PP-Part-1-Labor-Law-Review-2021.pptx

I. Fundamental Principles and Policies
Constitutional Provisions
Article II
Secs. 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20

State Policies
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and
dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote
full employment, a rising standard of living, and
an improved quality of life for all.

Espina v. Zamora
G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010
• 2000- President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. 8762 or the
Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A.
1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging
in the retail trade business.
• Some members of the House of Representatives, filed the present
petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following
grounds:
• First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the
Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy
under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of
opportunities, promote industrialization and full employment, and
protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade
policies.

Espina v. Zamora, 2010
SC: But as the Court explained in Tañada v.
Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the declarations of principles and
state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies
cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts.

Espina v. Zamora, 2010
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services.
While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into
the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is
to strike a balance between protecting local businesses
and allowing the entry of foreign investments and
services.

Section 10. The State shall promote social
justice in all phases of national development.

Define Social Justice:
Social justice calls for the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least
be approximated.

Bar Exam (11)
Q: For labor, the Constitutionally adopted policy of
promoting social justice in all phases of national
development means-
a) nationalization of the tools of production
b) periodic examination of laws for the common good
c) humanization of laws and equalization of economic
forces (x)
d) revision of laws to generate greater employment

Manila Water v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014
In the instant petition, Manila Water essentially
questions the award of separation pay to
respondent who was dismissed for stealing the
company’s property which amounted to gross
misconduct. It argues that separation pay or
financial assistance is not awarded to
employees guilty of gross misconduct or for
cause reflecting on his moral character.

2014
SC: As a general rule, an employee who has
been dismissed for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 297of the Labor Code
is not entitled to a separation pay.

2014
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged.
At best[,] it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not
condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of
every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal
claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted
to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an
impediment to the punishment of the guilty.
Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are
clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant
for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it,
like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the
blemishes of their own character.

2014
In the subsequent case of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers
Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission we
expanded the exclusions and elucidated that separation pay shall be
allowed as a measure of social justice only in instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
• serious misconduct,
• willful disobedience,
• gross and habitual neglect of duty,
• fraud or willful breach of trust,
• commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or
• those reflecting on his moral character.

2014
The attendant circumstances in the present case
considered, we are constrained to deny Del Rosario
separation pay since the admitted cause of his
dismissal amounts to serious misconduct.
He is not only responsible for the loss of the water
meters in flagrant violation of the company’s policy
but his act is in utter disregard of his partnership
with his employer in the pursuit of mutual benefits.

Bar Exam:
Q: Which of the two takes precedence, human
rights or property rights?
Answer: human rights.

State Policies
• Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
• Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.

Philippine Telegraph v. NLRC
G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
• On September 2, 1991, private respondent (Grace de Guzman) was once
more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the
probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that
was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the
portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
• It now appears that private respondent had made the same
representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she
signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly
learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia
M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15,
1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she
was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married
women for employment. (She was subsequently terminated.)

1997
SC: The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men
and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a
gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones,
Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof
dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly
requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all,
including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all
workers.

1997
Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII mandates
that the State shall protect working women
through provisions for opportunities that
would enable them to reach their full potential.

1997
In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or
considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by
our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty,
the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company
were dissolved principally because of the company's policy
that married women are not qualified for employment in PT
& T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

1997
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to
private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the
company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're
fully aware that the company is not accepting married women
employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you."
Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch
supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her
severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment
of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of
the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that
married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.")

1997
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which
establish employer preference or conditions relating to the
marital status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus"
discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the
other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must
not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is
protected by federal job discrimination laws.
Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of
married women, but do not apply to married men, have
been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job
discrimination against employees and applicants on the
basis of, among other things, sex.

State Policies
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force. It shall protect the rights
of workers and promote their welfare.

Wesleyan University v. Faculty
G.R. No. 181806, March 12, 2014
• The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100of the Labor
Code explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or
reducing the benefits received by their employees. This
rule, however, applies only if the benefit is based on an
express policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a
practice. To be considered a practice, it must be
consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a
long period of time.
• An exception to the rule is when "the practice is due to
error in the construction or application of a doubtful or
difficult question of law." The error, however, must be
corrected immediately after its discovery; otherwise, the
rule on Non-Diminution of Benefits would still apply.

2014
Facts: Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered
employees are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation leave
with pay every year and that after the second year of service, all unused
vacation leave shall be converted to cash and paid to the employee at the
end of each school year, not later than August 30 of each year.
The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, however, states that vacation
and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be earned on
a month-to-month basis. This, in effect, limits the available leave credits of
an employee at the start of the school year. For example, for the first four
months of the school year or from June to September, an employee is only
entitled to five days vacation leave and five days sick leave.
SC: Considering that the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 imposes a
limitation not agreed upon by the parties nor stated in the CBA, we agree
with the CA that it must be struck down.

2014
• In closing, it may not be amiss to mention that
when the provision of the CBA is clear, leaving
no doubt on the intention of the parties, the
literal meaning of the stipulation shall govern.
• However, if there is doubt in its interpretation,
it should be resolved in favor of labor, as this is
mandated by no less than the Constitution.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009
• For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, to wit:
• Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
• does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to
national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly
limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either
for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner
claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it
impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies
them due process.

2009
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure
"designed to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers
overseas x x x. By limiting the liability to three months [sic],
Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign
employers." The limitation also protects the interest of local
placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder
millions of pesos in "termination pay."

2009
SC: Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of
the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by
mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such
callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected.
There can never be a justification for any form of government
action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes
the same burden on another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private businesses such as
placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea that private business
interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state
interest is odious.

2009
• Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the
solidary liability of placement agencies vis-à-vis their foreign
principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the
constitutional rights of OFWs
• The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4,
2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring
foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to
migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary
measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive
suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003,
contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring
foreign employers.

2009
• Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the
less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in
enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
• Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10
of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and
other OFWs to equal protection.

2009
• Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the
clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3, Article XIII of the
Constitution.
• While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing,
there are some which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article
XIII being one, particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court,
in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, has described to be not self-
actuating:
• Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure
may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically
acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation. However,
to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full
exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein
expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. Xxx

2009
• Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own,
be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the
dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to
serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of
the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require
legislative enactments for their enforceability. (Emphasis added)
• Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source
of direct enforceable rights, for the violation of which the
questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may
unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker
or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as
social justice for labor.

2009
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow
on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it
with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection
through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition.
Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive
and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect
the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that
constitutional agenda that the Court formulated the judicial precept
that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation
of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection -- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court
may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the
same to strict judicial scrutiny.

Executive Order No. 51, May 2018

State Policies
Section 20. The State recognizes the
indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investments.

Rosario v. Victory Ricemill
G.R. No. 147572, February 19, 2003
[N.B. Procedural process was not served because no Notice to Explain was served
upon the dismissed employee.]
• SC:Only if the termination of employment is not for any of the causes provided
by law is it illegal and, therefore, the employee should be reinstated and paid
backwages.
• In so ruling, the Court recognized that "the law, in protecting the rights of labor,
authorized neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer," thus:
• The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken by the employer
to terminate employment either for an authorized or just cause can result in an
injustice to the employer. For not giving notice and hearing before dismissing an
employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or even of an attempt against
the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to keep in his employ such
guilty employee. This is unjust.

Rosario v. Victory Ricemill
2003
It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social
economic force." But so does it declare that it "recognizes the
indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investment.
The Constitution bids the State to "afford full protection to
labor."
But it is equally true that "the law, in protecting the rights of
the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer. And it is oppression to compel
the employer to continue in employment one who is guilty or
to force the employer to remain in operation when it is not
economically in his interest to do so.

State Policies
• Article III, Secs. 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, 18 (2)
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

Sameer Overseas v. Cabiles
G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is
on the employer. "The employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause." Failure to show that there was valid or just
cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was illegal.

2014
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in
work is valid, it must be shown that:
1) the employer has set standards of conduct and
workmanship against which the employee will be
judged;
2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must
have been communicated to the employee; and
3) the communication was made at a reasonable time
prior to the employee’s performance assessment.

2014
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent
failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work
requirements and was inefficient in her work. No
evidence was shown to support such allegations.
Petitioner did not even bother to specify what
requirements were not met, what efficiency standards
were violated, or what particular acts of respondent
constituted inefficiency.

Tongko v. Manulife
G.R. No. 167622, November 7, 2008
In its Petition for Certiorari dated January 7, 2005 filed before the CA,
Manulife argued that even if Tongko is considered as its employee, his
employment was validly terminated on the ground of gross and
habitual neglect of duties, inefficiency, as well as willful disobedience
of the lawful orders of Manulife.
It is readily evident from the above-quoted portions of Manulife's
petition that it failed to cite a single iota of evidence to support its
claims. Manulife did not even point out which order or rule that
Tongko disobeyed. More importantly, Manulife did not point out the
specific acts that Tongko was guilty of that would constitute gross
and habitual neglect of duty or disobedience. Manulife merely cited
Tongko's alleged "laggard performance," without substantiating such
claim, and equated the same to disobedience and neglect of duty.

Tongko v. Manulife
2008
SC: We cannot, therefore, accept Manulife's position.
In Quebec, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that:
When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination
was for a valid or authorized cause. This burden of proof appropriately lies
on the shoulders of the employer and not on the employee because a
worker's job has some of the characteristics of property rights and is
therefore within the constitutional mantle of protection.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Tongko v. Manulife
2008
This burden of proof was clarified in Community Rural Bank of San
Isidro (N.E.), Inc. v. Paez to mean substantial evidence, to wit:
The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services
of an employee for just cause and this must be supported by
substantial evidence. The settled rule in administrative and quasi-
judicial proceedings is that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required in determining the legality of an employer's dismissal of an
employee, and not even a preponderance of evidence is necessary as
substantial evidence is considered sufficient. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.

Tongko v. Manulife
2008
Here, Manulife failed to overcome such burden of
proof. It must be reiterated that Manulife even failed
to identify the specific acts by which Tongko's
employment was terminated much less support the
same with substantial evidence.
To repeat, mere conjectures cannot work to deprive
employees of their means of livelihood. Thus, it must
be concluded that Tongko was illegally dismissed.

Serrano v. NLRC
G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000
SC: Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of
Due Process
The cases cited by both Justices Puno and
Panganiban refer, however, to the denial of due
process by the State, which is not the case here.
There are three reasons why, on the other hand,
violation by the employer of the notice
requirement cannot be considered a denial of due
process resulting in the nullity of the employee's
dismissal or layoff .

Serrano v. NLRC
2000
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It
does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as
the termination of employment under the Labor Code.
This is plain from the text of Art. III, §1 of the
Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." The
reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the
life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of
the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of
this power is consistent with what are considered
civilized

Serrano v. NLRC
2000
The second reason is that notice and hearing are required
under the Due Process Clause before the power of
organized society are brought to bear upon the
individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of
employment under Art. 298. Here the employee is not
faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The
purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an
employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to
be heard on any charge against him, for there is none.
The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the
eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to
determine whether economic causes do exist justifying
the termination of his employment.

Serrano v. NLRC
2000
Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 297, the purpose for the
requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and
hearing is at the trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of
notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due process.
Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice
requirement before he dismisses an employee does not
foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality of his
dismissal. As Art. 292(b) provides, "Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker
to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a
complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission."

Serrano v. NLRC
2000
The third reason why the notice requirement under Art.
298 cannot be considered a requirement of the Due
Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be
expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own
cause. This is also the case in termination of employment
for a just cause under Art. 297 (i.e., serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of the employer, gross and habitual neglect of duties,
fraud or willful breach of trust of the employer,
commission of crime against the employer or the latter's
immediate family or duly authorized representatives, or
other analogous cases).

Serrano v. NLRC
2000
Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for
the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an
employee illegal. This is clear from Art. 294 which provides:
• Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who
is unjustly dismissed rom work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.

Agabon v. NLRC
G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004
Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions
attributable to the employee while dismissals based on
authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which
allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for
an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When
the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement
and full backwages are mandated under Article 294. If
reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was
unjust, separation pay may be granted.

Agabon v. NLRC
2004
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 297, the employer must give the employee two
written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if
requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and
(2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under
Articles 298 and 299, the employer must give the employee
and the Department of Labor and Employment written
notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

Agabon v. NLRC
2004
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be
derived:
(1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 297 of
the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article
298, or for health reasons under Article 299, and due
process was observed;
(2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but
due process was observed;
(3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and
there was no due process; and
(4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due
process was not observed.

Agabon v. NLRC
2004
• In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid and
the employer will not suffer any liability.
• In the second and third situations where the dismissals are
illegal, Article 294 mandates that the employee is entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time the compensation was not paid up to the
time of actual reinstatement.
• In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld.
While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should
not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should
be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.

Agabon v. NLRC
2004
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The
dismissal should be upheld because it was established that
the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another
company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the
notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices
to the last known addresses would have been useless because
they did not reside there anymore.
Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid
excuse because the law mandates the twin notice
requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it
should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process

Agabon v. NLRC
2004
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due
process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and
authorized causes of employment termination under the
Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal.
Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found
in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I,
Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order Nos. 9 and
10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the
Labor Code.
Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from
failure to comply with constitutional due process.

Agabon v. NLRC
2004
Constitutional due process protects the individual from
the government and assures him of his rights in
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;
while statutory due process found in the Labor Code
and Implementing Rules protects employees from
being unjustly terminated without just cause after
notice and hearing.

Agabon v. NLRC
2004
The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due
process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of
such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar,
we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this
form of damages would serve to deter employers from future
violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At
the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this
fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code
and its Implementing Rules.

De Jesus v. Hon. Aquino
G.R. No. 164662, February 18, 2013
Under Agabon, the new doctrine is that the failure of
the employer to observe the requirements of due
process in favor of the dismissed employee (that is, the
two-written notices rule) should not invalidate or
render ineffectual the dismissal for just or authorized
cause.

De Jesus v. Hon. Aquino
2013
Even so, the Agabon Court still deplored the employer's violation of
the employee's right to statutory due process by directing the
payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of
which would be addressed to the sound discretion of the labor
tribunal upon taking into account the relevant circumstances.
Thus, the Agabon Court designed such form of damages as a deterrent
to employers from committing in the future violations of the statutory
due process rights of employees, and, at the same time, as at the very
least a vindication or recognition of the fundamental right granted to
the employees under the Labor Code and its implementing rules.
Accordingly, consistent with precedent the amount of P50,000.00 as
nominal damages is hereby fixed for the purpose of indemnifying De
Jesus for the violation of her right to due process.

Abbott v. Alcaraz
G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013
A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of
tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from
just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is
provided under Article 296 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary
employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known
by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.
Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on
probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a
just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed
by the employer.

Abbott v. Alcaraz
2013
SC: Nonetheless, despite the existence of a sufficient
ground to terminate Alcaraz’s employment and
Abbott’s compliance with the Labor Code termination
procedure, it is readily apparent that Abbott breached
its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it failed to
abide by its own procedure in evaluating the
performance of a probationary employee.

Abbott v. Alcaraz
2013
Veritably, a company policy partakes of the nature of an implied
contract between the employer and employee.
Records show that Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia,
that the job performance of a probationary employee should be
formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least twice:
first on the third month and second on the fifth month from the date
of employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a
Performance Improvement Plan during the third month review to
bridge the gap between the employee’s performance and the
standards set, if any. In addition, a signed copy of the PPSE form
should be submitted to Abbott’s HRD as the same would serve as
basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the
probationary employment

Abbott v. Alcaraz
2013
In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcaraz’s
probationary employment for her failure to meet the standards
required for her regularization, and while it must be further
pointed out that Abbott had satisfied its statutory duty to serve
a written notice of termination, the fact that it violated its own
company procedure renders the termination of Alcaraz’s
employment procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of
nominal damages.

Abbott v. Alcaraz
2013
Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court modified Agabon in
the case of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot
(Jaka) where it created a distinction between procedurally
defective dismissals due to a just cause, on one hand, and
those due to an authorized cause, on the other.

Abbott v. Alcaraz
2013
It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under
Article 297 of the Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with
the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should
be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by
an act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an
authorized cause under Article 297 but the employer failed to comply
with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because
the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his
management prerogative.
Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an authorized
cause of retrenchment – as contradistinguished from the employee in
Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of neglect of duty – the
Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages at
the higher amount of P50,000.00.

Facts: Petitioners contend that Glaxo’s policy against
employees marrying employees of competitor
companies violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions
among employees on account only of marriage. They
claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to
marry.
Duncan v. Glaxo
G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004

Duncan v. Glaxo
2004
SC: No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of
Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an
employee from having a relationship with an employee
of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from
competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical
industry.

Duncan v. Glaxo
2004
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In
laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

Duncan v. Glaxo
2004
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority.
Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or
wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state in any of
its manifestations or actions has been found to have become
entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct.

Duncan v. Glaxo
2004
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and
the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does
not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships
between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its
employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing.
What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of
interest between the employee and the company that may
arise out of such relationships.

Duncan v. Glaxo
2004
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed
company policy which forms part of respondent’s Employee
Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such
as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his
employment.
Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he
signed his employment contract and when he entered into a
relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and
voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo,
the stipulations therein have the force of law between them
and, thus, should be complied with in good faith." He is
therefore estopped from questioning said policy.

Yrasuegui v. PAL
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
SC: The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal
under Article 297(e) of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to
no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to
keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his
ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
The standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of
the employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a
cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his
or her position in the company. In other words, they were
standards that establish continuing qualifications for an
employee’s position.
In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not
fall under Article 297(a) whose express terms require the
element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal.
The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in
fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to
(d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 297(e) – the
"other causes analogous to the foregoing."

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that
apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They
apply prior to employment because these are the
standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to
be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee
must continue to meet these standards while on the job
in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a
violation is not one of the faults for which an employee
can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article
297; the employee can be dismissed simply because he
no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether
or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional.

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when
placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 297(e) of
the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the
service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
"[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is
solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a
particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can
show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualificationj (BFOQ).
In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job
discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to
engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination
when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal
operation of a business or enterprise.

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
In British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission
(BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and
Service Employee’s Union (BCGSEU) the Supreme Court
of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in
determining whether an employment policy is justified.

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
Under this test:
(1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard
for a purpose rationally connected to the performance
of the job;
(2) the employer must establish that the standard is
reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that
work-related purpose; and
(3) the employer must establish that the standard is
reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the
legitimate work-related purpose

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court
held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must
prove that:
(1) the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and
(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be (un)able to properly perform the duties
of the job.

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company
policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is
valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.”

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
In this case, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the
weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be
gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times
in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care
for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not
farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records.
People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that
airline companies transport their passengers to their respective
destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is
unacceptable.

Yrasuegui v. PAL
2008
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the
possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft,
should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant
during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the
aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility.
Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin
attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can
translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just
because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow
aisles. These possibilities are not remote.

Opinaldo v. Ravina
G.R. No. 196573, October 16, 2013
In the case at bar, we recognize that respondent’s act of requiring
petitioner to undergo a medical examination and submit a medical
certificate is a valid exercise of management prerogative. This is
further justified in view of the letter-complaint from one of
respondent’s clients, PAIJR, opining that petitioner was "no longer
physically fit to perform his duties and responsibilities as a company
guard because of his health condition." To be sure, petitioner’s job as
security guard naturally requires physical and mental fitness under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5487, (AN ACT TO REGULATE THE
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE DETECTIVE, WATCHMEN
OR SECURITY GUARDS AGENCIES, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 11, October 3, 1972.) as amended by Presidential Decree No. 100.

Opinaldo v. Ravina
2013
While the necessity to prove one’s physical and mental fitness to
be a security guard could not be more emphasized, the question
to be settled is whether it is a valid exercise of respondent’s
management prerogative to prevent petitioner’s continued
employment with the Agency unless he presents the required
medical certificate.

Opinaldo v. Ravina
2013
All said, what behooves the Court is the lack of evidence on record
which establishes that respondent informed petitioner that his failure
to submit the required medical certificate will result in his lack of work
assignment.
It is a basic principle of labor protection in this jurisdiction that a
worker cannot be deprived of his job without satisfying the
requirements of due process. Labor is property and the right to make
it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. As
enshrined under the Bill of Rights, no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. The due process
requirement in the deprivation of one’s employment is transcendental
that it limits the exercise of the management prerogative of the
employer to control and regulate the affairs of the business.

Opinaldo v. Ravina
2013
In the case at bar, all that respondent employer needed to prove
was that petitioner employee was notified that his failure to
submit the required medical certificate will result in his lack of
work assignment – and eventually the termination of his
employment – as a security guard. There is no iota of evidence in
the records, save for the bare allegations of respondent, that
petitioner was notified of such consequence for non-submission.

Bar Exam (06)
Q: What property right is conferred upon an employee
once there is employer-employee relationship?
A: Right of person to his employment is deemed to be
a “property” within the meaning of constitutional
guarantees.

State Policies
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Phimco Industries v. PILA
G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010
A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with
management in the course of setting their terms and conditions of
employment. Because it is premised on the concept of economic war
between labor and management, it is a weapon that can either
breathe life to or destroy the union and its members, and one that
must also necessarily affect management and its members.
In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike must be
exercised responsibly and must always rest on rational basis, free from
emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hot
heads; it must focus on legitimate union interests. To be legitimate, a
strike should not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be
pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining
social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all,
the employer.

2010
Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor
and management but also the general peace and progress of
the community, the law has provided limitations on the right
to strike. Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply
with Article 278 of the Labor Code, which requires that:
(a) a notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended
date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;
(b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained
by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and
(c) a notice be given to the DOLE of the results of the voting
at least seven days before the intended strike.

2010
These requirements are mandatory, and the union’s failure to comply
renders the strike illegal. The 15 to 30-day cooling-off period is
designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve
the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator,
while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an
opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the
imprimatur of the majority of the union members.
In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal
procedural requirements; a strike notice was filed on March 9, 1995; a
strike vote was reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the strike
vote was filed with the DOLE on March 17, 1995; and the actual strike
was launched only on April 25, 1995.

2010
But strike may be illegal for commission of prohibited acts
Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance
with the procedural requirements, a strike may still be held
illegal where the means employed are illegal. The means
become illegal when they come within the prohibitions under
Article 279(e) of the Labor Code which provides:
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress
to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.

2010
To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. The work stoppage may be accompanied by
picketing by the striking employees outside of the company
compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work,
picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its
incidents to inform the public of what is happening in the
company struck against.
A picket simply means to march to and from the employer’s
premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and
other signs making known the facts involved in a labor
dispute. It is a strike activity separate and different from the
actual stoppage of work.

BPI v. BPI Employees
G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010
SC: Settled jurisprudence has already swung the balance in favor of
unionism, in recognition that ultimately the individual employee will
be benefited by that policy. In the hierarchy of constitutional values,
this Court has repeatedly held that the right to abstain from joining a
labor organization is subordinate to the policy of encouraging
unionism as an instrument of social justice.
Taking a second look on this point, we have come to agree with Justice
Brion’s view that it is more in keeping with the dictates of social
justice and the State policy of according full protection to labor to
deem employment contracts as automatically assumed by the
surviving corporation in a merger, even in the absence of an express
stipulation in the articles of merger or the merger plan.

2010
By upholding the automatic assumption of the non-surviving
corporation’s existing employment contracts by the
surviving corporation in a merger, the Court strengthens
judicial protection of the right to security of tenure of
employees affected by a merger and avoids confusion
regarding the status of their various benefits which were
among the chief objections of our dissenting colleagues.
However, nothing in this Resolution shall impair the right of
an employer to terminate the employment of the absorbed
employees for a lawful or authorized cause or the right of
such an employee to resign, retire or otherwise sever his
employment, whether before or after the merger, subject to
existing contractual obligations.

2010
More importantly, we find no reason to reverse our
previous pronouncement that the absorbed FEBTC
employees are covered by the Union Shop Clause.

2010
In any event, it is of no moment that the former FEBTC
employees retained the regular status that they
possessed while working for their former employer
upon their absorption by petitioner.
This fact would not remove them from the scope of
the phrase "new employees" as contemplated in the
Union Shop Clause of the CBA, contrary to petitioner's
insistence that the term "new employees" only refers
to those who are initially hired as non-regular
employees for possible regular employment.

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.

Pryce Corp. v. Chinabank
G.R. No. 172302, February 18, 2014
SC: This court has brushed aside invocations of
the non-impairment clause to give way to a
valid exercise of police power and afford
protection to labor.

Abella v. NLRC
G.R. No. 71813, July 20, 1987
Issue: payment of separation pay to workers at the end
of lease
Petitioner contends that constitutional guarantee
against impairment of obligations and contracts is
violated, because when she leased Hacienda Danao-
Ramona on June 27, 1960, neither she nor the lessor
contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay
separation pay to workers at the end of the lease.

Abella v. NLRC
1987
SC: Such contention is untenable.
The purpose of Article 283 as amended is obvious-the protection of the workers
whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and
reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents in the
case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled — for the thirty three
years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco.
Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the
absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former
employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind
them would amount to nothing.
Moreover, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect a change
in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with reference to
non-parties.

State Policies
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

Goya v. Goya Employees
G.R. No. 170054, January 21, 2013
Issue: whether the voluntary arbitrator is
empowered to rule on a matter not covered by
the issue submitted for arbitration

2013
SC: In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those
questions expressly stated and limited in the submission
agreement. However, since arbitration is the final resort for the
adjudication of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he has
the power to make a final settlement.
Thus, assuming that the submission empowers the arbitrator to
decide whether an employee was discharged for just cause, the
arbitrator in this instance can reasonably assume that his
powers extended beyond giving a yes-or-no answer and
included the power to reinstate him with or without back pay.

2013
In one case, the Supreme Court stressed that "xxx the Voluntary
Arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the
agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own
authority subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court.
The Arbitrator, as already indicated, viewed his authority as
embracing not merely the determination of the abstract
question of whether or not a performance bonus was to be
granted but also, in the affirmative case, the amount thereof.

2013
By the same token, the issue of regularization should be viewed as
two-tiered issue. While the submission agreement mentioned only the
determination of the date or regularization, law and jurisprudence
give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as
adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on
voluntary arbitration was created – speedy labor justice.
It bears stressing that the underlying reason why this case arose is to
settle, once and for all, the ultimate question of whether respondent
employees are entitled to higher benefits. To require them to file
another action for payment of such benefits would certainly
undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional
mandate providing full protection to labor.

State Policies
Section 18 (2).
2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.

Imbong v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Facts: According to petitioners, The RH Law violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the
RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude
because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are
compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for
indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment
and other forms of punishment.
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it
violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude.
They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private
and non-government health care service providers to render forty-
eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually
amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.

Imbong v. Ochoa
2014
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services
envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as
forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health
care service providers have the discretion as to the
manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover,
the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a
right.
SC: The point of the OSG is well-taken.

Imbong v. Ochoa
2014
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare.
Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right
but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves
the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the
power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice
of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the
public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point
of revoking such right altogether.

Imbong v. Ochoa
2014
The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.
A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages
private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bono service.
Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should
they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of
health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to
render pro bono service against their will.

State Policies
Article XIII
Secs. 1, 2, 3, 13, 14

ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good. xxx
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.

LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and
shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled
person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-
reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

WOMEN
Section 14. The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions,
taking into account their maternal functions, and such
facilities and opportunities that will enhance their
welfare and enable them to realize their full potential
in the service of the nation.

International School v. Quisumbing
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination
is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect
the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the
Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.

2010
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is
entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace — the factory, the office or the field —
but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote
"equality of employment opportunities for all."

2010
It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions
if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure
equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and
discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the
Labor Code.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.

Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime
G.R. No. 190161, October 13, 2014
The Seafarer’s Death Should Occur During The Term Of Employment.
With respect to the second requirement for death compensability, the
Court takes this opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is
that the seafarer’s death should occur during the term of his
employment, the seafarer’s death occurring after the termination of
his employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a
work-related injury or illness constitutes an exception thereto.
This is based on a liberal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as
impelled by the plight of the bereaved heirs who stand to be deprived
of a just and reasonable compensation for the seafarer’s death,
notwithstanding its evident work-connection. The present petition is a
case in point.

Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime
2014
SC: A strict and literal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC,
especially when the same would result into inequitable
consequences against labor, is not subscribed to in this
jurisdiction.
Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to give
maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in
Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, contracts of
labor, such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are deemed to be so
impressed with public interest that the more beneficial
conditions must be endeavoured in favor of the laborer.

Asia Brewery v. TPMA
G.R. Nos. 171594-96, September 18, 2013
SC: We rule that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused her discretion
when she relied on the unaudited financial statements of petitioner
corporation in determining the wage award because such evidence is
self-serving and inadmissible. Not only did this violate the December
19, 2003 Order of the Secretary of Labor herself to petitioner
corporation to submit its complete audited financial statements, but
this may have resulted to a wage award that is based on an inaccurate
and biased picture of petitioner corporation's capacity to pay — one of
the more significant factors in making a wage award.
Petitioner corporation has offered no reason why it failed and/or
refused to submit its audited financial statements for the past five
years relevant to this case. This only further casts doubt as to the
veracity and accuracy of the unaudited financial statements it
submitted to the Secretary of Labor.

Asia Brewery v. TPMA
2013
Verily, we cannot countenance this procedure because this could
unduly deprive labor of its right to a just share in the fruits of
production (Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution states in part:
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.)
- and provide employers with a means to understate their profitability
in order to defeat the right of labor to a just wage.

Bar Exam (2012)
Q: Which of the following is not a constitutional
right of a worker?
to engage in peaceful concerted activities
to enjoy security of tenure
to return of investment (x)
to receive a living wage

Bar Exam (98)
Q: What are the salient features of the protection
to labor provisions of the Constitution?
A:
1) Full Protection and Full Employment
2) Guarantee of Workers’ Rights
3) Shared Responsibility and Voluntary Settlement
of Disputes
4) Share in the Fruits of Production

Civil Code
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.

Dongon v. Rapid Movers,
G.R. No. 163431, August 28, 2013
The prerogative of the employer to dismiss an employee on
the ground of willful disobedience to company policies must
be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of
labor.
Petitioner maintains that willful disobedience could not be a
ground for his dismissal because he had acted in good faith
and with the sole intention of facilitating deliveries for Rapid
Movers when he allowed Villaruz to use his company ID.
SC: Petitioner was not guilty of willful disobedience; hence,
his dismissal was illegal

Dongon v. Rapid Movers
G.R. No. 163431, August 28, 2013
The disobedience attributed to petitioner could
not be justly characterized as willful within the
contemplation of Article 297 of the Labor Code. He
neither benefitted from it, nor thereby prejudiced
the business interest of Rapid Movers.
His explanation that his deed had been intended to
benefit Rapid Movers was credible. There could be
no wrong or perversity on his part that warranted
the termination of his employment based on willful
disobedience.

2013
Although we recognize the inherent right of the employer to
discipline its employees, we should still ensure that the
employer exercises the prerogative to discipline humanely
and considerately, and that the sanction imposed is
commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of
the infraction.
The discipline exacted by the employer should further
consider the employee’s length of service and the number of
infractions during his employment. The employer should
never forget that always at stake in disciplining its employee
are not only his position but also his livelihood, and that he
may also have a family entirely dependent on his earnings

2013
Considering that petitioner’s motive in lending his
company ID to Villaruz was to benefit Rapid Movers as
their employer by facilitating the loading of goods at
the Tanduay Otis Warehouse for distribution to Rapid
Movers’ clients, and considering also that petitioner
had rendered seven long unblemished years of service
to Rapid Movers, his dismissal was plainly
unwarranted.

Civil Code
Article 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not
merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest
that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on
labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed
shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar
subjects.

Cirtex Employees v. Cirtex
G.R. No. 190515, November 15, 2010
Facts: Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the
controversy, respondent created a Labor Management
Council (LMC) through which it concluded with the
remaining officers of petitioner a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) providing for daily wage increases
of P6.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 and P9.00 per
day effective January 1, 2005.
Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and
Manifestation to the Secretary of Labor, alleging that the
remaining officers signed the MOA under respondent’s
assurance that should the Secretary order a higher award
of wage increase, respondent would comply

2010
SC: That the arbitral award was higher than that which
was purportedly agreed upon in the MOA is of no
moment.
For the Secretary, in resolving the CBA deadlock, is not
limited to considering the MOA as basis in computing the
wage increases. He could, as he did, consider the financial
documents submitted by respondent as well as the
parties’ bargaining history and respondent’s financial
outlook and improvements as stated in its website.

2010
While a contract constitutes the law between the parties, this is
so in the present case with respect to the CBA, not to the MOA
in which even the union’s signatories had expressed reservations
thereto.
But even assuming arguendo that the MOA is treated as a new
CBA, since it is imbued with public interest, it must be construed
liberally and yield to the common good.

2010
While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between
the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied
the principles of law governing ordinary contracts.
A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between
labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed
with public interest, thus, it must yield to the common good.
As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and
technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic
construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which
it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.

Civil Code
Article 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation (not
limited to Labor Code) and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for
the laborer.

PNCC Traffic v. PNCC
G.R. No. 171231, February 17, 2010
The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without
reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties
must be gathered from that language, and from that language
alone.
Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is
clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean
that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good
reason can be assigned to show that the words used should be
understood in a different sense.

2010
In the case at bar, the contested provision of the CBA is clear
and unequivocal. Article VIII, Section 1 (b) of the CBA
categorically provides that the scheduling of vacation
leave shall be under the option of the employer. The
preference requested by the employees is not controlling
because respondent retains its power and prerogative to
consider or to ignore said request.

2010
Moreover, the relations between capital and labor are not
merely contractual. "They are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good x
x x."
The supremacy of the law over contracts is explained by the
fact that labor contracts are not ordinary contracts; they are
imbued with public interest and therefore are subject to the
police power of the state. However, it should not be taken to
mean that provisions agreed upon in the CBA are absolutely
beyond the ambit of judicial review and nullification. If the
provisions in the CBA run contrary to law, public morals, or
public policy, such provisions may very well be voided.

Magis Center v. Manalo
G.R. No. 178835, February 13, 2009
What is truly contentious is whether the probationary
appointment of the respondent on April 18, 2002 was for
a fixed period of one (1) year, or without a fixed term,
inasmuch as the parties presented different versions of
the employment agreement. As articulated by the CA:
In plain language, We are confronted with two (2)
copies of an agreement, one with a negative period and
one provided for a one (1) year period for its effectivity.
Ironically, none among the parties offered corroborative
evidence as to which of the two (2) discrepancies is the
correct one that must be given effect. x x x.

Magis Center v. Manalo
2009
SC: Under this circumstance, We can only apply Article
1702 of the Civil Code which provides that, in case of doubt,
all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the laborer.
Then, too, settled is the rule that any ambiguity in a
contract whose terms are susceptible of different
interpretations must be read against the party who drafted
it. (contra proferentem) In the case at bar, the drafter of
the contract is herein petitioners and must, therefore, be
read against their contention.

Bar Exam (95)
Q: Is Art. 1702 of the Civil Code (and Art. 4 of the Labor
Code) violative of the Equal Protection Clause?
A: No. EPC only applies to persons or things identically
situated. There is reasonable classification between the
employer and employee. Also, the articles are in
pursuance of the Social Justice provision of the
Constitution.

Bar Exam (93)
Q: In what manner does the labor law show its solicitous
compassionate policy towards the working man?
A:
1) In case of doubt, interpretation is in favor of labor.
2) Termination must be only with just or authorized cause
3) Regularization of employees is assured despite contrary
agreement
4) Reinstatement is immediately executory
5) Separation pay may still be awarded if employee is dismissed
not for serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character

Labor Code
Article 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall assure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work.

Labor Code
Article 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing
rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor.

Labor Code
Article 172 [166]. Policy. The State shall promote and develop a
tax-exempt employees’ compensation program whereby
employees and their dependents, in the event of work-
connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate
income benefit and medical related benefits.

Labor Code
Article 218 [211]. Declaration of Policy.
It is the policy of the State:
To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;
To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of
democracy and the promotion of social justice and development;
To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement;

Labor Code
To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as
union members and as employees;
To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement of
labor or industrial disputes;
To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and
To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes
affecting their rights, duties and welfare.
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the
employers and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through
collective bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall have the
power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions
of employment, except as otherwise provided under this Code.

PAL v. PALEA
G.R. No. 85985, August 13, 1993
In the instant petition for certiorari, the Court is
presented the issue of whether or not the
formulation of a Code of Discipline among
employees is a shared responsibility of the
employer and the employees.
As stated above, the Principal issue submitted for
resolution in the instant petition is whether
management may be compelled to share with the
union or its employees its prerogative of
formulating a code of discipline.

PAL v. PALEA
1993
PAL asserts that when it revised its Code on March 15, 1985, there was
no law which mandated the sharing of responsibility therefor between
employer and employee.
Indeed, it was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of Republic
Act No. 6715, amending Article 218 [211] of the Labor Code, that the
law explicitly considered it a State policy "(t)o ensure the participation
of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting the
rights, duties and welfare."
However, even in the absence of said clear provision of law, the
exercise of management prerogatives was never considered
boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina (177 SCRA 565 [1989]) it was held
that management's prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion.

PAL v. PALEA
1993
Verily, a line must be drawn between management
prerogatives regarding business operations per se and
those which affect the rights of the employees. In
treating the latter, management should see to it that its
employees are at least properly informed of its
decisions or modes action.
PAL asserts that all its employees have been furnished
copies of the Code. Public respondents found to the
contrary, which finding, to say the least is entitled to
great respect.

Labor Code
Article 267 [255]. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers’ participation in
policy and decision-making. The labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right,
subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making processes of the
establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect
their rights, benefits and welfare. (Principle of Co-Determination) For this purpose,
workers and employers may form labor-management councils: Provided, That the
representatives of the workers in such labor-management councils shall be elected by
at least the majority of all employees in said establishment.

Exceptions to Principle of Co-Determination-
(limited to participation & representation, not co-
management)
• corporate planning
• charting of corporate business
• modes and procedure of corporate management
• acquisition of property

Moresco v. Cagalawan
G.R. No. 175170, September 5, 2012
When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by
the employer and that submitted by the employee, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
employee. This is consistent with the rule that an
employer’s cause could only succeed on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s
evidence.

Bar Exam (76)
Q: What is the basis of the power of the State to enact
labor laws and social legislation?
A: Police Power

Bar Exam (95)
Q: Differentiate labor legislation from social legislation
A: Labor legislation covers employees and employers while
social legislation covers generally covers members of the
society (social justice).
What about the Labor Code? It is both labor and social
legislation.
Labor Legislation- consists of statutes, regulations and
jurisprudence governing labor and capital

Bar Exam (06)
Q: What is the purpose of labor legislation?
A: In general, to aid and assist employees or workers.
In particular, to implement the State policy on labor.

Bar Exam (95)
Q: What are the classification of labor laws?
A:
1) Labor Standards- fixes the minimum terms and conditions of employment-
wages, hours of work, cost and living allowances, etc.
2) Law on Social Security- applies when the employee is not able to work
resulting in the impairment or loss of earning capacity, this provides
substitute income, benefits or assistance, etc.
3) Labor Relations- governs the terms and conditions “above” the minimum
standards that are determined through bargaining, conciliation, grievance
machinery, etc.- or governs the relations between employer and employee

Bar Exam (97)
Q: Are labor standards and labor relations mutually
exclusive?
A: They are not, they are interrelated.

What are other bases of labor law?
- Doctrine of Incorporation (PIL)
- Social Justice

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