Intention to Create Legal Relations in India

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CONTRACT PROJECT

Intention to create legal relations: Whether
it is sustainable in India or not?
Group members
Anand Vardhan Narayan (2011-16/B.A.LL.B/009)-Group leader
Anand Swaroop Das (2011-16/B.A.LL.B/008)
Arepalli Nagababu (2011-16/B.A.LL.B/015)
Jyoti Ranjan Deo (2011-16/B.A.LL.B/024)
Pragalbha Priyakar (2011-16/B.A.LL.B/037)
Utkarsh Kumar Mishra (2011-16/B.A.LL.B/059)

Intention to create Legal Relations Page 1

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ABSTRACT

„Intention to create legal relations‟ forms one of the basic elements in establishing a valid
contract across a number of jurisdictions around the world. However the law regarding the
same in India is still unsettled and consideration from both the contracting parties is usually
indicative of their intention to create legally binding relations. This research article will build
upon the same issue and try to establish the relationship between „intention to create legal
relations‟ and consideration. The main hypothesis of the paper will be to prove that
consideration reflects intention of the parties to the contract in India. This article will first talk
about how intention forms a basis of a contractual relationship. It will then shed some light
on consideration and will move on to a relationship between intention and consideration.
Thereafter the focus will shift to how intention is implicit in the consideration of the parties.
Lastly the article will talk about how the abovementioned issue has evolved in India and a
few other countries and will make a comparative study between the same.


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INTENTION AS A BASIS OF CONTRACT
Intention, per se, is a quintessential element of transforming a contractual relationship as
legally enforceable. Along with all other elements, the court presumes the presence of
intention in contracts depending upon the context and the circumstances. . Intention has been
defined as “full advertence in the mind of the defendant to his conduct, which is in question,
and to its consequences, together with a desire for those consequences.” 1 The agreement has
to be backed by intention of the two parties even if there is the presence of consideration. It is
well settled law in England that “An agreement, even though it is supported by consideration,
is not binding as a contract if it is made without any intention of creating legal relations 2.
However in India there is no specific provision for intention to create legal relation in
establishing a valid contract.

Intention has been differentiated on the basis of presumption as-:

1. DOMESTIC/SOCIAL ARRANGEMENTS- In such conditions, the courts assume
that the parties do not intend to create a legal relationship. This is illustrated in the
case situations of Balfour v. Balfour3 and Jones v. Padvatton4. The former one
exemplifies a domestic contractual setup between husband and wife and the latter
deals with a parent-child agreement. In both these cases, the court ruled that the
parties to the contract, in the capacity of the relationship they share, if at all promise
for a particular object, it is by virtue of the seriousness and inclusive nature of their
relation, to be treated as a trifle. The court stresses on the rule -de minimis non curat
lex5 - the law does not concern itself with trifles which may prevent legal effect being
given to agreements6. It is considered that such agreements do not give rise to any
legal relationship, nor is it intended by the parties that legal consequences shall flow
in these contracts.

1
P.H.Winfield, A Textbook of Law of Tort at 19(5th edition, 1950)
2
“ Chitty on Contracts ” (25th Edition, Volume I, para. 123)
3
Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571
4
Jones v. Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328
5
The common law concept of de minimis non curat lex was expressed in the English decision of The
"Reward"(1818)
6
See supra note 6


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2. BUSINESS/ COMMERCIAL AGREEEMENTS- The contracts of such a nature,
encompass a presumption that the parties to the contract do intend to create legal
relations. But, this presumption is open to be rebutted by the clear evidence to the
contrary. In Rose and Frank Co. V. Crompton and Bros. Ltd.7, it was held that there is
no legal relations in circumstances where the contract stated „This agreement is not
entered into as a formal or legal agreement'. Consequently, this presumption was
rebutted by adducing evidences thereby validating the contrary in a plethora of cases
including Evans v Merzario Ltd8 and Burrows v Brent LBC9.

3. AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO VOLUNATRILY-An exception to the above
stated rule comes into the forefront, while taking into account agreements entered into
voluntarily such that a person volunteers their services. Here, the law assumes it
unambiguously that the parties do not normally intend to create legal relations. This
presumption helps in analysing those cases where it is important to determine whether
the parties in a work situation intended to create an employment contract and
therefore be covered by worker‟s compensation10.

The presumption which the courts take into consideration on the basis of the nature of
agreement, are rebuttable in nature11. This principle usually finds its application in cases
where the factor of intention is implicit or has not been explicitly declared inter alia the
contractual provisions. The 1957 case of Todd v Nicol12 and that of Simpkins v Pays13 clearly
state this situation, where even the agreements of a domestic nature were awarded the status
of enforceable contracts. A Similar course of action was followed in agreements of
commercial nature and the same was adjudged in Jones v Vernon‟s Pools Ltd.14 and Esso
Petroleum Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise15.

7
Rose and Frank Co. v. Crompton and Bros Ltd. [1925] AC 445
8
Evans v. Merzario Ltd. [1976] 1 WLR 1078
9
Burrows v Brent LBC [1996] 1 WLR 1448 (HL)
10
Teen Ranch v Brown (1995)
11
See supra note 3.
12
Todd v. Nicol [1957] SASR 72
13
Simpkins v Pays [1909] 1 WLR 975
14
Jones v Vernon‟s Pools Ltd [1938] 2 All ER 626
15
Esso Petroleum Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1 All ER 117


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It is pertinent to note at this state the will theory which says that commitments are
enforceable because the promisor has willed or freely chosen to be bound by his commitment
is found drifting away from the intention theory and with certain flaws. It does not explain
the reason why a few promises are legally binding. Enforcing promises because they
excogitate the free choices of the individuals gives license to all such promises made which
are free from coercion to be legally enforceable which would be unjustified. Thus the
presence of intention is of utmost importance.

Intention usually is expressly stated and may also manifest itself as a letter of intent. In
Dresser Rand S.A. v. M/s. Bindal Agro Chemical Ltd. & Another16; a two-Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court of India signified that whether letters of intent rise to the level of being a
contract lies on the content of the letter itself. It observed as under: - "It is now well settled
that a letter of intent merely indicates a party‟s intention to enter into a contract with the
other party in future”. Similarly, agreements to negotiate are not normally binding:
However, an agreement „locking out' negotiations with a third party is not necessarily void, if
there is consideration and a realistic time limit17. In the case of Turriff Construction v.
Regalia Knitting Mills18 it was held that letter of intent is a collateral contract for preliminary
work.

Thus we observe that intention forms the basis of contract by giving us the idea that whether
the contracting parties seriously want to bind each other legally or they just intend to fulfil
promises and not take the matter to court. The consequence of lack of intention in a contract
leads to the annulment of the contract and no legal remedy for the party to seek. If a
reasonable man in place of the promise expects performance or equivalent compensation then
the agreement can be construed as a contract. This can only happen when the promisor shows
an intention on his part to be legally bound by the agreement. The intention of the contracting
parties stands frustrated if their perception of a legally binding obligation becomes
unenforceable.

16
Dresser Rand S.A. v. M/s. Bindal Agro Chemical Ltd. & Another, (2006) 1 SCC,751,773
17
Walford v Miles [1991] 28 EG 81 CA
18
Turriff Construction v. Regalia Knitting Mills (1971) 22 EG 169


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CONSIDERATION: AN OVERVIEW
Consideration can trace its origin from the concept of doctrine of assumpsit. The debate
among the academician about the origin of consideration will not be discussed in this
research paper .It has been show how doctrine of assumpsit evolved from the concept of quid
pro quo.19Thereby consideration is based on the idea of quid pro quo.

An offer and acceptance form an agreement between the parties. The law of contracts needed
to adopt some means of distinguishing between those agreements which are enforceable and
those which are not. It has to be ensured that all agreements are not legally binding. The test
of enforceability which is used under our law of contract is the requirement of consideration.
That is to say,

Offer + Acceptance = Agreement.

Offer + Acceptance Consideration=Legally Enforceable Agreements.

The black law dictionary has defined Consideration in this manner-“Consideration is
something (such as an act, a forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a
promisor from a promisee; that which motivated a person to do something, esp. to engage in a
legal act”.

Defining consideration is one of most difficult task in contract law. The first definition of
consideration was given in leading case of Currie Vs Misa.20 Lush J. said- “A valuable
consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to one party or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given,
suffered or undertaken by the other.”To make the definition more explicit let us take an
example. Consider the case where X (landlord) will not initiate eviction proceedings for three
years for a charge of Rs.1 Lakh. Now in this case the consideration for tenant is the promise
made by X (landlord) to not initiate eviction proceedings. Hence the definition of

19
JohnWilsonTwyford, THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION (The role of consideration in contract
modification),(Feb.,2002),
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/2100/286/02Wholethesis.pdf?sequence=2
20
Currie Vs Misa (1875) LR 10 Exch 153, 162


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consideration in Currie v Misa21 is founded on the idea that one party must suffer a detriment
or receive a benefit of what is promised under contract.22

Rules of consideration in English Law

The rules of consideration can be broken down into 4 elements:-

1. Consideration need to be adequate.23
2. Consideration must move from the promisee.24
3. Consideration must not be past.
4. Consideration must not include a legal duty.25

1. Consideration need not be adequate

It is important to note here that consideration need not be adequate, but it must be legally
recognized. The basis of contract law is that parties must have the liberty to ponder what
should be their consideration in their terms of contract. For example a flat worth Rs. 5 lakhs
can be sold at Rs 100 if both the parties have agreed to it. The court will never inquire
whether it was equivalent to the promise which was given in return.26In Chappell & Co.Ltd
v. Nestle Co.Ltd27 wrappers from the chocolate bars were held to a part of the consideration
for the sale of record.

2. Consideration must move from the promisee

In England, the consideration can flow only from the promise. If it has came form any other
person/source then it will be not a valid contract. That is the promisee must show that
consideration was provided by him. But the law does not say that the consideration must flow
to the promisor.

21
See supra note 20.
22
Ryan Murray, “Contract Law The Fundamentals”
23
Thomas v. Thomas (1842) 2 Q.B. 851
24
Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 62 ALJR 508
25
Collins v.Godefroy (1831) 1 B & Ad 950
26
Anson‟s Law of contract 28th edition J. Beatson
27
Chappell & Co.Ltd v. Nestle Co.Ltd [1960] A.C. 87,ANTE,P.90.


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3. Consideration must not include a legal duty

If someone is bound to do a task then that task can never be a consideration. The leading case
in this aspect is Collins Vs Godefroy28 In this case an attorney who had been subpoenaed to
give evidence was promised a guinea a day for attendance. This was held to be “a promise
without consideration” as he was already bound to attend. Thus a public officer cannot
enforce a promise to pay him money for doing his duty (which he is legally liable to
do).Enforcement of such contract will tend to encourage extortion and corruption.

4. Consideration should not be past

The rule is that past consideration is not a consideration. We need to ask ourselves a question
as to what is consideration concerned with? The doctrine of consideration is concerned with
the mutual exchange of promises. That is to say consideration is to be provided at the time of
exchange of promise and not before that. Let us understand past consideration with an
example. X has lost his wallet and Y finds that wallet. Now X is very pleased and says, I will
give you Rs. 500 for having recovered my wallet. The next day X refuses to give Y 500 and
says Rs 100 is good enough. X is not legally liable to give Y Rs.500 because this is a past
consideration. Basically in past consideration the act (consideration) is done prior to the
formation of the contract.

Consideration in Indian Contract Act

Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act defines consideration as follows:

“When at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained
from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing,
something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.”

As per this section we understand the essential requirement of valid consideration:-

1. The act or the abstinence which forms the consideration must be at the desire
of the promisor.
2. The act which forms consideration can be past, present or future.
28
Chappell & Co.Ltd v. Nestle Co.Ltd. (1831) 1 B. & Ad.


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3. The source of the consideration must be the promisee or any other person.
4. The consideration must have some value in eyes of law.

However there are exception to the general rule which are illustrated in section 25 (1), 25(2)
and 25(3) of Indian Contract Act, 1872. We will not discuss that section since it will be
beyond the scope of our work.

This is complete and exhaustive definition of consideration. We will now point out the
difference between Indian law and English Law.29

1. Past Consideration is valid-Unlike English law; past consideration is recognized as a
valid consideration.
2. Source of consideration can be promisee or any other person-In English law for
contract to be valid the consideration must flow only from the promise. The definition
in section 2(d)30[ the promisee or any other person] shows us that consideration need
not move from the promisee alone but may proceed from a third party. This means
that even a stranger to consideration can sue provided he is a party to the contract. But
in England a person not a party to consideration is a stranger to the contract and hence
he cannot sue.

29
See supra note 19.
30
See Section 2(d) of Indian Contract Act,1872


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INTENTION IN CONSIDERATION
The intention to create legal relations and the existence of consideration form two of the most
significant elements of a valid contract. However, in England till the nineteenth century the
intention to create legal relations had not gained much prominence as a separate element in
contract. But after that it came to enjoy a position as a separate condition to form a valid
contract. Thus in countries like US and UK one has to prove besides „consideration‟ the
„intention of the parties to create legal relations‟. However in common law countries,
consideration should be itself indicative of the intention and a separate proof of the latter is
not required. Thus, in emerging economies like India and China „intention to create legal
relations‟ is not an independent condition for a valid contract but is implied under the
existence of consideration of the two parties.31

The Indian Contract Act does not provide for a specific provision which says that an offer or
an acceptance be made with the intention to create legal relations32 .To decide such an
intention the courts usually make presumptions depending upon the nature of agreements i.e.
whether it is a domestic agreement or a commercial agreement. However the increasing
interactions between familial and commercial relations have blurred the line of distinction
between domestic agreements and commercial agreements.33 And intention being a very
subjective concept poses another challenge. Sometimes one party commences work and
exposes himself to large expenses, while the other party has little or no intention of finally
completing the contract. The social and cultural background of the parties also determines
how they perceive situations differently. Such complexities give rise to the debatable
question as to whether intention to create legal relations should be regarded as a separate
condition or be implied from the consideration.
Consideration forms one of the most essential elements of a valid contract in India. Under
section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act consideration is defined as “When, at the desire of the
promisor34, the promisee35 has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing,
or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is

31
Bhawna Gulati, „Intention to Create Legal Relations‟:A Contractual Necessity or an Illusory Concept (Bejjing
Law Review), (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.scirp.org/Journal/PaperInformation.aspx?paperID=7721
32
Lisa P.Lukose & Versha Vahini, (rev.), I.C.Saxena, “ Commercial Law”, Joseph Minattur, INDIAN LEGAL
SYSTEM, 2nd ed.2008, p.507
33
See supra note 26
34
Section.2(c) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
35
Ibid.


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called a consideration for the promise.” An agreement without consideration is not
recognized as a valid contract in India. Consideration need not be adequate however it must
amount to something which has some value in the eyes of law36
The Indian Contract Act says nothing about intention to create legal relations. This is not
surprising, as the founding case on this, Balfour vs. Balfour37, came decades after the making
of the act. This entire concept of intention to create legal relationship has to deal with
intention of the parties, express and implied communication between the parties, and the
formation of agreement. This is important in the sense that section 10 of Indian Contract Act
tells us that which agreement are contract. The law regarding this aspect in India is not settled
and there is confusion regarding whether Intention to create legal relation is an essential
ingredient for an agreement to be a contract.
The Supreme Court of India has recognized the principle of Intention to create legal
relationship in some of the cases. The first case on this matter is Commissioner of Wealth-
Tax, vs. Abdul Hussain Mulla Muhammad Ali38. A study regarding the facts, issues and
judgement of the same case has been discussed subsequently. The respondent has advanced a
sum of Rs. 4,00,000 to is partner Faizullabhai Mandlawala.The borrower employed the sum
as part of his capital in the firm.When A‟s wealth was suppose to be calculated by the
Commissioner of Wealth-Tax,Bhopal he contended that tax cannot be calculated on this
amount of loan on the claim that this loan was what was known to Muslim Law as 'Quaraza-
e-Hasana‟. Basically „Quaraza-e-Hasana‟ is a debt of good faith and goodwill carrying with it
no legal obligation on the part of the debtor to repay and no right on the part of the assessee
to except it.39The tax payer gave an argument that the parties did not intend to create legal
relations, thus there was no obligation to pay the debt or for him to enforce it. The Supreme
Court accepted that a valid contract can be set aside on the grounds that the parties did not
intend to create legal relations.(They fully endorsed the British law).The Supreme Court said
that “The contention has, no doubt, its possibilities” But the assessee have failed to establish
the practice such as Quaraza-e-hasana exist or not. Further it has been shown that there was
no consideration in this case since Faizullabhai was not suppose to pay any rate of interest. If
there was a consideration in this case then that itself would have shown that parties intended

36
Forbearance to sue at the promisor‟ s desire constitutes consideration. Similarly, restoration of
family peace is a good example of a valid consideration.
37
See supra note 3.
38
Wealth-Tax, vs. Abdul Hussain Mulla Muhammad Ali AIR 1988 SC 1417
39
Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Bhopal vs. Abdul Hussain Mulla Muhammad Ali, AIR 1973 MP 26


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to come into a legal relation. The researchers are trying to show that once consideration has
been established in a commercial agreement then it itself show that the parties intend to come
into a contract. It was stated in this case that “Here, one partner has lent a large sum to the
other to be utilised as capital in the partnership venture. The transaction is in the context of a
commercial venture. The presumption is that legal obligations are intended.” If the parties
want to show that they never intended to create a legal relationship in a commercial
agreement then the onus of proving it is very heavy. But in domestic agreement there is
always a necessity to prove that the parties intended to come into a legal relationship.

It has been argued that commercial agreements „are not governed by contractual intentions,
but reflect a variety of influences, including social norms and the norms of conduct that
develop within the relationship.‟40 The parties while contracting do not provide for all
contractual obligations and rules and thus it becomes unreasonable when the intention of the
parties at the time of contracting is questioned. Thus in such cases the consideration flowing
from both the parties should be taken into consideration. If there is consideration then
intention is also present.
Common law recognised that usually parties do not define their intention to enter into legal
relations. Casting their agreement into the form of bargain (offer, acceptance, and
consideration) provides a practical test for the intention. Thus the test of bargain is proof
enough to show the presence of intention in consideration. A deliberate promise seriously
made is enforced irrespective of the promisor‟s views regarding his legal liability.41

40
E. Posner, “A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error,” 94 North-western
University Law Review 749,( 2000).
41
S. Williston, “Williston on Contracts,” 3rd Edition, Rochester, New York, 1957.


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EVOLUTION OF THIS CONCEPT

Although it‟s not, that the intention to enter into legal relationships is not taken care of in India, but
the emphasis should again be on the hypothesis of this paper which talks of the assumed intention
to create a binding relation as implicit in the consideration which is provided by the promisee to the
promisor.

Intention as a distinct and identically discrete element has been envisaged to be a crucial element of
a contractual relation in England since long, but there is no specific provision in the Indian Contract
Act which requires that a proposal or its acceptance be made with the intention of creating a legal
relation42. Much similar to this, is the arrangement in China. As per article 14 of the contract law of
the Public Republic of China, an offer would mean the manifestation of the party‟s intention to
enter into a contract with another party43. For this reason, the terms of the offer should be definite
and specific and should indicate the party‟s willingness to be bound by a contract on acceptance of
the offer44. It is also to be analysed that intention per se, in the Chinese context, can be an
implication of the acceptance which can and usually is, manifested as under the provision of
consideration45. In this regard it should be noted that the Indian Contract act clearly distinguishes
between „consideration‟ and „adequate consideration‟46. While it should be made clear that
„adequate considerations‟ intensifies the binding nature and the sanctity of a contract, this is not so
as far as „consideration‟ in general, is concerned.

This conception may differ from context to context. As the sociological relativism and
societal evolution and its organisation get distinct, with much simulation it casts a shadow on
the legal system of a political arrangement. It is well acknowledged universally that one can
be bound by a contractual obligation only if one has so intended. French law favours and
controls, in principle, the actual subjective intention; it does, however, also take into account
the declaration of intention, in an attempt to protect legal security47. Complementary to this,
acceptance may be expressed by any means, provided that it is not ambiguous. Acceptance
42
See supra note 32.
43
Article 14, Contract Law of the People‟s Republic of China.
44
Mubashshir Sarshar, Comparative study of the principles of Contract formation of India, China, USA and
France, (January 2009), Offer and acceptance, p.14
45
Article 21, Contract Law of the People‟s Republic of China.
46
Sec. 2 (d) Indian Contract Act, 1872
47
See supra note 10.


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may not therefore be implied from the promisee‟s silence, since such behaviour does not have
a clear meaning. Under some specific circumstances, the meaning of silence may however be
explicit and it is therefore possible to admit that it expresses an intention to contract 48. Under
the Indian Contract Law, when one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to
abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or
abstinence, he is said to make a proposal49 in comparison to Article 14 of the Contract Law of
the People‟s Republic of China which states that, an offer means the manifestation of the
party‟s intention to enter into a contract with another party. Under Chinese Contract Law,
offer made to the public at large is considered as an invitation to offer rather that an offer, as
under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Secondly a proposal becomes effective only when it
reaches the promisee and not when it leaves the promisor as in Indian Law50. Under the
Indian Contract Act, a contract is not a mere exchange of an offer and acceptance as under
Chinese Law. It is an exchange of promises which has to be assisted by a „consideration‟, a
characterstic which is yet again absent from the Contract law of China. This further affirms
the claim that the facet of intention gets expressed through various modes and parameters.

Contrary to this, the social dynamics of the libertarian and individualistic thought which
flows within the western society has enabled the contract law in U.S. to be firm in the regards
of stipulating the presence of intention explicitly. Implied intention, in the case of U.S. laws,
thus can never be validated even if it happens through affirmative expression or an act51. If
we delve upon the question of intention as implicit in consideration further, the path towards
the validation of the hypothesis of this paper comes closer. The Indian Contract law being
highly influenced by the Contractual provisions of the common law aides this understanding.
Both in common law and the legal system as practised in India, a gift is not considered to be a
contract as there no consideration which is involved there. On the other hand, a gift is
considered to be a contract in US contract law. If the promisor communicates a proposal to
the promisee regarding his intention to gift the promisee a book, and acceptance is
communicated thereof, then the promisor is under a legal obligation to give the book to the
promisee. The promisor cannot change his mind regarding the gift thereafter. Here, it is

48
Ibid.
49
Sec. 2(a), Indian Contract Act, 1872.
50
Rule of Arrival, Article 16, Contract Law of People‟s Republic of China.
51
See supra note 12


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quintessential to note that at times it is the intention which testifies the declaration, in the
same manner as at other times; the declaration purports to express the intention.

The principle of „autonomy of will‟ which finds its mention under the French Civil Code
takes into account, in general, no absolute distinction between the “real” intention and its
manifestation. As evident, the necessities of commercial life demanded that some value
should be placed on outward behaviour. It is not astonishing that the french writers were
forced to come up with a theory which gives effect to outward behaviour while appearing to
concur to the principle that only the “real” intention of the parties count. This theory
maintains that there is no conflict between the “real” and apparent intention in as much as
outward behaviour is a means whereby the “real” intention may be deduced. The argument,
no doubt, appears artificial for it ignores a possible clash between real and apparent intention
by assuming that the former must necessarily associate with the latter. But in practice, the test
adopted by French law is not very different from the objective test of English law52.

Therefore, the prime difference between the French subjective system versus the more
objective system envisaged by the rest of the world, “it is only a matter of emphasis, since all
legal systems have to work with exteriorized indications of inner psychological elements in
order to appraise and evaluate their legal effects53.”

CONCLUSION
All in all, it thus comes to light that irrespective of the contractual provisions which persist in
various countries; the element of consideration in India finds itself sufficient to envisage per
se the intention of the contracting parties to enter into a legal relationship. This validates the
hypothesis of the present research article.

52
Chloros, supra note 8, at 615-16 (citing Planiol et Ripert, Traité Élémentaire de droit civil 69 (1949)).
53
Parviz Owsia, Formation of Contracts: A Comparative Study under English, French, Islamic and Iranian Law
219 (1994).


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‘Intention to Create Legal Relations‟: A Contractual Necessity or An Illusory
Concept, Beijing Law Review,2011,2,127-133
Cohen, “The Basis of Contract,” Harvard Law Review,Vol.46,1933,pp.553,575
Lisa P.Lukose & Versha Vahini, (rev.), I.C.Saxena, “ Commercial Law”, Joseph
Minattur, Indian Legal System, 2nd ed.2008, p.507
E. Posner, “A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial
Error,” 94 North-western University Law Review 749, 2000.
Parviz Owsia, Formation of Contracts: A Comparative Study under English,
French, Islamic and Iranian Law 219 (1994).
Akhileshwar Pathak,”Oxford Contract Law”, 1st ed. 2003
Ryan Murray, “Contract Law: The Fundamentals”, 1st ed.
A. Singh, “Contract and Specific Relief,” 10th edition.
J. Beatson, Andrew Burrowsa, John Cartwright, “Anson‟s Law of Contract,” 29th
edition.
Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571
Jones v. Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328
Rose and Frank Co. v. Crompton and Bros Ltd. [1925] AC 445
Evans v. Merzario Ltd. [1976] 1 WLR 1078
Burrows v Brent LBC [1996] 1 WLR 1448 (HL)
Teen Ranch v Brown (1995)
Todd v. Nicol [1957] SASR 72
Simpkins v Pays [1909] 1 WLR 975
Jones v Vernon‟s Pools Ltd [1938] 2 All ER 626
Esso Petroleum Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1 All ER 117
Dresser Rand S.A. v. M/s. Bindal Agro Chemical Ltd. & Another, (2006) 1
SCC,751,773
Walford v Miles [1991] 28 EG 81 CA
Turriff Construction v. Regalia Knitting Mills (1971) 22 EG 169


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Thomas v. Thomas (1842) 2 Q.B. 851
Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 62 ALJR 508
Chappell & Co.Ltd v. Nestle Co.Ltd [1960] A.C. 87,ANTE,P.90.
Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, vs. Abdul Hussain Mulla Muhammad Ali AIR
1988 SC 1417
Indian Contract Act, 1872
S. Williston, “Williston on Contracts,” 3rd Edition, Rochester, New York, 1957.
Lisa P.Lukose & Versha Vahini, (rev.), I.C.Saxena, “ Commercial Law”, Joseph
Minattur, Indian Legal System, 2nd ed.2008, p.507
Parviz Owsia, Formation of Contracts: A Comparative Study under English,
French, Islamic and Iranian Law 219 (1994).
Contract Law of the People‟s Republic of China


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