1.
Remedy design in digital
abuse cases: Getting
the Demand-side right
Amelia Fletcher
CCP and Norwich Business School, UEA
Disclaimer: These are not necessarily the views of
any organisation with which I am associated!

2.
What do we know?
 Consumers’ choices can be strongly influenced by choice
architecture.
 Eg Framing bias, salience bias, default bias
 There is strong evidence on these biases generally
 They can inherently weaken competition but can also be
exploited strategically
 Google Android (EC, 2018): Default bias.
 Google Shopping (EC, 2017): Salience bias.
 The choice architecture around privacy on Google and
Facebook (CMA, 2020).
 Similar issues for Amazon’s Buy Box and app stores?

3.
Implications for remedy design
 So choice architecture matters. But it can be hard to get it right.
 Google Shopping provides a salutary example.
 From September 2017, to resolve antitrust concerns, Google opened up its “shopping box”
to rival choice comparison services. They were able to bid for space in the shopping unit.
 In March 2019, Commission Vestager accepted that “It has taken time for the mechanism to
show results”, but reflected positively on recent changes that should help, including a
feature to allow users to toggle between the current window that shows links going directly
to merchants, and a window that shows links to comparison sites.
 By November 2019, she admitted that “The proposal does not seem to be doing the trick.
We may see a show of rivals in the shopping box. We may see a pickup when it comes to
clicks for merchants. But we still do not see much traffic for viable competitors when it
comes to shopping comparison”.
 Why is this all so hard, and what can be done?

4.
Implications for remedy design 2
 Some specific issues related to opening up
the Shopping box.
 Bidding-based competition for
‘default/salient’ positions can: (i) be
exploitative; (ii) favour those who can gain
market power from it; and (iii) favour
vertically integrated services.
 But also consumer biases remain strong:
 Consumers likely to click on/near
image, taking them to merchants.
 If default shows links to merchants,
few will ‘toggle’.
 So, Google likely to remain first stop.

5.
Implications for remedy design 3
 What do we learn?
 It can be hard to improve competition without harming consumer experience
(consumers may well prefer a straight-through click to a merchant).
 Remedies that are designed to improve consumer choices, with a view to driving more
effective competition, need careful A/B testing and ongoing monitoring.
 NB This is just one example, and is effectively turning DGComp into a regulator. There
is also Google Shopping, could be Amazon Buy Box, Apple app stores, etc.
 A reason why ex ante regulation may have advantages over antitrust.
 Likely to see similar issues around data portability measures – a reason why
wholesale data access may be a more powerful option where feasible.

6.
Thank you