1. NASA Project Management Challenge
09-10 February 2010, Galveston, Texas, USA
The Quest for an
OCO (Orbiting Carbon Observatory)
Re-flight
Presented by
Ralph R. Basilio
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
© 2009 California Institute of Technology. Government sponsorship acknowledged.
Used with permission

2. Agenda
• The OCO mission
• That fateful day
• From shock to resolve
• Measurement imperatives
• Initial options examined
• Service platforms
• Access to space
• Options examined in detail
• While we await authorization
• Summary/conclusions
2

3. OCO Mission
To make the first space-based measurements of
CO2 with the accuracy needed to quantify sources
and sinks of this important greenhouse gas
Accurate predictions of climate change require an
improved understanding of the global carbon
cycle and its interaction with the Earth System
3

4. Final Taurus XL Processing at VAFB
4

5. 24 February 2009: A Beautiful Launch
5

6. Then…
• The launch vehicle payload fairing was scheduled to separate
approximately 3 minutes after launch, but telemetered data never
provided positive indication
• The launch vehicle failed to reach orbital velocity providing
corroborating evidence of excess mass being carried into space
• A contingency was declared less than 16 minutes after launch
• A somber moment: The OCO mission manager stating that the
space and ground network station failed to acquire a signal from
the observatory
• Another somber moment: Telemetered data provided positive
indication that the observatory had separated from the launch
vehicle, albeit, still inside the fairing
6

7. The Investigation
• NASA HQ commissioned an MIB (Mishap Investigation Board) in
an attempt to determine the root cause of the anomaly and
recommend corrective actions
• Although a direct cause was not identified, a number of hardware
components whose failure modes may have caused the anomaly
were
• Incomplete fracture of the frangible joint
• Electrical subsystem failed to deliver initiating signals
• Pneumatic system failed to provide sufficient pressure
• Flexible Confined Detonating Cord snagged
• NASA LSP (Launch Services Program) is working to improve the
reliability of the Glory launch aboard a Taurus XL
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8. No Time to Grieve
• OCO Project personnel met with JPL senior management the day
after the loss to initiate re-flight planning
• An unsolicited proposal (for the direct rebuild option) was
prepared and delivered to NASA HQ just two days later
• Key note: Little to no flight spare hardware available
8

9. Commissioning of a Science White Paper
• NASA HQ requested the OCO Science Team to prepare a white
paper discussing:
• The current state of carbon cycle science
• The advances made in carbon cycle science since the
selection of the OCO mission in 2002
• Key issues
• The Decadel Survey made it’s recommendations
• GOSAT (Greenhouse gases Observing SATellite) was
launched
• OCO was lost
• Minimum science requirements for the next carbon mission
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10. Justification for an OCO Re-flight
• Accurate and precise measurements
of carbon dioxide sources and sinks
is of paramount importance
• Despite progress, our knowledge is
limited by the lack of high precision
global measurements of atmospheric
carbon dioxide
• While there have been advances in
space-based measurements there is
no existing or confirmed sensor
capable of quantifying carbon dioxide
sources and sinks
An OCO re-flight meets science
and policy imperatives
10

11. Charter
• Beginning in Early March 2009, JPL was directed to
• “…conduct studies to assess the options for the re-flight of the
OCO instrument and recovery of the OCO carbon-related
measurement, and to understand and quantitatively assess
the cost, schedule, and technical and programmatic risks of
the identified options.”
• Consider multiple options initially, “…eventually
concentrating on the most profitable and viable option later
in the latter portion of the study.”
• Assessment report delivery/submittal schedule
• 20 March 2009, Initial
• 24 April 2009
• 29 May 2009
• 26 June 2009
• 30 July 2009, Final
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12. Service Platform Requirements
Increases for Shared Platform (OCO
Original Likely Increases for Dedicated
Parameter Does Its Own Pointing via TBD pointing
OCO Spacecraft (not LeoStar II)
mechanism)*
10% to 20% to replicate structure of
Mass 134 kg 10% to 20% + 10 to 30 kg increase
OCO spacecraft used by instrument
10% to 30% for converter boxes to 10% to 30% + 10W to 20W for pointing
Power ~105 W
replicate LeoStar interfaces mechanism
Returning full 8 footprints would take ~2 Mbs
Data Rate ~1 Mbs
5% to 10% risk if packets need to be redefined for new system
Interfaces See next page
FOV 1o x 0.1o With near 2π steradian keep out zone
Pointing
Nadir, glint, target, solar, lunar
Modes
Pointing
200 arcseconds knowledge
Knowledge
Science questions best served in a slow repeat cycle, high inclination, 10 am to 2 pm
1:30 pm equator crossing, sun-synchronous orbit (slow repeat cycle = better geographic
Orbit
sun sync sampling, high inclination = global coverage, near-noon = high SNR, sun-synchronous
= simpler inversion of sources and sinks)
* Mass and power pointing mechanism very uncertain. Polarization issues will make this much more
complicated than traditional systems.
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13. Pre-Screened Service Platform Options
• Programs too far in the development life cycle to accommodate
the addition of an OCO instrument (i.e., in Phase D or equivalent)
– NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)
▪ Glory - Launch is currently scheduled for NET 01 Oct 2009
▪ Aquarius/SAC-D
- The observatory includes a full-complement of
instruments
- Launch is currently scheduled for NET 22 May 2010
▪ NPP [NPOESS (National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System) Preparatory Project]
- The observatory includes a full-complement of
instruments
- Launch is currently scheduled for June 2010
• An airborne option for the OCO instrument was investigated, but
appears to provide only limited science benefit [e.g., better
understanding of the BRDF (Bi-Directional Reflectance
Distribution Function)]. No further work warranted.
13

14. Other Service Platforms Screened Later
• Dedicated and shared service platforms that did not meet
technical requirements or the capabilities unknown
– Thales Alenia Space PROTEUS
– Thales Alenia Space Globalstar-2
– STP (Space Test Program) SIV (Standard Interface Vehicle)
“Heavy” version
– Iridium-2
– General Dynamics Spectrum Astro Space Systems
– USAF ORS (Operationally Responsive Space)
– GCOM-W1 (Global Change Observation Mission, Water No.1)
– GCOM-C1 (Global Change Observation Mission, Carbon No.1)
– IceSat-2
– International Space Station
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15. Other Service Platforms Considered
• Dedicated and shared service platforms that did not meet technical
requirements or the capabilities unknown
– Thales Alenia Space PROTEUS
– Thales Alenia Space Globalstar-2
– STP (Space Test Program) SIV (Standard Interface Vehicle) “Heavy”
version
– Iridium-2
– General Dynamics Spectrum Astro Space Systems
– USAF ORS (Operationally Responsive Space)
– GCOM-W1 (Global Change Observation Mission, Water No.1)
– GCOM-C1 (Global Change Observation Mission, Carbon No.1)
– IceSat-2
– International Space Station
• The two most likely solutions
– Shared platform with the TIRS (Thermal Infrared Sensor) instrument
– OSC (Orbital Sciences Corporation) LeoStar-2 [The Baseline]
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16. OCO and TIRS Instruments on a Shared Bus
• JPL, along with GSFC and USGS, participated in a NASA ESD-lead joint
OCO-TIRS (Thermal Infrared Sensor) mission study that was documented
in a report issued on 19 June 2009
• Two options were examined
– Option 1: OCO and TIRS instruments on a shared, nadir-pointed
platform
▪ Co-registration of TIRS-LDCM/OLI (Operational Land Imager) data
drives cost
▪ Scenario requires OCO pointing and polarization mechanisms
– Option 2: OCO and TIRS instruments on a time-shared platform
▪ Scenario is incompatible with stringent TIRS thermal stability
requirements
– However, a third option was examined: Dual-manifest launch with OCO
and TIRS on separate platforms
▪ An initial assessment identified a fairing envelope violation
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17. OCO Instrument on a Dedicated Platform
• Build a “Carbon Copy” of OCO (instrument and spacecraft bus) to
the extent possible
• This lowest risk approach leverages the original OCO design,
management approach, key personnel, and processes to the
maximum degree to provide the shortest path to launch
• Minimize change!!
– JPL successfully delivered OCO and met all the cost and
schedule commitments outlined in the revised plan presented
at the 05 April 2007 NASA SMD (Science Mission Directorate)
DPMC (Directorate Program Management Council)
– Carbon Copy is based on the OCO implementation approach
and is, to the extent possible, a recurring implementation task
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18. Primary Access to Space Considerations
• Assumptions bearing upon the choice of launch vehicle
(minimum requirements)
– Injection orbit: altitude and inclination
▪ Equatorial altitude: 550 km (was 640 km for OCO
mission)
▪ Orbit Inclination: 80 deg (was 97.95 deg for OCO
mission)
– Observatory mass to injection orbit: 447 kg
– Observatory launch configuration dimensions
▪ Length: 246 cm
▪ Diameter: 140 cm
– Observatory contamination control requirements: GN2
instrument purge
– Injection orbit errors:
▪ ∆SMA ≤ 30 km, 3σ
▪ ∆Inc ≤ 0.15, 3σ
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19. Access to Space Options
• OSC
– Pegasus Air-Launched Vehicle: Does not meet mass
requirements
– Taurus II: New, not yet certified
• Space X Falcon 9: New and launches from VAFB are uncertain
• ULA (United Launch Alliance): All cost-prohibitive
– Delta II
– Delta IV
– Atlas V
• A number of shared rides were also examined, but none ‘fit the
bill’
• The two most likely solutions
– OSC Minotaur IV
– OSC Taurus XL [The Baseline]
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20. Minotaur IV Launch Vehicle
• Must be provided by USAF through either
– The DoD SERB (Space Experiments Review Board)
process (e.g., NASA SMAP mission), or
– As a direct procurement through the USAF Space
Development & Test Wing (e.g., NASA LADEE mission)
• NASA KSC LSP assessed use of Minotaur IV/V for NASA
Class C:
– Mission risk is appropriately mitigated after one
successful flight of a vehicle in this family and USAF
post flight data review
– First Minotaur IV flight scheduled for late 2009
• Use must comply with U.S. Commercial Space
Transportation Act
Minotaur IV
• A 27-month procurement cycle from ATP to ILC (Initial Rocket System
Launch Capability) appears feasible on test stand
• Must verify loads (i.e., lateral) compatibility
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21. Taurus XL Launch Vehicle
• The Taurus XL is the existing baseline
• A 28-month life cycle from RFP to ATP to ILC
can be supported
• May incur risks associated with infrequent
launches
– 4.5 years between ROCSAT-2 and OCO
– 1-2 years between OCO and Glory
– 1-3 years between Glory and OCO Re-flight
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22. While We Await Authorization to Start
• NASA has provided funding to the OCO Project to
– Procure some instrument and spacecraft bus EEE parts
mitigate parts obsolescence issues, etc…
– Assess and evaluate required changes (e.g., use of a substrate-
removed HgCdTe detector for the instrument A-band channel
and adaptation/use of a split, pulse tube cryocooler)
– Collaborate with the GOSAT (Greenhouse gases Observing
SATellite) team
▪ Assist them in producing the best possible retrieval
estimates of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration
levels
▪ Mitigate risk by exercising OCO science data processing
capabilities developed pre-launch with actual in-flight data
• These and other tasks serve to place the OCO Project in a more
robust posture/position in the event a re-flight is authorized
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23. Summary/Conclusions
• No guarantees - Spaceflight is a risky business, and with
calculated risks failures occasionally occur
• Keep the team intact – Corporate knowledge resides with people.
Fortunately, many on the OCO Project have a sense of unfinished
business and are committed to the re-flight efforts.
• Believe in your cause and others will believe - The OCO mission
continues to receive endorsements, support, and encouragement
by NASA and other agencies/entities
• Due diligence for the American taxpayer - An objective evaluation
of re-flight options was completed
• Make it work, not make it better - Even though a direct rebuild or
carbon copy is the leading re-flight option, the project is
challenged by change each and every day
• Patience, and make the best of the situation – The project team is
using the available time and resources to reduce implementation
risk while awaiting a decision on a re-flight
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24. OCO-2 Can be a Reality
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