This is a presentation delivered by Mr Jaganath Sankaran, at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference 2014.

1. Evaluating the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
Missile Defense System:
Does EPAA Threaten Russian ICBMs?
What Measures Of Cooperation With Russia Are Viable?
RUSI Missile Defense Conference
Session II - March 18, 2014
Jaganath Sankaran
Post-Doctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Managing the Atom Project
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard University
This research was performed as a Stanton Nuclear Security Post-Doctoral Fellow from August, 2012 to August, 2013 at the
RAND Corporation. The views expressed are the author’s.

2. The Policy Problem – A Seeming
Disagreement over EPAA Capability
• The United States and NATO have endorsed
EPAA for defense against Iranian ballistic
missiles
• Russia has raised concerns about the effect of
EPAA on its deterrent forcesEPAA on its deterrent forces
• Russia has pegged further nuclear arms
reductions to a resolution of these concerns
Analysis of EPAA performance can inform
discussions on these issues.
2

3. Architecture of the EPAA Missile
Defense System
Russian ICBM trajectories
Iranian missile trajectories
EPAA Sites

4. Estimating the Performance of EPAA without
the SM-3 Block IIB Interceptor
• EPAA Phase IV (SM-3 Block IIB with Vbo of 5.5
km/s) has been cancelled, leaving only slower
interceptors in planned deployment
– Does this change the perceived threat to Russian– Does this change the perceived threat to Russian
ICBMs?
– Does it render all Russian concerns invalid; i.e. will this
action make both Aegis-Ashore and ship-based Aegis
ineffective against Russia?
– Is the system still capable of effectively defending
against Iranian threats? (Not discussed here, but yes)
4

5. Bottom Line: Results From the
Analytic Evaluation of EPAA
• The currently planned interceptors do not allow
EPAA to reach Russian ICBMs aiming for the
U.S., even given optimistic assumptions for
defensedefense
• Analytic result dependent only upon final velocity
of interceptors, which is realtively easier for
Russia to verify by monitoring EPAA inteceptor
flight tests

6. Does EPAA as Currently Conceived
Threaten Russia?Threaten Russia?
6

7. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack
(no time delay)
Vbo < 3.5 km/s
Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s
Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s
Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s
Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s
Vbo > 5.5 km/s
Offense: Russian ICBM
Missile Attack from
Vypolzovo, Russia to
Washington D.C.
Defense: From Aegis
Ashore SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5
km/s) located in
Redzikowo, Poland
7
ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and
(3) No Countermeasures
Vypolzovo,
Russia
Washington D.C.,
U.S.A
Redzikowo,
Poland

8. Defense Against Russian ICBM
Attacks
– EPAA Phase II Aegis-Ashore site in Deveselu,
Romania with SM3-IB with a Vbo of 3.5 km/s does
not have a capacity to intercept this particular (or
any other) Russian missile trajectory.
– Neither does Phase III Aegis-Ashore site in– Neither does Phase III Aegis-Ashore site in
Redzikowo, Poland with SM3-IIA with a Vbo of 4.5
km/s.
– In fact, even the canceled SM3-IIB with a Vbo of
5.5 km/s has no capability against this particular
Russian trajectory.
– What about other Russian launch locations? Are they
vulnerable? 8

9. Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks on
U.S. East Coast– All Launch Locations
120 seconds is a very favorable estimate of the time needed by the Globus II radar in Norway
to start tracking Russian ICBMs. The real-world conditions will be more demanding.

10. Are there other deployments of EPAA (outside
current U.S. plans) that might interceptcurrent U.S. plans) that might intercept
Russian ICBMs?
10

11. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack
(no time delay)
Vbo < 3.5 km/s
Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s
Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s
Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s
Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s
Vbo > 5.5 km/sVypolzovo,
Russia
North Sea
11
ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and
(3) No Countermeasures
Russia
Washington D.C.,
U.S.A
Offense: Russian ICBM Missile
Attack from Vypolzovo, Russia to
Washington D.C.
Defense: From Ship-based SM-3
IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in the
North Sea Area

12. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack
(no time delay)
Vbo < 3.5 km/s
Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s
Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s
Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s
Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s
Vbo > 5.5 km/s
Bershet,
Russia
Barents Sea
12
ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and
(3) No Countermeasures
San Francisco,
U.S.A
Offense: Russian ICBM Missile Attack
from Bershet, Russia to San Francisco
Defense: From Ship-based SM-3 IIA
(Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in the Barents
Sea Area

13. Joint (North and Barents Sea) Defense
Against Russian ICBM Attacks

14. Cancelation of SM3-IIB Should Resolve All
Plausible Russian Concerns
• The baseline EPAA deployment after the cancelation of the
SM3-IIB allows a strong analytic result:
– The baseline EPAA deployment can not kinematically reach Russian
ICBMs, even with implausibly short time delays
• Realistic time delays eliminates the theoretical capability to
engage Russian ICBMs with EPAA Aegis Ships with the SM3-engage Russian ICBMs with EPAA Aegis Ships with the SM3-
IIA in the North Sea and the Barents Sea
The cancelation of the SM3-IIB has in effect removed any
threat from EPAA to the Russian deterrent potential against
the United States.
14

15. What measures of cooperation
between NATO and Russia arebetween NATO and Russia are
viable?

16. Russian Position on Cooperation
• Medvedev: “We do not want next generations of politicians in
2019 or 2020 to take decisions which would open a new page in
arms race. But such a threat exists and everyone in Russia and the
U.S. should understand this.”
• Russia wants legally binding “military-technical”
guaranteesguarantees
– Certain changes to the algorithms of the missile defense
radars
– Refraining from bringing Aegis ships into areas that are in
proximity to trajectories of Russian ICBMs
– Stationing Russian observers at U.S. and NATO missile
defense installations
– Formulating a mechanism to monitor the implementation of
these measures

17. U.S./NATO Position on Cooperation
• The U.S. Senate resolution supporting ratification of New
START specifically states that it would not accept any
limitations on missile defense
• U.S. will not accept limits on capabilities and numbers of
missile defense systems or on where Aegis ships deploymissile defense systems or on where Aegis ships deploy
• Non-binding political agreement affirming U.S. missile
defenses are not aimed at Russia
• Prominent scholarly suggestion rest on data sharing about
interceptors. However, it is not clear what data can be
provided that they are not capable of independently
obtaining.

18. Possible Measures of Cooperation
• Cooperation might instead be achieved via a range of
disparate interactions.
• Missile Defense isn’t always about Missile Defense
– Not irreducible to technical arguments? Deployments close
to Russia’s border regions
– Russia wants to retain a say in (future) U.S. missile defense– Russia wants to retain a say in (future) U.S. missile defense
plans? Reflection of broader U.S.-Russia relations?
• Dialogue on Threat Assessment (Iran, North Korea)
• Joint Data Exchange Center
– Some form of monitoring U.S. missile defense operations
– Demonstrating limitations of current U.S. space-based and
ground-based early warning/missile tracking systems

19. Thank you. Questions.

20. EPAA Defense Against Present
Iranian Threats
20

21. EPAA Would Reach Present Iranian Threats
Interceptor Interceptor
Location
Target
Missile
Targeted
Location
Distance to
targeted
location (km)
Intercept
Possible?
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Eastern
Mediterranean Sea
Iranian
Shahab-3/3A
Incirlik Air
Base, Turkey
964 YES
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Eastern
Mediterranean Sea
Iranian
Shahab-3/3A
(depressed
trajectory)
Incirlik Air
Base, Turkey
964 YES
trajectory)
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Deveselu, Romania Iranian
Shahab-3/3A
Incirlik Air
Base, Turkey
964 NO
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Eastern
Mediterranean Sea
Iranian
Shahab-3/3A
Izmir Air
Base, Turkey
1670 YES
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Deveselu, Romania Iranian
Shahab-3/3A
Izmir Air
Base, Turkey
1670 YES
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Deveselu, Romania Iranian
Shahab-3/3A
(depressed
trajectory)
Izmir Air
Base, Turkey
1670 YES

22. EPAA Would Reach Future Iranian Threats
Interceptor Interceptor
Location
Target
Missile
Targeted
Location
Distance to
targeted
location (km)
Intercept
Possible?
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir Camp Darby,
Italy
3064 YES
SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5
km/s)
Redzikowo, Poland Iranian Safir Camp Darby,
Italy
3064 YES
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir Ramstein Air
Base,
3309 YES
km/s) Base,
Germany
SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5
km/s)
Redzikowo, Poland Iranian Safir Ramstein Air
Base,
Germany
3309 YES
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir London, U.K. 3876 NO
SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5
km/s)
Rezikowo, Poland Iranian Safir London, U.K. 3876 YES
SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5
km/s)
Western
Mediterranean Sea
Iranian Safir Rota, Spain 4529 YES