2. The Economic Sustainability of United States Fisheries
by
Michael S. Meiran
Submitted to The Department of Economics
Project Advisor: Stephanie Martin
Second Reader: Hoa Nguyen
Date: April 6th
, 2016
I hereby recognize and pledge to fulfill my responsibilities as defined in the Honor Code and to
maintain the integrity of both myself and the College as a whole.
Michael S. Meiran
3.
4. i
Acknowledgements
First, I would like to thank my advisors in the process, my first reader: Ms. Stephanie
Martin and my second reader Ms. Hoa Nguyen. With the support provided by both of you, this
research experience was not only enjoyable and eye opening but very enriching. I will carry this
experience with me for the rest of life into all of my endeavors and I sincerely thank you for
making this possible.
Next I would like to thank my Dad. No matter what you have been there for me since day
one of kindergarten until the completion of this research project. You have given me the support
I need to succeed in the things I want to accomplish in this life. From every single football game,
to move in days here at school you have been there every single step along the way and I hope I
make you proud through the completion of this research project and achievement of my degree.
Last, I would like to thank my friends. I have the best friends in the world and all the
motivation I’ve ever needed has come from the support I feel from you on a daily basis. Thank
you to my friends Christian, Brandon, Ben, Alex, Nick, Chris, Patrick, and Colin for always
being there. Next, thank you to my housemates and teammates for always being there for me;
Chris, Lucas, Josh, and Clayton. And thank you to Zach and Nick for always spending those long
nights in Quigley hall working on the countless projects we have completed over the last 4 years.
8. v
Abstract
The goal of this study will be to look at the economics of efficient sustainable fisheries
management to determine the best practice of increasing sustainability in both the recreational
and commercial fishing sectors. Over the past 30 years, global fish populations and ecosystems
have been on a decline. This has been attributed to pollution, habitat destruction and
unsustainable fishing methods. These resources do not only have ecological implications for
many different species of wildlife but economic implications for many different governments,
societies and private institutions. By looking at ecosystem approaches and incentive based
approaches, the goal is to conclude a strategy to reverse the effects of unsustainable fishing
practices and to provide policy implications to introduce a change into way the fishing industry
and fishing practices operate as a whole in the United States.
9. “As an ocean farmer, my job is not to be an ocean hero. My job is not to save the
seas. My job is to have the seas save us”
-Bren Smith, 2013
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Chapter I: Literature Review
I) Introduction:
Marine ecosystems all over the world are in decline, and many species populations have
been squandering to remain at the same levels. Currently in the US, there are 94 species of
marine life that are considered extremely endangered. This is alarming because fisherman may
only be targeting certain species, but don’t think about the impacts that their harvests on the
ecosystem as a whole. Unsustainable fishing practices are the leading cause of ecosystem decline
(Hannesson 2002) and must be addressed.
It has been found that these problems have arisen from six principal factors:
Inappropriate incentives, high demand for limited resources, poverty, inadequate knowledge,
ineffective governance, and interactions between fishery sectors and other aspects of the
environment. (FAO 2002) Not only do all of these problems have to be addressed for reasons of
ecology and destruction of wildlife, but because of the economic implications that ride the coat
tails of unsustainable practices. If these industries go away because marine life is wiped out and
ecosystems are destroyed; a decline in revenue for governments across the world, a decline in
revenue for private companies and the loss of jobs for millions of commercial fishermen are at
stake. The fishing industry is big business all over the world, but in the US in 2012, 5.6 billion
dollars’ worth of revenue was generated from the processing of both finfish and shellfish within
US borders. When looking at other economies: In Australia, over the past ten years, the
Australian federal government has committed over 60 million dollars towards fisheries research
and ecologically sustainable development. They have also implemented detailed scientific
fishery management plans that incorporate strong stakeholder involvement, and have also
expanded their National representative System of Marine Protected Areas. (McLoughlin and
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Findlay 2005) In Ireland, similar action has been taken to protect fishing and the fishing industry.
Taking seabed into account, Ireland is one of the largest countries in the EU, and has one of the
largest sea to land ratios (10:1) in the EU. By comparing US sustainability policy to that of other
fisheries globally, a more perfect strategy for governing sustainable fishing practices in the US
can be achieved.
This study aims to explore the gap between the declining marine ecosystems being
exhibited in the US and the sustainable/unsustainable practices that are in play, as well as the
economic impacts that are a result of this gap. When looking at the issue of sustainability, the
Tragedy of the Commons theory will be explored to explain unsustainable fishing practices.
Brought together with the previous theory, property rights and a general equilibrium model will
also be used to show how to fix the issues that have led to unsustainable fisheries in the US.
Finally, empirical analysis of time series data will be implemented to show how the practices in
use over the past few decades have impacted US fisheries, as well as policy implications that
should come about due to these facts.
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II) Literature Review:
To explore the Health of US fisheries, policy both past and present must be explored.
The Fishery conservation and management act was implemented in 1976. Also known as
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, it created the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Association and delegated the power to oversee fishing activities in federal waters
to the NOAA. (NOAA, 2012)
According to the NOAA:
“[The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act] is the primary law governing marine
fisheries management in U.S. federal waters. First passed in 1976, the Magnuson-Stevens Act fosters long-term
biological and economic sustainability of our nation's marine fisheries out to 200 nautical miles from shore. Key
objectives of the Magnuson-Stevens Act are to: Prevent overfishing, Rebuild overfished stocks, Increase long-term
economic and social benefits, Ensure a safe and sustainable supply of seafood” (NOAA, 2016)
The MSA also created Regional Fishery Management Councils comprised of Federal and State
officials, including the National Fish and Wildlife Service, as well as eliminating foreign fishing
in US water and promoting domestic growth within the fishing industry. (FWS, 2016) In 1996,
the Magnuson-Stevens Act was reformed due to alarming rates of dropping fishing populations
to focus less on promoting fishing to promoting conservation. (OEP, 2011) The next year, the
MSA was forced to reevaluate policies due to the “Status of Fisheries of the United States Report
to Congress” done by the National Marine Fisheries Service that outlined the issues dealing with
US fisheries t the time, and reporting that 86% of all species were overfished at the time. The
MSA was again reformed in 2007 when President George W. Bush signed into law an
Amendment to the act implementing strong policy to end overfishing of all species. (The White
House, 2007) The next major milestone for policy reform occurred in 2010 when the New
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England Regional Fisheries Management Council implemented new policy that changed the way
New England groundfish fisheries (dealing with species such as cod and haddock) were
managed, creating sectors of fishermen that governed total catch limits, replacing the old system
of limiting the number of days fishermen could fish. The latest reform to the MSA was in 2012
when Congress completed the goal set forth in 2006 to create science based total catch limits that
are adequate for sustaining US fisheries for years to come. The comprehensive reform of the
MSA coupled with research done by organizations like the NOAA overtime leads to promising
results for the future.
Going hand in hand with fisheries management reform, Fisheries Economics of the
United States 2012 is a longitudinal study from 2003 to 2012 that had the goal of providing the
American public with descriptive statistics on economic impacts of the seafood industry,
commercial fisheries landings, revenue and price trends; angler expenditures and economic
impacts of recreational fishing, recreational catch, effort and participation rates; as well as
employer and non-employer establishment, payroll, employees and annual receipt information
for fishing related industries. Sources of information form this study were obtained from many
sources including the Fisheries Statistics Division, Office of science and technology, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) fisheries; Alaska Fisheries Science center,
NOAA Fisheries; Alaska Department of Fish and Game; California Department of Fish and
Game; Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife; Pacific Coast Fisheries Information Network
(PacFIN), Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife Department; and Western Pacific Fisheries
Information Network (WPacFIN). The analysis used in this report has been generated from two
separate IMPLAN models of the Economics and Sociocultural Analysis Division, Office of
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Science and Technology, NOAA Fisheries. Other data was obtained from the US Census Bureau,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. (NOAA, 2012)
All data collected for this study has been obtained through NOAA databases that provide
statistics through reported harvests and catch methods as well as outlining the regions of the
United States from which that data was obtained from the 1980’s through 2015 reported data.
The 2012 NOAA report goes on to outline the picture of the impact fishing has had on the US
and the fishing industry as a whole in the US according to statistics, as well as highlighting data
across all regions of the US and the impact fishing has had on those areas. The impactful nature
of the 2012 NOAA study comes from an overview of fishing across more than a decade in the
United States and gives insight into what can be done to prevent further destruction of habitats
across the US and beyond. (NOAA, 2012)
In order to create a more comprehensive study, looking at fishery policies globally is
essential to determine the downfalls and triumphs of US fishery policy. Reforming the Common
Fisheries Policy is a report that was done by the European Commission, Maritime Affairs and
Fisheries sector. The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was enacted by the European Union (EU)
and does many things including setting quotas for which member states are allowed to catch
what amounts of each type of fish, as well as encouraging the fishing industry by various market
interventions. In the report, it outlines some problems of the CFP that have led to unsustainable
fishing practices and what should be done to change these policies to make them more
sustainable economically and ecologically.
In the report, it outlines what reforms should be taken:
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“Take action against over-fishing and [act] in favour of the sustainable management of fish,
Ensure productivity of fish stocks to maximise long-term yield, Multi-annual plans governed
by ecosystem approach, Simplified rules and decentralised management, System of transferable
fishing concessions, Measures beneficial to small-scale fisheries, Ban on discards, New
marketing standards and clearer labelling, Better framework for aquaculture, EU financial
assistance to support sustainability objectives, Up-to-date information on state of marine
resources, International responsibility.” (European Commission, 2015)
Through these reforms, the goal of this report and subsequent action is outlined as such:
“By bringing fish stocks back to sustainable levels, the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
aims to provide EU citizens with a stable, secure and healthy food supply for the long term. It
seeks to bring new prosperity to the fishing sector, end dependence on subsidies and create new
opportunities for jobs and growth in coastal areas. At the same time, it fosters the industry’s
accountability for good stewardship of the sea” (European Commission, 2015)
The new policy that arises from the CFP would directly affect fishing practices and overall
ecosystem health. (European Commission, 2015) When looking at the goals and practices
associated with the CFP, there is a clear lineage to what the US has outlined they would like to
achieve in fisheries management and what the EU has defined in the CFP as adequate reform to
fisheries policy in their sector.
Australia also possesses a fishery that is one of the largest in the world and has proposed
similar solutions to obtaining sustainability in Australian national fisheries Incentive-Based
Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries, is a report done by the Economics and Environment
Network of the Australian National University (ANU); and has outlined issues, especially in
16. 7
Australia that have come about due to unsustainable fishing practices, and what approaches must
be taken to remedy the situation. In the report, the failures of traditional target-species
management that have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote
sustainability are outlined.
The Australian report argues that an ecosystem approach is necessary to approach the
situation, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to
address important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries. The study also outlines
inappropriate incentives bearing on fishermen, and the ineffective governance that frequently
exists in commercial, developed fisheries, managed primarily by total harvest limits and input-
controls. They contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisherman motivation
when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in
commercial fisheries, they argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community,
individual harvest, or territorial rights and also price ecosystem services coupled with public
research, monitoring and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries. (Grafton, et. All,
2005)
Ecological Economics; Economics of biodiversity and sustainable fisheries management
also outlines the fact that Marine ecosystems are complex, and many marine species are
ecologically interdependent. As a result, losing a species could produce a cascading effect on
other species. They argue that fishery scientists advocate an ecosystem-based approach to fishery
management to meet long-term sustainable goals. The Ecological Economics paper models the
complex interrelationships among species and the relationship between biomass growth and
phenotypic diversity. They have found that the equilibrium stock and catch/yield levels are
overestimated when diversity is not accounted for. Consequently, it is argued that if species are
17. 8
diverse, fishery policy based on single fishery management could overestimate catch potentials
and potentially results in biological overfishing and stock collapse, which is what has occurred in
to the North Sea Cod fishery in Alaska. (Akpalu, et. All, 2009)
An article from Nature, International weekly journal of science, called: Towards
Sustainability in World Fisheries looks as well at a holistic approach to fisheries management,
based on historical evidence that has led to the decline of fishery sustainability, going along with
the report from Ecological Economics. This article outlines similar approaches of how to address
fisheries based on ecosystem development. In the article, it is argued that fisheries have rarely
been ‘sustainable’. Rather, fishing has induced serial depletions, long masked by improved
technology, geographic expansion and exploitation of previously spurned species lower in the
food web. With global catches declining since the late 1980s, continuation of present trends will
lead to supply shortfall, for which aquaculture cannot be expected to compensate, and may well
exacerbate entire ecosystems. Reducing fishing capacity to appropriate levels will require strong
reductions of subsidies. Zoning the oceans into unfished marine reserves and areas with limited
levels of fishing effort would allow sustainable fisheries to be possible, based on resources
embedded in functional, diverse ecosystems. (Pauly, et.all, 2002)
Derived from this research, there are many failures of previous fisheries management and
legislation that have caused the decline of global fisheries over the past two decades. To start,
“total catch limits” have caused direct ecosystem depletion. Total catch limits cause fishermen to
“race” against other fishermen to catch as many fish as they can as quickly as possible to fill
their daily, weekly, monthly, or seasonal quotas. This decreases sustainability because it wipes
the ecosystem clean of certain species of fish that are in season for a certain period of time until
the population can rejuvenate. This is a problem because often daily catch limits are set too high,
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and wipe out too many members of the same species to the point where time in between seasons
is too small to allow the population of certain species to rejuvenate. An example of this is in
Canada’s Northern cod fishery. Because of concerns by the regulator of Canadian fisheries that
reduced harvests would generate bankruptcies and unemployment, coupled with uncertainties
over the status of stocks (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2004), overestimation of stocks
and recruitment resulted in total catch limits being set too high, which ended up being a major
contributor to stock collapse in the 1990s. (Walters and Maguire, 1996) In order for fisheries to
remain sustainable, accurate total catch limits must be set by governing bodies, backed by
complete research to ensure both the sustainability of both fishing industries and ecosystems.
This problem becomes even more complex because even though the NOAA governs all federal
fisheries, it is often left to each individual state to decide how total harvest limits are set.
The next conclusion I have found is looking at an ecosystem approach to addressing
sustainable fishery management. This theory goes hand in hand with evaluating total catch limits
and ensuring that the ecosystem is not wiped out. It seems that most scholars deem it important
to control population of different species of fish rather than a single species because they are all
intertwined. Therefore if one species has a collapse in population, it causes the ecosystem as a
whole to decline. In order to address these issues, some solutions have been proposed. First,
Marine reserves and “No Take” areas must be implemented in more frequency to increase
abundance, size and biodiversity of fish and to increase resiliency to ecological shocks. This will
ultimately lead to an increase in profitability over time, even if harvest limits are diminished at
first and profitability is diminished initially. Next, enforcement of the elimination of “by-catch”
can increase health of an ecosystem, and also lead to increased profitability of an ecosystem over
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time. Last, preventing habitat destruction is key, because it also increases health of the ecosystem
and will increase abundance and size of species. (Akpalu, et. All, 2009)
Last, the research conducted points to an Incentive-based approach, outside of ecosystem
management that will lead to more sustainable fisheries globally. Not only must total catch limits
be set appropriately, but fishermen of the greatest marine predator and other species must be
incentivized to fish sustainably. The first approach to this is to allow for better territorial rights
for fishermen. Fishermen, whether they are commercial, or fishing for private consumption as
some long standing communities have done historically, must be allowed to exclude others from
fishing on their fishing grounds for survival through profitability and long term fishery health.
This could be done through stricter licensing requirements for commercial fishermen that
designate only certain individuals can purchase these licenses accompanied with regulations they
must follow. When looking at private consumption, certain rights could be handed down from
governments to give special privilege to groups that have property rights on certain fisheries.
This approach puts the long term costs of overexploitation of resources on the shoulders of the
fishermen who hold the special privileges. Through collective action, better enforcement of the
policies in place would cause the ones who burden the long term cost to ensure that the fisheries
are managed properly. This would also solve the allocation problem of who gets to fish in certain
areas and overexploitation of ecosystems as a whole would be decreased.
An encouraging fact is that many fishermen are starting to realize the effects of their
actions. Bren Smith is the creator and prime implementer of the GreenWave initiative. Smith is a
3D Ocean Farmer that is pushing for sustainability in US fisheries. He has been a commercial
fishermen for the better part of 30 years and by his own admittance has divulged that he
previously used unsustainable fishing practices in order to gain a profit, admitting to dumping
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sometimes over 10,000 pounds of dead by-catch back into the ocean after wiping whole
ecosystems clean. The GreenWave initiative focuses on polar opposite practices. (Smith, 2013)
3D Ocean Farming is a revolutionary sustainable fishing practice that focuses on using
shellfish and seaweed to rejuvenate ecosystems, provide habitats for fish species and ultimately
make a profit, all the while creating zero pollution, and protecting stocks from being depleted by
natural disasters and other events. Smith claims that over nitrification of oceans due to pollution
from things like farming are causing dead zones in ocean waters today that are devoid of oxygen
and life, but by farming oysters, which filter up to 30-50 gallons of water a day and clear the
nitrogen from the water, this pollution is a non-factor and the oceans are able to thrive. Coupled
with this, growth of seaweed has many positive externalities such as creating an artificial reef
system, protection from storm surges and natural disasters, filtering carbon from the atmosphere,
creating biofuel, creating fertilizer and substantiating a blue-green economy. (Smith, 2013)
Smith argues, as coral reefs disappear, there's no foundation for ecosystems to be built
around. The farms attract over 150 species back from places which were once barren patches of
ocean that are turned into thriving ecosystems. Farm function as storm surge protectors that stand
in the way between things like hurricanes as they pummel the shore line to reduce the amount of
destruction exhibited. The farms also grow kelp that soaks up 5 times the amount of carbon out
of the atmosphere as land based plants, which smith calls the "sequoia of the sea" to create a
sustainable carbon sequestration plant to slow climate change. Kelp is also used as biofuel which
Smith explains that a network of kelp farms totaling half the size the state of Maine could replace
all the oil in the United States, and in a one acre area, 2000 gallons of biofuel a year can be
grown all with zero inputs because it requires no fresh water, no fertilizer, no arid land, which
Smith claims “making it the most sustainable form of food in the world and a sustainable source
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of biofuel.” Last, kelp is used as fertilizer. By capturing the nitrogen polluted into the ocean,
coupled with the Yale sustainable food project which uses the kelp produced it to grow
vegetables, the nitrogen leaches back into the ocean, is captured again and thus a closed nitrogen
farming loop is created. Smith argues, that through this process, a blue-green economy is created
that creates employment. Smith argues that “anybody with 20 acres and a boat, about 50,000
dollars in the US can start their own farm and be up and running the first year.” (Smith, 2013)
With the implications of Bren Smith’s type of sustainable ocean farming practices, this
can be proposed as a solution to not only cleaning up polluted zones of the ocean but ensuring
the continued sustainability of US fisheries for decades in the future.
In conclusion, this study points to a two pronged approach of looking at fishery
management: ecosystem control and incentive based approaches towards sustainable fishing.
Looking ahead to chapter two, this study will look at current economic theories that can be
applied to solving the issues facing unsustainable fishing practices in the US and further looking
at how the long term profitability of US fisheries can be preserved.
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III. Theoretical Analysis
When looking at fishery management, the topics that will be explored are ecosystem
control and fishermen incentives. Based on these approaches to creating and maintaining
sustainable fisheries, the fundamental theory that will be used is The Tragedy of the Commons as
it relates to sustainable fishing practices. As well as exploring this, looking at property rights of
fishermen and certain groups that use fishing as their main source of income, as well as looking
at general equilibrium theory to explain why certain fisheries are unsustainable and how to
control the factors involved is of utmost importance.
The tragedy of the commons theory was first introduced by Garrett Hardin in his paper
“The tragedy of the Commons” in 1968. In his paper, he argues that “the commons” is a situation
where all have an equal opportunity to use the resources provided, but because of an infinitely
increasing population, the destruction of “the commons” is inevitable. The management of “the
commons” falls on morality of the actors using these resources. In order to preserve the resources
within the commons, governments and laws are used to regulate how these resources are
allocated. Hardin then goes on to say that failures in preservation occur because governments are
subject to outside forces like corruption that prevent the ultimate goal of utility maximization for
all, which is unobtainable because although laws are easy to put into place, they are difficult to
enforce because, regardless of laws, every individual will seek to maximize their own utility,
unless the laws make the cost of maximizing utility too great. He then brings the idea of “the
conscience” into the argument by proposing that the conscience is not a governing body in the
fact that the commons is mostly enjoyed by the conscience-less individual who only cares about
personal utility maximization, which is why laws are required. He gives the example of
“taxation” to support this theory by explaining that if taxation were voluntary based on “the
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conscience” individuals who were “conscience-less” would reap the benefits of the commons
without paying taxes, while those with a “conscience” would pay taxes to enjoy the benefits of
diminished utility. He concludes his argument by saying that man must agree on mutual coercion
to prevent the universal ruin of the commons. (Hardin, 1968)
The problem facing fisheries management is that, fisheries are a common-property
resource. Feeny, Hannah and McEvoy use the definition of a common-property resource, taken
from Berkes as: “A class of resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves
subtractability”. Based on this definition, The Tragedy of the commons can be applied to the
efficiency of contemporary fisheries management. In his Paper, “Toward an Interactive Theory
of Nature and Culture: Ecology, Production, and Cognition in the California Fishing Industry”,
McEvoy sums up Hardin’s theory by restating his assumption: “ As Hardin saw it, when
competing users shared resources in common, the inevitable fate is annihilation”. (McEvoy,
1987) he then goes on to say that fisheries are the “classic instance of the commons tragedy”.
(McEvoy, 1987) Fisheries are often the subject of very high economic competition that often do
not conform to boundaries of property rights or legal jurisdiction.
Fisheries are also ecologically volatile and are affected by a range of different factors
from weather to human interaction. As one member of an ecosystem is impacted, it has
cascading effects on the rest of the ecosystem based biological interdependence. In their study,
Akpalu argues that if there is greater phenotypic diversity within an ecosystem, and by
implementing an ecosystem model of fisheries management, effort levels of fishermen could be
reduced because ecosystems will be allowed to thrive through the conservation of all species.
This means that higher profits would be yielded based on reduction of costs, and stocks would
grow to preserve the fishery’s health long term. If stock quotas are set too high, ecosystems are
24. 15
knocked out of balance and effort in the long run for fishermen will be greater and health of the
ecosystem will be diminished. (Akpalu, 2009) Because of these factors, fisheries are resources
that are easily depleted if harvesters do not leave sufficient stock behind to regenerate future
supplies. (Mcevoy. 1987) Human interaction with the ecosystem in question has a large impact
on the survival and robust nature of the ecosystems in which they fish because policy
implications dealing with even a small part of the ecosystem can have cascading effects on all
organisms living within that ecosystem.
As well as describing “the commons”, Hardin uses Adam Smith’s invisible hand to show
the nature of why “the commons” is inevitably doomed for annihilation. (Hardin, 1968) Adam
smith’s, well known work “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” is
applicable to almost all aggregate economic problems faced in the economic realm today, and it
also applies to fishery management. Hardin uses Smith’s theory to highlight that if all individuals
act in their own rational best interest, this does not contribute to sustaining the commons as a
whole. The “tragedy” arises from a rational unlimited want for resources but only a finite supply,
and once the tipping point is reached, then there is no utility for all. (Hardin, 1968) (Smith, 1776)
based on this theory, if all fishermen try to maximize their economic utility, it will lead to
ultimate depletion of resources. Governments and regulations aim to solve this problem, but have
failed because fish populations have been on the decline for the past two decades.
The Tragedy of the Commons can be applied to contemporary fisheries management by
evaluating producer incentives. The commons in this framework is any fishery in question that is
publicly shared and utilized by both commercial and recreational fishermen. In this example, the
producers may want to fish sustainably in order to preserve their livelihood in the long run, but
cannot do so because they must make a short term profit, creating the negative externality of
25. 16
ecosystem depletion. To solve this problem, fishermen incentives and exclusionary rights must
also be evaluated to determine what should be done to fix this problem.
Public fisheries around the world are known as “Common Property Resources”.
(Schlager, Ostrom, 1992) Schlager and Ostrom define “Common Property Resources” as
“property owned by a government, property owned by no one, or property owned by a
community of resource users. (Schlager, Ostrom, 1992) the term can also be used to describe
“any common-pool resource used by multiple individuals regardless of the type of property
rights involved.” (Schlager, Ostrom, 1992) Operational activities dealing with these types of
resources are constrained and made predictable by operational-level rules regardless of the
source of the rules that constrain them. The “rules” being talked about here are generally agreed
upon and enforced prescriptions to the resource that require, forbid, or permit specific actions for
more than a single individual. (Schlager, Ostrom, 1992)
Examples of these “rules” can include anything from specifying the type of fishing
equipment allowed in certain fisheries or allowing permits to fish on certain grounds. (Schlager,
Ostrom, 1992) Grafton et. All argue, “the key to IAF [sustainable fisheries] is to provide
harvesters with long-term and secure rights that are legally enforceable, and with corresponding
duties by non-owners to not interfere with the exercise of these rights.” The issue facing how
these regulations are set is complex because there must be enough permits so that they are
efficient in allowing for the industry to thrive while still preserving the ecosystem, they must
please collective bargaining groups, and they must be cost efficient so producers can make a
profit. If regulations are set correctly, Grafton et. All also believe, “Secure and durable
harvesting or territorial rights, in most cases, provide fishers with the incentive to one, protect
the value of their assets and, two, obtain the greatest possible sustainable flow of benefits from
26. 17
fishing.” In order for regulations to be effective, fishermen must bear the long term cost of
unsustainable fishing practices. (Grafton et. All, 2009)
When addressing sustainable fisheries management and the ecosystem approach, the
emphasis has been on select species management, rather than dealing with the incentives given
to fishermen. In order to create more sustainable fisheries, In their work, “Incentive-Based
Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries” Grafton et. all argue that the long term costs of
unsustainable fishing practices must fall on the shoulders of the individuals using the resources
so that they are incentivized to fish sustainably. (Grafton, et. All, 2005) That means that
fishermen that use the resources should be able to exclude individuals or practices that create an
unsustainable environment when it comes to the resources in question.
Schlager and Ostrom offer the example of Lobster fisheries in Maine as an example of
this principle. Today, the state of Maine owns the lobster fisheries off it’s coast, but it was not
always like that. Prior to 1920, the entire coast of Maine was divided into “fiefs”, where
fishermen would only fish off the coast of the harbors with which they were associated. These
fishermen decided how these grounds would be managed: who would be allowed to fish there
and what kind of equipment would be used to harvest a catch, but they could not sell or lease
these rights to others. In order to enforce these rules, they would destroy the gear of whoever
would violate these principals. After new technology and the shape of the coastline changed over
time, this began to change. The invention and installation of motors allowed for fishermen to go
further offshore, and would allow them to fish in rougher waters, not constrained to fishing
solely when it was calm. Because of this, fishermen were inclined to infringe on others fishing
grounds because there was more profit to be gained. Because of this, the situation turned into a
full scale war to compete against others for profit, still being dealt with through gear destruction.
27. 18
In turn, most of the competitors gear was getting destroyed so fishermen decided it would be
better to mix than fight.
The reasoning for the type of behavior exhibited can be explained by using the Coase
theory of incentives. The lobstermen were incentivized to give up their individual property
rights, in order to gain an advantage through sharing the property amongst each other. The
fishermen opted for the control of the fisheries to be controlled by the state, regulating the
fishery holistically, based on open fishing seasons that have led to a stable yield rate, even when
not self-regulated. (Schlager, Ostrom, 1992) These regulations are an example of how proper
collective property rights of fishermen in these areas cause the long term effects of impractical
fishing practices to be diminished, because of a collective need for well-defined property rights.
In the Coase theorem, RH Coase explains that because of negative externalities, actors would
rather work together in certain situations than fight against each other to reach a common
solution. (Coase, 1960) Lobster fishermen decided that instead of collectively destroying each
other, it was in the common best interest of all to work together.
In order to provide more perfect fisheries management, public oversight through
collective action is the most viable option to ensure regulations are correctly handed down and
followed. (Grafton et. All, 2009) Regulations imposed on commercial fishermen create “rights”
of certain individuals or groups being permitted to use or to exclude others from the resource or
resources in question. (Schlager, Ostrom, 1992) There are three types of rights that are defined as
such: Management Rights: The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource
by making improvements. Exclusion Rights: The right to determine who will have an access
right, and how that right may be transferred. And last, Alienation Rights: The right to sell or
lease either or both of the previously described collective choice rights. (Schlager, Ostrom, 1992)
28. 19
This is important because when it comes to public fisheries; it is the governments that create the
property rights and hand them down to the fishermen. These rights impact the fisheries in
question because it determines the amount of fishermen that are on those grounds as well as the
amount of effort they put into harvesting their catch. This can cause major implications of
resource depletion if not properly managed, and must be closely evaluated so the rights of
fishermen ensure long term sustainability.
As well as defining property rights, accurate costs must be imposed on these fishermen to
ensure ecological conservation. An example of this is the 1998 Agreement on the International
Dolphin Conservation Program in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. (Grafton et. All, 2009) In order to
incentivize fishermen to watch their by-catch while commercially fishing for yellowfin tuna as to
not deplete the ecosystem, a regulation was imposed that if a certain number of dolphin kills had
been recorded in the act of fishing, that vessel must cease all fishing activities, causing fishermen
to bear the cost of ecosystem depletion. Total dolphin mortality was decreased by around 75%.
(Grafton et. All, 2009)
Another issue facing regulation is determining the number of permits given to fishermen
to achieve favorable results. This could potentially be mitigated through fishermen incentives as
well. Grafton et. All argue that through the use of transferable Habitat Impact Units (HIU’s), that
would proxy marginal habitat damage associated with different gear and habitats, the total
number of HIUs would be set to ensure a desired level of habitat protection, enforced with a
vessel monitoring system that would track each vessels location and rate of movement,
fishermen would have the incentive to take into account the impact of fishing on habitats because
HIUs would be scarce and tradable. Those who exceed their initial allocation of HIUs would be
required to purchase more units that would increase their fishing costs, while those who have
29. 20
HIUs left over after fishing could sell or lease them to others at a profit, creating a market for
sustainability that is equitable based on the amount of habitat destruction one vessel causes.
(Grafton et. All, 2009)
Last, a general equilibrium model can be applied to Contemporary fisheries management.
Jiang uses their study to explain that because of population growth and advancements of
technology when it comes to harvesting, this has caused the decrease in fish populations
globally, especially in developing countries. (Jiang, 2010) Jiang argues that there are three
factors of production in this model: a wild fish stock, land, and labor. (Jiang, 2010) Jiang states:
“When the relative price of fish is lower than the fishery entrance price, there is no activity in the
capture fishery because fishermen’s marginal cost of producing fish is higher than the fish price as
described in the capture fishery section. However, there is activity in aquaculture always as long as the
relative price of fish is positive. The potential viability of the capture fishery in an equilibrium including
manufacturing goods depends upon whether land is sufficiently scarce relative to labor.”
This points to the fact that as long as fishermen are making a profit, the equilibrium model
suggests that the fishermen will produce, as long as entry into the market is less than the cost of
fishing. This is evident in Jiang’s conclusions:
“Population growth and technological improvement in aquaculture have opposite impacts on
wild fish stocks. Population growth raises fish prices and reduces wild fish stocks, while technological
progress in aquaculture reduces fish prices and increases wild fish stocks. Therefore, the direction of
change in the wild fish stock depends on which factor dominates. While both population growth and
technological improvement in aquaculture enhance fish production in aquaculture, the harvest in the
capture fishery may rise or fall.”
30. 21
These factors pointed out by Jiang suggest that the tragedy of the commons theory and
that well defined property rights associated with fish harvest are contributing to habitat depletion
and reduced fish stocks. (Jiang, 2010)
In order to improve US fisheries, more perfect policy must be implemented as derived
from this analysis. Based on the tragedy of the commons theory, if fishermen incentives are not
addressed, habitat destruction is imminent, and fishery health will not improve. Coupled with
this, in order to incentivize producers to fish sustainably, property rights for fishermen must be
adequately set to ensure a market of sustainability that is available to all producers within the
commercial fishing industry. In order to create this market, the correct price and availability of
permits to fish sustainably must be available, and negative incentives towards fishing
unsustainably must be implemented through policy handed down by a public governing body. If
these results are achieved, fishermen will fish sustainably based on the general equilibrium
model as long as they are still able to make a profit doing so. Moving forward in this study,
empirical analysis will be performed to evaluate the health of US fisheries over time and to
address what should be done to ensure sustainability and profitability of the US fishing industry.
31. 22
IV) Empirical Analysis
In order to assess the current and future economic viability of US fisheries, empirical
analysis based on the theories discussed in the previous chapter has been chosen in order to
address the issues at hand. All data collected for this study has been provided by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) and is in a time series format. According to the
NOAA: “the data is used by state, regional and federal fisheries scientists and managers to
maintain healthy and sustainable fish stocks”, and is efficient in determining health and viability
of all US fisheries (NOAA, 2015). Based on the data collected, I have determined these variables
are crucial in performing an accurate assessment of fish stocks within the US and will be
adequate in performing a comprehensive economic analysis of sustainable fishing practices:
harvestunreleased – Variable for total reported number of species harvested and not released through
recreational methods in a given year. Indicates angler education as well as ecosystem health based on
reported harvestings being released unharmed back into the ecosystem.
harvestreleased – Variable for total reported number of species harvested and released through recreational
methods in a given year. This indicates the amount of species being depleted from the ecosystem and
overall ecosystem health.
revenue – Variable for total revenue generated through commercial methods of fishing. This shows the
economic impacts of ecosystem depletion over time based on fluctuations of revenue.
year – Variable for the year in which data was collected. Used to identify trends over time as to why
fisheries have reacted to changes and can determine how to better address fisheries in the long run.
totalanglertrips – Variable for total number of reported recreational angler trips in a given year. This shows
the effort level that recreational fishermen are exerting for catching the amount of fish harvested and can
determine ecosystem health through examining the number of species harvested per trip.
coastal – Variable for the total number of coastal fishing licenses purchased in a given year. This indicates
the number of anglers that participate in fishing activities and explains total harvest numbers.
commercialweight- Variable for total harvest weight of all commercial fishing activities in a given year.
Used to determine ecosystem health based on the amount of fish harvested on a yearly basis.
fcma- Dummy variable used to show the years in which US fisheries management was operating under the
fcma, pre 1996.
msa- Dummy variable used to show the years in which US fisheries management was operating under
MSA reform policies after 1996.
msaandnmfs- Dummy variable used to show the years in which US fisheries management was operating
under MSA and NMFS reform policies after 1997.
msa2007- Dummy variable used to show the years in which US fisheries management was operating under
MSA reform policies after 2007.
nereform- Dummy variable used to show the years in which US fisheries management was operating under
New England Regional Fisheries Management Council reform after 2010.
msamilestone- Dummy variable used to show the years in which US fisheries management was operating
under MSA reform policies after 2012.
32. 23
When building a model, each variable that plays an important role in determining
economic and ecological health of US fisheries was taken into account. The first two analysis
chosen to determine the health of US fisheries were the total number of species released
(harvestreleased) and species unreleased (harvestunreleased). The data collected for these
variables is based on recreational fishing numbers only, because the NOAA does not report
species released and species unreleased numbers for the commercial fishing industry. This is so
because often there are not any released species during commercial fishing activities and any
undesired species that are either not the correct size or correct species are dumped back into the
ocean as dead by-catch. (Akpalu, 2009). It is expected that as more numbers of species are
released over time, overall ecosysytem health will increase and the opposite as more are
harvested and not safely put back into the ecosystem.
Last, revenue itself will be looked at as a dependent variable. Revenue, based on harvest
numbers and weight determines the long term value of US fish stocks as a viable source of
income for fishery related businesses as well as the aggregate economy of US fisheries. It is
assumed that if revenue is increasing, so is the health and viability of US fisheries. In order to
provide a clearer picture of the fishing industry as a whole, all data collected for this analysis is
based on commercial fishing numbers because revenue generated by the fishing industry comes
through the commercial catch and sale of species at market value. Any revenue generated from
private fishing endeavors is usually through the sale of licenses which are governed by the
individual states that sell them.
33. 24
The table that follows summarizes the data that has been collected:
Figure 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
harvestunreleased 331 19332572.72 23356162.26 117328 95000000
harvestreleased 287 23990354.90 29203701.83 48664 110000000
revenue 34 3662655246 859721711.50 2323202016 5523722562
totalanglertrips 169 12867942.69 7312059.35 350568 26000000
year 365 1998.69 10.07 1981 2015
coastal 154 1646880.34 819043.34 83837 3300000
commercialweight 34 8783886644 1400980571 6021394099 10266970060
fcma 365 0.39 0.49 0 1
msa 365 0.027 0.16 0 1
msaandnfms 365 0.30 0.46 0 1
msa2007 365 0.0027 0.052 0 1
nereform 365 0.066 0.25 0 1
msamilestone 365 0.115 0.32 0 1
*All values estimated from NOAA data
First, looking at the minimum and maximum results for all variables, there is a large
discrepancy in numbers from the beginning year (1981) and the final year data was collected
(2015). This means that reporting of statistics has gotten much better over time, because the
number of fishermen has not drastically risen by this rate since the early 80’s, although the
number of Coastal and Non-Coastal licenses purchased across the nation has risen in the same
time period. Also, the number of fish harvested and released has drastically risen since the
beginning of this study. Looking at this fact, it is expected that ecosystem health has increased
because of better fisherman education over time and heightened awareness towards preserving
ecosystems. This can also show that harvest limits have gotten stricter over time to preserve
ecosystem health so fishermen are releasing more of their catch. Also, because not all variables
have the same amount of observations in the model, this may cause some results to appear as if
they are not significant. For example, based on yearly totals of revenue, there are only 34
observations, but it is expected that revenue will have changed over time along with the amount
34. 25
of fish harvested and sold at market value. In order to account for this, direct comparison of
variables has been used to show strong relationships between connecting factors.
Regression analysis has been chosen to generate the most perfect results to analyze the
health of US fisheries. Regression analysis is a statistical method for determining the strength of
relationships between variables. It is relevant in determining the present and future economic
viability of US fisheries because there are many different factors that attribute themselves to the
health of US fisheries. By looking at a comprehensive model of the factors included in the
regression model, a more perfect picture of how to address US fisheries can be achieved.
The first regression model observed was for total harvest unreleased. The model used is
as follows:
harvestunreleased= β0 + β1year + β2totalanglertrips + β3coastal + β4fcma + β5msa + β6msaandnmfs+ β7msa2007
+ β8nereform+ β9msamilestone
The results are as follows:
Figure 4.2: Total Harvest Unreleased
Variable P-value Coefficient*
year 0.000 -596339.10
totalanglertrips 0.000 2.69
coastal 0.550 -1.25
fcma 0.179 -4855610
msa 0.126 -5943718
msaandnmfs 0.254 -2376728
msa2007 0.832 2033722
nereform 0.922 249403.80
msamilestone 0.087 3990434
constant 0.000 1200000000
Number of Observations: 365
F ( 9, 355) : 199.60
R- Squared: 0.8350
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8308
*All Coefficient values estimated to two significant figures
In order to properly represent the data obtained, the model chosen for total harvest
unreleased includes all variables that pertain only to recreational fishing. Recreational fishing has
35. 26
been proven to have less of an impact on ecosystem degradation than commercial fishing
because of the differing methods used in commercial and recreational fishing. In order to get a
full view of the fishing landscape, it has been deemed important to take a look at recreational
fishing as an indicator of ecosystem health. Although recreational isn’t as harmful, catch
numbers fluctuate with the health of the ecosystem in which is fished.
Initially looking at the results obtained, it appears that year in which harvest was obtained
(year), the amount of trips anglers take in a given year (totalanglertrips), and the most recent
MSA legislation reform (msamilestone) all significantly affect total harvest unreleased based on
a 90% confidence level.
The year in which the species were harvested and released back into the ecosystem alive
makes sense based on fishing policy over time. As research on the subject has gotten better,
stricter catch limits have been imposed upon fishermen in order to preserve ecosystems. This
allows fish more time to grow and as they get older create more and bigger offspring, allowing
for ecosystem rejuvenation. As catch limits become stricter, and ecosystems begin to rebound, it
is expected that there will be more fish that have not grown to be within legal size limits when
caught, so legally, they must be thrown back by fishermen, or fishermen face a penalty
depending on the grounds they are fishing on, creating the negative coefficient on year.
A similar principle can be applied when looking at total angler trips. As fishermen input
more effort into their fishing practices with more fish thriving in a rebounding ecosystem, it is
expected that they catch more fish; so one would expect the coefficient on total angler trips to be
positive. This is a good sign for rebounding ecosystem health. Even though more fish are being
taken out of the ecosystems in question, they must be meeting the regulations set forth by the
36. 27
governing bodies in control of the fisheries in question. Because of the MSA milestone reform in
2012, total catch limits across the nation are backed by scientific research. This means that the
size of the fish being taken out of the ecosystems in question have been scientifically deemed big
enough to be sustainable based on their size and age. (Fisheries, 2014)
The 2012 milestone reform policy is also statistically significant with a positive
coefficient for unreleased species. This shows as well how it is possible that regulations and
reform based on research are working to create thriving ecosystems that allow for the harvest of
more species being taken out of the ocean. Although this data is only from recreational fishing
reports, the implications for the commercial industry are promising. The policies in question
affect all fishermen and all fishermen must abide by the regulations set forth, as well as
regulations set forth by the individual governing bodies they are fishing under. As more research
is done and more accurate catch limits and stricter penalties for breaking these laws are enforced,
ecosystems as a whole will most likely continue to come back.
When looking at the non-significant results, the signs are as expected. Based on the
number of coastal licenses sold, there have been more fish released back into the ecosystem. This
is accurate, also based strict regulations. As more fishermen enter into the fishery, even if
fisheries are rebounding, the number of legal fish in the ecosystems in question does not support
the number of fishermen engaging in fishing activities, so even if fishermen are catching more
fish, they must release more of their catch.
When looking at the insignificant results based on policy reform, the signs are also
expected. As policy reform gets stricter over time to support ecosystem health, more fish will be
released back into the ecosystem. This is true except for the New England reform policies and
37. 28
the 2007 MSA reform. This could indicate multiple events. First, either both reform policies
were not strong enough to have an effect on ecosystem health. Second, the New England reform
policy did not have a large effect on overall catch numbers because it is only for one region of
the country. Or, last, ecosystems have rebounded, allowing for more fish to be taken out of the
ecosystems as a result of both policies being good for ecosystem health and more fish being
caught that meet legal requirements.
Comparing these results to the theories discussed in Chapter two, it appears as if
ecosystem management systems based on strict catch limits for a number of diverse species is
contributing to rebounding species population numbers and rebounding ecosystems. Fishermen
incentives are also being addressed, at least on the recreational level based on reform policy that
tightens up regulations on the types and size of species being caught and the penalties that go
along with killing an unlawful sized member of an ecosystem.
Going hand in hand with total harvest unreleased, looking at total harvest released is
valueable to see if the predictions based on the data are coming true. The model used for total
harvest released is as follows:
harvestreleased= β0 + β1year + β2totalanglertrips + β3coastal + β4fcma + β5msa + β6msaandnmfs+ β7msa2007 +
β8nereform+ β9msamilestone
38. 29
The results are as follows:
Figure 4.3: Total Harvest Released
Variable P-value Coefficient*
year 0.153 247774.7
totalanglertrips 0.000 2.73
coastal 0.133 3.51
fcma 0.579 2238372
msa 0.694 1703212
msaandnmfs 0.282 2502838
msa2007 0.918 1107732
nereform 0.764 -849676
msamilestone 0.205 3299801
constant 0.000 0.000000049
Number of Observations: 365
F ( 9, 355) : 240.50
R- Squared: 0.8591
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8555
*All Coefficient values estimated to two significant figures
In comparison to looking at unreleased numbers, there are not as many significant values.
The lone significant value is based on total angler trips (totalanglertrips). The coefficient is
positive which indicates a few things. First, this means that more fish are being released back
into the ecosystem. This is opposite of what was shown in the initial regression analysis on total
harvest unreleased. This points to the conclusion that overall, per trip, more fish are being caught
by recreational anglers, which is an indicator of improving ecosystem health, which is promising.
The reasoning for this is also because of fishing policy reform. As shown by the non-significant
values based on policy reform, over time, more fish have been released. By looking at a direct
comparison of total harvest released to year, it becomes clear that because of stricter regulations,
harsher penalties and better angler education, there have been rising number of released fish over
time, coinciding with strict policy reform over the past 30 years.
39. 30
Table 4.1
The Graph clearly shows an upward linear trend beginning in the late 80’s of more fish being
released over time, which has contributed to rebounding ecosystem health, most likely due to
policy reform.
The last regression analysis performed looks at revenue generated through commercial
fishing practices. This analysis does not take recreational fishing into account and instead
focuses solely on the commercial fishing industry. In order to formulate the most perfect model,
the Variable commercialweight has been generated that takes into account total catch weight of
the commercial fishing industry. There is no NOAA data for total catch numbers for the
commercial fishing industry because often, total catch numbers are not reported and instead total
catch weight is reported. This can be misleading because reported numbers can also include by
catch that is discarded dead back into the ocean, which is alarming, especially when it can be
thrown back into the ocean in the tens of thousands of pounds. (Smith, 2013) With that being
said, the regression analysis will hopefully predict what can be done to maximize both profit and
ecosystem health.
40. 31
The model used for total revenue is as follows:
revenue= β0 + β1commercialweight + β2year + β3fcma + β4msa + β5msaandnmfs+ β6msa2007 + β7nereform+
β8msamilestone
The results are as follows:
Figure 4.4: Revenue
Variable P-value Coefficient*
commercialweight 0.000 0.42
year 0.655 -1517864
fcma 0.154 -113000000
msa 0.167 -117000000
msaandnmfs 0.032 -97900000
msa2007 0.791 -55500000
nereform 0.358 50900000
msamilestone 0.286 53900000
constant 0.649 3100000000
Number of Observations: 365
F ( 9, 355) : 1243.13
R- Squared: 0.9654
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9647
*All Coefficient values estimated to two significant figures
When looking at the results, there are two significant values. First, when looking at total
commercial weight of fish caught, it is expected that the coefficient would be positive. there are a
few contributing factors to this notion. First, based on market value of fish, the weight which is
caught and the price of fish at the market the time they are sold is how revenue is determined.
Second, this can determine the economic sustainability of the market for the future. Based on the
trend of revenue increasing over time, if the health of the fisheries in question is sustained, the
economic implications for millions of jobs of commercial fishermen, jobs in the food and
processing industries and jobs for scientists studying these habitats is promising. The upward
trend is shown on this graph:
41. 32
Table 4.2
As shown, there is an upward trend of revenue from the early 80’s up to 2014. As stated, this
could be contributed to fluctuating prices and inflation, but if the trend continues and fisheries
remain profitable for fishermen, the economic sustainability of these fisheries is in good shape,
so policy must dictate the preservation of this economic resource.
The only other significant variable in the model is for MSA and NMFS reform from
1997. The negative coefficient on this is telling. This shows that at this point in time, fisheries
policy was not contributing to revenue generated through the harvest of species commercially.
The 1997 legislation is significant because it demonstrated a clear shift in policy from focusing
on getting individuals involved in fishing to focusing on conservation in fishing. The negative
significant results implicate that this policy had a great effect on the landscape of commercial
fishing and caused empirical changes.
Even though the results were not significant, there is a clear shift in the sign of the
coefficients dealing with policy reform. As stated above, the negative impact on revenue
42. 33
incurred by policy changes in 1997 shows that policy reform had not done enough to shift the
landscape of commercial fisheries. This was the case of all policy up through 2010. For all the
policies implemented in 2010 or after, there is a positive coefficient for revenue. This can be
explained by increased fishery health as well. The regulations that were imposed in 2010 created
harvesting limits in New England that allowed for fishermen to govern themselves as they see fit.
This has shown increasing results in ecosystem health. not only has it caused the ecosystem to
rebound, but it has caused more efficiency based on revenue, causing a switch in the sign of the
coefficient on policy to become positive. The same story can be told for the 2012 MSA reform.
Because of more efficient governance, revenue has been increased in the commercial fishing
industry because of better policy that has led to increased ecosystem health, which points to
economic viability of US fisheries in the future.
In conclusion, regression analysis has been used to determine what should be done to
improve and nurture US fisheries to ensure their long term economic and ecological health. It has
been surmised that in order for fisheries to become and remain sustainable, adequate policy
decisions regarding US fisheries must be streamlined to look at the needs of all stakeholders
involved. It was the goal of this chapter to create the most perfect analysis by looking at
implications of fishing both on the recreational and commercial level to create a broad picture of
what the fishing landscape looks like in the United States currently. It has been shown that US
fisheries are on the rebound in terms of both economic and ecological health, which is promising
when trying to evaluate long term sustainability of the fishing industry, both commercially and
recreationally in the US.
43. 34
V) Conclusion
The goal of this study was to determine the economic sustainability of United States
fisheries based on both theoretical and empirical analysis. A combination of both biological and
economic implications, it is a complex issue that has many solutions that boil down to strong
policy on the issue. In order for the preservation of the ecosystems in question to be achieved, it
is important that when law makers amend and create new policy on the issue they take into
account fishermen incentives, ecological depletion, fishing methods based on common fishing
practices, territorial rights and property rights and the economic implications overfishing has on
the entire economy of the United States.
In order to perform the most perfect analysis, these things were all taken into account. It
has been shown that while fish populations were on the decline at the beginning of this study,
leading to ecosystem degradation, species being caught has shown positive improvement due to
correct policy implementation. As well as ecosystem health, the economic landscape also looks
promising. If more is done to continue to regulate the fishing industry more closely, there is
much promise for the future when it comes to economic sustainability of US fisheries.
Looking forward, there is much more that can be done to make policy more efficient. The
2012 MSA reforms took a large step in the right direction when it comes to long term
sustainability, by taking scientific research into account when setting total catch limits, rather
than just looking at the economic implications. Based on this principle, more scientific research
should be done in order to preserve ecosystems globally.
A solution to this issue should be more government subsidies for programs like Bren
Smith’s 3D ocean farming program. In the literature review chapter of this study, there was
44. 35
much time spent outlining the economic and ecological sustainability of the 3D Ocean farming
program set up to grow mollusks and seaweed to create many positive externalities. If more
programs like 3D Ocean farming were to come about, then the sustainability problem faced by
the fishing industry would be eliminated, millions of jobs could be created and producers could
shift from traditional fishing methods to more sustainable methods. In order to foster the growth
of such programs, the federal government would be able to shift money being spent on
conservation efforts to subsidize programs such as sustainable 3D Ocean farming, causing more
sustainable practices without increasing the burden on tax payers.
The fishing industry in the United States is big business. If it were to cease to exist,
millions of jobs would be lost, there would not be food on the tables of many US citizens, the
great past time of the sport of fishing would be lost, and the economy would take a massive hit.
It is important that legislators understand the implications of fishing legislation and the impact it
has on the American people, regardless of whether or not they fish for recreation, eat fish or use
any ocean based products. The hopes of this study were to shed light on the fallacies of past
regulations in order to preserve the natural resources of the ocean that drive the economy for
centuries to come.
45. 36
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About The Author:
Michael S. Meiran is a Managerial Economics Major that also completed minors in Political
Science and Education at Allegheny College in Meadville, PA. Michael was a three year letter
winner for the Allegheny Gator football team, playing on the Offensive Line his entire career. In
his free time he is an avid fisherman and conservationist. Upon completing his graduation from
Allegheny College, Michael plans on pursuing a career as a College Football Coach as well as
earning his MBA.
