IBM Cloud Technical University 2016 - How to Transform Your Messaging Environment to a Secure Messaging Environment

IBM Cloud Technical University 2016
25 – 28 October 2016|Madrid, Spain
I173
How to Transform Your Messaging
Environment to a Secure
Messaging Environment
Rob Parker, MQ Ecosystem

2
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remains at our sole discretion.
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be given that an individual user will achieve results similar to those stated here.
Please Note:

© 2016 IBM Corporation 3
Agenda
• Aims of this presentation
 Step by step of each security feature in MQ
 Will take an unsecured Queue Manager and
secure it
 At the end we will have a secured Queue
Manager
• Each security feature section will have:
 What is it and Why do you use it
 Main points of the feature
 How to configure it.

Available Security Features
• Connection Authentication
• Authorisation
• Channel Authentication
• Transport Layer Security (TLS)
• Security Exits
• AMS

Client to Queue Manager connections (Net)
Channel Authentication
(BLOCKADDR)
TLS
(ADDR/USER/SSL Map)
Security Exit
Connection
Authentication
(BLOCKUSER)
Authorisation
MQRC_NONE
MQRC_NOT_AUTHORIZED
Or

Client to Queue Manager connections (Local)
(BLOCKADDR)
TLS
(ADDR/USER/SSL Map)
Security Exit
Connection
Authentication
(BLOCKUSER)
Authorisation

Queue Manager to Queue Manager
(BLOCKADDR)
TLS
(ADDR/QMName/SSL Map)
Security Exit
Authorisation

Working example
• Queue Manager
• Channel Type(SVRCONN)
• Local Queue
• Channel Authentication – Disabled
• Connection Authentication – Disabled
• MQ Administrator set on Channel MCA
• No Security Exit
• TLS not configured
• AMS not configured
CTU
Client.Data.Q
Client.Connections

Connection Authentication

Introduction
• Authentication is used to force clients to identify
themselves.
• It is usually used in combination with authorisation.
• Connection authentication was added as a feature of
MQ in version 8.
*****

Main features
• MQ allows you to specify levels of security for
connections
 Client and local can be set to different levels
 Different client connections can have different
levels using Channel Authentication records.
• Also allows two different user repositories to check
supplied credentials against
 Operating system OAM.
 LDAP Server
*****

Configuration
DEFINE AUTHINFO(USE.OS) AUTHTYPE(IDPWOS)
DEFINE AUTHINFO(USE.LDAP) AUTHTYPE(IDPWLDAP)
CONNAME(‘ldap1(389),ldap2(389)’)
LDAPUSER(‘CN=QMGR1’)
LDAPPWD(‘passw0rd’) SECCOMM(YES)
MQCONNX
User1 + pwd1
Application (User2)
QMGR
CTU
O/S User
Repository
(z/OS + Dist)
LDAP Server (Dist only)

Configuration
CHCK…
NONE
OPTIONAL
REQUIRED
REQDADM
MQCONNX
MQCONNX
Application (User2)
QMGR
CTUInter process
Communications
DEFINE AUTHINFO(USE.PW) AUTHTYPE(xxxxxx)
CHCKLOCL(OPTIONAL)
CHCKCLNT(REQUIRED)
ADOPTCTX(NO)
ALTER QMGR CONNAUTH(USE.PW)
REFRESH SECURITY TYPE(CONNAUTH)
MQRC_NOT_AUTHORIZED (2035)
MQRC_NONE (0)
User
Repository
Application (User4)

Configuration
DEFINE AUTHINFO(USE.PW) AUTHTYPE(xxxxxx)
CHCKCLNT(OPTIONAL)
SET CHLAUTH(‘*’) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP)
ADDRESS(‘*’) USERSRC(CHANNEL)
CHCKCLNT(REQUIRED)
ADOPTCTX(NO)
SET CHLAUTH(‘*’) TYPE(SSLPEERMAP)
SSLPEER(‘CN=*’) USERSRC(CHANNEL)
CHCKCLNT(ASQMGR)
CHCKCLNT
ASQMGR
REQUIRED
REQDADM
QMGR
CTU
User's Digital
Certificate
CA
Sig
MQCONNX
Application (User2)
MQRC_NONE (0)
SSL/TLS Network
Communications
MQCONNX
Application (User4)
MQRC_NOT_AUTHORIZED (2035)

Configuration
• Procedural MQI changes:
• MQCSP structure
 Connection Security Parameters
 User ID and password
• MQCNO structure
 Connection Options
MQCNO cno = {MQCNO_DEFAULT};
cno.Version = MQCNO_VERSION_5;
cno.SecurityParmsPtr = &csp;
MQCONNX(QMName,
&cno,
&hConn,
&CompCode,
&Reason);
MQCSP csp = {MQCSP_DEFAULT};
csp.AuthenticationType = MQCSP_AUTH_USER_ID_AND_PWD;
csp.CSPUserIdPtr = “parrobe";
csp.CSPUserIdLength = 7; /* Max: MQ_CLIENT_USER_ID_LENGTH */
csp.CSPPasswordPtr = "passw0rd";
csp.CSPPasswordLength = 8; /* Max: MQ_CSP_PASSWORD_LENGTH */

Configuration
• Object Oriented MQ classes changes
• JMS/XMS classes changes
MQEnvironment.properties = new Hashtable();
MQEnvironment.userID = “parrobe";
MQEnvironment.password ="passw0rd";
System.out.println("Connecting to queue manager");
MQQueueManager qMgr = new MQQueueManager(QMName);
cf = getCF();
System.out.println("Creating the Connection with UID and Password");
Connection conn = cf.createConnection(“parrobe", "passw0rd");

Authorisation

Introduction
• Authorisation is used to limit what connected
applications can do.
• Authority can be given on a per group basis
 Windows allows per user by default
 Linux can do per user with configuration
• Authority to perform an action is given.
 By default a user/group will not have any authority
• Best practice is to only grant minimum required
authority

Features
• Each object in MQ can have separate authorities for
each user/group
 Additionally you can also supply a generic object
name
• MQ supplies 5 tools to view and modify authority
records
 MQ Explorer
⁻ Display, create and alter authority records for all
objects

Tools (continued)
 runmqsc
⁻ Display, create & Alter Authority records for all
objects
 setmqaut
⁻ Create & Alter authority records for requested
objects
 dspmqaut
⁻ Displays authority records for requested objects
 dmpmqaut
⁻ Outputs authority records for requested objects,
output can be inputted into QMGR.

Which user is used for authorization?
Method Notes
Client machine user ID flowed to
server
This will be over-ridden by anything else. Rarely do you
want to trust an unauthenticated client side user ID.
MCAUSER set on SVRCONN
channel definition
A handy trick to ensure that the client flowed ID is never
used is to define the MCAUSER as ‘rubbish’ and then
anything that is not set appropriately by one of the next
methods cannot connect.
MCAUSER set by
ADOPTCTX(YES)
The queue manager wide setting to adopt the password
authenticated user ID as the MCAUSER will over-ride
either of the above.
MCAUSER set by CHLAUTH rule To allow more granular control of MCAUSER setting,
rather than relying on the above queue manager wide
setting, you can of course use CHLAUTH rules
MCAUSER set by Security Exit Although CHLAUTH gets the final say on whether a
connection is blocked (security exit not called in that
case), the security exit does get called with the
MCAUSER CHLAUTH has decided upon, and can change
it.

Configuration
• Example 1: Granting clients the ability to read to the
Queue
 Here we will give the group “readers” authority to
connect
 In a command prompt
• Queue Manager to create authority record for
• Object type you are creating authority record for
• Group to give authority to
• Authorities
Setmqaut –m CTU –t qmgr –g readers +connect

Configuration
• Example 1: Granting clients the ability to read to the
Queue
 Here we will give the group “readers” GET and
BROWSE authority
 In runmqsc.
• Object to grant authorities for
• Object type
• Group to grant authority
• Authority to add
SET AUTHREC PROFILE(CLIENT.DATA.Q) OBJTYPE(QUEUE) +
GROUP(‘readers’) AUTHADD(GET) AUTHADD(BROWSE)

Channel Authentication Records

Introduction
• Allows Granular control over connections
 Can Supply a whitelist or blacklist to block or allow
connections
• Can filter on:
 SSL distinguished name (both issuer and subject)
 Client user ID (Application or final adopted)
 Remote Queue Manager name
 IP/Hostname
 Blocking at channel (ADDRESSMAP) or listener
(BLOCKADDR) level

Features
• Values used in filters can be specific or generic
• Specific rules have higher precedence than generic
rules
1. Addressmap blocking ‘*’
2. Addressmap allowing ‘127.0.0.1’
 Any connections from 127.0.0.1 will be allowed by
(2).
 Other connections blocked by (1)

Features
• When creating Channel Authentication rule you can set
it to use a different User ID for future authority checks:
 NOACCESS – Blocks the connection regardless
 CHANNEL – Use the User ID specified in Channel
MCA
⁻ If this is blank then we use the userid supplied
by application
 MAP – Use the User ID specified in this rule.

Configuration
• Example 1: Blacklisting bad connections
 Aim: Block connections from 129.1.198.X
• In Rumqsc:
• Channel name
• Rule type
• Address to match to
• Action
• Warn
SET CHLAUTH(‘CLIENT.CONNECTIONS’) TYPE(ADDRESSMAP) +
ADDRESS(‘129.1.198.*’) USERSRC(NOACCESS) WARN(NO)

Configuration
• In MQ Explorer:

Transport Layer Security

Introduction
• TLS is used for two reasons in MQ:
 Authentication with a Queue Manager
 Encrypting and protecting data in transit between a
client or Queue Manager and destination Queue
Manager.
• Uses a certificate containing a public-private key pair in
order to establish a secure link.
 Called an SSL Handshake.

Features
• During the SSL Handshake, asymmetric encryption is
used.
 Once the handshake is completed symmetric
encryption is used to transfer data.
• Channels are enabled for SSL/TLS by setting a
CipherSpec.
 Only one CipherSpec can be used on a channel.

Features
• A server Queue Manager must have a certificate
• A client application (or client Queue Manager) does
not require a certificate.
 But does require a copy of the server Queue
Manager’s public certificate.
• As of MQ v8 a channel can use a different certificate
than the Queue Manager it is defined on.

Tools
• MQ Supplies 3 tools for your certificate and key
repository management needs:
 strmqikm (or IBM Key Management)
⁻ IBM JRE GUI tool for managing certificates
 runmqckm
⁻ command line tool to manage certificates – can
handle JKCS repositories
 runmqakm
⁻ Command line tool to manage certificates – can
handle Elliptic Curve certificates

Defaults
• Default location for Queue Manager Key Repository is
 <MQ Data Root>/qmgrs/<QM Name>/ssl/key.kdb
⁻ Can be changed using Queue Manager SSLKEYR
attribute
• Default certificate used by the Queue Manager is
 Ibmwebspheremq<qmname>
⁻ Can be changed in MQ v8+ using Queue
Manager CERTLABL attribute

Configuration
• Example 1: Setting up a Queue Manager to use SSL/TLS
• First create the Key Repository the Queue Manager will
use:
 In a command prompt:
• What we are altering
• Action to perform
• Name and location of key repository to create
• Password to access the key repository
• Tells runmqakm to stash the password which is used by
MQ.
runmqakm –keydb –create –db /var/mqm/qmgrs/CTU/ssl/key.kdb
–pw passw0rd -stash

Configuration
• Next create the Queue Manager’s certificate
• In a command prompt:
• What we are altering
• The action to perform
• Where to store the certificate
• Tells runmqakm to use the stash file to access the key repository
• The distinguished name to give the certificate
• The label to refer to the certificate
runmqakm –cert –create –db /var/mqm/qmgrs/CTU/ssl/key.kdb
–stashed –dn “CN=CTU,OU=MQ,O=IBM,C=UK” –label ibmwebspheremqctu

Configuration
• Next set the Queue Manager to use Key Repository
 Unless you are using defaults
 In runmqsc
• Location of the key repository to use
 No file extension!
• Label of certificate to use
ALTER QMGR SSLKEYR(‘/var/mqm/qmgrs/CTU/ssl/key’) +
CERTLABL(‘ibmwebspheremqctu’)

Configuration
• Finally set a channel to use SSL
 In runmqsc
• Channel name
• Whether to enforce mutual authentication
• The CipherSpec to use on this channel
ALTER CHANNEL(‘CLIENT.CONNECTIONS’) SSLCAUTH(REQUIRED) +
SSLCIPH(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256)

Configuration
• Example 1: Client application changes
• MQSCO structure
• SSL Security Parameters
• Location of Key Repository
• Certificate label to use (MQ v8 Only)
• MQCNO structure
• Connection Options
MQSCO sco = {MQSCO_DEFAULT};
sco.version = MQSCO_VERSION_5
sco.KeyRepository = “/var/client/clientkeyr”;
Sco.CertificateLabel = “clientcertificate”
MQCNO cno = {MQCNO_DEFAULT};
cno.Version = MQCNO_VERSION_4;
cno.SSLConfigPtr = &sco;
MQCONNX(QMName,
&cno,
&hConn,
&CompCode,
&Reason);

Configuration
• Example 1: Client application
• Alternatively, if you cannot adjust your application
 In command prompt
EXPORT MQSSLKEYR=var/client/clientkeyr
EXPORT MQCERTLABL=clientcertificate

Configuration
 Ensure the certificate trust chain is complete on
each side
ibmwebspheremqctu
Queue Manager KeystoreClient Keystore
runmqakm –cert –extract –db /var/mqm/qmgrs/CTU/ssl/key.kdb
–stashed –label ibmwebspheremqctu –file /var/certs/qmgr.cer
Qmgr.cer

Configuration
each side
ibmwebspheremqctu
Qmgr.cer
runmqakm –cert –add –db /var/client/clientkeyr.kdb –stashed
–label qmgrsignercert –file /var/certs/qmgr.cer
qmgrsignercert

Configuration
• Example 1: Client application (Mutual Authentication)
each side
ibmwebspheremqctu
client.cerqmgrsignercert
clientcertificate
clientsignercert
runmqakm –cert –extract –db /var/client/clientkeyr.kdb
–stashed –label clientcertificate –file
/var/certs/client.cer
runmqakm –cert –add –db /var/mqm/qmgrs/CTU/ssl/key.kdb
–stashed –label clientsignercert –file /var/certs/client.cer

Security Exits

Introduction
• Security exits are bespoke, customer created exists that
are ran during the security checks.
• MQ contains an API used in the security exits to extract
information about an incoming connection.
 This information can then be used in the security
exit to determine whether to allow or disallow a
connection.
• Prior to MQ v8 a security exit was used in MVS to
supply connection authentication capabilities
 CSQ4BCX3

Features
• Security exits are stored in
 <MQ Data Root>/exits/<Installation name>
• MQ will look in this folder when an exit is attached to a
channel
• Exits are referenced in SCYEXIT channel attribute
 Without the file suffix or location

Features
• As well as security exits there are also:
 Receive exits – RCVEXIT
 Send exits – SENDEXIT
• For each exit you can also supply custom data to pass
to the exit using the channel’s ***DATA attribute
 For example Security exit data using SCYDATA

Configuration
• First write a C Application with the following skeleton
code:
void MQENTRY MQStart() {;}
void MQENTRY EntryPoint (PMQVOID pChannelExitParms,
PMQVOID pChannelDefinition,
PMQLONG pDataLength,
PMQLONG pAgentBufferLength,
PMQVOID pAgentBuffer,
PMQLONG pExitBufferLength,
PMQPTR pExitBufferAddr)
{
PMQCXP pParms = (PMQCXP)pChannelExitParms;
PMQCD pChDef = (PMQCD)pChannelDefinition;
/* TODO: Add Security Exit Code Here */
}

Configuration
• Next compile and link the exit as a Dynamic library and
place in:
 <MQ Data Root>/exits/<Installation name>

Configuration
• Next specify the exit on the channel:
 In runmqsc
• Channel name
• Name of security exit to run
 Without location or file extension
• Custom data to pass to the security exit
ALTER CHANNEL(‘CLIENT.CONNECTIONS’) SCYEXIT(‘mqccred’) +
SCYDATA(‘sec exit data’)

Advanced Messaging Security

Introduction
• AMS provides a higher level of protection to messages
• Has two levels of protection - policies
 Integrity protection
⁻ Prevents messages from being tampered with.
⁻ Guarantees message has been received from
known source
 Integrity and privacy protection
⁻ Same benefits as Integrity protection
⁻ Also provides encryption to prevent
unauthorised recipients seeing message
!*54%
@”p

Features
• AMS does not perform access control but simply
provides privacy and integrity to messages.
• Messages are protected using certificates that each
signer and recipient will need.
 Depending on level of protection
!*54%
@”p

Features
• It is an end-to-end security model
 Messages are protected from creation until
destruction
• Messages can be protected so that only authorised
users can see message data
 This means even MQ Administrators cannot view a
message.
• Messages are protected both in transit and at rest
 Satisfies the standards compliance for certain data
types (HIPAA, PCI, etc)
!*54%
@”p

Features
• AMS is incorporated into MQ Client applications
without the need for re-building applications
 No code changes are necessary!
• Message size will increase in order to incorporate AMS
format
 New message size = 1280 + [Old Message Length] +
(200 x [# of recipients])
!*54%
@”p

Tools
• Unlike SSL, it requires the FULL trust chain
 Subject certificate, signer certificate, signer’s signer
certificate, etc
• MQ has three tools for defining and managing policies
 MQ Explorer
⁻ Define, display, delete policies
 setmqspl
⁻ Define, delete policies
 dspmqspl
⁻ Display policies
!*54%
@”p

Configuration
• Example 1: Configuring MQ to protect messages
 In a command prompt:
• Queue Manager
• Queue to protect
• Signing algorithm
• Authorised signer
• Encryption algorithm
• Authorised recipient
!*54%
@”p
setmqspl -m CTU -p CLIENT.DATA.Q -s SHA512 -a
"CN=CLIENT1,O=CLIENTORG,C=UK" -e AES256 -r
"CN=CLIENT2,O=CLIENTORG,C=UK"

Configuration
Example 1: Application changes
!*54%
@”p
Alice’s
Sending/Receiving
App
AliceCertificate
MQS_KEYSTORE_CONF=/…/Keystore.conf
(Or create Keystore.conf in home directory)
No Changes Necessary!
Keystore.conf
cms.keystore=/…/Keystore
cms.certificate=AliceCertificate
Keystore

For Additional Information
 IBM Digital Experience Solutions
http://www-01.ibm.com/software/collaboration/digitalexperience
 WebSphere Portal and IBM Web Content Manager Information
Center Wiki
http://www-10.lotus.com/ldd/portalwiki.nsf/
 IBM Digital Experience Demonstrations:
http://www.youtube.com/user/IBMXWebX
• IBM Digital Experience Developer
http://developer.ibm.com/digexp
 IBM Software Business Solutions Catalog
https://greenhouse.lotus.com/catalog/

Where can I get more information about IBM MQ?
IBM Messaging developerWorks
developer.ibm.com/messaging
IBM Messaging Youtube
https://www.youtube.com/IBMmessagingMedia
LinkedIn
Ibm.biz/ibmmessaging
Twitter
@IBMMessaging
IBM MQ Facebook
Facebook.com/IBM-MQ-8304628654/

Rob Parker
Thank you very much.
IBM
IBM MQ Ecosystem
parrobe@uk.ibm.com

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IBM Cloud Technical University 2016 - How to Transform Your Messaging Environment to a Secure Messaging Environment

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IBM Cloud Technical University 2016 - How to Transform Your Messaging Environment to a Secure Messaging Environment