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Resiliency in Systems Engineering
Prepared for C-NO INCOSE Chapter – 18 August 2020
Rick Hefner, Ph.D.
California Institute of Technology
Center for Technology and Management Education
rhefner@caltech.edu, 626.395.4043
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 1
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Background
 Resilience is the ability to provide required capabilities in the
face of adversity - any condition that may degrade the desired
capability of a system
 This presentation will discuss the characteristics of a resilient
system and its supporting design techniques
 Presentation is based on Systems Engineering courses at
Caltech Center for Technology and Management Education,
https://ctme.Caltech.edu
2Resiliency in SE | Hefner
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Resilience
 Resilience is the ability to
provide required capability
in the face of adversity
 Adversity is any condition
that may degrade the
desired capability of a
system
• Environmental sources
• Normal failure
• Human sources - malicious or
accidental
Can the corporate network
function effectively under:
 Flood, earthquake
 Failure of any component
 Human error in configuration
 Cyber attack
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 3
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Resiliency Emerging as a Major Design Consideration
4Resiliency in SE | Hefner
What is Resiliency Engineering?, Kazuo Furuta
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Resiliency Challenges are Amplified in Systems of Systems
 Systems acquired at
different times, from
different providers
 Total system not
designed top-down, so
emergent behaviors may
be unknown
 Impact of individual
failures of system
performance
5Resiliency in SE | Hefner
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Framing the Resiliency Problem
 The capability(s) of interest (note: a system may deliver several
capabilities each of which may have different levels of resilience)
• The measure(s) (and units) of the capability(s)
• The target value(s) of the capability(s), perhaps by level (e.g., nominal,
degraded mode, minimum useful, objective, threshold, etc.).
 System modes of operation (e.g., operational, training, exercise,
maintenance, update…)
 The adversity(s) being considered for this resilience scenario
• The ways that the adversity(s) affect(s) the system and how the system
reacts in terms of its ability to deliver capability
• The timeframe of interest
 The required resilience (performance) of the capability in the face of
each identified resilience scenario
• E.g., expected availability, maximum allowed degradation, maximum length
of degradation, etc.
• Note there may be several resilience goals (e.g., threshold, objective,
As Resilient as Practicable (ARAP))
6Resiliency in SE | Hefner
System Resilience, sebokwiki.org
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Types of Disruptions
Type A – A disruption of input
• An unexpected or unknown
(to the designer)
phenomenon
• NY twin towers attack
• Tacoma Narrows bridge
• A change in environment
• Katrina hurricane and flood
Type B – A degradation in
function, capability or capacity
• Software error
• Human error (in the system)
• Nagoya
• Metrolink 111
• Component failure
• Challenger
• Interaction Between
Components
• Helios 522
• Mars Polar Lander
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 7
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Failure States
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 8
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Means of Achieving Resilience
 Avoiding – Keep the adversity from
happening or from effecting the system
• E.g., shielding, hardening
 Withstanding – Accept the adversity’s impact but continue
operating despite it (perhaps at a reduced level)
• E.g., redundancy
 Recovering – Accept the adversity’s impact and reconfigure
afterwards to continue operating
• E.g., serviceable system
 Evolving and adapting – Sense the approaching adversity and
adjust over time to lessen/eliminate it’s impact
• E.g., failure detection
System Resilience, sebokwiki.org
9Resiliency in SE | Hefner
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Attributes of a Resilient System
Robustness
• Ability of a system to
withstand a threat in the
normal operating state
Adaptability
• Ability of a system that
allows it to restructure itself
in the face of a threat
Tolerance
• Ability of a system that
allows it to degrade
gracefully following an
encounter with adversity
Integrity
• Property of being whole or
cohesive
Jackson, S., & Ferris, T. (2013). Resilience Principles
for Engineered Systems. Systems Engineering, 16(2),
152-164. doi:10.1002/sys.21228.
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 10
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Robustness
Ability of a system to withstand a threat in the
normal operating state
Design techniques:
 Absorption – Withstand a disturbance without a fundamental
breakdown in the system’s performance or structure
 Physical redundancy – Two or more independent and identical
components to perform critical tasks
 Functional redundancy – Two or
more different ways to perform
a critical task
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 11
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Adaptability
Ability of a system that allows it to restructure
itself in the face of a threat
Design techniques:
 Restructuring
 Human in the loop
 Complexity avoidance – System no more complex than required
 Drift correction – System
senses an approaching failure
and takes corrective/
preventative action
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 12
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Tolerance
Ability of a system that allows it to degrade
gracefully following an encounter with adversity
Design techniques:
 Modularity – Functionality is distributed through multiple nodes,
so if one node is damaged, others continue to function
 Loose coupling – Events in various elements can occur
independently
 Neutral state - System is put into neutral state, if possible,
following a disruption
 Reparability – System can be brought to partial or full capability,
over a specified period of time, in a specified environment
 Defense in depth – Two or more ways to address a vulnerability
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 13
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Integrity
Property of being whole or cohesive (acting
as a unified whole in the face of a threat)
Design techniques:
 Internode interaction – Every node, or element, of a system
should be capable of communicating, cooperating, and
collaborating with every other node
 Reduce hidden infrastructures – Potentially harmful
interactions between nodes of the system are reduced
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 14
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Other Perspectives
Engineering techniques
 adaptive response
 analytic monitoring
 coordinated defense
 deception
 distribution
 detection avoidance
 diversification
 dynamic positioning
 dynamic
representation
 effect tolerance
 non-persistence
 privilege restriction
Objectives
 Adapt
 Anticipate
 Understand
 Disaggregate
 Prepare
 Prevent
 Continue
 Constrain
 Redeploy
 Transform
 Re-architect
 proliferation
 protection
 realignment
 reconfiguring
 redundancy
 replacement
 segmentation
 substantiated
integrity
 substitution
 threat suppression
 unpredictability
Brtis, J. S., and McEvilley, M. A. (2019). Systems Engineering for Resilience, MITRE Technical Report
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 15
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
System Resilience Relationships
Resiliency in SE | Hefner 16
©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu
Summary
 System engineers must increasingly consider resiliency in
designing systems
 Multiple design principles exist – selecting and applying the
right one(s) requires experience and judgement
17Resiliency in SE | Hefner

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Resiliency in Systems Engineering

  • 1. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Resiliency in Systems Engineering Prepared for C-NO INCOSE Chapter – 18 August 2020 Rick Hefner, Ph.D. California Institute of Technology Center for Technology and Management Education rhefner@caltech.edu, 626.395.4043 Resiliency in SE | Hefner 1
  • 2. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Background  Resilience is the ability to provide required capabilities in the face of adversity - any condition that may degrade the desired capability of a system  This presentation will discuss the characteristics of a resilient system and its supporting design techniques  Presentation is based on Systems Engineering courses at Caltech Center for Technology and Management Education, https://ctme.Caltech.edu 2Resiliency in SE | Hefner
  • 3. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Resilience  Resilience is the ability to provide required capability in the face of adversity  Adversity is any condition that may degrade the desired capability of a system • Environmental sources • Normal failure • Human sources - malicious or accidental Can the corporate network function effectively under:  Flood, earthquake  Failure of any component  Human error in configuration  Cyber attack Resiliency in SE | Hefner 3
  • 4. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Resiliency Emerging as a Major Design Consideration 4Resiliency in SE | Hefner What is Resiliency Engineering?, Kazuo Furuta
  • 5. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Resiliency Challenges are Amplified in Systems of Systems  Systems acquired at different times, from different providers  Total system not designed top-down, so emergent behaviors may be unknown  Impact of individual failures of system performance 5Resiliency in SE | Hefner
  • 6. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Framing the Resiliency Problem  The capability(s) of interest (note: a system may deliver several capabilities each of which may have different levels of resilience) • The measure(s) (and units) of the capability(s) • The target value(s) of the capability(s), perhaps by level (e.g., nominal, degraded mode, minimum useful, objective, threshold, etc.).  System modes of operation (e.g., operational, training, exercise, maintenance, update…)  The adversity(s) being considered for this resilience scenario • The ways that the adversity(s) affect(s) the system and how the system reacts in terms of its ability to deliver capability • The timeframe of interest  The required resilience (performance) of the capability in the face of each identified resilience scenario • E.g., expected availability, maximum allowed degradation, maximum length of degradation, etc. • Note there may be several resilience goals (e.g., threshold, objective, As Resilient as Practicable (ARAP)) 6Resiliency in SE | Hefner System Resilience, sebokwiki.org
  • 7. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Types of Disruptions Type A – A disruption of input • An unexpected or unknown (to the designer) phenomenon • NY twin towers attack • Tacoma Narrows bridge • A change in environment • Katrina hurricane and flood Type B – A degradation in function, capability or capacity • Software error • Human error (in the system) • Nagoya • Metrolink 111 • Component failure • Challenger • Interaction Between Components • Helios 522 • Mars Polar Lander Resiliency in SE | Hefner 7
  • 9. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Means of Achieving Resilience  Avoiding – Keep the adversity from happening or from effecting the system • E.g., shielding, hardening  Withstanding – Accept the adversity’s impact but continue operating despite it (perhaps at a reduced level) • E.g., redundancy  Recovering – Accept the adversity’s impact and reconfigure afterwards to continue operating • E.g., serviceable system  Evolving and adapting – Sense the approaching adversity and adjust over time to lessen/eliminate it’s impact • E.g., failure detection System Resilience, sebokwiki.org 9Resiliency in SE | Hefner
  • 10. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Attributes of a Resilient System Robustness • Ability of a system to withstand a threat in the normal operating state Adaptability • Ability of a system that allows it to restructure itself in the face of a threat Tolerance • Ability of a system that allows it to degrade gracefully following an encounter with adversity Integrity • Property of being whole or cohesive Jackson, S., & Ferris, T. (2013). Resilience Principles for Engineered Systems. Systems Engineering, 16(2), 152-164. doi:10.1002/sys.21228. Resiliency in SE | Hefner 10
  • 11. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Robustness Ability of a system to withstand a threat in the normal operating state Design techniques:  Absorption – Withstand a disturbance without a fundamental breakdown in the system’s performance or structure  Physical redundancy – Two or more independent and identical components to perform critical tasks  Functional redundancy – Two or more different ways to perform a critical task Resiliency in SE | Hefner 11
  • 12. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Adaptability Ability of a system that allows it to restructure itself in the face of a threat Design techniques:  Restructuring  Human in the loop  Complexity avoidance – System no more complex than required  Drift correction – System senses an approaching failure and takes corrective/ preventative action Resiliency in SE | Hefner 12
  • 13. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Tolerance Ability of a system that allows it to degrade gracefully following an encounter with adversity Design techniques:  Modularity – Functionality is distributed through multiple nodes, so if one node is damaged, others continue to function  Loose coupling – Events in various elements can occur independently  Neutral state - System is put into neutral state, if possible, following a disruption  Reparability – System can be brought to partial or full capability, over a specified period of time, in a specified environment  Defense in depth – Two or more ways to address a vulnerability Resiliency in SE | Hefner 13
  • 14. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Integrity Property of being whole or cohesive (acting as a unified whole in the face of a threat) Design techniques:  Internode interaction – Every node, or element, of a system should be capable of communicating, cooperating, and collaborating with every other node  Reduce hidden infrastructures – Potentially harmful interactions between nodes of the system are reduced Resiliency in SE | Hefner 14
  • 15. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Other Perspectives Engineering techniques  adaptive response  analytic monitoring  coordinated defense  deception  distribution  detection avoidance  diversification  dynamic positioning  dynamic representation  effect tolerance  non-persistence  privilege restriction Objectives  Adapt  Anticipate  Understand  Disaggregate  Prepare  Prevent  Continue  Constrain  Redeploy  Transform  Re-architect  proliferation  protection  realignment  reconfiguring  redundancy  replacement  segmentation  substantiated integrity  substitution  threat suppression  unpredictability Brtis, J. S., and McEvilley, M. A. (2019). Systems Engineering for Resilience, MITRE Technical Report Resiliency in SE | Hefner 15
  • 16. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu System Resilience Relationships Resiliency in SE | Hefner 16
  • 17. ©Caltech https://ctme.caltech.edu Summary  System engineers must increasingly consider resiliency in designing systems  Multiple design principles exist – selecting and applying the right one(s) requires experience and judgement 17Resiliency in SE | Hefner