Factbook, 2011

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still new and is not a topic of this study. A recently published study4 is “inquiring into the
causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens’ involvement of foreign fighters in Syria and
Iraq.” Unfortunately there is still no report available that studies the dynamics and
processes of the radicalization of a part of the general Muslim population in Kosovo.
Methodology
This is a short explanation as to how I conducted my research on the subject.
Data and information regarding deradicalization processes in foreign countries was mainly
obtained from reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
Hard data about Kosovo prisons was obtained through the International Centre for Prison
Studies (ICPS), University of London, the Kosovo Correctional Service (KCS) in
Prishtina and the Kosovo Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims (KRCT) in Prishtina.
Information about Gërdofc High Security Prison was provided by an official working
there. All data regarding Dubrava Correctional Facility was provided by Mr. Hysni Haliti
and Mr. Bajram Shoshi, both former prison officials in Dubrava.
With the permission of the acting director of Peja Detention Center, Mr. Sami Gashi I
conducted a small survey among the detainees in Peja Detention Center. I prepared a
number of questions to obtain data from radical and radicalized prisoners, as well as from
their cellmates.
As the purpose of my study is narrowed down only to show evidence that the problem of
radicalization in Kosovo’s prisons indeed exists and not to make a sociological study
about the inner workings of the actual radicalization process I utilized only the data
necessary to illustrate some general facts about radical prisoners, for example their social
background.
The prisoners from which I obtained data remain anonymous as most of them are awaiting
trial; I intend to exclude the possibility of harming their defense by publishing information
about their cases.
To describe prison procedures regarding the treatment of radical prisoners in Peja I relied
on staff interviews. I conducted interviews with 13 staff members. These interviews were
usually very short and only served for the purpose of obtaining information about how the
prison staff performs their duties in regard to the treatment of high risk prisoners.
4
KCSS (Kosovar Centre for Security Studies) report: “Raport për shkaqet dhe pasojatsepërfshirjes së
qytetarëve të Kosovës si luftëtarë të huaj në Siri dhe Irak”,Prishtina,April 2015

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As I am myself a prisoner and spent the first 7 years of my sentence as a high risk prisoner
I of course put in my own observations when it was necessary to describe connections or
procedures for which there was no data available. Further I used information obtained
from prisoners in other correctional facilities then Peja, especially from Dubrava prison.
Limitations and assumptions
The facts presented about Peja prison are not representative for other detention facilities in
Kosovo.
The scope of this work is limited and all data and information presented here serves the
purpose to describe and illustrate the problem of prisoner radicalization

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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Mr. Sami Gashi, the acting director of Peja Detention Center who granted
me permission to conduct a survey and to interview the staff of Peja Detention Center.
I also thank Muamer Ibrahimi and my wife Valbona for helping me with the script

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................2
THE SPECIAL SITUATION IN KOSOVO IN REGARD TO RADICAL ISLAM….….3
METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................................4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................6
TABLE OF CONTENTS……… ........................................................................................7
DEFINITIONS OF KEY WORDS… .................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………...…………………9
CHAPTER 1 Radicalization.............................................................................................11
1.1 The Threat… ...............................................................................................................11
1.2 Radicalization-Definition… ........................................................................................12
1.3 Is Radicalization Brainwashing?...................................................................................13
1.4 Radical meets Criminal: The Prison as a Meeting Point….........................................14
1.5 Islamic Radicalization in Kosovo…............................................................................14
Radicalization- Summary…… ......................................................................................…16
CHAPTER 2 Deradicalization and Disengagement…….................................................17
2.1 Deradicalization Definition… .....................................................................................17
2.2 Key Elements of Deradicalization…...........................................................................17
2.2.1 Monitoring……........................................................................................................17
2.2.2 Screening of external Deradicalization Factors………............................................18
2.2.3 Staff Training…………............................................................................................18
2.2.4 Prison Regimes……….............................................................................................18
2.2.5 Theological Dialogue and Interlocutors… ...............................................................19
2.2.6 Incentives……..........................................................................................................19
2.2.7 Social Assistance……..........................................................................................…19
2.2.8 Aftercare…… ...........................................................................................................20
2.3. Common Key elements found in Deradicalization Programs… ................................20
2.4 Key elements of Dutch deradicalization programs ...................................................20
Deradicalization- Summary………...................................................................................21

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CHAPTER 3 High Risk Prisoners and Islamic Radicals in Kosovo…….........................22
3.0 Definition of Terms……… .........................................................................................22
3.1 The Kosovo Correctional Service (KCS)-Short History of High Risk Prisoners .......22
3.2 Prisons in Kosovo........................................................................................................23
3.3 Radical Islamic Prisoners in Kosovo’s Prison System................................................24
3.4 Radicalization in Prison…...........................................................................................25
3.5 The Dubrava Prison Break… ......................................................................................26
3.6 Radical Support Networks……...................................................................................28
3.7The Nexus between Radical Islam, Nationalist Terrorism and Organized Crime ......29
3.8 The Number of Radical Prisoners ...............................................................................29
3.9 Radicalization Awareness ...........................................................................................31
Summary....................................................................................................................……32
CHAPTER4 Deradicalization in Kosovo’s Prisons…… ...........................................…..33
4.1 Introduction… .............................................................................................................33
4.2 Peja Prison- Methodology of Research… ...................................................................33
4.3 Peja Prison- Short Description… ................................................................................34
4.3.1 Peja Prison- Detainee Routine…..............................................................................34
4.3.2 Peja Prison High Risk Prisoners...............................................................................34
4.3.3 Characteristics of Radical Islamic Prisoners in Peja… ............................................35
4.3.4 Radical Prisoners in Peja- General Information………...................................……35
4.3.5 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Social Background……… .........................................…35
4.3.6 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Family Ties……………… ....................................……35
4.3.7 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Education…… ...............................................…………36
4.3.8 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Religious Appearance……… ............................………36
4.3.9 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Behavior……................................................….………36
4.4.0 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Engagement with Radical Groups…..............................36
4.4.1 Religiously motivated Interaction and Incidents between Radical Prisoners
and Non-observant Muslim Prisoners ...............................................................................37
4.5 Deradicalization Efforts...............................................................................................37
4.6 Key Elements in Kosovo’s prisons regarding Deradicalization..................................38
4.6.1 Key Elements of Deradicalization- Peja Prison .......................................................38
Summary....................................................................................................................……41

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CHAPTER 5 Conclusions and Recommendations…........................................................42
5.1 Deradicalization in Kosovo’s Prisons... ......................................................................42
5.2 Short Term (immediate) Measures to fight Prisoner Radicalization in Kosovo .........43
5.3 Mid Term Measures to fight Prisoner Radicalization in Kosovo ................................44
5.4 Long Term Deradicalization Measures in the Kosovo Correctional System ..............44
Summary and Outlook…...................................................................................................45
REFERENCES AND SOURCES… .................................................................................46
List of Tables
Table 1. Definitions of Key Words ..................................................................................10
Table 2. Levels of Security…............................................................................................24
Table 3. Radicalization Factors in Prison… ......................................................................26
Table 4. Number of Radical Prisoners in Kosovo Prisons… ............................................30
Table 5. Deradicalization Key Elements in Peja Prison… ................................................41

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Definition ofKey Words
Key word definitions vary from author to author and from country to country. Therefore the
following definitions are solely to use for this work.
Table 1. Definition of Key Words
Prisoner Radicalization
“A cognitive process whereby inmates develop a violent, extremist mindset that (legitimates) the
need and use of violence to promote a political or religious agenda.”5
Prisoner
Any person under detention or serving a prison term, an imprisoned person.
Extremism
“Political ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles.”6
Detainee
A person in pre-trial detention.”Any person deprived of personal liberty
except as a result of conviction for an offence.”7
“Radical” Prisoner
A prisoner or detainee that has been already radicalized before incarceration.
“Radicalized” Prisoner
A prisoner or detainee that has been radicalized in prison.
Deradicalization
The process of “how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies”8
Islamists
“Muslims with Islam-based political agendas…those who reject the separation of religious
authority from the power of the state.”9
5Tony Parker,AssistantCommissioner of Prisons,TennesseeDepartment of Corrections,North American
Association of Wardens & Superintendents, TrainingConference, Memphis, Tennessee, 2014, slide8
6 The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence(ICSR) report,” Prison and
Terrorism,Radicalization and De-radicalization in 15 Countries”,London 2010,page 12
7
United Nations General Assembly Resolution Nr. 43/173. Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, New York , December 9, 1988
8
RAND National Security and Research Division report:“DeradicalizingIslamistExtremists”,Santa Monica
2010,page 1
9
Ibid.,page 2

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CHAPTER 1 RADICALIZATION
1.1 The Threat
Prison authorities all over the world have known for a long time that prisons can serve as
schools for criminals. Instead of getting the prisoners rehabilitated, quite the opposite
happens. The prisoner leaves prison more violent and aggressive than when he entered it.
Further, a lot of inmates improve their criminal skills and use the opportunity that the
prison presents to make contacts with fellow criminals with whom they plan new offenses.
“Yet strangely, the same insight has for the most part eluded jail keepers in countries now
targeted by Islamic terrorists. The usefulness of prisons as universities for terrorists,
however has not escaped Islamic radicals.”10
On January 7, 2015 two persons armed with assault rifles entered the Paris headquarters of
“Charlie Hebdo Magazine”, a satirical newspaper, and killed 12 of its staff members
including the editor. One policeman was shot later in the streets. French investigators
identified the main suspects for these killings as the brothers Cherif and Saïd Kouachi,
French citizens of Algerian origin. Both of them were known to the authorities prior to the
attacks. In 2008 they were both arrested under the suspicion of terrorist activities and
while Saïd was released soon after his arrest, his brother Cherif was sentenced to a three
year sentence in French prisons. It was during this time that Cherif Kouachi met with for
the first time Amedy Coulibaly, who himself was serving a sentence for armed robbery in
the same prison. Amedy eventually would become the third perpetrator of the “Charlie
Hebdo” attacks. Jean Charles Brisard, the chief of the French Center for the Analysis of
Terrorism stated that Cherif Kouachi was "in prison with other hard-liners, including a
central figure in the al Qaeda networks in Europe. That is where his real radicalization
began.”11
On 14 and 15 February 2015, Omar el-Hussein, a 22 year old high school dropout with
Jordanian-Palestinian parents, carried out two terrorist attacks in the Danish capital
Copenhagen. During the first attack, where he was shooting at an event at a cultural
centre, one person was killed and three police officers were wounded. During a second
shooting at a Bar-Mitzvah celebration in a Synagogue, a Jewish man was killed and two
policemen were wounded. Later that day Omar el-Hussein was tracked down and killed by
police forces. Omar served a short time in prison for a knife stabbing in 2014. At this time
the prison reported about him and his behavior to the Danish Security and Intelligence
Service, because he became “extremely religious".12
10 Ian M. Cuthbertson: Prison and the Education of Terrorists,World Policy Journal,Fall 2004,p.15
11
Jean-Charles Brisard,head of the French Center for the Analysis of Terrorism,interview with CNN,
January 14, 2015
12 Catherine Bloch: http://www.b.dk/nationalt/pet-ingen-grund-til-at-tro-at-22-aarig-planlagde-
terrorangreb,17 February 2015

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On August 18, 2007 seven prisoners escaped from Dubrava prison in Kosovo. Three of
them went to Macedonia where on the morning of November 13, 2007 they became
involved in a firefight with Macedonian Special Police units. The Macedonian government
stated that the head of the group that fought with their police was Lirim Jakupi, one of the
Dubrava escapees. Six persons were killed during the fighting, one of them, Ramadan
Shyti, who also had escaped prison together with Jakupi. Although authorities in
Macedonia as well as in Kosovo realized that the escaped prisoners were extremely
dangerous, they never learned that all of them, except two, had been transformed during
their time in prison. Dangerous criminals had become extremist Islamic radicals; they
were radicalized in prison.
Ramadan Shyti was buried as a “Shehid”, a martyr fallen in Jihad. Radical Islamic
propaganda videos posted on the internet are praising the former Dubrava prisoner’s feats
and his fight against the Macedonian “infidels”.13 Somehow the fact that the police had to
deal with Islamic radicals and not with dangerous, but common criminals has never been
acknowledged by the authorities. Even the US embassy in Prishtina expressed its concern
about the dangerousness of the escaped convicts, yet, didn’t connect them with any radical
Islamic groups.14
These few examples show that the problem of prisoner radicalization is a very present
problem. The fact that in all three examples the authorities failed to recognize the true
nature of the threat indicates the need to get ahead of prisoner radicalization. But what
exactly do we mean when we talk of prisoner radicalization?
1.2 Radicalization
According to the US Federal Bureau of Prisons, prisoner radicalization refers “to the
process by which inmates…adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures
need to be taken for political or religious purposes.”15 As the focus of this study is on
religious, Islamic radicalism, radicalization means that a prisoner under the influence of
other already radical inmates becomes more radical in his view of Islam, and especially
embraces violence.
That doesn’t mean that every prisoner that becomes a devoted Muslim in prison has been
radicalized. The vital factor to consider a prisoner as “radicalized” is that he or she
considers violence as a legitimate tool in the struggle for whatever objective it is they gain
to obtain.
13 https://youtu.be/RjyIiuVwJGQ
14 https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07PRISTINA640_a.html
15 A review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’Selection of MuslimReligious Services Providers,Department
of Justice, Officeof The Inspector General, April 2004,p.6

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Of course somebody can also be radicalized outside of a prison. The internet offers
Islamist propaganda and there are Islamic preachers in every western country who teach
their version of radical Islam and they are not hard to find. There are several reasons why
the situation in prisons is different than on the outside. For once, prisoners are housed
together 24 hours a day so that the indoctrination and the peer pressure on a new “recruit”
for the Islamic cause is much greater than outside where the person to be radicalized
usually has a family and a job or at least some kind of occupation, so that the influence of
any radical teaching is less intense on the individual. Then there is already a violent
atmosphere in most prisons and a new prisoner very quickly has to adapt to this
environment. So when he or she gets into contact with violent ideas of radical Islam it’s
much easier for them to overcome their inhibitions regarding the use of violence as they
already had to learn to accept violence as a part of their daily routine in prison.
Furthermore a lot of prisoners, because of their peculiar social situation have weakened
bonds to their families and friends who normally have a positive influence on them and are
somehow a counterweight against radical ideas. And of course many prisoners have
committed violent crimes and radical Islam gives them the possibility to continue with
violent acts, but this time it is not forbidden anymore, but even desirable. Radical Islam
justifies these prisoner’s crimes as long as they are directed against those that they
perceive “infidels”.
These are some of the reasons why the “radicalization process” in prison is also much
faster than on the outside where it may take months or even years until an individual
transforms itself from a “normal” person to an Islamic radical. The same process in prison
sometimes takes only a few weeks.
1.3 Is Radicalization Brainwashing?
With brainwashing one understands “a forcible indoctrination to induce someone to give
up basic political, social, or religious beliefs and attitudes and to accept contrasting
regimented ideas.”16
Often the media and government officials in Kosovo use the term “brainwashed” to
describe radical Islamists in a pejorative manner. Unfortunately, even the KCSS report
“Inquiring into the causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens’ involvement in foreign
fights, respectively in Syria and Iraq”17 uses this term. Brainwashing is a complicated
process that requires “time, patience, and professional knowledge”18 and shouldn’t be
confused with the radicalization process that involves moderate Muslims and turns them
into radical Islamists. During my interviews with radical prisoners in Peja Detention
Center, none of them stated that they underwent any process that could be considered as
16 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/brainwashing,2015
17 KCSS report “Inquiringinto the causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens’involvement of foreign
fighters in Syria and Iraq.” , Prishtina,2015,p.74 (Albanian languageVersion)
18 Mladen Zvonareviç,“Socialna Psihologjia”,Zagreb, 1989,pp. 610-614,taken from Dr. Ejup Sahiti,
“PsiklologjiaGjyqësore,Prishtina 2007,page105

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brainwashing, neither while in Kosovo, nor during their time spent in Syria or Iraq. The
process used by ISIS and other radical Islamic organizations to prepare selected members
for so called “martyr” or suicide missions is indeed a form of brainwashing, but only a few
persons undergo this process and not the usual “fighter”in these organizations.
It is important to make a distinction between the terms “brainwashing” and
“radicalization’ as it is to acknowledge that the process to reverse brainwashing is
different from deradicalization and requires different approaches and means. A
brainwashed person would not be affected by deradicalization efforts.
1.4 Radical meets Criminal: The Prison as a Meeting Ground
Prisons in Western Europe have become the breeding ground for terrorists. Or, like Alain
Grignard, a senior Belgian police authority on terrorism states: “The prisons of today are
producing the terrorists of tomorrow.”19Al Qaeda or ISIS are not interested in recruiting
dentists or flower salesmen. The “professions” they are mostly interested in are found in
prisons. Counterfeiters or drug dealers are very useful for terrorist organizations, either for
their expertise that comes handy or to finance terrorist actions with their criminal
activities. The prison is the ideal meeting ground. Even when the recruitment effort fails
and the individual has not been recruited, still, contacts are made and a forger or drug
dealer doesn’t much care about the religious convictions of his clients as long as they pay.
An example of the nexus between crime and terrorism were the train bombings in Madrid
in 2004, which were carried out and financed by a terrorist cell consisting of drug
dealers.20 The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 was funded in large part by
credit card fraud operations.21 In the above mentioned Dubrava prison break from 2007,
the escaped prisoners practically “hired” one fellow inmate to help them out. As this
prisoner already had successfully escaped several times from different prisons in Kosovo,
it was left to him to plan the escape, while the logistical support was left to one of the
Islamic extremists. The group immediately split after their escape and while the radicals
left for Macedonia the “common” criminals stayed in Kosovo and started a crime spree
consisting of multiple robberies. They were the first of the escaped to be apprehended by
the police and sent back to prison.
1.5 Islamic Radicalization in Kosovo
Fortunately until today Kosovo has been spared from any deathly attacks on its soil
committed by Islamic radicals. In the past 15 years Kosovo has been considered as a
transit country where Islamic fighters from Bosnia or the Sandxhak region were going
through to reach their destination, primarily in Afghanistan or Iraq. With the break out of
19 Robert S. Leiken, “Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11”, Washington,
Nixon Center, 2004
20 Ian M. Cuthbertson, Prison and the Education of Terrorists,World Policy Journal 2004,p.19
21 John Mintz and Douglas Farah,“Small Scams probed for Terror Ties, Washington Post,August 12, 2002

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civil war in Syria this has changed. Since 2013 young Kosovars started to join Islamic
organizations that are fighting against the Syrian government in relatively big numbers.
According to the Kosovar Center for Security Studies, in January 2014 there were 232
Kosovo citizens fighting in Syria.22
Since then some of them returned home and others left to go there, so that the actual
number of Kosovars fighting for ISIS remains mainly unchanged. These persons pose a
threat for several reasons:
- There is an ongoing radicalization of young persons in Kosovo especially in rural
areas; persons returning from Syria reinforce this process.
- Persons who fought in Syria and then returned to Kosovo are recruiting more
young people to go the same way;
- Persons returning from the battlefields of Syria and Iraq have the knowledge and
mindset to eventually organize terrorist attacks in Kosovo or in the region.
The authorities in Kosovo reacted to these developments:
- In June 2012 the Kosovo government adopted a “National Strategy against
Terrorism”.23
- In March 2015 the Kosovo assembly voted the” Law on Prohibition of Joining the
Armed Conflicts outside State Territory”24
However the Kosovo government still lacks a strategy against violent extremism. It has no
deradicalization strategy adopted neither are there any programs to deradicalize young
people coming back from Syria. A recently published report of the Kosovar Center for
Strategic Studies recommends to setup “rehabilitation” programs for this group of people.
The report also explains the enormous importance that prisons had played in the history of
the Islamic State organization. Unfortunately the report doesn’t go any further and does
not take a look at the situation in Kosovo’s prisons.25
22 Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) report: “Raport për shkaqet dhe pasojate përfshirjes së
qytetarëve të Kosovës si luftëtarë të huaj në Siri dhe Irak,Prishtina,April 2015,page25
23 Republika e Kosovës, “Strategjia Kombëtare e Republikës së Kosovës kundër Terrorizmit 2012-2017,
Prishtina,June2012
24 Law on Prohibition of joiningthe Armed Conflicts outsideState Territory, Nr 05/L-002, Prishtina,March
2015
24 Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) report: “Raport për shkaqet dhe pasojate përfshirjes së
qytetarëve të Kosovës si luftëtarë të huaj në Siri dhe Irak,Prishtina,April 2015,page25

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Radicalization- Summary
The Islamic radicalization of prisoners constitutes an imminent threat to society. This
problem has been acknowledged in many Western countries where the problem has been
studied and countermeasures have been set in place.
Meanwhile there have been some positive developments in Kosovo regarding the
recognition of this new threat that radical Islam poses to society. A recent study even
mentions the need to have deradicalization programs in place. However, Kosovo
authorities are not yet aware of the special challenge that prison radicalization imposes on
the authorities.

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CHAPTER 2 DERADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT
2.1 Deradicalization: Definition
“Deradicalization is a process where...individuals or groups cease their involvement in
organized violence and/or terrorism.”26
Disengagement is “the process in which a radical group reverses its ideology and
delegitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals…”27
There is further a difference between individual or collective deradicalization and
disengagement. Collective deradicalization is aimed at groups while individual
deradicalization deals with a single person. There are as many different approaches to
deradicalization as there are correctional services conducting these programs. Therefore this
work will list just the key elements that most of these programs have in common with
special emphasis on programs in Western Europe. It must be said that a prison
deradicalization program only can have success when it is integrated into a general
nationwide strategy to combat radicalization. These comprehensive programs usually
include mosques, schools and other places were young people spend time. A prison
shouldn’t be seen as an isolated place which has no connection to the world outside. Often
potential recruits get their first taste of extremist ideology or radical religious views in
institutions like mosques or schools before they come into contact with prison life. On the
reverse it is more difficult for an extremist organization or person to recruit a new inmate in
prison when this one has been taught correctly in school or mosque about the peaceful
nature of Islam.
2.2 Key Elements of Deradicalization
2.2.1 Monitoring
Potential recruits or people who might be at risk to succumb to extremist views should be
identified and monitored throughout their incarceration. Ideally the community the
prisoner lived in or the police already have gathered intelligence about the suspect and are
able to communicate their information to the prison authorities. This information is then
handled by a prison officer designated for this task or an investigative unit in the
correctional service. There should be a close cooperation regarding this matter between
police, prison authorities and other security services responsible for fighting extremism. A
26 The International Centre For The Study Of Radicalization And Political Violence(ICSR),Prison and
Terrorism; Radicalization and De-radicalization in 15 Countries,London, 2010,p.12
27
Ashour, Omar,” The De-Radicalization of Jihadists:Transformingarmed Islamistmovements.” New York:
Routledge, 2009,page 5-6

18
problem which often arises is how to spot a potential recruit. Many Muslim prisoners that
didn’t practice Islam become more devout during their stay in prison. That doesn’t mean at
all that these persons have become extremists. In contrary most of the times religion has a
positive effect on prisoners and has long been recognized by prison authorities as an
important tool to reform prisoners. Monitoring also should include the identification of
radical persons or groups already installed in correction facilities. A radicalized prisoner
should be monitored during every phase of his sentence and after his release.
2.2.2 Screening of external radicalization factors
Extremist influence to prisoners can also come from the outside in form of reading material
or visitors, especially Muslim clerics who visit prisons on a regularly basis. Books or
brochures that spread hate or preach radical Islamic views must be banned. It is often
difficult for correction personnel to decide whether a certain publication should be allowed
or not. This problem can be solved by submitting these publications to a Muslim cleric who
has the trust of the authorities. All Muslim clerics that are allowed to visit prisons should be
vetted by a competent authority. This can be done in cooperation with the Islamic
community.
2.2.3 Staff training
Correction officers and other staff members in contact with inmates (social workers,
medical personnel) should receive awareness training. They should learn how to recognize
suspicious behavior that might be a sign of radicalization and how and to whom to report
it. Especially social workers and psychologist play an important role in every
deradicalization effort.
2.2.4 Prison regimes
Often extremist prisoners are treated as high security prisoners and are isolated from the rest
of the prison population. This provides higher security but might collide with the inmate’s
human rights. Further it makes it nearly impossible to deradicalize the prisoner as he or she
has only very limited interaction with other human beings. Therefore it should be used with
care and only when strictly necessary. A dispersal of radical prisoners among the general
prison population however bears the risk that these individuals might radicalize other
prisoners. Both approaches, segregation and dispersion, are used in Western Europe and the
United States depending on the evaluation of the individual prisoner and his risk assessment.
Further there is the question of concentrating extremist prisoners or dispersing them among
other prisoners. By concentrating them in one place it is easier for the authorities to monitor
them and to apply measures. The danger of radicalizing other prisoners is low if they are not
housed together with them. On the other hand deradicalization methods are very hard to

19
apply. Because of the peer pressure that other group members exercise over the individual it
will be almost impossible that one individual leaves the group and renounces violence. In
most of the cases where extremist prisoners are concentrated collective disengagement
methods are used. These collective deradicalization and disengagement methods are used in
countries with a prison population numbering a high number of extremists like in
Afghanistan, Yemen or Saudi Arabia. These countries had different successes with their
programs. I will not further go into collective deradicalization methods as they are not
applicable in Kosovo due to the relatively low number of radical prisoners but also because
of the political and security situation here. These methods are suitable for countries with a
domestic extremist group that fights against their own government. These collective
methods aim at persuading a great number of extremists to abandon their armed struggle,
sometimes this process is accompanied with peace negotiations.
2.2.5 Theological Dialogue and Interlocutors
Muslim clerics that visit prisons on a regular basis can challenge extremist ideas by
teaching a moderate view of Islam. Important is that these clerics have a certain credibility
in the inmates eyes and are not viewed as spokespersons of the authorities or even traitors.
Another method to change extremists’ points of view is by having former radicals talk to
them. That can be inmates that abandoned their radical Islamic ideas or people brought
from the outside that have been involved in radical movements but left the path of
violence. However in some countries like for example the Netherlands, radicalization is
seen as a sociopolitical and not a religious issue. These countries concentrate on social
measures (as described in point 2.2.7) and theological dialogue has not such a great
importance to them.
2.2.6 Incentives
Prisoners that are willing to refrain from extremism are offered incentives like early
release or other benefits inside the institution like schooling, better accommodation, more
visits etc.
2.2.7 Social Assistance
Often the reason why people fall for radical ideas are of social nature; except that the
prisoner has to face a new situation in a harsh environment his family is left without a
supplier. It is known that many radical Islamic organizations have excellent financial
means and offer financial aid for families of new recruits. So it is important that relevant
authorities offer assistance not only to a de-radicalized prisoner, but also to his family.
This should include housing, health care and education.

20
2.2.8 Aftercare
Even the best de-radicalization program is worthless if nobody takes care of the prisoner
after his release from prison. Successful programs prepare the prisoner for his release and
continue to assist him after that. There should not only be social and material assistance
offered, but also theological and spiritual help as there is the risk that the ex-prisoner
might re-radicalized.
2.3. Common Key Elements found in Deradicalization Programs
Every country that has set up a prisoner deradicalization program uses a different approach
with different key elements. Still, all deradicalization programs have three things in
common:
1.” Credible Interlocutors who can develop relationships with imprisoned militants…to
convince the radicals of the error of their way”28
2. The program is continued after the prisoner has been released
3. The program provides incentives for deradicalizing subjects
2.4 Key elements of Dutch deradicalization programs
Some countries like Denmark, Sweden or the Netherlands focus their deradicalization
programs around social and economic aid for the prisoners and their families, as well as
psychological support:29
- Social and economic support for the prisoner
- Social and economic support for the prisoner’s family
- Psychological support
- “ Diversionary activities”30 , meaning activities that divert prisoners from harmful
activities, for example vocational training and education
- Discussions and dialogue with the prisoners
- “Religious or ideological counseling”31
- Support from public and private organizations
28 RAND National Security Research Division report:“DeradicalizingIslamistExtremists,Arlington 2010,
page xvii
29 Institute for Strategic Dialogue,Policy Briefing,“TacklingExtremists:Deradicalisation and
Disengagement”, London, 2013
30 Ibid.,page 4
31 Ibid.,page 4

21
Deradicalization- Summary
• Deradicalization reverses the process of radicalization.
• There are different ways and methods to deradicalize a prisoner.
• There are certain key elements that have to be in place so that the deradicalization can
succeed
• The most important key elements are Interlocutors, Aftercare and Incentives.

22
CHAPTER 3 HIGH RISK AND RADICAL ISLAMIC PRISONERS IN KOSOVO
3.0 Definition of Terms
• For the purpose of this work the term “prisoner“ is used for any person under detention
or serving a sentence in Kosovo.
• For persons in pretrial detention the term “detainee” is used.
• For persons serving a sentence the word “sentenced prisoner” or “sentenced person” is
used.
• A “prison” is any facility where prisoners are housed.
• A “detention center” holds mainly detainees.
• A “correction center” houses mainly sentenced persons.
3.1 The Kosovo Correctional Service (KCS) - Short History of High Risk Prisoners
The KCS was founded in 1999. Immediately after the war the prison system in Kosovo
was dysfunctional and the biggest prison in Kosovo, Dubrava Correctional Center, was
heavily damaged during the NATO air campaign. Due to an almost complete absence of
local staff the first prisons were run by the international peacekeeping force, KFOR. As it
is not a soldier’s job to guard prisoners, in late 1999 the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took over prison management from KFOR
and started recruiting locals to work as correction officers. During this time period there
were no Islamic radicals imprisoned anywhere in Kosovo.
With the terrorist attack in New York on September 11, 2001 the situation changed.
KFOR, especially the US led Multinational Brigade East, rounded up a lot of persons they
suspected of Islamic fundamentalist activities. The legal base for these arrests and
detentions was the United Nations Resolution 1244 32 and UNMIK regulation Nr
1999/24.33 KFOR and UNMIK police were allowed to arrest and hold persons in detention
without asking a court for permission. Suspected individuals arrested after September 11
were brought to Bondsteel Detention Facility, an improvised prison run by the United
States Armed Forces inside a military base near the town of Ferizaj. This has been the first
time that radical Islamists were held in Detention on Kosovo soil. This also gave many of
these individuals the opportunity to meet with each other, not only with fellow believers
from Kosovo, but also with radicals from Macedonia and Bosnia. During the same time
32 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244,adopted on June 10, 1999
33 UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24,“On the Law applicablein Kosovo”,December 12, 1999

23
Bondsteel housed more than 100 fighters of the UCPMB34 and the National Liberation
Army (NLA).35 A lot of persons that are still today playing an active role in extremist
activities in Kosovo and the region met for the first time in Bondsteel. Some of the more
“known” Bondsteel detainees were the Imam Shefqet Krasniqi and Xhezair Shaqiri, better
known as “Komandant Hoxha”36Bondsteel also housed prisoners suspected of “National
Albanian” terrorism that UNMIK felt constituted a high risk and were too dangerous to
place in the Kosovo prison system. In 2002 most of the detainees in Bondsteel were
released or handed over to the Kosovo Correctional Service. At this time the Kosovo
Correctional Service had developed enough capacities to deal with high risk Prisoners.
The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) managed the
KCS until 2008. With the goal to concentrate all High Risk prisoners in one place, block 1
in Dubrava prison has opened in 2003. All high risk prisoners in Kosovo were
concentrated there. However after the prison break from 2007, it was clear that this block
was not safe and secure anymore and another building in Dubrava, block 8 was
refurbished to house Kosovo’s most dangerous. This block worked until early 2015 as a
Secure Housing Unit for High Risk prisoners. Today the newly build high security prison
in Gërdovc is accommodating the greatest part of the high risk prisoners in Kosovo.
However there is always a number of high risk category prisoners in other prisons and
detention Centers.
3.2 Prisons in Kosovo
The legal basis of the Kosovo Correctional Service’s work is the Law on the Execution of
Penal Sanctions of the Republic of Kosovo (LEPS).37 The KCS manages 10 prisons:38
1. Correctional Center for long sentences in Dubrava;
2. Correctional Center for Juveniles and Females in Lipjan;
3. Correctional Center for short-term sentences in Smrekonica;
4. Prizren Detention Center;
5. Prishtina Detention Center;
6. Gjilan Detention Centre;
7. Peja Detention Center
8. Mitrovica Detention Centre;
34 Ushtria Clirimtaree Presheves, Medvedges dhe Bujanovcit(UCPMB), “Liberation Army of Preshevo,
Medvedgje and Bujanovc,an ethnic Albanian Guerrillagroup operatingin the Preshevo Valley in South
Serbia in 2000
35 The National Liberation Army is an ethnic Albanian group operatingin Macedonia since2001.
36 Xhezair Shaqiri was arrested on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia with weapons for the NLA in
2001,while the Imam Shefqet Krasniqi was arrested after September 11, 2001 for his open supportgiven
to radical Islamists
37 Ligji NR. 04/L-149 per Ekzekutimin e SanksionevePenale, The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 29
July 2013
38 Website of the Ministry of Justice, Republic of Kosovo, http://www.md-ks.net/?page=2,62

24
9. Lipjan Detention Center and
10.High Security Prison in Gërdovc.
3.3 Radical Islamic prisoners in Kosovo’s prison system
The KCS doesn’t have an extra category for Islamic radical prisoners. Most of the
prisoners who have committed crimes related to Islamic terrorism are placed in the high
security category. The courts decide after a person’s arrest during an initial hearing if the
person will be placed in detention or not and if he or she has to be categorized as high risk
detainee. The prison authorities also have the possibility to address the court and request
that a certain person should be categorized. The categorization of prisoners is regulated by
an internal KCS regulation.39 Criteria to put a prisoner in a high risk category are:
- The nature of the crime the person is suspected of/charged with/ sentenced for
- The person’s behavior during detention (escape attempts, attacks on correction
personnel)
- The length of his/hers sentence
There are also small numbers of prisoners awaiting extradition that are placed in the high
risk category. The reasoning behind this is that it would be embarrassing for Kosovo’s
authorities if a person that is wanted in a foreign country and is awaiting extradition
escapes or get harmed. The placement in the high risk category is to prevent this from
happening. This practice collides with the detainee’s human rights and should be
abandoned.
Table 2. Levels of Security- There are four levels of security:40
Low Security This category is for sentenced prisoners that
showed good behavior and have less than a
year left to serve in prison
Medium Security The standard category for prisoners and
detainees. 90% of the prisoners in Kosovo
belong to this category
High Risk Persons considered being dangerous. All
persons accused of criminal acts connected
with radical Islam are currently in this
category
Very High Risk Persons considered to be very dangerous
(mostly for prisoners that attacked staff
members or staged multiple escapes)
39 Interview with A. K., Head of Security, Peja Prison,May 8, 2015
40 Ibid.

25
Further there is a distinction if the prisoner is a high risk on the outside (for example
during court sessions or transfer) or just inside the prison. Usually high risk prisoners are
an in and outside risk.
A high security prisoner is still housed with other prisoners who are not categorized.
However he is under stricter supervision. This means in practice that he is checked on
every half an hour, his visits and telephone calls are strictly supervised and he is subjected
more often to searches. High risk prisoners have to change their cell every two weeks.
Apart from that they have the same rights and obligations like any other prisoner.
3.4 Radicalization in Prison, “Radicalized” prisoners
The number of persons that were radicalized in prisons in Kosovo is very difficult to
determine. They usually are not in the high risk category. There is no monitoring in place
and there is a lack of staff that could report prisoners that are transforming into radicals.
Prisons in Kosovo are understaffed and especially social workers are scarce and therefore
can spend only a minimum amount of time with any prisoner. 41 Prisoners that are
vulnerable to radical ideas have certain characteristics in common. Some of these are:42
- Relatively young age, seldom older than 25 years and not married
- Unfinished secondary education
- Low self esteem and often psychological problems
- High levels of frustration
- Disciplinary problems
- Most of them come from urban areas, especially Prishtina, from problematic
neighborhoods (Dardania, Vranjefc)
- Severed family ties
A prisoner who has this “profile” is more prone to try to look for acceptance with radical
Muslim groups. After entering a detention facility or prison in Kosovo he will sooner or
later have contact with either a “radical” or “radicalized” prisoner or the so called “prison
hoxha” or “prison imam”. This is a prisoner who appointed himself to the task of being a
prison cleric. Some of these prison clerics do indeed have received some kind of formal
education in a “madrassa“and their influence should not be underestimated. Fortunately
most of them preach a liberal and tolerant form of Islam and wouldn’t it be for them, the
number of radicalized prisoners would certainly be higher. In Kosovo, in contrast to most
Western countries prison radicalization doesn’t happen in the midst of the general prison
population, but in places where the “prison hoxhas” do not have access. These are high-
security blocks, detention centers, and the so called “arrival blocks”. An arrival block is a
building where a sentenced prisoner is sent to upon his arrival in prison. Normally the new
41 The Kosova Rehabilitation Centrefor Torture Victims,Human Rights in the Correctional Institutionsof
Kosovo, sixth annual report,April 2014,page 57
42 Interview with J. A., social worker in Peja prison,Peja,June 4, 2015

26
prisoner is supposed to stay there only for a short time, to be monitored more strictly, to be
evaluated if he is violent and then sent to another cell block in the general prison
population. In practice however, it can happen that a prisoner stays for months in the
“arrival” block. Living conditions there are severe and often prisoners sleep on the floor
due to overcrowding. Dubrava Prison’s arrival block housed more than 185 prisoners in
2011, while the maximum capacity for this block is only 80.43Sometimes prisoners there
turn to listening to radical Islamists out of sheer boredom. Similar conditions are found in
Kosovo’s detention centers: Overpopulation, lack of activity and lack of any spiritual
guidance like the one provided by the “prison imam“are factors that push prisoners into
the hands of more radical individuals. Other places where radicalization takes place are
segregation cells where prisoners are sent to when they seriously violate the rules of the
institution. The level of frustration of these inmates is very high and they are often
aggressive. In many cases prison management’s decision to send a prisoner into
segregation as a punishment is arbitrary. Although this matter is extensively regulated by
law, 44in practice decisions are based on corruption and influence from outside. Some
infrastructural factors are facilitating prisoner’s radicalization, while others may help to
stop or even reverse it.
Table 3. Radicalization Factors in Prison-Infrastructure
Factors in prison that are facilitating the
radicalization of prisoners
Factors in prison that might help prisoners
not to get radicalized
Overcrowding of living quarters Sufficient living space for each inmate
Arbitrary decisions by prison staff/ injustice Respect of laws, rules and regulations by
staff and prisoners
Lack of activities/ sport etc. Physical and cultural activities, a rich
library
Lack of spiritual guidance Prison imams and clerics visiting from
outside
Lack of social workers/ psychologists Well instructed and sufficient staff
Categorization taking into account the risks
of radicalization
Placement of vulnerable prisoners for long
periods of time in segregation or “arrival
blocks”
3.5 The Dubrava Prison Break
As I mentioned already in Chapter 1, a classical example of prisoner radicalization and the
consequences of it is the Dubrava prison break of 2007. During this time all prisoners in
Kosovo that were categorized as “high risk” and very”high risk” were concentrated in
block 1, Dubrava Prison. The same year management over the high risk category prisoners
43 Interview with B. S., Former Senior Supervisor in Dubrava Prison,May 10,2015
44 Kosovo Law on the Execution of Penal Sanctions (LEPS), articles 101-114,Assembly of the Republic of
Kosovo, Prishtina,July 2013.LEPS has 14 articles regulatingdisciplinary action againstprisoners,butonly
one article(92) that regulates privileges for good behavior.

27
was handed over from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to local
authorities. Block 1 prison staff became locally run; meanwhile UNMIK remained with
two Italian correction officers that had a monitoring function. At the time of the prison
break there was only a minimum of staff present, due to the summer holidays. Block 1 was
divided into North and South wing and each wing housed about 12 prisoners in cells with
one or two inmates. In overall there were 23 prisoners of different backgrounds in the
block, mainly:
- Former KLA soldiers, mostly accused of crimes related to the war;
- Very High Risk criminals, some of them escape risks
- Drug dealers that were suspected of being the leaders of important criminal groups
These three groups could freely meet with each other which made it possible for them to
combine their resources and to plan and organize an escape. Two prisoners who already
escaped several times successfully from prisons in Kosovo took over the planning, while
some of the former military were responsible for the logistics. It was their associates that
awaited the escapees once they made it over the prison wall and supplied them with
weapons. Money to bribe the guards and to buy weapons was given from the drug dealers,
although they were not involved in the planning and organization of the escape and in the
end they refrained from participating. The final preparations went on without them. A gun
was smuggled in with the help of a correction officer. All prisoners involved in the escape
had mobile phones which were used to organize and coordinate the escape. Due to the
high number of former KLA members in the block searches for mobile phones or weapons
were rare and if there was a search it was almost always very superficial as the correction
officers had a certain respect for the KLA members and didn’t want to impose any
inconveniences on them. As some of the former KLA members shared a cell with
prisoners from other groups, these persons profited as well from the laxness of the staff.
All this went on undetected from the eyes of the staff.
Several of the escapees were radicalized in the months prior to the escape by their fellow
radical inmates. Lirim Jakupi and Ramadan Shyti were both radical fundamentalists when
they came to block 1. Both had great authority in front of the other inmates due to their
involvement in the KLA45, the UCPMB46 and the National Liberation Army in Macedonia
as well. Ramadan Shyti was also known as the follower and “close friend”47 of Shukri
Aliu an influential radical Islamic cleric and former NLA commander who still has a great
influence on young Kosovars who join the terrorist organization Islamic State. The KCCS
“Report inquiring into the causes and consequences of Kosovo citizens’ involvement as
foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq” dedicates four pages to the activities of Shukri Aliu.48An
important factor that was helpful to radicalize a greater number of prisoners was the great
45 Kosovo Liberation Army
46 The UCPMB (Liberation Army of Presheva,Medvegja and Bujanofc) was an ethnic Albanian guerillaforce
operating in the Presheva Valley in south Serbia in 2000
47 KCCS report, Albanian version,“Raportpër shkaqe dhe pasojate perfshirjes seqytetareve të Kosovës si
luftëtare të huaj në Siri dheIrak,Prishtina,April 2015,page53
48 Ibid.,pages 52-55

28
number of literature and videos (DVD’s) that were brought in during family visits. Prison
authorities didn’t screen reading material and videos for radical content, but only checked
whether it contained pornography. Shyti and Jakupi were able to radicalize at least 5 other
prisoners, most of them former KLA fighters with military training but also some “very
high risk” prisoners who had criminal records for the most violent crimes. Not all
prisoners radicalized by Shyti and Jakupi escaped with them. Bedri Krasniqi, sentenced to
27 years for the murder of two police officers stayed behind. He eventually escaped in
December 2008. Some of those who stayed behind were sent to other prisons in Kosovo
where they themselves started radicalizing their fellow inmates. Xhafer Zymberi was
another block 1 inmate who didn’t participate in the escape. He spent several months in
block 1 during 2007, but eventually got released. He was killed on May 9 or 10, 2015 in
Kumanova, Macedonia as a member of an armed group of ethnic Albanians with links to
the former National Liberation Army (NLA). Although Xhaferi was by no means an
Islamist, he nevertheless cooperated with them under the command of the NLA. In
contrast to the Kosovo Liberation Army, that rejected any form of radical Islam, the
National Liberation Army in Macedonia always had a number of radical fundamentalists
in its ranks. Another person taking part in the Kumanovo incident was Shefqet Hallaqi. He
served time in Peja prison shortly before the Kumanovo incident took place, accused of
having assaulted a police station in Prizren in 2014. It is obvious that the prison
management in these cases made some serious mistakes. As this example shows, prisoner
radicalization is especially a problem in high security blocks or prisons and other
environments with similar conditions. Overcrowding, lack of activities and a violent
atmosphere are typical living conditions in high security prisons and are factors that
enforce and facilitate Prisoners radicalization.
3.6 Radical support networks
A radical Islamic prisoner in a Kosovo prison has support on the in and outside of the
institution. First of all there is always number of prisoners that sympathize with him and
his to cause. There are even staff members that do not discard some ideas of radical
Islamic ideology. In an informative talk after an interview that I conducted with a staff
member in Peja prison, the person told me that he can at least understand the “bearded
ones” regarding their hatred against Israel and the Jews. Radical prisoners have a lot of
followers in the general prison population. During the ritual prayers a lot of prisoner
responds to the call of the Prison Imams by shouting "tekbir". That doesn’t mean that all
these prisoners are radicalized, but it shows a widespread moral support for their ideas.
There are also persons on the outside that provide financial support. Due to the ongoing
corruption in the Kosovo correctional system a lot of radicalized prisoners own mobile
phones and are in contact with Muslim radical clerics in Kosovo. One radicalized prisoner
told me: “I can call him all the times; he will always answer my phone call, even when it

29
is three o’clock in the morning.” 49 The prisoner was talking about the Imam Shefqet
Krasniqi, a well-known radical cleric in Kosovo.
3.7 The Nexus between Radical Islam, Nationalist Terrorism and Organized Crime
KCS officials consider that the three groups that pose the greatest threat to the safety and
security in Kosovo’s prisons are50:
- Radical and radicalized Islamists
- Members of organized crime groups
- “Nationalist Albanian activists”, persons accused of war crimes and terrorist offenses
In Kosovo a prisoner might not belong to only one of these groups. The Dubrava escapees
that went to Macedonia in 2007 and fought with the Macedonian police belonged to more
than one “high risk” group. All of them were former members of the Kosovo Liberation
Army, some of them were members of the National Liberation Army, too, but all of them
were also radical Muslims. Before the Kumanovo incident in May 2015, Shefqet Hallaqi
was known to the authorities as a pimp and a violent person51, but not as a nationalist
terrorist. Prisoners belonging to one of these “high risk” groups don’t seem to have many
inhibitions to mingle with one or two of the other groups although they don’t share any
common beliefs with each other. Additionally the members of the “National Albanian
activists” groups are usually well connected to political circles. Xhafer Zymberi, the
former Dubrava block 1 prisoner that died in the Kumanovo incident was a candidate for a
political party during the parliamentary elections in Kosovo in June 2014. Bedri Krasniqi,
who escaped block 1, Dubrava prison in December of 2008 was working as a bodyguard
for a local politician after the war.
3.8 The Number of Radical Prisoners
There is no official count of the number of Islamic radical prisoners in Kosovo’s
correctional system. Therefore the numbers given here are based on interviews I
conducted with correction personnel and my own observations. It is relatively easy to
establish the number of persons who were arrested on grounds of their radical Islamic
activities and that are now in pretrial detention in several prisons in Kosovo. All of them
are suspected or charged of crimes related to terrorism. It is however difficult to establish
how many prisoners have been radicalized during their incarceration. This number can
only be estimated. It is impossible to know if their radicalism is just some temporary
49 Interview with C.C, radicalized prisoner,May 23,2015
50 Interview with Sami Gashi,actingdirector,Peja prison,Peja,May 20, 2015
51 He assaulted a policestation in Prizren in 2014, for this crime he served time in Peja prison

30
behavior during their stay in jail or if it will continue after their release. To ascertain if a
prisoner belongs to the“radicalized in prison” category the following criteria were applied:
- The prisoner socializes with prisoners known to be radicals
- The prisoner is imprisoned for violent crimes (murder, armed robbery etc)
- The prisoner behaves aggressively towards other inmates who are less “religious”
- The prisoner owns or consumes radical Islamic reading material, DVD’s, CD’s etc
- The prisoner is praying the saleed, the Muslim prayer, in the “radical” or “Taliban”
way and/or is using the “tekbir” phrase inappropriately in an aggressive or defiant
way52
Only if a prisoner has fulfilled all five criteria and after having spoken with his cellmates
was he considered “radicalized in prison”. The fact that a prisoner is bearded and is
wearing clothes that are normally attributed to persons with radical fundamentalist
convictions is not sufficient to consider him as “radicalized”, because people in prison
tend to dress more “extreme” and unconventional then on the outside. There are prisoners,
especially in Dubrava prison that look quite radical on first sight, but it turns out that they
do not share any radical Islamic beliefs. The numbers given here are conservative and on
the lower end of any estimate.
Table 4. Number of Radical Prisoners in Kosovo Prisons (May 2015 estimate)
Detention Facility/Prison Radical Islamic Prisoner Radicalized in Prison
Dubrava 3 453
High Security Prison in
Gërdovc
254 855
Peja Detention Center 6 0
Gjilan Detention Center 0 1
Total Number 11 13
That means that the total number of radical Islamic prisoners in the Kosovo prison system
ranges at around 24 prisoners. 56 Although these numbers don’t seem that high it is
52 Several radical prisonersduringtheir interviews with me told me about slightdifferences between the
prayer positions of moderate and radical Muslims;“tekbir” is Arabic and stands for “Allahu Ekber”(God is
the greatest)
53 This number includes Shkumbin Mehmeti who is placed in Block D outside Dubrava’s main prison
54 In pretrial detention
55 This number includes mostof the survivingDubrava escapees fromthe 2007 prison break,Burim Basha,
Faton Hajrizi (meanwhileradicalized),Amir Sopa, LirimJakupi,AstritShabani , but also Bedri Krasniqi,one
of the most notorious offenders in Kosovo
56 I heavily relied on interviews to get these numbers : For Dubrava Prison :interview with H. H., former
chief of Block 2 (pretrial detention, Dubrava prison),interviewon April 23, 2015,for High Security Prison in
Gërdovc : interview with QQ, official in Gërdovc , interview on xx,x,2015,for Peja Detention Center :
interview with S. K., Senior supervisor in chargeof security,Peja Detention Center, interview on March 17,
2015

31
nevertheless a disturbing fact that the number of prisoners ‘radicalized in prison’ exceeds
the number of radical Islamic prisoners that have been placed in detention for their radical
activities and are actually known to the authorities as such.
3.9 Awareness on Radicalization
Prison authorities are aware of the ongoing radicalization in Kosovo’s prisons. But as the
numbers of radical and radicalized prisoners is still low in relation to the common prison
population other issues are prioritized. Starting to stop the radicalization of prisoners is not
on top of the KCS task list.
First of all there is a tremendous problem with drug abuse in Kosovo’s prisons. People
with drug problems constitute about 35%57 of the general prison population. There is no
rehabilitation program set up for this category of prisoners.
There are serious problems with corruption and with overpopulation as well. There is a
lack of staff in almost all detention facilities and the staff that is working there lacks
proper training, especially, for the treatment of “high risk” prisoners.58
Bearing in mind these kinds of conditions it is understandable that a program aimed to
stop radicalization is not on top of the KCS agenda. Another problem is that although KCS
management is aware of the ongoing radicalization inside their institutions, it is not certain
that the dangers these processes might pose for the future, not only for the safety and
security of prisons but for society in general are fully understood.
Kosovo authorities and the public opinion are unaware of prison radicalization. The
“National Strategy of the Republic of Kosovo against Terrorism” doesn’t mention
prisons.59The Kosovo Correctional Service is not a partner in its implementation. The
Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) in a recent “Report inquiring into the causes
and consequences of Kosovo citizens’ involvement as foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq”
mentions prisons as an institution that played an important role to the birth of radical
Islam. The report states that the ideology that makes young Kosovars go and fight in Syria
was born in Egyptian prisons. As many as 40% of the people who went from Kosovo to
Syria to join the Islamic State Organization have a criminal record60, meaning they were at
one time in their life imprisoned or detained. Unfortunately there is nothing said about
what role the prison played in the radicalization of these persons and if or whom they
might have met there that might have influenced them to join radical Islam.
57 Interview with the medical staff of Peja prison,May 6, 2015
58 The Kosovo Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims,Human Rights in the Correctional Institutions in
Kosovo, Sixth annual report, April 2014,page 33
59 Republika ë Kosovës, Strategjia kombëtare e Republikës sëKosovës kundër Terrorizmit, Prishtina,July
2015
60 Ibid.,page 71

32
Summary
• The Kosovo Correctional Service treats Islamic radical prisoner as “high risk” prisoners.
• Radical Islamic prisoners are dispersed over several detention centers and correctional
facilities.
• There are persons that have been radicalized in prison.
• The KCS is aware of prison radicalization, however considers that other problems have
priority.

33
CHAPTER 4 DERADICALIZATION IN KOSOVO’S PRISONS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates the possibilities to set up a prisoner deradicalization program in
Kosovo. By using the example of Peja Detention Center it shows which ones of the key
elements necessary for a deradicalization program are already in place and could be put to
use in a short time, but also which ones are missing.
4.2 Peja prison-Methodology of Research
Peja Detention Center is one of the smallest prisons in Kosovo. It has space only for 80
prisoners (Dubrava Correctional Center, in comparison houses about 900 prisoners61).
Although the observations reported here are not representative for the whole prison system
in Kosovo, the chapter describes and illustrates the problems that are facing other prisons
in Kosovo in a similar way. The upside of doing this kind of research in a small prison is
that it is easier to observe a very small environment where the prisoners have very limited
space for interaction. In bigger prisons like Dubrava or Gërdofc it would be nearly
impossible to make this kind of observations as the relations between staff and prisoners
are less intimate. As prisoners in Dubrava or Gërdofc live in different housing units,
access to them is much more restricted. In Peja all prisoners are housed in one single
building. Further, in an effort to fight corruption Dubrava prison started to rotate
correction personnel every month. That means that a correction officer stays one month in
one cell block and after that starts working in another block (building). That makes it
impossible for the staff to monitor a single prisoner for a longer period of time and detect
slow changes in the prisoner’s behavior. Nevertheless the scientific worth of the
observations presented here is limited to proving that the problem exists and illustrating it.
No conclusions should be drawn that could be projected to any other prison in Kosovo.
Nevertheless detention centers in Kosovo are very similar by their size and the way they
are organized and as one Human Rights group states in a report, they all deal with very
similar problems.62
61 The Kosova Rehabilitation Centrefor Torture Victims,Human Rights in the Correctional Institutionsof
Kosovo, sixth annual report,April 2014,page 35
62 Ibid.

34
4.3 Peja Prison- Short Description
Peja prison is a detention center situated in the West of Kosovo in the city centre of Peja.
It has a maximum capacity of 80 prisoners. As it is a detention center, about 85% of the
prisoners in Peja are in pretrial detention. The other 15% are sentenced prisoners usually
serving short sentences not exceeding 3 months. The sentenced prisoners are the
workforce of the prison.
4.3.1 Peja prison-Detainee Routine
In Peja prison one single building houses all prisoners. The building has four floors (A, B,
C, D). Floor A houses sentenced prisoners that work in the prison and has two cells, while
the other three floors house detainees. Each floor has a small bathroom with a shower on
one end and a small hall on the other. All detainees are accommodated in cells containing
four prisoners. Two cells (8 prisoners) take their meals together in one of the small halls at
the end of each corridor. Every prisoner is entitled to 45 minutes yard time twice a day.
The rest of the day they have to spend in their cells. Family visits are once a week and
each visit lasts half an hour.
4.3.2 Peja prison- High Risk prisoners
There are currently six high risk prisoners awaiting trial in Peja prison (April 2015).63 Five
of them are indicted for “Organization and Participation in a Terrorist group”64, while one
prisoner is suspected of “Recruitment for Terrorism.”65The only prisoner in Peja Prison
that meets the criteria “radicalized Prisoner” is indicted of robbery.66The 5 “high risk”
prisoners are dispersed between the other detainees. Never two of them share the same cell
or take their meals together. However due to the small size of the building it happens that
two high risk prisoners are sharing their yard time together. A High Risk prisoner’s
communication is restricted to:
- The three people in his cell
- The other four people of the neighbored cell with which whom he takes his meals
and spends his yard time
- Two other cells from another floor with which they have yard time together
- Eventual family visits and phone calls (if allowed by the court)
63 Prisoner sheet, daily update from 08.05.2015;This is a computer pri ntout containinga listof all prisoners
and important data (Registration Nr, Name, Date of Birth, Age, Floor and room nr, Date of Arrest,
admission to Peja Prison,admission time,category, lastcourtdecision,if indicted or not, nature of charge,
responsiblecourt,casenr, name of the judge who issued the lastdecision of their judge, if sentenced for
how long,release date, etc.)
64 Article143 of the Kosovo Criminal Code

35
- Visits from their lawyers and phone calls to them
- Staff members (Correction officers, nurses and doctors, social workers)
4.3.3 Characteristics of Radical Islamic Prisoners in Peja
Although I conducted many informal interviews with all of the prisoners of this category,
one has to take into account that all of them are awaiting trial and any information I
divulge here could harm their case, especially information about their involvement in
terrorist activities, their plans, their associates which are still not identified by the
authorities etc. Due to their low number it is not enough just to keep their names
anonymous. Therefore I will divulge only general information, mainly about their social
background and education, but also regarding their behavior and how far it differs from
that of “common” prisoners and from the “radicalized in prison” category.
4.3.4 Radical prisoners in Peja- General Information
The 5 “radicals” in Peja are between 26 and 29 years old. This is about the average age of
prisoners in Kosovo’s prisons and in Peja prison as well. Two of them have a criminal
record due to prior convictions, both convictions were for theft. All of them come from
small cities or villages.
4.3.5 Radical Prisoners in Peja-Social Background
All five “radicals” in Peja come from rural areas. Most of their family income comes from
farming or small jobs. One of them has been working as a security guard for a local
private security company and another one in a bakery. Their financial situation compared
to the rest of the population can be described as average. One detainee has his parents
working in Western Europe since 25 years and is therefore financially well off. Another
one’s father owns a small restaurant and this prisoner also had an income from the family
business.
4.3.6 Radical Prisoners in Peja –Family Ties
Three of the radical prisoners come from families that are non observant Muslims and they
state that at least some of their family members (usually the father or a brother) consume
alcohol. All 5 prisoners have several brothers and sisters and none of them is either the
youngest or the oldest child. None of them stated that he had any problems with his family
because of their radical religious beliefs. Two of them are married, both have children. Of
these two prisoners, none of them took his family with them when they left Kosovo for

36
Syria. All of them except of one (the one that has his family out of country) have regular
visits from their families.
4.3.7 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Education
Four of the High Risk prisoners have a high school degree and one of them has completed
elementary school. None of them has learned a profession, but as I mentioned before, one
of them is a licensed security guard, which involves a certain amount of training and
passing an exam.
4.3.8 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Religious Appearance
Four of the radicals are wearing beards and dress according to their religious conviction,
while one of them dresses like a usual person. By leaving their cells, prisoners in Peja are
obliged to wear an orange jumpsuit, so that what clothes a prisoner wears under his
jumpsuit is more or less a personal matter and is not restricted. All of them pray the
Muslim prayer five times a day like it is custom for any observant Muslim. Further all of
them read religious material that is provided by the prison library. None of them had any
books coming from the outside, by visitors or through mail. None of them smokes.
4.3.9 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Behavior
According to staff members all of the five are very polite when talking to staff and only
one of them had a disciplinary problem.67This is in stark contrast to the average inmate,
not only in Peja. Most of the prisoners have problems to adapt, show aggressiveness,
participate in illegal activities like smuggling, drug abuse, fights, etc. This is also in
contrast to almost all of the radicalized prisoners, who have an unusually high number of
disciplinary problems in comparism to the general prison population.
4.4.0 Radical Prisoners in Peja- Engagement with Radical groups
One radical prisoner told me that he regrets having come back from Syria: “I should have
stayed there”.68 Another one justifies his engagement with the Islamic State organization
as: “We’ve been fighting against the Serbs and Russians, what is wrong with that?”69 The
other three prisoners accused of having ties to the Islamic State didn’t want to talk about
their reasons why they joined ISIS or if they feel any regrets that they’ve done so70.
67 Interview with Z. Q., Shift Leader in Peja Prison,Peja,May 7, 2015, a cell phone was found with Prisoner
AB and the prisoner therefore spent 10 days in solitary confinementas a disciplinary measure.
68
Interview with A.A, IslamicRadical Prisoner,March 2,2015
69
Interview with D.D, Islamicradical,March 23,April 12,2015
70 In the meantime, after I finished my interviews with him, one of the radical prisoners went to court and
admitted his involvement with ISIS (June 5, 2015).

37
Nevertheless all of them spoke very frankly about their engagement, except of one. None
of them has given any religious justifications for his actions.
4.4.1 Religiously motivated interaction and incidents between radical prisoners and non
observant Muslim prisoners
There have been a number of serious incidents in 2014 and 2015 between radical prisoners
and other non observant Muslim prisoners in Peja Detention Center. In spring 2014 a
radicalized prisoner attacked one of his cellmates, because the latter didn’t want to join the
ritual prayers that were held in their cell. This radicalized prisoner was newly transferred
from Dubrava prison and tried to install himself in Peja as a “prison imam”. After a couple
of more incidents in which he threatened other prisoners with violence if they don’t join
him, he was transferred to Gjilan Detention Center. In another incident in August 2014 a
radical prisoner was severely beaten up by his cellmates after he showed his disapproval
for his cellmates who were consuming alcohol in their cell. The radical prisoner was
transferred as were two of his cellmates involved in the incident. Peja prison staff often
observed that once a radical prisoners comes into a new cell there is normally a time of
discussion between him and his cellmates which last about one or two weeks.71 After that
time usually some of his cellmates and sometimes even all of them join the radical with
the ritual prayers. When the radical is removed from the cell, usually after two or three
month (due to his status as “high risk” he is supposed to change his cell every two weeks,
but in reality prison management does not rotate high risk prisoners more often than every
2 or 3 month) things go back to normal and it is rare that any cell continues with ritual
prayers for a long time after the radical or radicalized prisoner has been removed. It must
be said that the fact that a prisoner joins a radical Islamist in his prayers is not necessarily
a sign of radicalization, but rather should be interpreted as morale support given to the
radical.
4.5 Deradicalization Efforts
At the time of this writing there is no deradicalization program set up or planned in Peja
prison, nor in any other facility of the Kosovo Correctional Service. High risk prisoners
are monitored, but not in regard to their radical Islamic activities or eventual attempts to
radicalize other prisoners. Nobody is monitoring and reporting of radicalized prisoners or
their potential “victims”. The KCS has no statistics about how many prisoners were
radicalized in Kosovo prisons.
71 Interview with Z. Q., Supervisor and ShiftLeader in Peja Prison,May 24, 2015

38
4.6 Key Elements in Kosovo prisons regarding Deradicalization
As described in Chapter 2, some key elements have to be in place, which are necessary for
a successful deradicalization. It cannot be expected that Kosovo will have its own prisoner
deradicalization program in the near future. Therefore deradicalization in this context
should be understood as every measure that prevents prisoners from getting radicalized.
4.6.1 Key Elements of Deradicalization – Peja Prison
1. Monitoring
There is a certain monitoring of radical prisoners in place. As all “radicals” are in the high
risk category, staff members have a closer look on them then they would normally have.
There was however a case in the past where a radical Islamic prisoner was not properly
categorized due to the negligence of the court. The KCS staff in Peja doesn’t share
information regarding prisoner radicalization with their Central Institutions or the Police.
2. Screening of external radicalizing factors
Books and other text material that comes into prison through visits or other channels are
not controlled for its content. The officer in charge of security in Peja prison:” We only
stop items from entering the prison if there is a direct threat to the security of the
institution.”72 The prison library contains about 400 titles and about 15% of them are
books with religious content. Most of these books come from the Dubrava prison library.
According to the person in charge of the library, the titles are “carefully chosen by the
prison authorities as a countermeasure to the great number of radical Islamic literature that
had flooded Kosovo prisons in the past.”73 Most of the books are indeed liberal and have
no radical content. However there are a couple of texts that preach extremist and radical
views of Islam. One example is a booklet titled “Great Sins”74, where the author states
(about homosexuality):
”All the scholars… accept that persons who are doing that act have to be killed…they
agree that these persons have to be punished with the most severe punishment... (The
prophet)…says: Kill the actor and the one upon he acts. After that they share their
thoughts at what would be the proper punishment. Some mentions lapidating, some say to
throw them from a mountain or a great height.”75
72 Interview with S. K., Senior Supervisor for Security in Peja Prison,April,2015
73 Interview of the author with N. M., Correction Officer and head of Logistics in Peja Prison,Peja,April 12,
2015
74 Lulzim Susuri,“Mekatet e Medha”, Prishtina 2013
75 Ibid.,page 32

39
Another booklet titled “Besimi Islam”76 is published by the Muslim Youth Forum, a sub
organization of the Islamic LISBA party.77 The book is a translation from an Arabic text
written by Muhammad bin Salih El Uthejmin. El Uthejmin is considered a Salafist
scholar. Some countries, like Germany for example, consider Salafism to be a radical
Islamic movement and a threat to democracy. Therefore Salafist organizations in Germany
are under the observation of the Federal Office of the Protection of the Constitution.78 The
book is translated by Dr. Shefqet Krasniqi. Both, the head of the LISBA party, Fuad
Ramiqi and Dr. Shefqet Krasniqi have been arrested in 2014 and both of them spent
several months in jail accused of “Inciting national, racial, religious or ethnic hatred,
discord or intolerance.”79 Fuad Ramiqi was detained in Peja prison.
Shefqet Krasniqi’s and other radical preacher’s lectures can also be followed by Peja
prisoner’s on the television in their cell. TV Mitrovica, a local TV station from Mitrovica
is broadcasting a lot of religious programs and its signal can be received in Peja prison.
3. Staff Training
Peja prison has a relatively well trained staff in comparison with other institutions in
Kosovo. Many of them have a long work-experience. There is no lack of staff and due to
the small size of the prison staff members very quickly familiarize with new prisoners.
However there are no guidelines issued about how to treat Radical Muslim Prisoners and
the staff has received no special training to deal with this prisoner’s category.
4. Prison regimes
As it has been stated before, radical prisoners share their cell with regular prisoners. There
is no concentration of radical prisoners on any floor and their maximum number on each
floor usually doesn’t exceed three. However in the past the number of Radical prisoners
detained in Peja was higher (up to twelve) and due to the lack of space it was not always
possible for the management to strictly separate them from each other.
76 Muhammed bin Salih El Uthejmin, “Besimi Islam”(IslamicFaith),Prishtina 2015
77 LISBA in Albanian “Lista Islamee Bashkuar”and in English “Muslim Listto Unite”, a political party in
Kosovo considered radical
78 Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz,”SalafistischeBestrebungen in Deutschland“, April 2015,page 1
79 Article147, Criminal Codeof Kosovo

40
5. Theological Dialogue and Interlocutors
There is no Islamic cleric who visits the institution. Psychologists are not available for the
prisoners, but there is a psychiatrist visiting the prison about once a week. However due to
the high number of drug addicted prisoners it is impossible for him to spend more than
five minutes with each patient. Two social workers are employed in Peja prison and their
caseload is relatively low, so that they have enough time to commit their time to more
problematic prisoners. One of them even made an attempt to convince a radicalized
prisoner to refrain from his violent beliefs; unfortunately after a few sessions with the
social worker the prisoner refused to participate in more talks.80The reasons for his refusal
are unknown to the social worker.
6. Incentives
The possibility for the management to offer any benefits for prisoners willing to
deradicalize or to refrain from violence is very limited. This is due to the Law on the
Execution of Penal Sanctions. The director has very few competencies and room to
maneuver when it comes to granting benefits for inmates. Further the benefits foreseen by
the law are mostly for sentenced prisoners, while in Peja Detention Center all of the
radical and radicalized persons are detainees in pretrial detention.
7. Social Assistance
Kosovo is a poor country and financially helping the prisoner’s families is impossible, as
there is no budget for that. The only thing the prison administration can do is to refer a
case to the local social entity on the municipal level. The social situation of most of the
inmates and their families is severe. Compared to them the radical prisoners and their
families are relatively well off and wouldn’t qualify for any social assistance anyway.
8. Aftercare
Most of the prisoners that are considered radical Islamic and that served time in Peja
prison have been released without a trial due to lack of evidence or they were sent home to
await their upcoming trial under house arrest. There is no aftercare program especially
designed for radical prisoners that are released from prison and they are treated just like all
other prisoners. In case a prisoner is released on probation there is a mandatory program
which is supervised by probation officers. This program mainly consists of making sure
that the released person does not violate his parole conditions.
80Interview with F. B., social worker in Peja prison,April 12,2015

41
Table 5. Deradicalization Key Elements in Peja Prison
Key Element In Place Not in
Place
Partially
in Place
Monitoring X
Screening of external
Radicalization Factors
X
Staff Training X
Prison Regimes 
Interlocutors X
Incentives X
Social Assistance X
Aftercare X
Summary: Deradicalization in Kosovo’s prisons
There are radical as well as radicalized prisoners in Peja Detention Center, even though in
small numbers. Radical prisoners are separated from each other and are housed together
with other non-radical prisoners. There have been violent incidents in the past between
these groups. Books with radical Islamic content can be found in the prison library and the
prisoners can follow radical Islamic programs on the TV set in their cells. Prison
management has not taken any steps to address these issues. Most of the key elements
necessary for deradicalization are not in place in Peja prison.

42
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Prisoner deradicalization is not a new concept in Western countries. In the United States
the first programs were introduced more than 30 years ago, mostly to fight gang related
crime and prison gangs. Great Britain and Western Germany had their own programs to
disengage Irish Republican Army members jailed in the United Kingdom and Red Army
Faction terrorists in German prisons. The deradicalization models from today, in the
United States and elsewhere, are based on experiences gained at that time. Deradicalizing
Islamic radical prisoners is of course different from deradicalizing gang members or
nationalist terrorists and some methods that worked with them may not work with Islamic
radicals. There is a lot of discussion about how to implement these programs and there is
also the question how to measure their success.
To recommend a certain program or a certain approach used in another country for
Kosovo is not possible. Every country is different and what might work in one country
turns out to be an utter failure in another. Still, Kosovo is a small place and is dealing with
a certain type of radical Islamic extremists. Therefore collective deradicalization, which
usually includes a huge number of radical prisoners that are well organized and have a
certain kind of hierarchy, is not an adequate approach for Kosovo. Kosovo authorities
should concentrate on individual deradicalization.
5.1. Deradicalization in Kosovo’s prisons-How to begin?
Measures that should be taken in Kosovo to fight radical Islam in prison can be classified
in different ways. One way is to ascertain which measures can be implemented
immediately without having to change the law. Other measures need a budget to be set up.
More sophisticated measures are relying on the coordination between different
government agencies and are part of a strategic long term and nationwide deradicalization
effort. Therefore the following recommendations are divided in three groups:
Short term measures are measures that can be introduced to the KCS immediately. No
change of any laws and no additional budget are required. Mid- term measures require a
certain budget and a change or reexamination of administrative instructions. To put long
term measures into place the Law on the Execution of Penal Sanctions has to be amended.
Further, the drafting of a national deradicalization program requires a lot of time that is
needed to coordinate every step with all the institutions involved and to plan a budget that
covers all the costs.

43
5.2 Short term (immediate) measures to fight radicalism in Kosovo’s prisons
The measures presented here are tactical and their purpose is to stop and prevent
radicalization.
Raising Awareness
Kosovo authorities are still mostly unaware of the role that prisons play in radicalization
processes. Furthermore in Kosovo prisons there is a dangerous nexus between Islamic
radicals, nationalist radicals and criminals. The Kosovo Correctional Service should raise
their awareness to deal with this problem and make it one of their top priorities. KCS
management should be made a partner in the implementation of Kosovo’s National
Strategy against Terrorism.
Using Resources
There are certain structures already in place that can be used for individual
deradicalization efforts. We’ve seen the examples of the “prison imams” in Dubrava
prison or the effort of a single social worker in Peja. These persons should be supported by
the prison management. Some other key elements can be set up immediately in all Kosovo
prisons:
- Bring in Muslim clerics from the outside to teach a tolerant form of Islam to prisoners
- Start the screening of reading material that enters the prison for radical content
- More frequent cell rotations of radical prisoners
- Issuing guidelines to the staff on how to treat radical prisoners
Improved Monitoring
It shouldn’t be a problem to set up an effective monitoring system that permits to have a
closer look at radical prisoners and to report suspicious behavior. That doesn’t necessarily
require additional staff. However, certain newly introduced practices like rotating staff
each month from one housing unit to another, like in Dubrava prison, makes prisoner
monitoring impossible and it also violates the Kosovo Correctional Service’s principle of a

Prisoners of Faith: A study about Prisoner Radicalization in Kosovo

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