Legal Ethics Case Digests

1. 1. Atty. Aurelio Angeles, jr. vs Atty. Renato Bagay
A.C. 8103, December 3, 2014
Facts: Atty. Angeles, Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, submitted a letter to
Hon. Remigio Escalada, jr., the Executive Judge of the RTC of Bataan, against Atty. Bagay,
alleging that the latter notarized 18 documents while outside the country, attending a
Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The documents include Deeds of Donation, Deeds of
Sale, and an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Attached to the letter were the affidavits of
the persons who had the documents notarized.
The Executive Judge thereafter referred the matter to the Bataan Chapter of the IBP who
later on endorsed the matter to the Commission on Bat Discipline(CBD). The CBD Director
opted to endorse the matter to the Office of Bar Confidant.
Atty. Bagay admitted that there were documents that were notarized while he was out of
the country, signed by his office secretary who was unaware of the import of the act. In a
Resolution, the IBP Board adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
holding Atty. Bagay guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public
and thereby revoking his Notarial Commission and disqualifying him from appointment as a
notary public within the next two years. Atty. Bagay filed a motion for reconsideration,
asking for leniency, as the act was without wrongful intention. The motion was, however,
denied.
Issue: Whether or not the notarization of documents by the secretary of the respondent
while he was out of the country constituted negligence.
Held: Yes. The notarization of documents by the office secretary while the Notary Public is
out of the country constitutes negligence.
Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines a notary public as, any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. Thus the secretary is not
commissioned to perform these notarial acts. The notary public cannot claim that he did not
authorized the act of the secretary, he is bound by the acts of the secretary he employed
because he negligently left his notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary.
Furthermore, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers not to
directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. The negligent acts of the
respondent allowed the unauthorized practice of law by his secretary in signing on his
behalf as a notary public.
Also, under Canon 7, every lawyer is directed to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession. The persons who sought to have their documents notarized found
that the same documents are without effect thereby eroding their faith in the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
Facts Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the

2. certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2
Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another
marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San
Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage
had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View
Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several
notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of
the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry
return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
HELD A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22
The issue to be determined
is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite
the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this
case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the
certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine,
Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan,
Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998
with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that
the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan
which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent
contracted the second marriage with Alba.

3. The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by
respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring
him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of
more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but
respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just
ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to
have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against
him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped
respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending
before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this
case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a
copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of
service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of
the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential
addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the
latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the

4. disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is
apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient
cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the
orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s
conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders
"not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the
Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also
the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.
3. JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.
KEEPING MULTIPLE NOTARIAL REGISTERS; DUTY TO ACT WITH COURTESY; DOUBLE DEALING
WITH CLIENTS
A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint with the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's
office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4)
violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission to the Bar and
receipt of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with
deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and
irregular entries in his notarial registers. Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty.
Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide
Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-

5. in-law. Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against
her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 3019 that one Priscilla Somontan
(Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing
against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of
conflicting clients' interests. Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a
"notorious extortionist" in the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against
her. In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide
referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental incompetence"
in one of his pleadings. According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate,
offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.
In his answer dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the
March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this
document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over the
typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this
document. Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he
notarized it before his admission to the Bar. On the alleged falsification of his notarial
entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial
registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients
and accommodate their growing number. This explains the irregular and non-sequential
entries in his notarial registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally
hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked
as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case
was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners. On this basis, the respondent
should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests. Finally, he denied
that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings.
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide
administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules (keeping irregular entries in
notarial register), representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting
language in his pleadings. The IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the evidence on
record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the Board
modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two
years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public. Atty. Zaide sought for the
reconsideration of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this was also denied in its
subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the IBP board’s decision was proper
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and
accordingly confirms them. As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not
present any concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
commission. It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio

6. Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name,
roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial commission,
were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true
information. However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the document. He
contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it appear
that he was the one who notarized it. This Court notes that at the time the document was
purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet
existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained
and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the
expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim
such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty.
Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his
notarial commission. We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by
maintaining different notarial registers in several offices. Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial
Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for
lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of
notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same
section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at
any given time." On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active
notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active
notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one
active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several
notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on
his behalf. Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must
also personally administer the notarial acts that the law authorizes him to execute. This
important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary
public, should perform it. On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in
chronological sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving
blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and
duties are impressed with public interest. A notary public's office is not merely an income-
generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a
notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform. The investigating
commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing
conflicting clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana, the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of
representing conflicting interests between and among his clients. One of these tests

7. is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Another test is whether a lawyer would be
called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment.
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared
against Gimeno, his former law firm's client. The lawyer-client relationship between Atty.
Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case
where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in
any way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the
Ombudsman. The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented
her family pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this
case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty.
Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint
against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her,
and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan
City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan
engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record
shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he acquired
while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.Under these circumstances,
Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition against the representation
of conflicting interests.
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's
professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on
the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case,
called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty.
Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment
against his opposing counsel.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and

8. illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any
offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language
even in his pleadings, must be dignified.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is foundGUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of
Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is
also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
4 MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
MCLE compliance requirement; Insulting and offensive language against a fellow lawyer
A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: In the complaint for damages filed by Orlando against his brother Marcelo
(represented by Maximino) and several defendants, Orlando provided data regarding his IBP
dues payment and MCLE Compliance. Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the
said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP
annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second. This is one
of the bases of this administrative complaint against Orlando for being in violation of Bar
Matter 1922.
On the other hand, upon receipt of a copy of the complaint for grave threats and estafa filed
by Marcelo against Orlando, Maximino discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had
been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming
that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "x x x
Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's
why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to
squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."
Furthermore, records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of
Counsel in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x has never done
anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount
of professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached
as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a
Compromise Agreement, both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature.

9. The above is the other basis for this administrative complaint for being in violation of Rule
7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Respondent’s contention: Orlando denied the charges against himand claimed that his late
submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice
to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the
request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case.
Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to
Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando
was downgraded to unjust vexation, which Orlando voluntarily pleaded guilty consisting in
his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading
words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x.
IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case, which was adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE/s:
(1) W/N the transgression to the MCLE compliance requirement is a ground for disbarment.
(2) W/N the insulting and offensive private messages of Orlando are violative of the CPR.
HELD:
(1) NO. The failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the
complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for
disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as
well as the expunction thereof from the records.
(2) YES. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of
legal proficiency and morality. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or
private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor,
to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
The IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind,
however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were
clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word

10. "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the
services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in
violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the
crime of unjust vexation was an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected
Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability.
Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should
remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the
event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them. Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private.
Indulgging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case,
constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasmdoes not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues
and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
5 BINAYAN VS ADDOG
The complainants are heirs of Barot Binay-an and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 005-CAR-07 for
Annulment of Documents filed with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),
La Trinidad, Benguet, against the defendants Angeline Damaso (Damaso) and the Cordillera
Small Business Assistance Center, Inc. The complainants are represented in said case by
Atty. Jerome W. Selmo (Atty. Selmo), while Atty. Atanacio D. Addog (respondent)
represented the defendants.
on February 8, 2008, Damaso, who is the constituted representative of the heirs of Barot
Binay-an, called for a meeting in Mandarin Restaurant. Paul Palos (Paul) and Bienvenido
Palos (Bienvenido ), who are also heirs of Barot Binay-an and their co-plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 005-CAR-07, and the respondent were present in the meeting. During the meeting,
Damaso and the respondent managed to convince Paul and Bienvenido to execute separate
Affidavits of Desistance, which were later notarized by the respondent. The respondent
subsequently submitted the Affidavits ofDesistance to the NCIP, which the NCIP Hearing
Officer denied. The NCIP Hearing Officer also cautioned the respondent on the ethical
consideration in having the affidavits submitted. The respondent later withdrew his
representation for the defendants. Thus, the complaint for misconduct against the
respondent, which was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as
CBD No. 08-2303.
ISSUE WON RESODENT IS LIABLE FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE DUTY OF ATTY SELMO.
HELD: YES. Canon 8, 10 Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: A lawyer
shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another

11. lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice
and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel. (Emphasis
ours) In this case, the respondent knew that Paul and Bienvenido were represented by
counsel, Atty. Selmo. His act of preparing the affidavit of desistance, even assuming that it
was only the joint affidavit of Paul, Isabela Daniel and Romana which he drafted and
notarized was true, nonetheless encroached upon the legal functions of Atty. Selmo.
Worse, the respondent even disclosed that the affidavits of desistance were
executed by the affiants in exchange for a certain sum of money.
It was unscrupulous of the respondent to compel some of the complainants in Civil
Case No. 005-CAR-07 to execute the affidavit of desistance sans the knowledge and
agreement of Atty. Selmo. In this regard, the respondent should have been mindful of the
canon dictating that: A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a
party not represented by counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
The respondent's acts clearly violated the ethical tenets of the legal profession and
must, therefore, be disciplined. "Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct
cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal
profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained." 16 WHEREFORE, Atty.
Atanacio D. Addog is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law
for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution,
with WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
6 TAPAY VS BANCOLO
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004
from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a
complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and
corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-
employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004
was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia
accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed
against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia
showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his
name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign
an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit
denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s
affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit
accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo. In a
Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the

12. Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to
the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for
Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia
and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that
they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of
Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6
which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients,
allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures
in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not
written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
HELD: YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the
Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly,
this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely
7. DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. v. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
Deceit, Gross Misconduct and Violation of Oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS: OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons,
Fernando and Efren. When the agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation patents and
titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who
in turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. The
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the

13. cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it
was not covered by the agrarian reform law.
This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court
of Appeals. Atty. Caracol, as “Additionall Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion
for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnonpraying for the full implementation of
the decision. Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and
Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela.”
Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the
motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record.
Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracolto file the second
motion because Efren had already been dead for more than a year. He claimed that
Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the
same parcel of land. Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as
“additional counsel”. He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go
ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of
rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor. In its Report and Recommendation, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that
Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct.
ISSUE: Is Atty. Caracol guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
RULING: YES. The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a
lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person
who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney
willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the
court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions. (Emphases supplied)
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person
without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave
of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the requisite
authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be
bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to
deny his assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.
Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for
Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and
conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and
presented authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the
parties may have been substituted.

14. Atty. Caracol was found guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, he was suspended from the
practice of law for one year.
8. Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing vs. Atty. Wallen De Vera
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
GROSS MISCONDUCT IN HANDLING AN ELECTION PROTEST CASE
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS: MarieCris Umaguing, daughter of Sps. Umaguing, ran for the position of SK Chairman
in the SK elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one vote.
Because of this, complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of
respondent Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera
to pay his acceptance fee of P30, 000.00, plus various miscellaneous expenses which also
amounted to P30, 000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than
enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only
took action when the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed
the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest.
The MeTC found that the attached affidavits of the material witnesses were falsified and
pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error, it was a flimsy
excuse since he has ample amount of time to file the case and submit the attachments
without irregularities.
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of
Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former
to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60, 000.00 in excessive fees he
collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case. In view of the
foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment. In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty.
De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against himby complainants. He
averred that the merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on the
statements of his clients.
In a Report and Recommendation dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera
be suspended from the practice of law for two months. Subsequently, the Board of
Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner, but on
reconsideration, the same Board reduced the period of suspension from two months to one
month.
ISSUE: Is Atty. De Vera administratively liable?
RULING: YES, Atty. De Vera is guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer
is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins
every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any

15. falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the
courts, as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core value of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”
In the instant case, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark
about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when
his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of
the law. Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate
preparation or allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only
thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any
resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds
against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue
enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of
the Law Profession. It deserves the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
Hence, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly suspended for six months from
the practice of law.
9. DUTY OF RESPECT
IN RE KAPUNAN
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/resolutions/2014/08/1
3-11-09-SC.pdf
10. HABAWEL VS CTA
FACTS
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation
(Surfield), which sought from the Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong
City the refund of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2000.[4] After the
City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for refund,[5] Surfield
initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142
entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of
Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor of Mandaluyong City, and assigned
to Branch 214.[6] Surfield later amended its petition to include its claim for
refund of the excess taxes paid from 2001 until 2003.[7]

16. On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that
the period to file the claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC ruled that the grant of a tax refund
was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus.[8]
Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the
CTA via petition for review (CTA AC No. 5 entitled Surfield Development
Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong
City).[9] The appeal was assigned to the First Division, composed of Presiding
Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and Associate
Justice Caesar A. Casanova.
In its decision dated January 5, 2006,[10] the CTA First Division denied
the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the remedies
provided under Section 253[11] and Section 226[12] of Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code).
the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for reconsideration. On the
issue of jurisdiction, the CTA First Division explained that the jurisdiction
conferred by Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals from the decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did not include the real property
tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess payment of which Surfield was
claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of the
CTA concerning real property tax cases fell under a different section of
Republic Act No. 9282 and under a separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.
In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners
employed in the motion for reconsideration, required them to explain within
five days from receipt why they should not be liable for indirect contempt or be
made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. And insofar as
the merits of the case are concerned let this Resolution be considered
as the final decision on the matter.
However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it
is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held

17. that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of
this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the
instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect for
the doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and
disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
they vow solemnly to conduct themselves with all good fidelityto the
courts. As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics enjoins them
to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its superior importance. Therefore, petitioners counsel
is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of
this Resolution why he should not be held for indirect contempt
and/or subject to disciplinary acti
The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006,[16] in which they
appeared to apologize but nonetheless justified their language as, among
others, necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spadeby spade.
the CTA FirstDivision adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct
contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity
and respectdue to the courts, sentencing each to suffer imprisonmentof ten
days and to pay P2,000.00as fine.
ISSUE; WON PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF CONTEMPT
HELD;
dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did
not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that the petitioners
committed direct contempt of court.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all
attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

18. It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts
and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through
legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly
given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:[25]
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize
the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by
the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that
it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then
the courts actuation are thrown open to public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and
expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal
of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected
not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct
of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion
as a citizen. xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)[26]
The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety.

19. Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following
statements, to wit: (a) [i]t is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court
to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant petition;[27] (b) [t]he
grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction;[28] and (c) the
Honorable Courts lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare
decisis.
11. RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E.
VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP
No. 119461.
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution1
dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas
S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same
Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show cause why
he should not be cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adaza’s explanation,2
we find his account insufficient, and find him guilty
of indirect contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was merely
performing his duty as Merdegia’s counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed
Justice Veloso’s partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an
administrative complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit
Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit
himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso,
to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for
assisting his client, especially when heal so believes in the merits of his client’s case.
Atty. Adaza’s explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince
us of his innocence from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for
inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso
during the oral arguments of Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition
should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. While we do not discount the fact that
it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that
he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.3
Had Merdegia
and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file
a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that
administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other
judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.4
While a lawyer has a duty to represent
his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law.5
He is also duty-bound to
impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to
encourage compliance with the law and legal processes.6
HELD

20. A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint7
shows an apparent failure to understand that
cases are not always decided in one’s favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an
extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the
case.8
In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the
features of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial
system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the
Court demand of him in acting for his client before our courts.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of
thecasethat,when read together with the administrative complaint heprepared,shows that his
complaint is merelyan attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adaza’s
penchantfor filingmotions for inhibition throughout the case:first, against Judge Ma. Theresa
Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order
unfavorable to his client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division
hearing his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken
together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an
order adverseto Atty. Adaza’s client, disclosethat there was more to the administrative complaint
than the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.
As a final note, Atty. Adaza’s contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction
as a member of the bar.10
If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him,
we are prevented from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution of
October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and not
why he should not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction
against Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a
disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person
charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of
the nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side.11
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation
of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further similar
misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against
him.
12. TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR.,
Respondent.
A.C. NO. 5686 16 June 2015
Being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and obligations. One of which is to ensure
that the client’s interest is met and protected with utmost diligence. Another is to accord
proper respect to the Court’s procedures.
FACTS:
Teodulo Enriquez filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia Jr
for gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. This
complaint stems from actions of Lavadia as the assigned attorney to a forcible entry
complaint against Enriquez before the MCTC of Talibon, Bohol.

21. During the handling of the forcible entry case, Lavadia has repeatedly failed to submit on
time the position papers and affidavits within the 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial
order. This led to defendants being declared in default and Atty. Lavadia filing for a notice of
appeal with sufficient bond. However, such appeal was dismissed due to the failure of
Lavadia to submit the appeal memorandum despite being granted a total of no more than
71 days or a total of 4 motions of extensions to file the memorandum. Relatively, great
damage and prejudice against Enriquez happened as such the complaint for disbarment.
During the Court’s and IBP’s investigation, Lavadia has exhibited the same cavalier attitude
shown in handling Enriquez’ case. The Court has granted every opportunity for Lavadia to
file his comment to the compliant. However, after a lapse of 8 years, a total of 155 days
extension to file his comment and no less than 8 resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to
comment: 2 of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 and requiring
him to show cause for his failure to file and comply with the Court’s resolution, Lavadia still
did not file any comment. Lavadia made excuses ranging from heavy case load, to sickness
of his wife and close relative to even having “dark beings” in his home causing him
misfortunes. Thus, IBP found Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties and responsibilities as an
attorney and recommends for his disbarment.
ISSUE: WON Lavadia may be held administratively liable.
HELD: YES. We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties
and obligations. Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the profession’s exacting standards.
A lawyer is expected to live by the lawyer’s oath, the rules of the profession and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). The duties of a lawyer may be classified into four general
categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client.
A lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and subject to the
Court’s disciplinary authority.
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his
client and to the court. This Court notes Atty. Lavadia’s propensity for filing motions for
extension of time to file pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of
the CPR.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the
preparation of pleadings for the case including the appeal. Atty. Lavadia however failed to
discharge his duties. He failed to file his client’s position paper rendering his client in
default. While he filed a notice of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file
the appeal memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately
neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement in Solidon,
Atty. Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making
him administratively liable.
As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of time to file the
appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with sufficient bond. The lower
court granted him four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the
appeal memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In

22. repeatedly asking for extensions of time without actually filing the appeal memorandum,
Atty. Lavadia is liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility
is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to their processes. (Citations omitted).
The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity
to file his comment to the complaint. We issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty.
Lavadia to comment: two of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 and
requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the Court’s resolutions.
In fine, we have granted him a total of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response
to his repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After a lapse of eight
years, this Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion
for extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.
While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance
his act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the
Court. This reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to
discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa the Court’s
Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer’s blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the
Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave
Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted
him, he continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court’s orders merits
disciplinary action.
We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez that the determination of whether an attorney should
be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion. This Court has imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other
pleading.
In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadia’s first infraction. However, given his
proven propensity for filing motions for extension of time and not filing the required
pleading, this Court finds that it should impose the severe sanction lest some other
unknowing clients engage his services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's
nonchalant attitude. Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his
client and his impertinent attitude towards the Court, we find the penalty of DISBARMENT
as recommended by the IBP appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED for violating
Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.

23. 13. EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE
BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, AND MELINDA D. SIOTING VS.
ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO
A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014
FALSE DECLARATION IN CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: Complainants in this case individually purchased housing units
from Rudex International Development Corp. (Rudex). However, due to several
inadequacies and construction defects in the housing units and the subdivision itself,
complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). There were 2 batches of rescission cases filed by
complainants on different dates. Judgments of default were eventually rendered
against Rudex in the first batch of rescission cases.
Rudex then filed 3 petitions for review before the HLURB and in the certifications against
forum shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes,
and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or has knowledge of
any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court,
tribunal or agency – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, previously filed an ejectment
case against Sioting and her husband before the MTC. Several other cases for rescission and
ejectment were later filed by Atty. Nazareno, and as in the previous cases, the certifications
against forum shopping attached thereto likewise stated the same statement and in 1 case,
Atty. Nazareno himself notarized the certification against forum shopping.
Complainants filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Philip Z. A. Nazareno, charging him with making false declarations in the certifications
against forum shopping subject of this case in disregard of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, and malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned 1 document number (i.e.,
Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached
to the six (6) complaints for rescission and ejectment.
HLURB, dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment on the ground that its
statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto were false due to
the existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazarenofor a period
of six (6) months for his administrative violations.
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty from a suspension of six (6)
months to only one (1) month.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable and accordingly
suspended for a period of one (1) month.
HELD: YES. The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed.

24. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and
subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
Failure to comply with such requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein
shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which
read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August
2003, petitions for review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of
rescission cases without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence
of the ejectment case it filed against Sps. Siotingwhich involves an issue related to the
complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by
Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against Sps. Sioting without
disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24,
2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002
ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April 1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno, once
more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the other complainants in this case
without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of
complainants’ own complaints for rescission.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law was
imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made false and
untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s infractions are of
a similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the foregoing
discussion, had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby suspends him from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public,
considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a
separate notarial act.
It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register
at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document

25. notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently,
Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule. Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the
certifications against forum shopping attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully
aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not
commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending actions or
proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum.
The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as
a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses
Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as
the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents
diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false statements
had his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being commissioned as such
for a period of one (1) year.
Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the
same penalties of such nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his
infractions on this front, coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the
Court deems it proper to revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify him
from being commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false
declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as well as
malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, he is
PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public and, his notarial
commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.
14. VICTOR D. DE LOS SANTOS II, Complainant, v. ATTY. NESTOR C.
BARBOSA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 6681, June 17, 2015
Undue delay in court proceedings; misleading the court as to the identity of his client.
FACTS: A complaint for Falsification of Public Document was filed by Melba D. De Los Santos
Rodis (Rodis) against her father, Ricardo D. De Los Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie
P. Canaco (Canaco). Rodis alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements in the certificate
of live birth of her son, Victor Canaco De Los Santos. Canaco indicated in her son's certificate

26. of live birth that she was married to De Los Santos, Sr. on September 1, 1974 in San
Fernando, Camarines Sur when no such marriage took place. Respondent was the counsel
de parte of Canaco.
On February 22, 2005, the complainant, Victor de los Santos II filed a Petition for
Disbarment with the Court, charging the respondent with multiple gross violations of his
oath as a lawyer and Canons of Professional Ethics for unlawfully obstructing and delaying
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 111152 against Canaco.
The complainant alleged that the respondent's act of sending out the letters dated May 24,
2004 to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics
Office, and St. Luke’s Hospita was criminally and maliciously done to delay, impeded,
obstruct, or otherwise frustrate the prosecution of Canaco, who is the respondent's client
and were made to suppress and conceal the subject birth record to impair its availability,
authenticity, verity, or admissibility as evidence in Criminal Case No. 111152 before the
MeTC. Compalinant further alleged that the acts of respondent constituted multiple gross
violations of his oath as a lawyer, of the Canons of Professional Ethics, and of his duties as
an attorney under the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the respondent argued that the complainant is a disgruntled litigant
whose series of cases, filed together with his group, had all been dismissed and the
respondent was the opposing counsel in these dismissals. The respondent further asserted
that this case is a violation of the rule on forum shopping since it is the tenth case pending
on the same set of facts.
The Investigating Commissioner found the defendant guilty of gross violation of his oath as a
lawyer and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
the said findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the IBP Commissioner's
recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year to
six (6) months. Atty. Barbosa moved to reconsider the BOG resolution. In a Resolution dated
December 11, 2008, the BOG denied the motion but modified the respondent's suspension
from the practice of law to a period of only three months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilt of unduly delaying the proceedings?
COURT’S RULING:
Unduly Delaying the Proceedings
Yes. Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice.A
lawyer should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid
any unethical or improper practices that may impede, obstruct, or prevent the realization of
a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
In the present case, in disregard of the METC's intent to expedite the proceedings through

27. its Order of October 19, 2004, the respondent sent letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke's Hospital to prevent
the prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the birth certificate of Victor Canaco
Delos Santos. The preliminary conference of May 24, 2004 was precisely postponed to allow
the prosecution to secure this certified true copy. Thus, the respondent committed willful
disobedience to a lawful order of the court intended to avoid any further delay of the
proceedings in the criminal case.
Misleading the Court as to the Identity of his Client
Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers owe candor, fairness,
and good faith to the court. Particularly, Rule 10.01 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice."
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyer's first duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice.
In this case, the respondent deliberately misled the MeTC, the Commission and this Court
into believing that Victor Canaco De Los Santos (Canaco's son whose birth certificate is at
issue in the criminal case) and Victor P. De Los Santos (named in the Information) are
different persons.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Commissioner that the difference in the
middle initial is a mere typographical error on the part of the City Prosecutor. The criminal
case involved one and the same Victor Canaco de los Santos whose birth certificate has
been at issue.
Members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission, that might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Nestor C.
Barbosa GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and
Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
15. FOSTER VS AGTANG
Complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of
absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion,
complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which
they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for
incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal
problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of

28. P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory
note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name
a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recom mended the
immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When
asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel
expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation.
Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda
Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the
one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this,
respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case.
Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complaina nt noticed that:
1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to
buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the
method of payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she
complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be
brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the
amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged
the request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her
misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by
a receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after
favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the
remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, be cause the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of
P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of
the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the
office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to
prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include
additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these
were amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message
from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the
same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion,
the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a
bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the
case had been set the following month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and
wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that
respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently , complainant
wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee
and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.
ISSUE whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
HELD YES.

29. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of
his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional
or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.”27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her
case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high
value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he
resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the
amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense
that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more
than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the
actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the
legal profession.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he
likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justic e,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his private
capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first
time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next
time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency
or emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by
promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These
acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence
reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent,
was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00
and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant and
were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting
and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his
lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations
to complainant.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to
modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented
insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship b etween a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is
the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty -bound to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s
duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered
by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would
trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the
rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable
for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a
corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that
respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being
questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil
Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which

30. the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the
complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission
of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was
the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised,
respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he
was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees
nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent
that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there
is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and
client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public
policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.”34
---DISBARRED