World energy markets outlook from some of the best and brightest minds both inside and outside of BP--one of the world's largest energy companies. The outlook reflects a ‘to the best of our knowledge’ assessment of the world’s likely path from today’s vantage point. It is not a statement about how BP would like the market to evolve, but rather how they believe it will evolve. Published Jan. 2013.

1. January 2013

2. Disclaimer
This presentation contains forward-looking statements, particularly those regarding global
economic growth, population growth, energy consumption, policy support for renewable
energies and sources of energy supply. Forward-looking statements involve risks and
uncertainties because they relate to events, and depend on circumstances, that will or may
occur in the future. Actual outcomes may differ depending on a variety of factors, including
product supply, demand and pricing; political stability; general economic conditions; legal and
regulatory developments; availability of new technologies; natural disasters and adverse
weather conditions; wars and acts of terrorism or sabotage; and other factors discussed
elsewhere in this presentation.
Energy Outlook 2030
2 © BP 2013

3. Contents
Page
Introduction 4
Global energy trends 7
Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 27
Implications 69
Appendix 81
Energy Outlook 2030
3 © BP 2013

4. Welcome to the 2013 edition of BP’s Energy Outlook 2030.
BP’s annual Energy Outlook contains our projections of future energy trends and factors
that could affect them, based on our views of likely economic and population growth and
developments in policy and technology. Together with the annual Statistical Review of
World Energy, it has become a respected contribution to the global discussion on energy
and I am pleased with the feedback we are receiving.
Last year’s edition led the way in showing how North America is likely to become self-
sufficient in energy. This year’s edition follows up by examining more closely the
phenomenon which is driving America’s energy revival, the revolution in shale gas and
tight oil, including its global prospects.
The Outlook describes a future that is different in several respects from what many
expected just a short while ago. We still expect global energy demand to grow – by 36%
between 2011 and 2030 - driven by the emerging economies. Without continuous
improvements in energy efficiency, demand would have to grow much more rapidly
simply to sustain economic growth.
Supply patterns are shifting. The Outlook demonstrates how unconventional oil and gas
are playing a major role in meeting global demand. Over the period to 2030, the US
becomes nearly self-sufficient in energy, while China and India become increasingly
import-dependent. This report illuminates some of the consequences. The implications are
far-reaching. Indeed, I believe they will stretch far beyond the boundaries of our industry.
Energy Outlook 2030
4 © BP 2013

5. As always, the numbers that make up this Outlook reveal long-term trends and highlight
potential “fault lines” in the system; in short, their job is to convey the underlying
challenges and opportunities we all face in producing and consuming energy.
What messages do we draw from this Outlook? It underlines the power of competition
and market forces in driving efficiency and innovation – importantly not only in unlocking
new supplies such as unconventional oil and gas but also in improving energy efficiency
and consequently limiting the growth of carbon emissions.
A second message is the importance of technology and innovation, which underpin the
key trends that are highlighted in the Outlook, from the development of shale resources
to the efficiency of power generation and improved vehicle fuel economy.
Third, the Outlook highlights the way energy resources are opening up. The energy
industry is highly competitive and investment will flow to the places that possess the
right resources below ground and the right conditions above it. Highlighting the “above
ground” factors that have made the US and Canada engines for energy innovation can be
instructive for other nations seeking to develop their domestic energy resources.
The overall conclusion is that increased demand can be met as long as competition is
present to drive innovation, unlock resources and encourage efficiency. This is why we
remain optimistic the world will produce the energy it needs to fuel continued economic
growth. We hope you find the 2013 edition of the BP Energy Outlook 2030 a useful
addition to the global energy discussion.
Bob Dudley
Group Chief Executive
Energy Outlook 2030
5 © BP 2013

6. Note on method and assumptions
This edition updates our view of the likely path of global energy markets
to 2030, taking account of developments over the past year. The
underlying methodology remains unchanged – we make assumptions on
changes in policy, technology and the economy, based on extensive
internal and external consultations, and use a range of analytical tools to
build a “to the best of our knowledge” view.
We focus on the “most likely” base case numbers, to provide a basis for
discussion. Of course the future is uncertain, and in the process of
building the Outlook we explore the impact of alternative assumptions.
While we do touch on some of the key uncertainties, the treatment of
energy market risks here is by no means exhaustive.
Unless noted otherwise, data definitions are based on the BP Statistical
Review of World Energy, and historical energy data through 2011 is
consistent with the 2012 edition of the Review. Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) is expressed in real Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. All data
sources are listed on page 86.
Energy Outlook 2030
6 © BP 2013

7. Page
Introduction 4
Global energy trends 7
Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 27
Implications 69
Appendix 81
Energy Outlook 2030
7 © BP 2013

8. Population and income growth…
Population GDP Primary energy
Billion Trillion $2011 Billion toe
8 100 12
OECD OECD OECD
Non-OECD Non-OECD non-OECD
6 75 9
4 50 6
2 25 3
0 0 0
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
8 © BP 2013

9. …underpin growing energy consumption
Population and income growth are the key drivers behind growing
demand for energy. By 2030 world population is projected to reach 8.3
billion, which means an additional 1.3 billion people will need energy;
and world income in 2030 is expected to be roughly double the 2011 level
in real terms.
World primary energy consumption is projected to grow by 1.6% p.a.
from 2011 to 2030, adding 36% to global consumption by 2030. The
growth rate declines, from 2.5% p.a. for 2000-10, to 2.1% p.a. for 2010-20,
and 1.3% p.a. from 2020 to 2030.
Low and medium income economies outside the OECD account for over
90% of population growth to 2030. Due to their rapid industrialisation,
urbanisation and motorisation, they also contribute 70% of the global
GDP growth and over 90% of the global energy demand growth.
Energy Outlook 2030
9 © BP 2013

10. Industrialisation and growing power demand…
By region By primary use By fuel
Billion toe Billion toe Billion toe
18 18 18
Renew.*
15 15 15 Hydro
Nuclear
12 12 12
Power
generation Coal
Coal
9 Non-OECD 9 9
Non-OECD
6 6 Industry 6 Gas
Gas
OECD
3 OECD 3 Other 3
Oil
Oil
Transport
0 0 0
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030
*Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2030
10 © BP 2013

11. …increase the world’s appetite for primary energy
Almost all (93%) of the energy consumption growth is in non-OECD
countries. Non-OECD energy consumption in 2030 is 61% above the 2011
level, with growth averaging 2.5% p.a. (or 1.5% p.a. per capita),
accounting for 65% of world consumption (compared to 53% in 2011).
OECD energy consumption in 2030 is just 6% higher than in 2011 (0.3%
p.a.), and will decline in per capita terms (-0.2% p.a. 2011-30).
Energy used for power generation grows by 49% (2.1% p.a.) 2011-30, and
accounts for 57% of global primary energy growth. Primary energy used
directly in industry grows by 31% (1.4% p.a.), accounting for 25% of the
growth of primary energy consumption.
The fastest growing fuels are renewables (including biofuels) with
growth averaging 7.6% p.a. 2011-30. Nuclear (2.6% p.a.) and hydro (2.0%
p.a.) both grow faster than total energy. Among fossil fuels, gas grows
the fastest (2.0% p.a.), followed by coal (1.2% p.a.), and oil (0.8% p.a.).
Energy Outlook 2030
11 © BP 2013

12. The power sector leads primary energy growth…
Growth by sector and region, Growth by sector and fuel,
2011-2030 2011-2030
Billion toe Billion toe
3.0 3.0
Hydro
2.5 RoW 2.5 Nuclear
2.0 2.0 Renew.
Middle
1.5 Electricity
East 1.5
Gas
1.0 China & 1.0
India Biofuels
0.5 0.5 Oil
OECD
0.0 0.0 Coal
Other
Transport
Industry
Power
Other
Transport
Industry
Power
-0.5 -0.5
Final energy use Inputs to power Final energy use Inputs to power
Energy Outlook 2030
12 © BP 2013

13. …while industry leads the growth of final energy demand
The power sector diversifies its fuel mix, with more than half the growth
coming from non-fossil fuels. Renewables contribute 27% of the growth,
just ahead of coal (26%) and gas (21%).
Industry leads the growth of final energy consumption, particularly in
rapidly developing economies. The industrial sector accounts for 57% of
the projected growth of final energy demand to 2030.
The transport sector shows the weakest growth, with OECD transport
demand projected to decline. The sector starts to show some
diversification away from oil; gas accounts for 16% of transport energy
demand growth, with another 13% coming from biofuels, and 2% from
electricity.
The growth of “other” sector energy consumption (primarily residential
and commercial) is heavily weighted towards electricity, with gas making
up virtually all the non-electricity energy use.
Energy Outlook 2030
13 © BP 2013

14. Emerging economies dominate energy production growth...
Primary energy production Primary energy production
Billion toe Billion toe
18 18
FSU
15 15
S&C America
12 12
N. America
9 9 Middle East
Non-OECD
Non-OECD 6 Europe
6
OECD Asia Pacific
3 3
OECD
Africa
0 0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
14 © BP 2013

15. ...with Asia Pacific accounting for nearly half of global growth
World primary energy production growth matches consumption,
growing by 1.6% p.a. from 2011 to 2030.
As is the case for energy consumption, growth in production will be
dominated by the non-OECD countries, which will account for 78% of
the world’s increase. These countries will supply 71% of global energy
production in 2030, up from 69% in 2011 and 58% in 1990.
The Asia Pacific region, the largest regional energy producer, shows the
most rapid growth rate (2.2% p.a.), due to large indigenous coal
production, and accounts for 48% of global energy production growth.
The region provides 35% of global energy production by 2030. The
Middle East and North America contribute the next largest increments
for supply growth; and North America remains the second largest
regional energy producer.
Energy production will grow in all regions but Europe.
Energy Outlook 2030
15 © BP 2013

16. Energy prices play a key role…
Shares of world primary energy Energy prices
$2011/boe
50% Oil 120 Oil - Brent
Gas - basket
40% 100
Coal - basket
Coal 80
30%
60
20%
Gas 40
10% Hydro 20
Nuclear Renewables*
0% 0
1965 1980 1995 2010 2025 1965 1980 1995 2010
*Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2030
16 © BP 2013

17. …in shaping the response of the global energy system
Prices, technology and policy drive changes in the fuel mix. Fossil fuels
are converging on a market share of 26-28% each and non-fossil fuels
groups on a market share of 6-7% each. Gas and non-fossil fuels gain
share at the expense of coal and oil.
Oil follows a long run trend of decline in its market share, with oil
increasingly concentrated in the sectors where it commands the highest
value. Gas remains on a trend of modest but steady gains in share. Coal’s
recent rapid gain in share will start to reverse soon, with a trend decline
evident by 2020. The rate at which renewables are projected to gain
market share resembles the experience of nuclear power in the 1970s
and 1980s.
Fossil fuel prices have risen to record levels in real terms over the past
decade. Average annual real oil prices over the five years 2007-11 were
220% above the average for 1997-2001; for coal the increase was 141%
and for gas 95%. These long run price movements inevitably lead to
demand and supply responses.
Energy Outlook 2030
17 © BP 2013

18. Energy efficiency improvements are critical…
Energy intensity by region Energy and GDP
Toe per thousand $2011 GDP Billion toe Trillion $2011
0.5 50 200
US
0.4 40
China 150
0.3 30
100
0.2 20 GDP (RHS)
50
0.1 World 10
EU*
Energy
0.0 0 0
1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030
*Euro4 (France, Italy, Germany, UK) pre-1970
Energy Outlook 2030
18 © BP 2013

19. …to meeting the energy challenge
We have previously noted the long run trend of declining and converging
energy intensity (the amount of energy consumed per unit of GDP).
Current high prices for energy and global integration reinforce this
trend.
Global energy intensity in 2030 is 31% lower than in 2011, declining at
1.9% p.a. compared to a decline rate of 1.0% p.a. for 2000-10. The rate of
decline accelerates post 2020, averaging 2.2% p.a. for 2020-30, in large
part the result of China moving onto a less energy-intensive
development path. Energy intensity declines in all regions.
The impact of declining energy intensity can be seen clearly in the gap
between GDP and energy consumption. Without the projected intensity
decline, the world would need to almost double energy supply by 2030
to sustain economic growth, rather than the 36% increase required in our
Outlook.
Energy Outlook 2030
19 © BP 2013

20. Energy demand growth is matched by supply…
Demand Supply
Billion toe
17
2030 level
Renew.*
16
Hydro
Nuclear
15
14
Other
Shale
13
Tight
Other
12
2011 OECD Non- 2011 Oil Natural Coal Non-
OECD gas fossil
*Includes biofuels
Energy Outlook 2030
20 © BP 2013

21. …from all sources, conventional and unconventional
High prices are also supporting the expansion of supply, and not just
from conventional sources – the development and deployment of new
technologies across a range of energy sources is opening up new supply
opportunities at scale.
The “shale revolution” first for gas and then for oil, is an example of this.
,
From 2011 to 2030 shale gas more than trebles and tight oil grows more
than six-fold. Together they will account for almost a fifth of the increase
in global energy supply to 2030.
High prices for fossil fuels also support the expansion of non-fossil
energy. Renewable energy supply more than trebles from 2011 to 2030,
accounting for 17% of the increase in global energy supply. Hydro and
nuclear together account for another 17% of the growth.
Despite all the growth from shale, renewables and other sources,
conventional fossil fuel supplies are still required to expand, providing
almost half the growth in energy supply.
Energy Outlook 2030
21 © BP 2013

22. Shale gas and tight oil resources and production...
Current resources Production in 2030
Billion toe Billion toe
60 Gas 1.0
Oil 0.8
40
0.6
0.4
20
0.2
0 0.0
Africa
Africa
N. America
S. & C. America
Europe & Eurasia
Middle East
N. America
S. & C. America
Europe & Eurasia
Middle East
Asia Pacific
Asia Pacific
Resources data © OECD/IEA 2012
Energy Outlook 2030
22 © BP 2013

23. …highlight the importance of above-ground factors
High prices and technological innovation have unlocked vast
unconventional resources in the US, reversing the trend of falling output
and altering global energy balances.
Globally there are estimated technically recoverable resources of 240
billion barrels (Bbbls) for tight oil and 200 trillion cubic meters (Tcm) for
shale gas. Asia has an estimated 57 Tcm of shale gas and 50 Bbbls of
tight oil, versus 47 Tcm and 70 Bbbls respectively for North America.
In 2012, 2.1 Mb/d (24%) of US oil production was from tight oil and 24
Bcf/d (37%) of natural gas from shale. These resources have boosted gas
output by nearly 20% and oil by 30% in the past five years.
Assessing both global resources and “above ground” factors, North
America will continue to dominate production by 2030, even as other
regions gradually adapt to develop their resources.
Energy Outlook 2030
23 © BP 2013

24. US tight oil and shale gas output is supported by...
Onshore oil & gas rigs 2011 Oil wells drilled and output
Thousands Thousands Mb/d
2.0 15 5
2012* 2011
2010 Output (RHS)
1.5 12 4
1.0 9 3
0.5 6 2
0.0 3 1
0 0
Bakken Canada Colombia
*Annualised from 1Q-3Q data
Energy Outlook 2030
24 © BP 2013

25. …a competitive environment including a strong service sector
“Above ground“ factors have enabled US success: a robust service
sector with the world’s largest rig fleet (over 1,800 rigs in operation, a
majority of which can drill horizontally), a competitive industry that
spurs continued technological innovation, land access facilitated by
private ownership, deep financial markets, and favourable fiscal and
regulatory terms.
As an example, output in the Bakken has increased from 0.1 Mb/d just
five years ago to over 1 Mb/d currently, roughly matching that of
Colombia, as operators are drilling more oil wells than in all of Canada.
So far, only the US and Canada have combined these variables to
support rapid production growth. The pace of development elsewhere is
likely to be measured, given the lengthy checklist of factors required for
development of shale gas and tight oil resources.
Energy Outlook 2030
25 © BP 2013

26. Energy Outlook 2030
26 © BP 2013

27. Page
Introduction 4
Global energy trends 7
Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 27
Implications 69
Appendix 81
Energy Outlook 2030
27 © BP 2013

28. High oil prices are reducing oil’s share of primary energy…
Oil share of energy and GDP Oil share in sector
% of energy % of GDP
60% Oil as % of primary energy 10% 100%
Cost of oil as % of GDP (RHS)
8% Transport
75% Industry
40% Other
6%
Power
50%
4%
20%
25%
2%
0% 0% 0%
1965 1978 1991 2004 2017 2030 1965 1978 1991 2004 2017 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
28 © BP 2013

29. …via substitution and efficiency gains in transport
After the oil price shocks of the 1970s, oil’s share in primary energy
consumption fell from a peak of 48% in 1973 to 39% in 1985. Rising oil
prices have again increased the burden of oil on the economy in recent
years and oil has lost market share again – falling to 33% in 2011. We
project this to fall further to 28% by 2030.
High relative prices have led to the substitution of oil by other fuels
outside the transport sector where cheaper alternatives are available.
Oil’s share in power generation, for example, fell from 22% in 1973 to 4%
in 2011 and is forecast to decline to just 2% by 2030.
Oil’s share in industry and other sectors (including residential and
commercial) has also declined substantially, although the decline in
industry has been (and will be) slower because of limits to substitution in
petrochemicals and other non-energy uses.
In transport, the market response to high prices has been primarily via
efficiency gains. Oil will remain the dominant fuel in transport, although
its share falls from 94% in 2011 to 89% in 2030.
Energy Outlook 2030
29 © BP 2013

30. Global transport demand growth slows…
Transport demand by fuel Fuel economy of new cars
Billion toe Litres per 100 km
3 12
EU
10 US light vehicles
Electricity China
2 Gas 8
Coal
6
Biofuels
1 Oil - road 4
Oil - non-road
2
0 0
1990 2010 2030 1995 2005 2015 2025
Energy Outlook 2030
30 © BP 2013

31. …as prices and policy boost vehicle fuel economy
Energy consumption growth in transport slows to 1.2% p.a. (from 1.9%
p.a. 1990-2010) primarily due to accelerating gains in fuel economy.
Other factors include the impact of high oil prices on driving behaviour,
vehicle saturation in the OECD, and non-OECD subsidy reduction.
Fuel economy improvements have accelerated in recent years, driven by
consumer reaction to rising prices and tightening policy (e.g. CO2
emissions limits in Europe and CAFE standards in the US) and enabled
by technology improvements. Enhancements to the internal combustion
engine and gradual hybridisation of the vehicle fleet are expected to
further accelerate efficiency gains, with fuel economy in the US, EU and
China improving by 2.9% p.a. in each region over the outlook period.
Transport demand will remain dominated by oil, since alternatives are
likely to remain uneconomic in most markets without policy support.
Nevertheless, biofuels and natural gas both reach 5% share of transport
by 2030 with electricity at 1%. Gas (including gas-to-liquids) is the fastest
growing alternative and likely to overtake biofuels in transport by 2030.
Energy Outlook 2030
31 © BP 2013

32. Liquids demand growth by region and sector...
Demand by region Demand by sector
Mb/d Mb/d
105 105
Other
90 90 Non-OECD
transport
Middle East 75
75
Non-OECD
60 Other non- 60 ind. & other
OECD Asia
OECD
45 45
China transport
30 30 OECD ind. &
US other
15 15
Other OECD Power
0 0
1970 1990 2010 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
32 © BP 2013

33. …is dominated by non-OECD transport demand
Global liquids consumption is projected to reach 104 Mb/d by 2030 but
growth slows to 0.8% p.a. (from 1.4% p.a. in 1990-2010 and 1.9% p.a. in
1970-90). OECD consumption will fall to 40.5 Mb/d, 1 Mb/d below the
1990 level. Non-OECD consumption is likely to overtake the OECD by
2014, and reach 63 Mb/d by 2030 – 2½ times the 1990 level.
By sector, liquids demand growth to 2030 comes from non-OECD
transport (nearly 14 Mb/d) due to a rapid increase in vehicle ownership,
with non-OECD industry also rising (by 6.5 Mb/d, largely for
petrochemicals). OECD demand declines across all sectors as vehicle
efficiency improvements outweigh (slow) growth in the vehicle fleet, and
oil is displaced by other fuels outside of transport.
Demand in China grows by 7 Mb/d to 17 Mb/d in 2030, surpassing the US
in 2029 (US demand falls by 2 Mb/d to 16.5 Mb/d over the outlook
period). Other non-OECD Asia also shows strong growth of 6 Mb/d (of
which almost two-thirds are in India). The Middle East is the next largest
contributor to growth over the outlook period at 3.5 Mb/d.
Energy Outlook 2030
33 © BP 2013

34. Tight oil will drive global supply growth…
Liquids supply by type Tight oil output
Mb/d Mb/d
105 45% 10 China % of total 10%
OPEC share (RHS)
Russia (RHS)
90 OPEC NGLs S. America
8 N. America 8%
75 OPEC crude
60 Biofuels 6 6%
Oil sands
45 4 4%
Tight oil
30 NGLs
Other non- 2 2%
15 OPEC
0 30% 0 0%
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
34 © BP 2013

35. …as high prices and technology have unlocked vast resources
Tight oil will likely expand by 7.5 Mb/d by 2030 and account for nearly
half of the 16.1 Mb/d of global supply growth. Non-OPEC supplies will
expand by 8.5 Mb/d versus 7.6 Mb/d for OPEC as the group will likely see
its market share drop until 2018 due to the surge in tight oil supplies
before recovering to 42% by the forecasting period.
By 2030, tight oil should reach 9% of global supplies. North America will
continue to dominate output with limited growth elsewhere.
Both Russia and China – with robust service sectors and expected
additional fiscal incentives – are expected to develop their tight oil
resources reaching 1.4 Mb/d and 0.5 Mb/d by 2030, respectively. South
America will also increase output due to investment in countries like
Colombia and Argentina.
North America’s tight oil growth is expected to slow post-2020 due to
today’s view of the resource base and the costs and drilling activity
required to sustain output.
Energy Outlook 2030
35 © BP 2013

36. With the Americas dominating global supply growth…
Supply growth by decade Americas surpass Middle East
Mb/d Mb/d
18 35
Americas Europe Americas
15 FSU Middle East
Middle East
Africa Asia Pacific
30
12
9
25
6
3 20
0
-3 15
1990-00 2000-10 2010-20 2020-30 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
36 © BP 2013

37. …unconventionals will constrain OPEC output
The Americas will account for 65% of incremental supply growth to 2030
as tight oil (5.7 Mb/d), oil sands (2.7 Mb/d), and biofuels (1.8 Mb/d) drive
growth. The US (4.5 Mb/d) leads regional increases and will surpass its
previous record output reached in 1970.
OPEC crude oil output will not return to the expected 2013 level of about
30 Mb/d until 2020 as non-OPEC supplies dominate global growth. From
2020-30, however, supplies will likely expand by 5.1 Mb/d as non-OPEC
output growth fades.
The US will likely surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia in 2013 as the largest
liquids producer in the world (crude and biofuels) due to tight oil and
biofuels growth, but also due to expected OPEC production cuts. Russia
will likely pass Saudi Arabia for the second slot in 2013 and hold that
until 2023. Saudi Arabia regains the top oil producer slot by 2027.
The US, Saudi Arabia, and Russia will supply over a third of global
liquids in our outlook.
Energy Outlook 2030
37 © BP 2013

38. The global liquids balance reflects the shifts…
Demand Supply
Mb/d
105 NGLs
2030 level
Iraq
Other
100 OPEC-11
S&C Am.
NGLs
95 Mid East
Tight
India oil
90
Biofuels
China Oil sands
85
80
2011 OECD Non- 2011 Non- Non- OPEC
declines OECD OPEC OPEC growth
growth declines growth
Energy Outlook 2030
38 © BP 2013

39. …in non-OECD demand and non-OPEC supply growth
Oil is expected to be the slowest growing fuel over the next 20 years.
Global liquids demand (oil, biofuels, and other liquids) nonetheless is
likely to rise by 16 Mb/d, to reach 104 Mb/d by 2030.
Demand growth comes exclusively from rapidly growing non-OECD
economies. China, India and the Middle East together account for nearly
all of the net global increase. OECD demand has peaked and
consumption is expected to decline by 5.6 Mb/d.
Rising supply to meet expected demand growth will come primarily from
non-OPEC unconventional sources and, later in the outlook, from OPEC.
By 2030, non-OPEC supply is expected to increase by 8.5 Mb/d while
OPEC production will expand by 7.6 Mb/d.
The largest increments of non-OPEC supply will come from the US (4.5
Mb/d), Canada (2.9 Mb/d), and Brazil (2.7 Mb/d), which offset declines in
mature provinces such as Mexico and the North Sea. The largest
increments of new OPEC supply will come from NGLs (2.5 Mb/d) and
crude oil in Iraq (2.8 Mb/d).
Energy Outlook 2030
39 © BP 2013

40. Slow demand growth and unconventional supplies…
Unconventionals share of Call on OPEC & spare capacity
net global supply growth
Mb/d Mb/d
100% Biofuels 9 Spare capacity 36
Oil sands Call on OPEC (RHS)
Tight oil
75%
6 33
50%
3 30
25%
0% 0 27
2000-10 2010-20 2020-30 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
40 © BP 2013

41. …create a more challenging future for OPEC
In our outlook, demand growth slows and non-OPEC supplies rise – both
as a result of high prices. Unconventional non-OPEC supply will account
for all the net growth in global production over this decade, and over
70% of the growth from 2020-30.
We assume that, in response, OPEC members will cut production over
the current decade; spare capacity exceeds 6 Mb/d by 2015, the highest
since the late 1980s. If OPEC were to maintain current production, the
market would experience unsustainably large inventory increases.
The market requirement for OPEC crude in our outlook is not expected to
reach 2011 levels for another decade. Thereafter, OPEC production
rebounds – and spare capacity shrinks – as the market requirement for
OPEC crude recovers.
While we believe that OPEC members will be able to maintain production
discipline despite high levels of spare capacity, OPEC cohesion is a key
oil market uncertainty, especially in the current decade.
Energy Outlook 2030
41 © BP 2013

42. Refinery throughputs are limited by NGL and biofuels growth…
Global liquids supply and demand Growth 2011-2030
Mb/d Supply:
105 Total liquids 16 Mb/d
Global liquids demand Other
Other liquids 1 0.5
NGLs
Non-refined NGLs 4
90
Biofuels Biofuels 2
Crude + Condensates 9.5
75
Crude
Supply Crude runs:
60 China 2 7
OECD
World outside China 2.5 Mb/d
45 1 includes processing gains
2 if no change in net product trade
2011 2015 2020 2025 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
42 © BP 2013

43. …with the lion’s share of crude run growth in China
Growth in the call on refinery throughput will be constrained by new
supplies of biofuels (2 Mb/d) and NGLs (4 Mb/d) that do not need
refining. Increases in processing gains and supplies of liquids derived
from gas and coal are likely to add another 0.5 Mb/d to product supplies.
These supply sources will compete directly with refineries to meet total
liquids demand growth of 16 Mb/d between 2011 and 2030, limiting the
increase in refinery crude runs to only 9.5 Mb/d over the next 19 years.
Existing spare capacity can accommodate some of the future growth in
refinery throughputs. In addition, new capacity continues to be added at
a fast pace with a net 5 Mb/d due to be added globally by 2015.
Around half of global liquids demand growth is in China and that
country’s refinery expansion plans will affect product balances globally. A
continuation of its stated strategy to be self-sufficient in refined products
would severely curtail crude run increases for refiners outside of China.
Energy Outlook 2030
43 © BP 2013

44. Shale gas growth will gradually spread beyond the US…
Gas production by type and region Shale gas production
Bcf/d Bcf/d
500 Non-OECD other 80 18%
RoW
Non-OECD shale China
400 OECD shale Europe & Eurasia
60 Canada & Mexico
OECD other
US 12%
300
40
200
6%
% of total
20 (RHS)
100
0 0 0%
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
44 © BP 2013

45. …making a significant contribution to global gas growth
Shale gas is expected to grow by 7% p.a. (or 54 Bcf/d) to reach 74 Bcf/d
by 2030, accounting for 37% of the growth of natural gas supply. Shale
growth is initially concentrated in North America, where growth is
projected to slow after 2020, based on current resource assessments.
From a global perspective, the momentum of shale gas growth is
maintained after 2020 as developments spread to other regions, notably
China.
Total natural gas production is projected to grow by 2% p.a., reaching
459 Bcf/d by 2030. Most of the growth originates from non-OECD
countries (2.2% p.a.), accounting for 73% of world gas production
growth. The OECD also shows growth (1.5% p.a.), as declines in Europe
are more than offset by strong growth in North America and Australia.
By 2030 Non-OECD will account for 67% of total supply, up from 64% in
2011. Meanwhile, OECD shale gas is set to account for 12.5%, up from
just 6% in 2011.
Energy Outlook 2030
45 © BP 2013

46. Shale gas brings self-sufficiency to North America…
Sources of gas supply, by region
N. America EU China
Bcf/d Bcf/d Bcf/d
120 120 120 Net pipeline imports
Net LNG imports
100 100 100
Shale gas production
80 80 80 Other domestic production
60 60 60
40 40 40
20 20 20
0 0 0
-20 -20 -20
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
46 © BP 2013

47. …while EU and China will grow imports
North American shale gas production grows by 5.3% p.a. reaching 54
Bcf/d by 2030, more than offsetting the decline of conventional gas
production. Supported by shale gas, North America will become a net
exporter in 2017, with net exports approaching 8 Bcf/d by 2030.
Shale gas development faces a number of challenges in Europe, so we
are unlikely to see shale growth at scale before 2030. For the EU, shale
gas production of 2.4 Bcf/d in 2030 is not enough to offset the rapid
decline of conventional gas production, leading to a 48% increase in net
imports.
China is expected to be most successful in developing shale gas outside
North America. Shale gas is projected to grow to 6 Bcf/d by 2030,
accounting for 20% of total Chinese gas production. Nonetheless, given
the fast growth of Chinese consumption, which by 2030 will be larger
than the current EU gas market, China still requires rapid import growth
(11% p.a.).
Energy Outlook 2030
47 © BP 2013

48. Gas demand growth is driven by non-OECD needs…
Demand by region Demand by sector
Bcf/d Bcf/d
500 500
400 China 400
Other
300 300 Power
non-OECD
200 Middle East 200 Other
Other OECD Industry
100 100
N. America Transport
0 0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
48 © BP 2013

49. …for power generation and industry
Non-OECD gas demand grows faster than in the OECD (2.8% p.a. vs 1.0%
p.a.), increasing the non-OECD share of global gas consumption from
52% in 2011 to 59% by 2030. Non-OECD markets account for 76% of
global gas demand growth to 2030. China alone accounts for 25% of the
growth, and the Middle East for 23%.
By sector, transport shows the fastest growth, but from a very small
base. The bulk of growth comes from power (2.1% p.a.) and industry
(1.9% p.a.), with the industrial sector remaining, just, the largest global
destination for gas use in 2030. Power accounts for 39% of gas demand
growth to 2030 and industry for 38%.
Gas replaces coal in the OECD in power generation and industry, while
non-OECD demand is strong enough to accommodate growth of gas and
coal in both sectors.
Energy Outlook 2030
49 © BP 2013

50. Shale gas is the big growth story in the OECD…
Demand Supply
Bcf/d
500
450 2030 level
Other
non-OECD OECD
400 China
Middle East Non-OECD
350
Other OECD
N. America
300
250
2011 OECD Non-OECD 2011 Non-shale Shale
Energy Outlook 2030
50 © BP 2013

51. …but conventional growth in the non-OECD is even larger
The expansion of shale gas supply in the OECD (37 Bcf/d) is more than
enough to cover the increase in OECD gas demand (34 Bcf/d). And shale
gas contributes a further 17 Bcf/d to non-OECD gas production growth.
However, despite all the attention surrounding the shale gas revolution,
in volume terms the bigger story is the expansion of mostly conventional
production in the non-OECD (84 Bcf/d). The Middle East is the largest
contributor with 31 Bcf/d, followed by Africa (15 Bcf/d) and Russia (11
Bcf/d).
Overall, the growth of non-OECD gas production (104 Bcf/d) almost
matches the growth of non-OECD consumption (110 Bcf/d). However, this
match on the aggregate level masks growing regional imbalances which
will support the expansion of gas trade.
Energy Outlook 2030
51 © BP 2013

52. Gas trade continues to grow faster than consumption…
Regional gas imbalances LNG exports
Bcf/d Bcf/d
80 80 20%
N. Am.
60 Mid East
Africa
40 60 15%
20 FSU % of total
consumption
0 40 (RHS) 10%
-20 Europe
-40 20 5%
China LNG
-60
RoW
-80 0 0%
2011 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
52 © BP 2013

53. …with LNG playing an ever larger role
Gas trade between regions continues to grow (3.7% p.a. from 2011).
Europe remains the largest net importer, and accounts for the largest
increment in net imports (18 Bcf/d). Russia remains the largest net
exporter – predominantly to Europe.
LNG contributes an increasing share of trade. LNG production grows by
4.3% p.a., accounting for 15.5% of global gas consumption by 2030. On a
regional level, Africa is set to overtake the Middle East to become the
largest net LNG exporter in 2028.
Australia, with a wave of large projects coming on stream from 2014,
expands LNG supply by 15 Bcf/d, overtaking Qatar as the largest LNG
supplier by 2018 and accounting for 25% of global LNG production by
2030.
Inter-regional pipeline trade grows by 3.0% p.a. to 2030, and like LNG
trade, sees its share of consumption rising.
Energy Outlook 2030
53 © BP 2013

54. LNG trade is accompanied by deeper market integration…
LNG diversification LNG infrastructure
10 140
Suppliers per importer Re-gas terminals
Customers per exporter 120 Liquefaction plants
8
100
6
80
60
4
40
2
20
0 0
1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Energy Outlook 2030
54 © BP 2013

55. …improving optionality for importers and exporters
Alongside the growth of LNG volumes, we have seen a diversification of
trading partners for both exporters and importers. In 1990 each exporter
or importer had an average of 2 partners – by 2011 that had risen to 9 and
6 respectively. Nigeria, Qatar and Trinidad & Tobago are leading export
diversification, with an average of 20 trading partners in 2011.
Another indicator of increased diversification is the decline in the share
of LNG accounted for by the largest importer and largest exporter - from
68% and 39% respectively in 1990 to 23% and 31% respectively in 2011.
The trend towards diversification is expected to continue as new
exporters and importers join the LNG trade. Increased market flexibility
and integration is also supported by the expansion of the physical
infrastructure, creating an ever-expanding network of trading nodes.
Energy Outlook 2030
55 © BP 2013

56. Coal consumption and production will level off after 2020…
Coal demand by region Coal supply by region
Billion toe Billion toe
5 5 Oil
4 4
China
China China
China
Industry
China
3 3 China
India
2 India 2 India
India
India
India
Other Non-OECD Other Non-OECD
Other non-OECD Power
Other non-OECD
1 OECD 1
OECD
OECD
OECD OECD
0 0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030 56 © BP 2013

57. …as the OECD and China reduce their reliance on coal
Coal consumption declines in the OECD (by 0.8% p.a. 2011-2030), but
continues growing in the non-OECD (1.9% p.a.). China remains the
largest coal consumer (52% of global consumption), while India (12%)
overtakes the US to become the second largest in 2024. China and India
account for 63% and 29% respectively of global coal growth to 2030.
China’s coal demand growth decelerates rapidly from 9% p.a. in 2000-10
to 3.5% p.a. this decade and 0.4% p.a. in 2020-2030, driven by a shift to
less coal-intensive economic activities and by efficiency improvements.
India’s coal demand growth slows down more gradually from 6.5% p.a.
in 2000-10 to 3.6% p.a. in 2011-2030, as energy efficiency gains partially
offset rising energy demand for industrial and infrastructure expansion.
Global coal supply is set to grow 1.0% p.a. in 2011-2030, with increases in
non-OECD countries offsetting declines in the OECD. Production in China
and India rises 0.9% p.a. and 3.9% p.a. respectively. Growing imports
drive further expansion and integration of global coal markets.
Energy Outlook 2030
57 © BP 2013

58. The share of coal declines in all sectors…
Coal demand by sector Coal share in sector
Billion toe
5 50%
Other
4 40%
Industry
Industry Power
3 30% Industry & other
Transport
2 20%
1 Power Power 10%
0 0%
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2010 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
58 © BP 2013

59. …driven by structural change and fuel diversification
The growth of global coal consumption in power generation slows from
3.6% p.a. in 2000-10 to 2.4% p.a. in 2011-20 and 0.4% p.a. after 2020. In
the OECD coal use in power is already in decline (-0.2% p.a. 2000-10); this
decline accelerates to -1.2% p.a. in 2020-30. In the non-OECD, the growth
of coal use in power slows, from 7.7% p.a. 2000-10 to 1.0% p.a. after 2020.
As a result, coal’s share in fuels used for power generation declines from
44% in 2020 to 39% in 2030; gas, nuclear and renewables all gain share.
Coal consumption in the industrial sector also levels off. While
consumption continues to decline in the OECD (-1.1% p.a.), growth in the
non-OECD decelerates from 7.8% p.a. in 2000-10, to 1.9% p.a. 2011-20 and
1.2% p.a. in 2020-30. As the focus of China’s economic development shifts
from rapid industrialisation and infrastructure building to growth based
on services and light manufacturing, its industrial consumption of coal
decelerates from 9.6% p.a. in 2000-10 to 0.9% after 2020.
Energy Outlook 2030
59 © BP 2013

60. Non-fossil fuels growth is led by renewables in the OECD…
OECD Non-OECD
Billion toe Billion toe
2.0 2.0
Renewables
Biofuels
1.5 1.5
Hydro
Nuclear
1.0 1.0
Renewables in power
0.5 0.5
Biofuels
0.0 0.0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
60 © BP 2013

61. …while nuclear leads in the non-OECD
Non-fossil fuels grow strongly in both the OECD (2.0% p.a.) and non-
OECD (5.2% p.a.). OECD growth is concentrated in renewable power
(6.7% p.a.), while nuclear output remains below pre-Fukushima levels,
and hydro continues to grow slowly.
In the non-OECD, growth is more evenly split between renewables,
nuclear and hydro. Nuclear contributes the most to growth, with output
increasing rapidly (7.9% p.a.) as China, India and Russia pursue
ambitious expansion programmes.
Including biofuels, renewables reach a 6% share of global primary
energy by 2030, up from 2% in 2011. Renewables growth is initially led
by the EU, but from 2020 the US and China are the largest sources of
growth. The non-OECD shows a higher growth rate than the OECD
(10.9% p.a. vs 6.1% p.a.), but in terms of volume growth the OECD
remains just ahead of the non-OECD.
Energy Outlook 2030
61 © BP 2013

62. Renewables continue to gain market share…
Share of power generation Renewable power
Growth 2011-30, and share of power
% share % p.a.
20% 25% 15%
Growth (RHS)
Nuclear Share 2011
1970-2000 20% 12%
15% Share 2030
15% 9%
10%
Non-OECD 10% 6%
5% Renewables
5% 3%
2000-2030
OECD
0% 0% 0%
2000 2010 2020 2030 OECD Other Non-
1970 1980 1990 2000 Europe OECD OECD
Energy Outlook 2030
62 © BP 2013

63. …assuming cost declines can keep the subsidy burden in check
Renewables are projected to gain market share in power, at a slower but
perhaps more sustainable rate than nuclear in the 1970/80s. Nuclear
power then gained share rapidly, but peaked in the 1990s as safety
concerns, rising costs, and continued public opposition led to a loss of
policy support.
Renewables face a different set of challenges, the most pressing of which
– and the key factor limiting growth – is the affordability of subsidies.
Continued rapid cost reductions are required to keep the subsidy burden
at an acceptable level as renewables scale up.
Renewable power growth in the EU slows, as the share of renewables is
now at a level where the subsidy burden has become an issue.
Nevertheless renewables continue to gain market share in the EU,
because overall power growth is low (0.8% p.a.). Less mature markets for
renewables, with lower current shares, can sustain higher growth rates.
Energy Outlook 2030
63 © BP 2013

64. Electricity gains in all sectors…
Electricity share of final consumption World power generation
Thousand TWh
50% 40
Renewables
Other
40%
30 Hydro
30% Nuclear
Industry 20
20% Coal
10 Gas
10%
Transport Oil
0% 0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
64 © BP 2013

65. …but power growth slows as China restructures
The power sector is a key driver of global energy growth, and the only
sector where all the primary fuels compete. Total electricity consumption
will be 61% higher in 2030 than in 2011, growing by 2.5% p.a. (versus
3.4% p.a. for 2000-10, and 2.7% for 1990-2000). Electricity continues to
gain share in final energy use, meeting 33% of non-transport energy
demand in 2030, up from 28% in 2011.
Electricity is closely tied to economic growth and industrialisation.
Global electricity demand growth accelerated as China started to
industrialise at scale. Beyond 2020 global electricity growth slows as
China shifts to less energy-intensive growth.
Improving end-use efficiency everywhere adds to this “China effect” The.
net result is a 1.1% p.a. decline in electricity per unit of GDP compared
,
to a 0.1% p.a. decline 1990-2010.
Improving conversion efficiency in power generation means that the
total fuel inputs to generate power grow less rapidly than electricity
demand, averaging 2.1% p.a.
Energy Outlook 2030
65 © BP 2013

66. The fuel mix for power generation diversifies…
Growth of fuel inputs to power Shares of power output
Billion toe
1.6 100%
Oil
1.2 80% Nuclear
0.8 60% Hydro
Gas
0.4
40%
0.0 Coal
20%
-0.4
0% Renew.
1990- 2000- 2010- 2020-
2000 2010 2020 2030 1970 1990 2010 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
66 © BP 2013

67. …with coal’s share declining rapidly post 2020
Over time we see large shifts in the fuel mix for power generation, driven
by relative prices, policy, and technology developments. In the 1970s and
1980s high priced oil was replaced by nuclear and to a lesser extent by
coal. In the 1990s and 2000s gas gained share as CCGT technology was
deployed, and coal’s share also rose, reflecting the growing weight of
Asia’s coal-intensive power sector in global power generation.
From 2011 to 2030 coal loses share and gas gains share only marginally,
as renewables start to penetrate the market at scale.
The impact on the growth of fuels for power, in volume terms, is
particularly striking in the final decade of the outlook. After 2020 we see
very little growth in coal used in power, in stark contrast to the previous
two decades. This is the result of the slowdown in total power growth,
and the increased role of both renewables and nuclear. Gas growth is
also reduced, but to a much lesser extent than coal.
Energy Outlook 2030
67 © BP 2013

68. Energy Outlook 2030
68 © BP 2013

69. Page
Introduction 4
Global energy trends 7
Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 27
Implications 69
Appendix 81
Energy Outlook 2030
69 © BP 2013

70. Distribution of oil and gas reserves: importing regions…
FSU
N. America
Europe
Middle East
Asia Pacific
Key:
% share of global total
50% S. & C. America
Africa
2011 reserves
2030 output
0%
Net importers 2011
Net exporters 2011
Energy Outlook 2030
70 © BP 2013

71. ...more likely to turn reserves into production
The world has ample proved reserves of oil and natural gas to meet
expected future demand growth. At the end of 2011, global proved
reserves of oil were sufficient to meet 54 years of current (2011)
production; for natural gas that figure is 64 years.
The distribution of global proved reserves of oil and natural gas – while
essential for energy production – is not a good predictor of the
distribution of future production growth. Indeed, the world’s oil and gas
importing regions – Asia Pacific, North America, and Europe – are
expected to contribute a disproportional share of the world’s oil and
natural gas production to 2030.
These countries sit atop just 16% of global proved reserves of oil and
natural gas, yet they will account for 38% of global production in 2030,
and will deliver one-third of the growth in global production.
Energy Outlook 2030
71 © BP 2013

72. The expected slowdown in tight oil and shale gas production…
Range of tight oil forecasts Share of global supply Range of shale gas
(excludes NGLs) growth forecasts
Mb/d Bcf/d
10 75% 120
Range Shale gas Range
BP Tight oil BP
100
8
50% 80
6
60
4
25% 40
2
20
0 0% 0
2010 2020 2030 2000-10 2010-20 2020-30 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
72 © BP 2013

73. …may not materialise if more optimistic outlooks are realised
We project that the current decade will experience the most rapid growth
in global production of tight oil and shale gas. After 2020, North
American growth is expected to moderate, in part due to current
assessments of the resource base. Continued, but more modest, growth
elsewhere results in slower global production growth in the next decade.
The global understanding of tight oil and shale gas potential is still
evolving, however, and the range of external forecasts reflects the
uncertain landscape. Different views on the North American resource
base – in particular, whether to expect further growth – are the key factor
behind the range of external forecasts. Elsewhere, varying assessments
of above ground issues are another driver of divergent forecasts.
These uncertainties could result in a significantly higher path for tight oil
and shale gas production – as much as 5 Mb/d and 35 Bcf/d, respectively,
by 2030. Additional supplies would have follow-on implications for the
broader outlook: in the case of oil, for example, by reducing the market
requirement for OPEC crude and boosting spare capacity.
Energy Outlook 2030
73 © BP 2013

74. Energy imbalances: significant changes in import profiles...
Energy imbalances Energy imbalances to GDP ratio
Mtoe China EU US Toe per $Mln GDP
200 60
China
0 40 US
EU
-200 20
-400
0
-600
-20
-800 Oil
-40
Gas
-1,000
Coal -60
-1,200
-80
1990
2010
2030
1990
2010
2030
1990
2010
2030
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
74 © BP 2013

75. ...put into perspective by economic growth
Growing production and flat consumption will see the US become nearly
self-sufficient in energy by 2030. The US will remain a small net importer
of oil, although net imports will decline by about 70%. With net exports
of natural gas and coal, US energy production will reach 99% of
domestic consumption, up from a low of 70% in 2005.
China is on pace to match Europe as the world’s leading energy importer
by 2030, and will replace the US as the world’s largest oil importing
nation by 2017.
However, the growth in Chinese energy imports will be taking place in a
context of robust economic growth. Adjusting the volume of energy
imports for expected economic growth will leave China relatively less
dependent (per unit of GDP) than EU on imported energy.
Other things equal, the development of energy imbalances point toward
a reduction of global trade imbalances.
Energy Outlook 2030
75 © BP 2013

76. Energy imbalances: growing energy exports...
Energy imbalances Energy imbalances to GDP ratio
Saudi Arabia Africa Russia
Mtoe Toe per $Mln GDP PPP
800 1200
Oil Saudi Arabia
Gas 1000 Russia
600 Africa
Coal
800
400
600
200 400
200
0
1990
2010
2030
1990
2010
2030
1990
2010
2030
0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Energy Outlook 2030
76 © BP 2013

77. ...and their relative importance
Russia will remain the world’s largest energy exporter, with increases in
exports of all fossil fuels. Net energy exports will rise by 25% in volume
terms.
By 2030, Saudi Arabia will be the world’s largest oil exporter, although
the trajectory over time will be impacted by the likelihood of OPEC
production cuts discussed earlier. By 2030, oil exports in volume terms
are likely to be 17% above the 2010 level.
As a region, Africa will become an increasingly important source of
fossil fuel exports as well.
Once again adjusting for expected economic growth, Russia – and the
African countries as a group – are likely to remain significantly less
dependent on energy exports than Saudi Arabia.
Energy Outlook 2030 77 © BP 2013

78. Energy demand growth drives carbon emissions…
CO2 emissions and primary energy Growth of CO2 emissions
Billion tonnes CO2 Billion toe % p.a.
50 Emissions from 8%
18 1970-1990
energy use
1990-2010
Primary energy
40 15 6% 2010-2030
(RHS)
30 12 4%
9
20 2%
Gas
6
10 0%
3 Oil
0 0 -2%
1970 1990 2010 2030 China EU US
Energy Outlook 2030 78 © BP 2013

79. …but the link weakens as the energy mix decarbonises
Carbon emissions from energy use continue to grow, increasing by 26%
between 2011 and 2030 (1.2% p.a.). We assume continued tightening in
policies to address climate change, yet emissions remain well above the
required path to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases at the
level recommended by scientists (450 ppm).
There is some progress: the changing fuel mix, in particular the rising
share of renewables and substitution of coal with gas, results in a
gradual decoupling of emissions growth from primary energy growth.
Carbon emissions continue to fall in the EU – on the back of carbon
abatement policies, support for renewables and declining overall energy
demand – and in the US – driven by falling oil demand (efficiency gains
in the car fleet), renewables in power and the displacement of coal by
gas.
The structural transformation of China’s economy slows its energy
demand growth, especially after 2020 and especially for coal, causing a
significant reduction in the growth of China’s carbon emissions.
Energy Outlook 2030
79 © BP 2013

80. Conclusion
% p.a.
Economic growth needs
4% energy
Competition and
3% innovation are the key to
Income
per meeting this need
capita
2% − energy efficiency
− new supplies
1%
Popul Energy security and
ation climate change remain
0% challenges
Economic Efficiency New
growth gains supply
Energy Outlook 2030
80 © BP 2013

81. Page
Introduction 4
Global energy trends 7
Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 27
Implications 69
Appendix 81
Energy Outlook 2030
81 © BP 2013

82. Key changes versus last year’s Outlook...
Changes in 2030 levels versus the 2012 Outlook
Revised down Revised up
N. America oil & gas supply Oil Gas
Middle East oil & gas supply
Transport consumption Biofuels
Biofuels
Inputs into power generation
Non-OECD Asia fossil fuel use Coal Coal
-150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250
Mtoe
Energy Outlook 2030
82 © BP 2013

83. …result in little net change in total energy
Our aggregate projection for world energy demand and supply is little
changed since our last Outlook – up about 0.5% by 2030.
The North American oil and natural gas supply outlook has been revised
higher (14%) due to evolving expectations for shale gas/tight oil plays.
Higher tight oil output leaves the market requiring less OPEC production,
with overall Middle East oil output revised lower with knock-on effects
for associated natural gas production.
Oil and gas useage in the transport sector has been revised up, largely
reflecting the need to offset a drop in biofuel supplies resulting from
more modest expectations of the penetration of next generation fuels.
Demand for power generation has been revised higher due mainly to
increased demand for electricity in non-OECD Asia Pacific, where fossil
fuel useage is impacted by a reassessment of that region’s potential for
economic development.
Energy Outlook 2030
83 © BP 2013

84. Comparison with other outlooks: the key difference…
Growth of energy consumption, 2010-2030
Billion toe Billion toe
6 6
non-OECD Other Nuclear Coal
5 OECD 5 Gas Liquids
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
0 0
IEA NPS EIA BP IEA CPS IEA NPS EIA BP IEA CPS
Energy Outlook 2030
84 © BP 2013

85. …lies in different views on non-OECD prospects
Our Outlook is based on a “most likely” assessment of future policy
trends. In that respect it differs from the energy projections published by
the IEA and the EIA, which are based on specific policy scenarios and
which make no judgements about the likelihood of those scenarios.
Our policy assumptions are closest to those in the IEA’s “New Policies
Scenario” (NPS), which assesses demand prospects on the assumption
that announced national policy objectives are implemented. Yet our
outcomes are closest to the IEA’s “Current Policies Scenario” and the
EIA’s reference case, both of which assume no change in policy settings.
Our Outlook shows more growth in non-OECD energy demand than the
IEA NPS; it also shows more growth for fossil fuels, especially for coal.
This probably reflects differing views on the outlook for rapidly
industrialising economies, in particular on the speed with which they can
move to a less energy-intensive growth path.
Energy Outlook 2030
85 © BP 2013

86. Data sources
Baker Hughes, Houston, Texas
BP p.l.c., BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, United Kingdom, June 2012
BP p.l.c., BP Energy Outlook 2030, London, United Kingdom, January 2012
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,
Heston, A., Summers, R., Aten, B., Penn World Table Version 7.1, Nov 2012.
Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook , Washington, D.C., United States, 2012
GIIGNL, Paris, France
International Council for Clean Transportation, Global passenger vehicle standards update. August 2012
International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Paris, France, 2012
International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, Paris, France, 2012
International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, Paris, France, 2012
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012, Paris, France, 2012
Oxford Economics Ltd, Oxford, UK
PIRA Energy Group, New York, NY, United States
Rühl C., Appleby P., Fennema J., Naumov A., Schaffer ME. (2012). Economic development and the demand for
energy: a historical perspective on the next 20 years. Energy Policy, vol 50, pp. 109-116.
Smith Bits S.T.A.T.S.
UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, New York, United States, 2011
US Environmental Protection Agency, Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and
Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2011. March 2012
World Bank, World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), November 2012
Plus various official sources
Energy Outlook 2030
86 © BP 2013