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The University of Chicago
Civil-Military Relations and Civilian Victimization in
Counterinsurgency
By Patrick Burke
July 2016
A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the
Master of Arts Program in the Committee on International Relations.
Faculty Advisor: Paul Staniland
Preceptor: Chad Levinson

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Abstract†
Why do some counterinsurgents intentionally kill civilians while others abstain from the practice?
Even more puzzling is the fact that some counterinsurgents target civilians in one conflict, and
practice restraint in another—sometimes in the span of only a few decades. Current research mainly
explains the occurrence of civilian victimization as a product of battlefield desperation. However,
desperation theories fail to account for the variation in victimization across guerrilla wars featuring
similar battlefield conditions. In this paper I argue that victimization is best explained by variation in
civil-military relations in place prior to the outset of rebellion. Even when faced with desperate
conditions on the battlefield, victimization is unlikely when civilian leaders create civilian-run
organizations able to coordinate with, monitor, and sanction the military during counterinsurgency.
Under this hierarchy civilians are able to efficiently ensure that the military does not target civilians,
which is seen as a hindrance to the ability of civil administration to function following hostilities.
Absent these structures, however, civilians allow the military autonomy while fighting rebellion. This
is because civilians fear overburdening the military in the midst of war by forcing them to restructure
their organization to facilitate coordination and monitoring. Autonomous military leaders victimize
due to a bias towards offensive strategies that target the insurgent’s source of power; i.e., civilians.
Importantly, however, as the number of counterinsurgencies repeated under civilian control
increases, the more closely military doctrine will reject the “ideology of the offensive” and adopt the
goals of the civil administration. To illustrate my theory I explore the Second Anglo-Boer War
(1899-1902), and the Arab Revolt in British Mandatory Palestine (1936-39).
Introduction:
Counterinsurgency wars commonly feature wide-scale brutality in the form of collateral
damage, torture, summary executions, destruction of infrastructure, and administrative detentions.
However, intentional killing of civilians through face-to-face massacres, aerial and artillery
† To the teachers of St. Tarcissus Catholic School. I never thought I would be here… but you did.

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bombardment, and the denial of humanitarian aid varies across cases. In fact, intentional killing
often varies in separate cases fought by the same counterinsurgent. For instance, while the U.S.
military allowed tens of thousands of civilians to die in concentration camps during the U.S.-
Philippines War, and indiscriminately bombed thousands in Vietnam, the recent Iraq war featured
the intentional lowering of force-protection to avoid collateral damage (Kahl 2008). We see similar
changes for the French in their wars in Algeria between 1830 (Vandervort 1998, 68) and 1954
(Mearom 2003); Uganda in their battles against the Lord’s Resistance Army between the 1990s and
engagements in the mid 2000s (Stanton 2015); and the British during their colonial and post-colonial
campaigns (Mockaitis 1990). What explains this variation?
In order to understand why civilian victimization varies across small wars it is crucial to
investigate civil-military relations prior to the outset of hostilities. I argue that civilian victimization is
unlikely when civilian leaders at the state level create professionalized civilian-run organizations able
to coordinate with, monitor, and sanction the military during small wars. The main function of such
an organization during times of peace is the governance and administration of a territory. During
times of conflict this organization not only continues administrative functions, but also ensures that
the military does not hinder the state’s goals concerning the governance of the territory following
hostilities. Indeed, civilians monitor the military on a range of issues when fighting rebellion.
However, ensuring the military avoids intentional killing of noncombatants is seen as especially
important because such actions obstruct future governance by making the population intransigent to
administration, and more likely to rebel in the future.
However, when military leaders are unencumbered by civilian oversight, intentional killing of
noncombatants is likely once deemed necessary for defeating the enemy. Military leaders are driven
towards these ends by the institutional goal of winning small wars through offensive strategies by
targeting the enemy’s source of power. Thus, these leaders see killing noncombatants as a strategic

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necessity when well-organized guerrillas derive their power from the civilian community.
Importantly, however, I do not suggest that military leaders will explicitly call for victimization in all
small wars throughout history. When a civilian-run organization is in place prior to hostilities,
military leaders incorporate civilian goals into small wars doctrine. Further, as the number of small
wars repeated under civilian control increases, the more closely military doctrine will reflect civilian
goals. Thus, my theory posits that the interaction of civilian and military organizations affects the
historical evolution of their respective organizational-cultures over time (Avant 1994).
I proceed by first laying out the alternative explanations of civilian victimization. Second, I
describe my dependent variable. I then move to describing my theory, and include a typology
explaining the outcomes my theory predicts. Fourth, I explain my methods and case selection.
Finally, I present my case studies and conclusions.
Alternative Arguments:
For the purposes of analytical clarity I identify two main camps in the victimization
literature. I term the first camp strategic-rational, and the second organizational-culture. Strategic-rational
scholars focus on analyzing how the conditions on the battlefield drive the logic of killing civilians.
Those within this camp studying civil wars identify asymmetric guerrilla war, high battle deaths
(Downes 2007; Valentino, Huth, Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino 2004), power asymmetries due to
foreign intervention (Stevenson 2014; Wood et al., 2012), and territorial loss (Ziempke 2012;
Kalyvas 2006) as determinants civilian targeting. In this paper I test the claim that victimization
occurs when (1) guerrillas are militarily threatening, including maintaining the ability to take and hold
territory and (2) rely on the civilian population as a base of power.
The strategic-rational theory of victimization in irregular wars provides a crucial foundation
for explaining victimization. However, this theory fails to account for the variation in victimization
across guerrilla wars featuring similarly strong guerrillas that rely on civilian support. For instance,

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41% of the civil wars (21/51) in Jessica Stanton’s dataset featuring strong rebels do not feature
civilian victimization by the state (Stanton 2015). I fill this gap by comparing two small wars
featuring similar conflict conditions, while focusing on how the organizational hierarchy between
civilian and military leaders affects the decision to victimize or remain restrained.
An additional problem with this literature concerns the measurement of “strong guerrillas”
and “civilian support.” Valentino et al (2004) operationalize “strong guerrillas” as those able to kill
37,000 or more state military personnel in irregular wars. This highly aggregated measure may be
appropriate for cross-national quantitative work. However, detailed process tracing allows me to
more fully develop what constitutes a “strong” guerrilla organization. As I explain in more detail
below, I measure “strong guerrillas” as those (1) able to take and hold territory (Ziemke 2012;
Kalyvas 2006), and (2) guerrillas with command and control structures able to plan and engage in a
coherent and persistent military campaign against the state while sustaining organizational capacity
(e.g., material resources, shelter, information, recruits, etc.) through active civilian support (Staniland
2014).
Finally, the measure of “civilian support” is problematic in much of the strategic-rational
literature. Kalyvas (2006) argues that civilian support occurs when a combatant is able to control
territory. However, even when under the control of guerrillas, large segments of the population
often do not provide support to guerrillas (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Further, some civilians
actively resist guerrillas by denying logistical support or collaborating with the state (Parkinson 2013;
Peterson 2001). Attempting to accurately account for this variation is likely an impossible task due to
data scarcity. Further, if we are attempting to answer how varying civilian support affects state
military action, it makes more sense to account for the latter’s varying perception of support for
guerrillas. Indeed, while some states with superior intelligence gathering capacity may maintain a
nuanced perception of the distribution of loyalties, lower capacity states may not. While this measure

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has problems as well,1
a close reading of communications by military and civilian leaders allows me
to reliably identify perceptions of support.
The organizational-culture camp explains victimization as a product of a combatant’s
organizational structure. Those scholars focusing on guerrillas identify high natural and/or external
resource endowments (Weinstein 2007), low social cohesion (Cohen 2013), and previously held
positions within a parochial political structure (Day and Reno 2014) as determinants of
victimization. Scholars focusing on the state find that the internalization of international norms and
institutional biases held by the military predict outcomes (Hull 2015, 2005; Thomas 2001; Legro
1992). As stated above, I follow the approach of this camp by systematically analyzing how civil-
military relations affects victimization. However, these scholars fail to consider the affect of
battlefield conditions on these structures. I fill this gap by examining how civil-military relations is
affected by the conflict over time. Thus, by holding severity of the guerrilla threat constant across
two small wars, while accounting for variation in civil-military relations, my theory attempts to build
on the work of both camps while also filling the gaps.
Dependent Variable:
Civilian victimization occurs when a belligerent’s military strategy is explicitly designed to kill
noncombatants.2
This means civilian deaths must be a part of an organized military strategy, rather
than isolated acts of errant troops (Downes 2008, 14; Valentino 2004, 10). This excludes incidents
such as the Haditha massacre during the Iraq War. Observable acts of civilian victimization include
face-to-face massacres, and intentional targeting of civilians with standoff munitions (e.g., artillery,
airstrikes, etc). In addition, victimization occurs when policies such as re-concentration of
1 For instance, some military leaders may misrepresent the level of civilian support to justify repressive measures to
civilian government officials.
2 I define combatants as those soldiers or civilians who either directly engage in combat, or comprise Walzer’s definition
of “munitions workers;” i.e., those who “are actually engaged in activities threatening and harmful to their enemies
(1977, 145-146).” These “munitions workers” include those who create, transport, or store munitions (e.g., small arms,
bombs, bullets, etc.). By contrast, noncombatants are those who do not directly supply munitions to combatants, carry
weapons, or engage in combat.

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populations, forced displacement, and denial of humanitarian aid are conducted for strategic military
purposes, and predictably result in large-scale deaths of civilians (Downes 2008, 15; Valentino 2004,
11).
Theory:
My argument is best understood through principal-agent theory. Civilian leaders at the state
level, functioning as the principal, have the option of delegating to its agent (the military) at two
extremes on a spectrum (Copelvitch 2010; Hawkins et al., 2006; Feaver 2003; Avant 1994). At one
end, the military may be allowed autonomy in formulating and implementing counterinsurgency
strategy. At the other end, the military must incorporate civilian-run organizations into the
formulation of strategy, and be subject to monitoring. However, the intensity of incentives for the
degree of delegation allowed is on a spectrum as well. When there is no civilian-run organization
tasked to coordinate and monitor the military prior to hostilities, incentives for allowing autonomy
are high. Absent a civilian-run organization the organizational-culture of the civilian leaders
institutionalizes the idea that attempting to gain control of the military in the midst of hostilities is
unduly burdensome. In the eyes of civilians, such dramatic shift would decrease efficiency of the
already task-saturated military, and increase the likelihood of losing the small war. Consequently, the
state believes it is forced to choose between possibly being rendered unable to carry out its goals in
the territory following hostilities (due to civilian victimization), or losing the small war by
overburdening the military. Faced with these outcomes the state allows a great deal of autonomy to
the military. It is important to emphasize that the institutionalization of the idea of military
autonomy obstructs civilian leaders’ ability to constrain the military even when—in reality—doing so
military would not lead to failure in small wars.
However, when a civilian-run organization is established prior to the onset of hostilities, the
incentives for allowing autonomy decreases, and the organizational-culture of civilian leaders adjusts.

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In this case, the relationship between the military and the civilian-run organization has been
institutionalized and thus incorporated into military doctrine. Therefore, when hostilities begin, the
military and the civilian-run organization communicate through pre-established organizational
structures. The two most important of these structures are: “coordination” and “monitoring (Feaver
2003).” First, the “coordinating” structure allows civilians to filter out strategies posed by the
military that prejudice the future goals of the state, while approving those necessary for victory.
Second, the “monitoring” structure allows civilians to ensure serious violations do not occur, and
punish deviations. Through repeated interactions under restricted autonomy, the military learns what
strategies will or will not gain approval. And sanctioning of leaders who deviate from approved
strategy sends the message that civilian leaders are able to adeptly monitor the military and can
credibly enforce their place in the hierarchy. Thus, subordination to civilian authority becomes
ingrained into the military’s organizational-culture, resulting in military leaders incorporating the
preferences of their civilian overlords into small wars doctrine and strategy (Avant 1994).3
The remaining part of this section describes three crucial components of my theory. First, I
describe how the goals of the state affect its preference towards counterinsurgency strategy. Second,
I answer why militaries intentionally kill noncombatants when unencumbered by civilian oversight.
Third, I describe how to observe the presence of a pre-established relationship between civilian-run
organizations and the military. Finally, I identify how this relationship functions during a small war,
and how this relationship affects victimization.
Goals & Counterinsurgency Strategy:
3 Thus, my theory directly contends with Colin Jackson’s excellent dissertation, which argues that the military un-learns
these lessons between small wars (Jackson 2009).

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Some states fighting small wars can be characterized to maintain what I call development goals.4
These goals are observable when (1) an incumbent plans to directly rule a territory or (2) install an
indigenous regime following hostilities. While rule may not be democratic, the incumbent’s goals are
to develop the indigenous population by providing education, infrastructure, legal arbitration and
other government services. When the goal is to install an indigenous regime, the incumbent desires
the same type of governance once they have departed. In accordance with “development goals,”
civilian leaders require a counterinsurgency strategy that involves the defeat of the guerrillas’ military
capabilities. However, such a strategy should also aim for a negotiated solution that results in the
elites (including former guerrilla commanders) and the segment of the population supporting the
rebellion to accept the rule of the state as legitimate (Jackson 2009, 75; Townshend 1986, 33-36).
The main aim of such a negotiated solution is to ensure a re-emergence of the rebellion is unlikely,
and “development goals” are obtainable. Thus, civilians require a counterinsurgency strategy
involving restraint from intentionally killing noncombatants because they view such tactics as
severely decreasing the likelihood of this outcome.
However, civilians will accept a low number of unintentional deaths in the pursuit of military
targets, especially when necessary for the reassertion of civil authority. Thus, offensive military
operations approved by civil authorities should be circumscribed to re-conquering territory in which
civil authority can no longer function, or to preemptively strike guerrillas planning to take territory.
Areas under civil authority that experience insurgent infiltration should mainly be combatted by
establishing a permanent occupation force for policing purposes, rather than brief offensives
4 The use of the term “development goals” to describe colonial administration may seem odd due to contemporary
sensibilities. However, I use this term because of its common use by colonial administrators to describe their goals for
the colonies.

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originating from militaries based outside of the towns and villages. I call this type of
counterinsurgency strategy “offensive policing.”5
With “development goals” in mind, it is difficult to understand why a state would not
constrain the scope of delegation to the military. It is thus worth explaining why such delegation
occurs in so many small wars. In addition, as I explain later, the military is largely unconstrained
during the Boer War and the preceding Victorian era. States do not set up civilian-run organizations
for three reasons. First, states with limited resources are forced to allocate most of these resources
towards the military component of the small war instead of ensuring their goals in the territory are
not prejudiced. “Limited resources” is mainly characterized by lacking the technology to allow
communication between the military in the field and a civilian organization. Wars of imperial
conquest during the 19th
century were often characterized by this reality. (Surridge 1998, 7).
However, even modern small wars, such as Rwanda’s invasion of Zaire in 1996, are characterized by
prohibitively expensive communications (Sterns 2011, 251-262). Second, small wars may be fought
with no progressive goals in mind. I identify two types of these small wars: extractive and defensive.
Examples of an extractive small war are the Belgian’s suppression of uprisings during their colonial
reign in the Congo. The Belgians used the Congolese for purely extractive purposes, caring little
about their development. Thus, when uprisings occurred they were put down with extreme brutality
(Hochschild 1999). Defensive small wars are fought across borders, mainly for the purposes of
defending the metropole’s security. The civilian population is thus seen as outside of the state’s
institutional reach (Ron 2003). Russia’s wars in Chechnya exemplify this type of small war (Gilligan
2010). Finally, some states’ laws and political culture construct barriers between civilian authority
5 To be clear, “offensive policing” is unlikely to involve “restraint” from any form of ill treatment of civilians. Indeed,
torture of suspected combatants, quick capitol punishments, administrative detentions, and limited destruction of
infrastructure are likely to occur under the “offensive policing” strategy. Again, however, the possibility that these forms
of violence may embitter the population is seen as a necessary risk by civilian administrators in the pursuit of military
victory.

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and the military. Why this occurs is clearer in some states than others. For instance, when the Tutsi
regime took over Rwanda in 1994, Paul Kagame—the leading general in the military—took
complete control of the Rwandan government. Unsurprisingly, with the head of the military also
acting as the head-of-state, military independence from civilian oversight became ingrained into the
political culture of Rwanda (Prunier 2009, 1-29). In other regimes the reasons are more opaque. For
instance, imperial Germany constructed a constitution in which the military was beholden to the
Kaiser, and not the Reichstag. This created a political-culture that saw impeding the effectiveness of
the military as antithetical to civilians’ function during war (Hull 2005, 104).
Military Independence & Counterinsurgency Strategy:
As shown above, there are multiple reasons why a state may not create a civilian-run
institution to oversee the military. But why does this independence result in intentional targeting of
civilians during small wars? Civil-military relations scholarship helps to answer this question.
According to this literature, military leaders prefer offensive strategies and autonomy from civilians
in order to reduce uncertainty in war and increase the organizational order necessary to win (Hull
2005; Posen 1984; Snyder 1984). The core goal of an offensive strategy is to disarm or destroy an
adversary’s armed forces within enemy territory. This strategy reduces uncertainty by allowing
combatants to carry out operations as they are planned before the battle (Posen 1984, 58-59).
Indeed, such a strategy requires flexibility in the face of enemy actions. However, such contingencies
are nowhere near as severe as defensive operations in which militaries are “often in a reactive
position, improvising new programs to cope with the adversary’s initiative (ibid., 1984, 48).”
Autonomy from civilians is important for similar reasons. Civilians not only prefer defensive
strategies, but they also limit offensives by pausing operations once it seems the enemy can be
pressed into a negotiated solution (Snyder 1984, 25). Thus, “the ideology of the offensive” applied
to small wars means the use of offensive operations to destroy the guerrillas’ ability to continue

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fighting (Townshend 1986, 30-33). In many cases, this involves destroying or removing the civilian
population (Valentino et al, 2004).
However, militaries are unlikely to expend vast resources to kill civilians when guerrillas pose
little military threat, and/or do not rely on civilians for support (Valentino 2004, 227-233). What it
means for a guerrilla organization to pose a “military threat” is a persistent debate in the civil war
literature. Parkinson (2013) and Petersen (2001) agree that threatening guerrillas must be able to
sustain their organization in the face of counterinsurgent attacks by relying on the active support of
the civilian population. However, these works fail to convincingly specify what makes a group adept
or inept at using force against the counterinsurgent. Attempts at measuring military strength often
focus on arbitrary numerical measures of relative numbers of troops compared to the
counterinsurgent, level of external aid (Cunningham 2011), battlefield victories (Christia 2012), and
numerical thresholds of counterinsurgent personnel killed (Valentino et al., 2004). While these
indicators are important, they capture only one component of what makes guerrillas militarily
threatening.
Paul Staniland’s “Networks of Rebellion” provides a typology that provides a parsimonious
description of what conditions allow guerrillas to be “strong” in terms of both the use of military
force and organizational sustainment. First, integrated groups are able to efficiently implement their
military strategy through a cohesive and disciplined leadership, as well as strong vertical ties to the
population (Staniland 2014, 26-28). Second, parochial organizations are able to maintain strong
vertical ties to the civilian populations, but are unable to maintain strong horizontal ties among
leaders (ibid, 31-32).6
I add that these types of organizations become militarily threatening when they
contest or control territory (Ziempke 2012; Kalyvas 2006). “Weak guerrillas” are conceptualized as
vanguard and fragmented groups. First, vanguard groups do not rely on the civilian population for
6 Although this type of organization is more vulnerable to state militaries than integrated organizations, the individual sub-
factions can be just as threatening to state control of territory

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support, but maintain strong horizontal ties. Second, fragmented groups are able to carry out limited
military operations on a scale that forces the state to deploy military forces on foreign soil. However,
because they are unable to maintain horizontal ties to ground commanders, or vertical ties to the
community, they are quickly defeated (Staniland 2014, 32-33). Both types are likely to be targeted
directly by the military, since the civilian population does not act as a base of power.
As stated in the introduction, there is one important caveat to my conceptualization of a
militaries’ institutional goals. I do not suggest that military leaders will explicitly call for victimization
in all small wars throughout history. Rather, I follow Deborah Avant’s view that military leaders will
formulate small wars doctrine in line with civilians’ institutional goals when they are aware that their
career advancement lies in the hands of civilian overlords (1994, 12-13). As the number of small
wars repeated under this hierarchy increases, the more closely military doctrine will reflect civilian
goals.
Civilian-Run Organizations and the Military:
How can we identify a civilian-run organization prior to the onset of hostilities? And how
can we observe its function during conflict? First, civilian-run organizations mainly take the form of
professionalized organizations mandated with the permanent governance of a territory. Or they can
act as an interim government tasked with developing and installing an indigenous regime. The
individuals that make up the organization are aware that their career advancement depends on
whether they are able to govern the territory in a manner that is beneficial to the state. Thus, a
coherent mission statement laying out the goals of the institution must exist; these goals must be
institutionalized through the training of recruits; promotion and recruitment should be based on
merit, not patronage; and individuals must be held responsible for failures. It should be made clear
by the organization that rebellion is a clear indicator of administrative failure, since the costs of
suppression surmount the benefit of occupation. Finally, leaders in the civilian-run organization

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should be aware that during rebellion they are expected to allow the military the force necessary to
quell the rebellion, while also restraining operations from severely obstructing future administrative
functions. The exact type of counterinsurgency strategy this translates to should be largely
ambiguous to the administrator. Nevertheless, it should be clear that the intentional killing of
civilians is prohibited.
Second, when rebellion does emerge, we should observe the state granting civilian-run
organizations legal authority over the final say in the implementation of counterinsurgency strategy.
Because it is clear to the military that they are subordinate to civilians, the former makes a concerted
effort to cooperate with the latter in the midst of war. This takes the form of face-to-face meetings
between civilian and military leaders. The military also submits to monitoring by the civilian
authority, both through these meetings, and by submitting reports to civilian authorities. Thus,
during conflict we should observe civilian leaders involved in both the formulation, and final
authority prior to the implementation of strategy through these platforms. Further, civilians should
maintain oversight throughout the conflict and reprimand or sack military leaders that violate their
authority. Finally, military leaders should preemptively incorporate civilians’ institutional goals into
the formulation of strategy. Offensive operations that are likely (though not explicitly) to involve
indiscriminate victimization may be suggested. However, intentional victimization is unlikely to be
discussed. I term the civil-military relationship described here: “civil-military coordination.”
On the other hand, when rebellions emerge and these civilian-run organizations are
institutionally incoherent, or absent prior to the outset of hostilities, we should observe what I term
“military domination.” Under this type of civilian-military relationship some form of civil
administration may exist “on-the-ground.” However, these administrators are not a part of a
coherent professionalized organization specifically delegated “coordinating” or “monitoring”
authority over the military. Thus, total legal authority is placed in the hands of the military

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commander, relegating civilian officials to administrative tasks. During hostilities we should see that
civil authorities are not involved in the formulation of military strategy, nor do they maintain final
authority prior to implementation. Though rare, attempts made by civilian officials to restrain the
military from victimization should fail. Again, civilians fail because the home government sees
reversing the hierarchy during a small war as risky, since there are no pre-established mechanisms in
place for “coordination” and “monitoring.” Further, military leaders are aware of the administrator’s
lack of power, and simply ignore their efforts. Table 1 shows how these types of civil-military
relations interact with the conflict environment to produce outcomes.7
Table 1. Military Domination Civil-Military Coordination
Powerful Guerrilla Intentional Targeting Offensive Policing
Weak Guerrilla Targeting of Guerrillas Only Targeting of Guerrillas Only
Method and Case Selection:
To test my theory I explore the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Arab Revolt in
British Mandatory Palestine (1936-39). Civilian victimization occurred during the Boer War, but was
absent during the Arab Revolt. Because these two wars are fought by the same actor (Britain) I am
able to reliably test how civil-military relations prior to the outset of hostilities affected these
outcomes. Further, the similarities on the battlefield allow me to test competing theories that stress
the strategic logic of victimization. Of course, the conflict conditions in the two cases differ in
certain aspects.8
I account for these differences, but show through careful process tracing and time-
slice analysis (Pape 1996, 113) that the hierarchy between civilian and military authorities best
7 As we see, intentional targeting of civilians is likely to take place under “military domination” when faced with a
powerful guerrilla group. Weak guerrillas, however, should be targeted directly since the civilian population does not
provide a base of support. Under civil-military coordination, weak guerrillas are met with a similar strategy. However,
even when faced with strong guerrillas, civil-military coordination produces “imperial policing” as a strategy. Although I
do not test the “weak guerrilla” argument, it is important to make the distinction to fully specify the mechanisms driving
the outcomes under the two types of civil-military relations.
8 For instance, mobility of troops and communications were far more advanced by the mid 1930’s than the turn of the
century. Yet, the British fielded a significantly larger army during the Boer War than the Arab Revolt.

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explains the outcomes in each case. Finally, sources for analyzing the two cases derive from a mix of
secondary historical literature and archival documents.9
Scope Conditions:
My theory is most useful for explaining victimization by a state’s military in asymmetric
guerrilla wars. Though my case studies feature a democratic state in the colonial era, my theory
should be applicable across regime types and eras. As I explain below, the mechanism causing
restraint by counterinsurgents are driven by cost/benefit calculations and organizational capacity,
not internal characteristics of democratic regimes.10
My theory should explain small wars fought by
both foreign and domestic counterinsurgents. Whether Britain’s colonial wars can be truly
considered “foreign” is a conundrum for civil war scholars (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 76-77;
Sambanis 2004, 827). However, even if colonial wars are considered “foreign,” the mechanisms
identified in my theory are applicable to internal wars as well. Indeed, scholars studying
contemporary internal wars find that counterinsurgents are less likely to target civilians that are seen
as part of the state’s institutional reach (Straus 2015; Ron 2003).11
Small Wars and Civil-Military Relations: From the Victorian Era to the 1930s:
During the 19th
century Britain allowed its military to conduct small wars largely
unconstrained from civilian oversight. This was largely due to the technological impossibility of the
home government efficiently communicating with the “in theater” civilian administrators or military
commanders. Further, these civilian administrators could not reliably communicate with or monitor
the military commanders in the field. Simply put, waiting weeks to garner approval for a military
9 The latter include Cabinet Memorandum, Colonial Office Reports, War Office Reports, and newspapers.
10 Examples of these characteristics include: the voting public’s aversion to victimization, and a state’s adherence to
international law/norms. Indeed, the number of cases of victimization in irregular wars is greater for autocracies than
democracies (Stanton 2009; Valentino et al 2004). However, democracies utilize victimization strategies in the post-
colonial era, including significant cases such as India in Kashmir (Stanton 2009), the U.S. in Vietnam (Valentino et al
2004), and Israel’s reprisal raids of the 1950s (Byman 2011, 18-26). This indicates that internal characteristics of
democratic regimes are not sufficient constraints on victimization (Downes 2008).
11 Whether such restraint can be traced to civil-military relations is fruitful ground for future research.

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strategy was seen as prohibitively obstructive to victory by civilian leaders (Surridge 1998, 6-7).
However, even when communications technology improved towards the end of the 19th
century, the
military continued to maintain autonomy during small wars. What explains this outcome? In 1854,
after 60 years under War Office (W.O.) control, the Colonial Office (C.O.) became a separate
organization with its own Secretary of State for the Colonies (Kirk-Green 1999, 7). However, when
a small war did break out, the C.O. and W.O. “had obviously to work closely together, yet no
institution existed to make co-ordination easier (Bond 1967, 13).” Further, while the War Office Act
of 1870 placed the civilian Secretary of State for War in charge of the Commander-in-Chief12
(C-in-
C) during armed conflict, the law remained silent on the role of the C.O. during conflict—both at
the Cabinet level (i.e., the Colonial Secretary) and on the ground. Thus, with no means of
coordination, and no clear hierarchy, when hostilities erupted C.O. “officials naturally corresponded
with the Colonial Office and local military commanders with the War Office (ibid., 13).” In sum, the
military had been independent from civilian control for so long that no organizations existed for
monitoring or coordination. Nor was there clear legal guidance or military doctrine describing how
relations between civilians and military leaders should function during small wars. As a consequence,
the organizational-culture of both the W.O., the C.O. internalized this hierarchy.
An additional reason C.O. administrators did not intervene in the military’s affairs was
because the former was un-professionalized and lacked clear organizational goals for the colonies.
Prior to the 1890’s C.O. administrators gained employment and were promoted based on patronage
and received no formal training in administration. Indeed, I use the term “Colonial Office” in this
context for convince, seeing as “there was no overarching imperial government” across the vast
British Empire (Surridge 1998, 5). The C.O. in the 19th
century “was little more than … separate
territorial civil services, each with its own procedures and character (Kirk-Green 1999, 9). Indeed,
12 The Commander-in-Chief during this period refers to the leading commander during small wars.

18. 18
during the 19th
century the goal of C.O. administrators was to facilitate imperial expansion.
However, what this meant was quite vague to many administrators. C.O. officials largely interpreted
this role to mean allowing the military the autonomy necessary to consolidate control of territory
through the use of force as leading officers saw fit (Townshend 1986, 34). Of course, as we will see
in the case of the Boer War, a few civilian administrators did attempt to control the military when
wars became too financially costly (Surridge 1998, 7). However, the idea that military necessity
should trump civilian oversight was simply too ingrained in the organizational-culture of the C.O.,
W.O., and even the Cabinet for the administrator’s view to win out. Further, as stated above, no
coherent organization existed to see that a civilian order was carried out, nor did clear military
doctrine exist to guide officers in fighting small wars under civilian control.
By 1899 the C.O. began its trajectory towards professionalization and maintaining the
organizational goal of political and economic development of the colonies. However, it was not until
the end of World War I that this goal became institutionalized. In 1899 Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, commissioned the Selborne Report, an “in-house committee … to
help decide whether there was really an institution that could honestly and properly be described as
‘the Colonial Service’ (Kirk-Green 1999, 12).” Following this report, Chamberlain decided to
formally consolidate the separate territorial civil services13
under the umbrella of the C.O.
Chamberlain was largely motivated towards institutional consolidation by the conclusion of the
expansion of the empire during the “scramble for Africa” in the 1880s. Simply put, by the early 20th
century the territories had been conquered and needed governance. The expense of funding the
territories through the British taxpayer became too great, and thus it was decided after the Selborne
report that the colonies would have to be self-sustaining. To do so, the C.O. began plans to ensure
the political and economic development of the territories was feasible.
13 With the exception of the Indian Civil Service.

19. 19
The first steps towards development for the C.O. involved sending its recruits through three
months of training at the Imperial Institute in London. The course covered subjects necessary for
providing an indigenous community the organization and skills to develop their government and
economy.14
The second significant shift was to do away with employment to the C.O. through
patronage. Instead, recruitment and career advancement would be merit based—similar to the
Cardwell reforms of the W.O. in the 1870s. Following this change, it became clear that failure in
developing a colony would be harmful to one’s career. The process of changing the C.O.’s primary
goal from purely administration to that of development slowed during World War I. However, by
the end of the war appointments to development services, such as agriculture, survey, and forestry
grew exponentially every year. Further, training became more thorough, and moved to top
universities such as Cambridge and Oxford (ibid., 22). Indeed, as we will see during the Arab Revolt,
the League of Nations (LON) Mandates system likely contributed to the C.O.’s shift to
development. The Mandate system charged European powers to aid territories to become politically
and economically independent from colonial powers. Failure to do so was perceived as detrimental
to the prestige of civilized nations. Indeed, with the requirement of providing an annual report on
the development of mandated territories to the LON, careers and egos were more on the line than
ever before.15
The immediate post-WWI period also saw a sudden and fundamental shift in civil-military
relations during small wars. Following the shift toward development of the colonies, small wars
fought in these territories were legally considered civil unrest. This meant that the guerrillas and
surrounding civilian population were to be treated as British subjects. Thus, the military was to aid
14 These subjects included: “colonial accounts, tropical economic products, hygiene and sanitation, criminal law and
procedure, international law and Mohammedan law, elementary surveying, African Languages and phonetics, and
ethnology… (Kirk-Green 1999, 17).”
15 League of Nations, Palestine Mandate (Geneva: The Council of the League of Nations, 1922)
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp.

20. 20
the civil government during times of rebellion, rather than acting as an autonomous entity. This
meant that the military was to conduct counter-guerrilla operations as an imperial police force,
bound by English Common Law only to use the “minimum force” necessary to restore order.16
The
principle of “minimum force,” and acting as a subordinate “aid to the civil authority” became legally
codified in the King’s Regulation’s, Manual of Military Law early in the 20th
century (Mockaitis 1990, 18).
Further, the 1914 version of Colonel C.E. Callwell’s influential Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices
emphasizes the need for adherence to the two principles (Hughes 2009, 316-317).
However, civil domination and the minimum force principle simply could not penetrate the
organizational-culture of the military in the early 20th
century. Further, as explained below, the King’s
Regulation’s left some legal ambiguity as to exactly when the two principles applied. Nevertheless,
during this period the C.O. and the Cabinet began to see the need to institutionalize “minimum
force” and civil control. Indeed, it is the expensiveness of the destruction during the Anglo-Irish war
(1919-1921)—and to some extent the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902)—that explains the shift
in this direction. No doubt, as the main goal for Britain’s colonies shifted toward “development” the
C.O. and Cabinet had no desire for such destruction to be replicated in other colonies (Mockaitis
1990, 22).
However, it was the Amritsar Massacre in 1919 that finally pushed civilian leaders to
radically alter civil-military relations during small wars. In the course of dispersing a crowd, General
Dyer ordered his men to fire on a crowd of demonstrators, resulting in an estimated 200 to 300
dead, with nearly 1000 wounded. The Hunter Committee investigated the incident and eventually
censured Dyer. The Committee rejected his defense that the entire Punjab was in a state of
16 “Minimum force” is a general principle derived from English Common Law and can be identified as a fundamental
characteristic of British counterinsurgency doctrine throughout the 20th century. This principle mandates that the task of
British soldiers is “not the annihilation of an enemy, but merely the suppression of a temporary disorder, and therefore
the degree of force to be employed must be directed to that which is essential to restore order, and must never exceed it
(Mockaitis 1990, 18).”

21. 21
insurrection and that martial law was in effect everywhere. Dyer believed that because martial law
was in effect, his actions following cessation of hostilities would be indemnified—as is specified in
the Manual of Military Law (ibid., 22). Instead, “The Hunter Committee ... took a narrower view of
the episode. Its members concluded that Dyer was not suppressing a rebellion but dispersing an
unlawful assembly (ibid., 23).” Essentially, this ruling resulted in the “principle of minimum force,
which had previously applied only to riot situations when the civil power was still in control, had
been expanded to include disturbances that occurred after martial law had been declared (ibid., 25).”
Thus, from this point onward, it became clear to the military that it was required to abide by
the principle of “minimum force” and remain subordinate to the civil power at all times when
suppressing rebellion. Thus, it became standard at the outset of a small war for the British to pass
emergency laws that allowed the civil power to maintain authority, and to ensure military officers
understood English Common Law continued to apply. Thus, the military began its trajectory
towards acting as an imperial police force used to quell disturbance, rather than a conventional army
seeking destruction of an enemy. Of course, the legal delineation of responsibility between the civil
power and the military was not always complied with, nor was the principle of “minimum force.”
However, according to historian Thomas Mockaitis, such deviations were generally held to account
by the British government, which resulted in the strengthening of the “minimum force” principle, as
well as the role of the military as an aid to the civil power. Interestingly, military doctrine adjusted to
this new reality (ibid., 17-57). Through the release of official pamphlets the W.O. made a strong
effort to clearly lay out how military leaders could effectively quell rebellion while also coordinating,
and ceding to monitoring by the civilian authority.17
The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902):
17 These include: Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (1923 & 1934) and Notes on Imperial Policing (1934 & 1937) (Hughes 2009,
316-317).

22. 22
On October 11, 1899 a conventional war began between England and the Boer Republics of
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (Farewell 1976, 35-36). Britain’s aims were to annex the
territories in order control the gold and diamond mines. However, the British intended to eventually
transition the Republics to self-rule once the economy was sufficiently productive, and the Boer
government was reformed (ibid., 28). The British won the conventional war by February of 1900,
and formally annexed the Boer Republics. Shortly thereafter, on 17 March 1900, Boer commanders
officially declared to fight a guerrilla war (Judd & Surridge 2003, 199). Though the British military
was by all accounts more powerful, the Boer guerrillas exacted a heavy toll on their occupiers. A
Boer force of about 44,000 men consistently sabotaged communication lines, trains, and gold mines.
They were even able to destroyed entire columns of British troops in several instances (Belfield
1993, 131). Indeed, the high death toll of British troops was deeply frustrating to both military and
civilian leaders. 18
However, it seems that the commandos’ ability to consistently invade the Cape
Colony throughout the guerrilla war was truly threatening to the British. These invasions increased
the likelihood of an Afrikaans rebellion. The Cape served as a vital strategic and economic port, and
thus a rebellion was potentially disastrous for Britain (Pakenham 1979, 544-545).
The Boers’ effectiveness was due to strong horizontal ties among commanders, skill of their
fighters, and logistical support (food, shelter, etc.) from the civilian population (Pretorius 2000, 173).
To meet this threat, the British mounted an offensive strategy mainly using flying columns of British
troops to destroy the commandos directly. However, Roberts and then Kitchener targeted the
civilian population as well. Lord Roberts had established a policy of punishment for sabotage of
trains or communication lines in the form of burning farms in close proximity to such incidents
(Spies 1977, 127). This resulted in an estimated 521 farms being destroyed during the eight months
18 In the end, an estimated 2,000 Boer commandos and 2,000 British military personnel were killed in action during the
guerrilla phase (ibid., 131). Although Britain maintained about 75,000 combat troops during the guerrilla war, these
numbers illuminate the threat posed by the Boers (Belfield 1993, 104).

23. 23
of his command during the guerrilla war (Heyningen 2013, 58). However, following his takeover as
C-in-C, Kitchener utilized a scorched earth strategy on larger scale. Unlike Roberts, Kitchener’s aim
was to deprive the Boers of logistical support provided by the civilian population through absolute
destruction (Spies 1977, 120). Kitchener’s forces burnt the majority of the estimated 30,000 farms
between 1900 and 1902, and killed millions of heads of cattle, and burnt thousands of acres of crops
as well (Downes 2008, 169). In numerous instances entire towns were destroyed (Spies 1977, 176).
As a result, thousands of civilians were left homeless and with no source of food. To his
credit, Kitchener placed these civilians into concentration camps, though at a staggering rate and
with little humanitarian provisions.19
In fact, Kitchener rejected humanitarian aid from England
several times, reasoning it would tie up the railways being used for transport of troops and military
supplies.20
As was predicted by some of his subordinates, in the span of just under two years 27,927
Boers, and 18,003 blacks died, mainly of disease.21
However, is this a case of civilian victimization? The morality rates in the camps were not
known until Emily Hobhouse released a pamphlet of her investigation in June of 1901. Although the
majority of these deaths occurred between March and November 1901 (ibid., 183), it is unclear
whether Kitchener actually knew the scale of death in the camps. Camp administrators complained
of deaths, but no survey of the camps was conducted that may have indicated the rates of death and
19 Camp administrators often complained that Kitchener would send an influx of refugees to camps without providing
sufficient provisions (Farewell 1976, 405). Kitchener also failed to communicate with camp administrators on the
number of civilians that would be brought into camps, and rarely specified the date of their arrival (Spies 1977, 192-195).
20 On 12 April 1901 St. John Broderick, the Secretary of State for War, had enquired Kitchener about reports the War
Office had received indicating that provisions in the Bloemfontein camp were lacking, and that typhoid was prevalent.
Kitchener replied that some camps were lacking in provisions, but that the Military Governor of the Transvaal had made
a public appeal for aid to the camps. In reality, however, in March 1901 Kitchener personally denied the appeal for aid
because it would be admittance to shortages, and “play into the hands of the pro-Boers (Pakenham 1979, 524).” In May,
he again denied aid from England once more (Spies 1977, 216).
21 No officers were able to predict the exact scale of death. However, in September 1900, when the camps had barely
begun, General French predicted that overcrowding would lead to epidemic, and thus ordered refugees to be dispersed
to other camps (Spies 1977, 150). Second, in March 1901, Captain A.G. Trollop (provisional chief superintendent of the
Orange River Colony camps) was denied additional tents by the army. He “privately told the chief ordinance officer that
it was impossible to expect women and children to crowd the tents to this extent. The people were ‘not so cleanly as
soldiers’ and epidemics were bound to result (Heyningen 2013, 116).”

24. 24
causes. That being said, the recent work of Elizabeth Van Heyningen shows that the level of
scientific literacy common among the British officer class during the early 20th
century provided
Kitchener the foresight to know his scorched earth policy and re-concentration of refugees to the
camps with little humanitarian aid would lead to an epidemic (Heyningen 2013). Thus, while no
face-to-face massacre occurred, I code this as a case of victimization because Kitchener was aware
massive death would ensue due to his counter-guerrilla strategy.
What was the role of the Cabinet and civilian administrators in all of this? To evaluate my
theory of “military domination” I divide the case into discrete time slices (Pape 1996, 113). The Boer
War is a hard case for my theory, since the Governor of the Cape Colony, Alfred Milner, lobbied
Roberts, Kitchener, and the Cabinet several times between June 1900 and November 1901 to
temper the scorched earth policy.22
The time slices focus on his efforts, and show that the lack of
clear hierarchy, and sufficient coordination and monitoring mechanisms resulted in (1) the Cabinet
consistently siding with the military upon the slightest hint of defeat, and (2) the C-in-C ignoring
Milner and shirking orders from the Cabinet with little consequence.
To be clear, for the vast majority of the guerrilla war Milner’s motivation for restraining the
scorched earth policy had nothing to do with the mortality rates in the camps. Again, Milner did not
know about the deaths until June 1901. Further, neither he, nor the Cabinet possessed sufficient
information on the scale of the scorched earth policy or the conditions in the camps to make a
reasonable predication that the mortality rates would be so massive. Kitchener successfully kept this
information hidden, even when asked directly by the Cabinet.23
However, the Cabinet and Milner
were fully aware from the outset that some number of civilians would die from the scorched earth
policy. Still, Milner was motivated mostly by economics. That is, he wanted to restrain the scorched
22 An easy case would feature little to no civilian interference with military matters; e.g., the German small war in South
West Africa (1904-1907) (Hull 2005, 5-70).
23 See footnote 18.

25. 25
earth policy because rebuilding the Transvaal and Orange River Colony would be extraordinarily
expensive. However, he also worried that the civilian deaths would make the Boer population and
their political leaders more likely to rebel in the future—a tremendous expense especially without an
expeditionary military. Indeed, once the scale of mortality rates became public, his fears of future
rebellion increased greatly, as did his efforts to improve the camps. Milner’s alternative counter-
guerrilla strategy was defensive. It involved occupying a district, protecting the population from the
commandos, and re-starting the economy before moving to the next district, “slowly occupying the
country, bit by bit, rather than rapidly and repeatedly scouring it (Pakenham 1979, 515).”
However, because Milner maintained no authority over the generals, his direct appeals to
Kitchener and Roberts were ignored when deemed to conflict with military necessity. Milner sent a
letter to Roberts early in the guerrilla war (June 1900) requesting farm burning be restricted to those
clearly aiding sabotage (Headlam 1933, 133). Roberts simply ignored Milner’s request, and continued
to expand the policy over the next three months. In response, Milner sent another letter in
September demanding restraint (ibid., 153). He was ignored once more. In October 1900 Milner
turned his sights to Kitchener—who was about to take over as C-in-C—clearly laying out the
defensive strategy described above (ibid., 164). Kitchener paid lip service to the request, but by
February 1901 it was clear that the general chose an offensive strategy involving flying columns and
an expanded scorched earth campaign (Spies 1977, 177). Milner received word of the offensive
strategy and sent a letter to Kitchener in February re-asserting the need for a defensive policy.
Kitchener claimed the offensive operations were needed because of the recent invasion of the Cape
by commandos for the third time since the beginning of the guerrilla war (ibid., 177). After being
ignored multiple times by Roberts and now Kitchener, Milner shifted his efforts to the Cabinet. In
early March he requested the Cabinet order Kitchener to institute a defensive strategy. Milner’s
emphasis on the economic burden of Kitchener’s strategy initially won their approval. Indeed, the

26. 26
impending peace talks at Middelburg in mid March drove home the reality to the Cabinet that
Britain would have to pay for re-construction upon cessation of hostilities (Judd & Surridge 2003,
203).24
Thus, Kitchener was ordered to temper farm burning, and begin occupying districts and
restarting the gold mines. But following the failure of the talks by late March, the Cabinet “officially”
allowed Kitchener to continue his offensive strategy. However, Kitchener had been shirking the
orders of the Cabinet for most of March anyways, only restarting a few mines and allocating scant
resources toward occupation (Pakenham 1979, 588).
Following the failure at Middleburg the commandos increased sabotage operations, as well
as their efforts to start a rebellion in the Cape. Kitchener met their efforts with an increase to the
scope and severity of his scorched earth strategy. At the same time, Milner increased his efforts to
restrain Kitchener. On 8 May he began the long journey to England, and on June 25 1901 presented
his plea to institute a defensive strategy before the Cabinet. The Cabinet approved his strategy, but
by July 25th
the commandos executed their most successful invasion of the Cape. The Cabinet
turned back to Kitchener, who quickly mounted two successful offensives into the Cape (ibid., 533).
Shortly after returning to South Africa in September 1901, Milner made another appeal to the
Cabinet. Roberts—now C-in-C of the W.O.—stepped in to convince the Cabinet that Milner’s
defensive strategy was infeasible and would lead to a defeat of the British (Judd and Surridge 2003,
212). Milner made one last effort in November, this time asking the Cabinet to sack Kitchener for
his consistent shirking of orders and lack of transparency. This time, however, Prime Minister
Salisbury stepped in and convinced the Cabinet that it was unclear how Milner’s plan could actually
be implemented, and that this risk was simply unacceptable considering the continued strength of
the commandos (ibid., 213). Frustrated, Milner ended his efforts, and shifted his attention to
reforming the camps. Indeed, the publicization of the mortality rates pushed the Cabinet to order
24 CAB 37/56/27 23 FEB 01, page 2; CAB 37/56/29 4 MAR 01; CAB 37/57/34 19 MAR 01.

27. 27
Kitchener to allow Milner to take over the camps and provide humanitarian aid. However, between
July and November 1901, Kitchener continued to obstruct aid in the name of military necessity.
Kitchener only allowed a full civilian takeover of the camps and influx of aid in late November
because he deemed that the threat from the commandos had lessened (Spies 1977, 252-253). Indeed,
with the approval of the Cabinet to continue his offensives, it is no surprise that Kitchener believed
he could successfully shirk orders to reform the camps.
As this case shows, the poor state of civil-military relations during the Victorian era led to
disastrous consequences for the British government. Following the cessation of hostilities, as
predicted by Milner, the Boer people believed the British had attempted to wipe out their race—a
belief that continues today (Heyningen 2008). Though never leading to rebellion, this belief could
have been used as a potent mobilization tool. Further, news of the deaths greatly damaged the image
of the British in the eyes of their public as well as the international community. Though these latter
factors never led to any significant material or political detriment for the Empire, the economic
burden of the destruction was substantial. Prior to the Boer War the entire budget for the C.O. was
£600,000 (Pakenham 1979, 608). The compensation for destruction of property during the guerrilla
war alone cost the British taxpayer £5.6 million (ibid., 610). Moving forward three decades to the
Arab Revolt reveals that the reforms to civil-military relations during the post-WWI era resulted in a
more restrained counterinsurgency strategy.
The Arab Revolt in British Mandatory Palestine (1936-1939):
By the time the Arab Revolt began in April 1936, the British had been administering a
League of Nations (LON) Mandate there for 14 years. The official LON document on the Mandate
explicitly states that Britain’s role was to develop the government and economic abilities of the
indigenous population, with the goal of eventual autonomous self-rule. However, the document

28. 28
does not specify which indigenous population—Arabs or Jews—was to rule Palestine.25
This
remained a vexing question to the British throughout the Mandate period. Indeed, this question was
the root cause and sustaining force of the Arab Revolt. The political leaders of Arab Palestinians, the
Arab Higher Committee (AHC), organized the uprising in April with the aim of pressuring the
British to (1) end Jewish immigration, (2) prohibit land sales to Jews, and (3) establish a legislative
council26
(Mockaitis 1990, 88).27
The Revolt was made up of two phases. The first phase occurred
between April and October 1936, and the second between July 1937 and May 1939.
Between April and August 1936, the Mandate government understood that the violence—
though seemingly conducted by fragmented gangs—was directed by the AHC, and would only
intensify if political grievances were not redressed.28
Thus, by early May the High Commissioner
(HC) of Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, proposed to the Cabinet that a Royal Commission be sent
to Palestine to mediate a political solution to the crisis. Wauchope also requested military
reinforcements from Egypt and Iraq be sent to Palestine, but made clear that he sought a political
solution to the crisis, stating: “I have no doubt that police and drastic military action can hold in
check major disorders but this course would lead to an increase of permanent embitterment [of the
population], and would be constantly liable to recur in [the] future.”29
However, by late August a purely political solution became increasingly unlikely. By then it
was clear to the British that the violence was organized, increasing in scope, and enjoyed widespread
support from the Palestinian population.30
Under the command of former Turkish Army officer
Fawzi Kawakji (who had arrived in August), and augmented by foreign fighters from the region,
25 League of Nations, Palestine Mandate (Geneva: The Council of the League of Nations, 1922)
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp.
26 Due to demographics, this condition would allow Arab domination of the eventual autonomous government.
27 The AHC conceded this condition was a long-term goal that could be deferred. However, they demanded the British
end immigration and land sales immediately.
28 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 May 1936, 3, TNA CAB 24/262/28.
29 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 May 1936, 3, TNA CAB 24/262/22.
30 The HC and Air Office Commanding (AOC) requested three additional battalions be sent to Palestine (Palestine
Situation-Gore, 26 August 1936, TNA CAB 24/263/55).

29. 29
Arab guerrillas attacked political officials, police and military personnel, and Jewish settlements.31
Sabotage of railways, telephone lines, and police barracks also became rampant. The disorders even
forced the British to shut down the Port of Jaffa, and many attacks threatened the oil pipeline
between Haifa and Iraq.32
Between April and early September, British military and police forces
reacted by maintaining defensive posts in towns, villages, and near sites of sabotage such as railways
and communication lines. Cordon and search operations only began following the influx of re-
enforcements in late September/early October. However, these operations were restricted to a small
number of villages.33
Punitive destruction of homes was also conducted, but the HC would only
allow this practice when it was possible to establish a reasonable level of guilt for an act of
violence.34
The promise of a Royal Commission to investigate a political solution between the AHC
and Zionists significantly contributed to the end of hostilities in October. However, it seems that the
threat of an increase in offensive operations under martial law also pressured the AHC to concede
(Mockaitis 1990, 182-183).
The calm held for nine months while the Royal Commission carried out its inquiry.
However, the disturbance began once again in July 1937, following the recommendation by the
Royal Commission to partition Palestine into two separate Arab and Jewish states (Segev 2000, 402).
During the second phase the Arab guerrillas enjoyed high levels of popular support. However, the
central leadership fled to Damascus to avoid arrest in September 1937, and was never able to
sufficiently control their two main ground commanders, Abdul Rahim el Haj Mahomed, and Aref
Abdul Razzik. Further, both men refused to work with one another due to pre-existing feuds.35
31 Kawakji assumed central command of the guerrillas, and immediately implemented an effective propaganda campaign
that resulted in a rapid increase in recruitment of fighters as well as gaining material and moral support from the civilian
population. He was also able to establish training camps and organized the guerrillas with the help of Arab officers from
Syria, Iraq, and Trans-Jordan (Rahman 1971, 100-104).
32 Proposed Statement of Policy, 05 September 1936,1-2, TNA CAB
24/264/12.
33 Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, 1938, TNA WO 191/70.
34 The Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 17 September 1936, 2, TNA CAB 24/264/19.
35 Report on Operations in Palestine, 19 May 1939, 4-5, TNA WO 32-9499.

30. 30
Despite this impediment, the guerrillas expanded in size,36
and were able to pose a significant threat
during the second half of the Revolt through sabotage,37
and especially by taking territory.38
The
guerrilla threat peaked in October of 1938 when they took control of the Old City of Jerusalem,
virtually all of the Southern District, and parts of the Northern District (Rahman 1971, 231-232).
However, the guerrillas quickly fell apart following the arrival of an extra division of British troops
in mid October of 1938. To meet this growing threat the British military greatly expanded counter-
guerrilla operation throughout the second phase. Tactics used during the first phase, such as cordon
and search, village occupation, collective punishments (house demolitions and fines), day and night
patrolling, torture, administrative detention, quick capitol punishments, deportation, and
assassination of guerrilla leaders, increased in scope and frequency.39
Despite this expansion, and increase of the guerrilla threat, civilian victimization—as defined
in this paper—did not occur. Matthew Hughes’ authoritative study on the treatment of civilians
during the Arab Revolt shows that intentional killing of civilians by British troops and police did
occur.40
However, in the conclusion of his study, Hughes argues: “Looking at the Arab revolt as a
whole, extreme acts of personal abuse were probably not systematic, and almost certainly not
systemic.” He goes on to say: “it was junior officers in the field who were intimately involved in any
excesses,” and that while British commanders tolerated such abuses at these low levels, they never
36 Estimates for the overall size of the full-time fighters during the Revolt range between 1,000 and 15,000. However, the
number volunteer fighters is unknowable—but likely well beyond 15,000. The British maintained about 30,000 troops
(Khalidi, 1971, 846-848).
37 Sabotage of the oil pipeline from Iraq and the Jerusalem-Lydda railway—which was closed for months—threatened
Britain’s economic and strategic interests in the region (Report on Operations in Palestine, 12 September 1938, 6, TNA
WO 32-9497; 19 May 1939, 4-5, TNA WO 32-9499).
38 The Cabinet, and all three High Commissioners during the Revolt acknowledged that the military should take legal
control over Palestine if the guerrillas were able to take territory, reasoning that civil administration would no longer
function in such a case. HC Wauchope: The Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 17 September 1936, 2, TNA CAB
24/264/19; HC Battershill: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 November 1937, 5, TNA CAB
24/273/11; HC McDonald: Talks in Jerusalem, 24 August 1938, 3, TNA CAB/24/278/0028; Cabinet: see footnote 44.
39 Report on Operations in Palestine, 19 May 1939, 4-5, TNA WO 32-9499
40 Two of the most reliable accounts of such killing occurred in the villages of Halhul in May 1938 and Al-Bassa in
September 1938. Accounts of how the deaths in Al-Bassa are varied, however, 20 villagers were intentionally killed by
British forces (Hughes 2009, 335-339). In Halhul 10-14 men were killed after being left in wire cages during a searching
operation. These men were left there for days without sufficient food or water (Ibid., 339-341).

31. 31
instituted intentional or indiscriminate killing as a part of their overall military strategy (Ibid., 350-
354).41
What explains this outcome? First, clear legal power was placed in the hands of the civil
power to monitor and sanction the military. Under this hierarchy the HC was able to ensure
offensive measures would allow for a political solution, and not obstruct future “development
goals.” Second, this hierarchy led military leaders to proactively coordinate with civilian officials to
ensure counter-guerrilla strategy met the civil powers’ approval. Interestingly, this relationship
actually improved as the guerrilla threat increased.
During the first phase, cooperation between military and civilian officials was hampered by
disputes over the necessary legal system needed to quell the Revolt. As stated earlier, HC Wauchope,
in disagreement with military officials, strongly argued for a political solution to the Revolt.
Wauchope was thus not willing to delegate all civil authority over Palestine to General Officer
Commanding (GOC), John Dill. In Wauchope’s view, offensive military action under martial law
would not only impede a political solution, but also likely exacerbate the guerrilla threat by
increasing public support for rebellion.42
Thus, throughout September 1936, Wauchope deliberated
extensively with the Cabinet over the distribution of legal powers between he and Dill.Dill also
lobbied the Cabinet to grant him power. However, Wauchope emerged as victor.43
The Palestine
41 Other historians who focus on treatment of civilians during the Revolt agree with this analysis (Norris 2008; Mockaitis
1990, 87-95).
42 Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0014.
43 Wauchope on the General Situation in Palestine, 9 September 1936 TNA CAB/24/264/0013; Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law
in Palestine, 15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0014; Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 17 September 1936,
TNA CAB/24/264/0019; Suspension of Immigration Into Palestine,15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0015; The
Question of Marital Law, 21 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0021; Memorandum Circulated by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 28 September 1936 TNA CAB/24/264/0024; Townshend 1986,106

32. 32
(Defense) Orders in Council of 1936 were established on 26 September,44
conferring upon the HC the
legal authority to enact Emergency Regulations,45
and control of the military.46
The Cabinet decided on this course for two reasons. First, establishing, after the technical
misunderstanding of how Martial Law actually functioned during small wars was clarified, it became
clear that the practice deviated sharply from how the civil-military hierarchy was normally structured
during rebellion.47
As the Attorney-General of Britain stated in his advisement to the Cabinet: “It
would, I should have thought, wholly foreign to [British] law and [British] methods to hand over the
whole administration to the military, leaving it to them to delegate back certain powers to the High
Commissioner.”48
Further, in the same memorandum, the legal advisor to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies warns against establishing Martial Law, noting that doing so is “unusual where the Civil
Power is still capable of functioning.”49
Second, the Cabinet seems that have agreed with Wauchope
that suspension of civil administration would lead to military actions that would embitter the
population against the civil administration at the end of hostilities.50
Concomitantly, abdication of
civilian control of the Mandate government would lead to a loss of legitimacy for the civil authority
44 Our parliamentary correspondent, "Public Safety In Palestine," Times of London, 30 September 1936, accessed
September4,2014, http://tinyurl.com/mc3oeyq.
45 These Emergency Laws include: censorship of the press, curfews, collective fines, house demolitions, administrative
detention, and summary justice.
46 Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, TNA CAB/24/264/0014; Palestine Disturbances, Martial
Law Policy, 10 August 1936, 97, TNA WO 32-9618; Townshend 1986, 106.
47 Embarrassingly, the Cabinet, Dill, and Wauchope were initially believed that declaring Martial Law would allow the
GOC the same powers as the HC—the most important of which being the ability to try guerrillas in military courts.
However, C.O. legal officers clarified that only the HC or a legislative act could confer such powers to Dill (Proposal to
Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, 5-6, TNA CAB/24/264/0014; The Situation In Palestine. The Question
of Martial Law, 21 September 1936, 1-6, TNA CAB/24/264/21).
48 Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, 5, TNA CAB/24/264/0014. The Secretary of State for
the Colonies re-iterated this reasoning during the second phase (Talks in Jerusalem, 24 August 1938, 2, TNA
CAB/24/278/0028).
49 Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September 1936, 6, TNA CAB/24/264/0014.
50 Palestine Situation: Proposals for Disarmament, 22 October 1936, 2, TNA CAB 24/264/47. Indeed, the legal advisor to the
Secretary of State for the colonies warned the Cabinet that the application of Martial Law “in the Colonies has more
than once led to grave abuses, e.g., British Guiana and Jamaica (Proposal to Proclaim Martial Law in Palestine, 15 September
1936, 6, TNA CAB/24/264/0014).”

33. 33
in the eyes of the AHC and the Palestinian public.51
This thinking was put most clearly by HC
Wauchope in a Cabinet memorandum:
Our immediate aim is clear, the maintenance of British prestige and early restoration of law
and order. But as you [The Cabinet] stated on the 10th June, 1936, this is not our only aim.
It is also our aim to achieve some settlement that will not leave an embittered, sullen, and in
their hearts, rebellious Arab population, ready to rebel in any future year.
Now if we establish law and order only through the employment of what may be
termed drastic air and military action, we may achieve the first aim but will certainly
endanger if we do not ruin the chances of success for our second aim.52
This reasoning was given by the Cabinet to maintain the same civil-military hierarchy during the
second phase.53
However, the Cabinet included an article in the Orders in Council allowing the HC to confer
total legal authority to the GOC if the rebellion overwhelmed the ability of the civil power to
function.54
An important distinction was made, however, concerning the intended legal authority
conferred to the GOC. In a draft memorandum, legal officers make clear that the military’s authority
under the Orders in Council of 1936 should “in no way prejudice or derogate from the ordinary
common law powers of a military commander dealing with war, rebellion or disturbance.”55
This
meant that even upon gaining full control of Palestine the military was to continue to abide by the
“minimum force” principle under English Common Law. Specifically citing the Amritsar massacre,
the memorandum made it clear that atrocities would not be tolerated, even upon total abrogation of
civilian authority.56
Although there is no evidence that Dill proposed civilian victimization, his predecessor, Air
Officer Commanding Richard Edmund Charles Pierce, explicitly suggested “The extension of
51 Palestine Situation: Proposals for Disarmament, 22 October 1936, 2, TNA CAB 24/264/47.
52 Palestine Situation-Gore, 26 August 1936, TNA CAB 24/263/55.
53 Palestine Disturbances, Martial Law Policy, 08 August 1937, 17, TNA WO 32-9618; Talks in Jerusalem, 24 August 1938, 2,
TNA CAB/24/278/0028.
54 Memorandum circulated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 September 1936, TNA CAB 24/264/24; The Question of
Martial Law. Report of the Law Officers, 21 September 1936, TNA CAB 24/264/21.
55 The Question of Martial Law. Report of the Law Officers, 21 September 1936, 2, TNA CAB 24/264/21.
56 Ibid.

34. 34
bombing operations to include areas in which resistance is offered to security forces, and to apply to
all persons in those areas, whether actually engaged in the incidents or not.” The AOC also suggested
in the latter memorandum and in another on 22 August 1936, the bombing of villages associated with
the insurgency after 24 hours warning.57
Wauchope points out that the evacuation of entire villages
would lead to hundreds women and children left homeless and exposed to the elements. The HC
notes that the government could not provide for vast numbers of refugees. Because the HC
maintained power over the AOC, he was able to successfully veto these tactics.58
Though critical of Wauchope’s restrictiveness, a confidential W.O. document written in 1937
to review the first phase of the Revolt specifies how officers could function more effectively under
civilian control in future small wars. The report’s main conclusion is that failure to quickly end
disturbances was caused mainly by Wauchope’s hesitation to delegate necessary legal authority to the
military, and restriction of offensive measures. However, the report also notes that the military
commander must be sympathetic to the civilian authorities’ desire to maintain control. The report
makes clear to its readers that an abrogation of civil power results in a loss of “prestige” in the eyes
of the colonial subjects. And that this in turn creates difficulty governing following the resumption
of power. To remedy such situations, the report advises that a military commander “will be well
advised to point out [to the HC] that if repressive measures have to be taken which may leave bitterness
in their wake it is better for the soldiers to undertake them rather than the civil authorities and police
who will have to live on in the country afterwards.”59
Interestingly, the report makes a point to
clarify the definition of “repressive measures.” The report stresses that such measures do not entail
57 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 June 1936, 3, TNA CAB 24/263/20; Palestine Situation-Gore, 26
August 1936, 5, TNA CAB 24/263/55.
58 Palestine Situation-Gore, 26 August 1936, TNA CAB 24/263/55.
59 Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936, 1938, 33-34, TNA WO 191/70

35. 35
“brutality.” Rather, “repressive measures” involve offensive military actions (e.g., cordon and search,
assassination, mass arrests), collective punishments, and other methods of population control.60
Lessons from the first phase were also learned by the civil power. The Cabinet,61
the Royal
Commission,62
and the LON heavily criticized Wauchope for restricting the military from executing
sufficient offensive actions. Such restrictions were seen as lengthening the unrest, and causing the
British to take the expensive step of deploying an entire division to Palestine (Townshend 1988, 918-
919).63
In addition, Wauchope was sacked, sending a clear message to his replacement, Sir Harold
MacMichael. Efforts to learn from mistakes by civil and military leaders paid off during the second,
and bloodier phase of the Revolt. Military and civilian officials closely coordinated on the
implementation of the counter-guerrilla strategy through Security Committees. These consisted of
district level police commanders, military commanders, and civilian administrators regularly meeting
to coordinate the formulation and monitor the implementation counter-guerrilla strategy. A Central
Security Committee consisting of the HC and the GOC also met regularly in Jerusalem to delegate
to district Security Committees. Both the military leaders and civilian administration noted the
effectiveness of such coordination in internal correspondence with their respective institutions.64
“Civil-military coordination” continued even in October 1938 when, as described earlier, guerrillas
took control of a significant portion of territory. This is especially significant because the GOC was
delegated full legal authority over the Southern district, yet he continued to coordinate his strategy
60 Ibid., 32
61 Palestine: The High Comissionership, 08 October 1937, CAB 24/271/32.
62 Palestine Royal Commission Report, Lord William Peel, July 1937, Ch. VII para. 57, 201-202,
http://tinyurl.com/oe4gdwv.
63 It is important to note the heavy cost—both strategic and economic—of deploying an entire division oversees. A
W.O. report in December 1936 statxes that the maximum force that could be dispatched overseas on short notice
amounted to two divisions. The Organization, Armament and Equipment of the Army, 04 December 1936, TNA CAB
24/265/45. Considering the size of the British economy, the economic burden of the first phase of the Revolt was not
significant. However, the total exports from Palestine declined from £774,000 in 1935 to £377,00 in 1936 (Economic
Advisory Council, 31 December 1936, 22, TNA CAB 24/265/61).
64 Palestine Disturbances, Martial Law Policy, 10 August 1936, 32, TNA WO 32-9618; Talks in Jerusalem, August 1938, TNA
CAB/24/278/0028

36. 36
with the HC.65
This relationship allowed the HC to put political pressure on the AHC, while the
military applied measured coercive force. This coordination paid off. By May 1939 the guerrillas
were fragmenting, forcing the AHC to end hostilities and accept the White Paper, which abandoned
“partition in favor of a single state in which Arabs and Jews would participate in a government
closely tied to Britain (Mockaitis 1990, 91).”
Conclusion:
I have sought in this paper to show that civil-military relations provides a fruitful avenue of
research on victimization. As the case of the Boer War shows, the dysfunctional state of civil-
military relations in place during the Victorian era led the Cabinet to side with military necessity,
even when antithetical to their economic interests. Simply put, the unprecedented nature of Milner’s
proposals were simply too risky to implement. However, the massive reforms both within and
between the W.O. and C.O. in the post WWI-era facilitated a path toward “offensive policing.” By
the time the Arab Revolt erupted, the Cabinet, the HC, and the GOC maintained the legal and
doctrinal template to maneuver the difficulties of implementing a more restrained small war.
These findings should be valuable to policymakers charged with aiding in the construction,
or re-construction of a foreign military. My findings suggest that policymakers should allocate
resources toward constructing clear mechanisms for civilian control that can be activated during
internal wars. Fundamentally, clear legal guidelines should be established that state that civilian
leaders maintain authority over the military during war. However, military doctrine should be written
to institutionalize civilian domination into the organizational-culture of the military. This doctrine
can be re-enforced through training, especially with foreign militaries that maintain good civil-
military relations. The exact makeup of the “civilian-run organization” may take the form of a
specially devised government agency, or even a political leader, such as a governor. Either way, this
65 Palestine Disturbances, Martial Law Policy, 10 August 1938, 22, TNA WO 32-9618

37. 37
organization should be allocated the resources and training necessary to coordinate with and
monitor the military during hostilities.
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