By the end of this lecture student will be able to understand that, in any return to conventional air-land integration, air forces will face: Vastly improved precision capabilities Greater intolerance of harm to civilian objects and infrastructure Greater demands for ubiquity Greater intolerance of fratricide A return to conventionally contested airspace

1. The Evolution of Air-Land Integration, III
Professor Joel Hayward

11. 11 May to 23 October 18-29 December 1972

16. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and USAF TAC
1982 AirLand Battle

17. United States Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
“ Goldwater-Nichols Act”

20. “Warden’s Rings”
Leadership
Systems Essentials
Infrastructure
Population
Fielded Forces

23. “Warden’s Rings”
Leadership
Systems Essentials
Infrastructure
Population
Fielded Forces

24. The Integrated Air Power Balance Sheet
(excluding control of the air)
Close Air Support (%) Interdiction (%)
• World War I 10 90
– RFC 5 95
– Imp German AS 25 75
• World War II 25 75
– RAF 10 90
– Luftwaffe 40 60
– Red Air Force 40 60 (and deeper)
• Korea 20 80
• Vietnam 20 80
• Gulf War I 10 90
• Gulf War II 10 90
• Current ops?

25. Air Power against Insurgents
Independent?
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
Integrated
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
Control of the Air

26. Air Power against Insurgents
Independent?
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
Integrated
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
Control of the Air

27. Air Power against Insurgents
Independent?
• Coercion
• Denial
• Punishment
Integrated
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
• ISR
• Mobility
Control of the Air

28. • Vastly increased precision capabilities and lethality
• Safer airspace
• But:
• Battle is non-linear with enemies potentially on all sides
• The enemy deliberately disperses his forces
• The enemy exploits surprise and spontaneity
Close Air Support against Insurgents?

29. • Lack of battlefield predictability makes air-land coordination extremely
hard
• The risk of fratricide is high
• Aircraft are few and seldom nearby
Close Air Support against Insurgents?

30. • The non-mechanized battle rhythm requires few supplies
• The battleground cannot be sealed
Air Interdiction of Insurgents?

31. • The enemy can re-supply locally
• A maze of small supply routes is available
• Insurgents draw on the civilian transport network
Air Interdiction of Insurgents?

32. Some thoughts on the future:
In any return to conventional air-land integration, air forces will face:
• Vastly improved precision capabilities
• Greater intolerance of harm to civilian objects and infrastructure
• Greater demands for ubiquity
• Greater intolerance of fratricide
• A return to conventionally contested airspace

33. Thank you