New Technology – Old Theories of Harm? – Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Italy - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets
•
1 gefällt mir•433 views
The document discusses abuses of dominance in digital markets. It notes that while some digital platforms like Google and Facebook offer free services funded by advertising, others like Amazon intermediate between sides and take commissions. Traditional antitrust theories of harm around tying and exclusivity have been applied to digital markets. New theories include platforms acting as both marketplaces and retailers leading to self-preferencing, and cases involving data access and use. Authorities need to rely on sound theories of harm tailored to specific conduct and incentives, while the application of exploitative theories to data remains uncertain legal territory.
Empfohlen
Empfohlen
Weitere ähnliche Inhalte
Was ist angesagt?
Was ist angesagt? (20)
Ähnlich wie New Technology – Old Theories of Harm? – Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Italy - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets
Ähnlich wie New Technology – Old Theories of Harm? – Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Italy - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets (20)
Mehr von OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
Mehr von OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs (20)
Kürzlich hochgeladen
Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)
New Technology – Old Theories of Harm? – Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Italy - October 2019 OECD-AGCM Workshop on Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets
- 1. Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets OECD Workshop for Competition Officials Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age Moderator: Andrea Minuto Rizzo, AGCM Katarzyna Tosza, European Commission Ryan Struve, Department of Justice (US) Mario Denni, AGCM
- 2. OECD Workshop for Competition Officials Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age Introduction • Digital platforms are not all quite the same (product features, business models, monetization) • some platforms (Google, Facebook) offer free services and are funded through advertising.. • …others intermediate between two/more sides and take a commission when a deal is concluded and are sometimes (Amazon) also involved as retailers • Exclusionary abuses • traditional theories of harm - like tying and exclusivity - are still used and seem to work well also in relation to digital markets (EU Android case similar to old EU Microsoft case) • new theories of harm • dual role of digital platforms both as marketplaces and retailers (self-preferencing in the EU Google Shopping and Italian Amazon cases) • cases involving data (EU Amazon and Italian Google cases) • new ideas, can a pattern of dominance-facilitating acquisitions qualify as anticompetitive behavior?
- 3. OECD Workshop for Competition Officials Session III – Abuses in the Digital Age Conclusion • Antitrust tools can still play a major role also in the digital world • The increased awareness of the existence of significant market power has led to a more interventionist approach, especially in Europe • Caution is needed, Authorities should rely on sound theories of harm • Traditional exclusionary theories of harm have been already extended to digital platforms • tying and exclusivity have been applied to a zero-price world in the EU Android case • Authorities can also pursue a wider catalogue of potential harms, like self-preferencing • theories of harm should fit with the conduct • incentives to foreclose have to be taken into consideration (vertical integration does not necessarily create incentives to foreclose rivals) • The application of exploitative theories of harm to data seems still unchartered legal territory