SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 2
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
A summary of the DNS control
and threat prevention mechanisms
supported by the Palo Alto Networks
next-generation security platform.
DNS is a very necessary and ubiquitous application, as such,
it is a very commonly abused protocol for command-and-
control and data exfiltration. This tech brief summarizes the
DNS classification, inspection and protection capabilities
supported by our next-generation security platform, which
includes:
1.	 Malformed DNS messages (symptomatic of vulnerability
exploitation attack).
2.	 DNS responses with suspicious composition (abused query types,
DNS-based denial of service attacks).
3.	 DNS queries for known malicious domains.
Our ability to prevent threats from hiding within DNS is best highlighted by
describing our overall approach to preventing threats which begins with the
accurate classification of DNS (App-ID™
) and our positive security model, and
then describing the specific DNS threat prevention capabilities.
Accurately Classifying DNS
First off, App-ID is our traffic classification engine that uses up to four
mechanisms (signatures, application and protocol decoders, heuristics) to
determine the identity of the traffic. In order for DNS to traverse our device, it
will be sent through the DNS decoder within App-ID to ensure that it is indeed
DNS and then it can be allowed by policy. Our next-generation security
platform allows you to create a policy using App-ID that allows the DNS
application only over port 53. By creating a policy with that application
specified in the policy, you ensure that only DNS traverses over 53, and not
proprietary C2 traffic. Even if a C2 protocol piggybacks on legitimate DNS
(i.e. tcp-over-dns, or any number of tools that leverage TXT records and
recursive queries), these types of traffic will fall out of the DNS decoder and
into another type of application, which would then be denied based on your
security policy. With this positive security (whitelist) model, we need not create
an IPS signature for each type of DNS abuse we see. We simply allow the
known good DNS usage patterns, while blocking everything else. As a means
of enforcing additional security-best practices, the firewall policy can also be
configured to:
• Block traffic from unauthorized source addresses to enforce that DNS traffic
from clients only go to the local DNS resolver, and that the only DNS that
leaves/enters the network is from/to the local DNS resolver.
• Identify, alert, and block DNS traffic on a non-standard port or going to
unexpected hosts. This is an integral capability of App-ID, our full stack
classification engine.
• Detect non-DNS traffic on port 53 by identifying and logging every session
at the application layer with App-ID to determine if the traffic on port 53
is legitimate DNS, or if it is identified as something else, such as a known
DNS tunneling application or even simply “unknown”. This traffic can
proactively be blocked using App-ID and a positive security model, or
blocked using a search-and-destroy negative model, or simply alerted in
logs to bring it to the administrator’s attention.
Palo Alto Networks®
DNS Protection Mechanisms
•	Accurately identify, control and inspect
DNS traffic.
•	Block DNS queries to malicious domains as
a means of breaking the C2 channel.
•	Identify compromised hosts on your network
through DNS sinkholing.
P A L O A LT O N E T W O R K S : D N S P r o t e c t i o n M e c h a n i s m s Te c h n o l o g y B r i e f
4401 Great America Parkway
Santa Clara, CA 95054
Main:	+1.408.753.4000
Sales:	 +1.866.320.4788 		
Support:	+1.866.898.9087
www.paloaltonetworks.com
Copyright ©2014, Palo Alto Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Palo Alto Networks,
the Palo Alto Networks Logo, PAN-OS, App-ID and Panorama are trademarks of
Palo Alto Networks, Inc. All specifications are subject to change without notice.
Palo Alto Networks assumes no responsibility for any inaccuracies in this document
or for any obligation to update information in this document. Palo Alto Networks
reserves the right to change, modify, transfer, or otherwise revise this publication
without notice. PAN_TB_DNS_070914
P A L O A LT O N E T W O R K S : D N S P r o t e c t i o n M e c h a n i s m s Te c h n o l o g y B r i e f
Inspecting DNS Traffic
After the traffic passes the application-level allow/block decision,
our threat prevention engine analyzes the traffic to look for
known malicious, high risk, or suspicious content and block it
based on policy. In the case of DNS, this can mean many things,
such as: suspicious query types such as zone transfers or “any”
queries (information leak); DNS amplification attacks from either
the intermediary or the ultimate victim (DDOS); DNS cache
spoofing attempts; and queries for known malicious domains
determined via Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) analysis,
malware sandboxing, or our global passive DNS network.
Blocking Known Malicious Domains
Our DNS-based threat detection allows you to block DNS queries
to malicious domains as a means of breaking the command-and-
control channel while also alerting the administrator of the
compromised machine. The DNS intelligence we use to execute
this function comes from several sources:
•	Reverse engineering and automatic “fast forwarding” of
Domain Generation Algorithms that we see being used in
malware.
•	Malware received by WildFire™
is dynamically analyzed in a
virtual machine environment to detect domains queried for
C2 purposes. The results are delivered to your device in the
form of scheduled content updates.
Discovering Malicious Domains with Passive DNS and WildFire
The passive DNS network feature allows you to opt-in to share
anonymized DNS query and response data with our global
passive DNS network. The data is continuously mined to
discover malicious domains that are then added to the PAN-OS
DNS signature set that is delivered daily, enabling timely
detection of compromised hosts within the network and the
disruption of command-and-control channels that rely on name
resolution. Data from the passive DNS network is used to
“predict” malicious domains; rather than rely solely on direct
observations of malware querying domains in a sandbox, we can
see if a domain that is queried on a customer network is related
to known malicious domains by any number of indicators, such
as shared records, name servers, or other heuristics on the
domain name itself.
WildFire complements the passive DNS feature by performing
malicious domain and command-and-control traffic analysis
through sandbox execution of potentially malicious files to find
previously undetected malware (APTs). If malware is present, a
signature is delivered to all WildFire customers and additional
malicious domain and C2 protection mechanisms are then
delivered via scheduled device updates.
Controlling Malicious DNS Traffic with DNS Sinkholing
When compromised hosts on the network query DNS to resolve
their command-and-control servers, you can alert, block, or
sinkhole the query using the DNS sinkholing feature. Sinkholing
refers to the ability of the firewall to send a forged response to
temporarily pollute local DNS cache to cause the malicious
domain to resolve to an IP address of your choosing. This can be
used to quickly identify compromised hosts on the network using
DNS data by discovering which hosts have attempted to initiate
sessions to the sinkhole IP. This feature can also be used to route
malicious traffic to an internal analysis environment such as a
honeypot or other analysis platform to perform packet captures
or interact with the compromised host to gather intelligence.
Files and passive
DNS monitoring
Protection
mechanisms
delivered
Activity to
10.10.10.10
logged
C2 query to
controlme.com
Compromised
endpoint
Global Passive DNS
Database WildFire
Internal DNS
Server
controlme.com
= 10.10.10.10

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Module 2 Foot Printing
Module 2   Foot PrintingModule 2   Foot Printing
Module 2 Foot Printing
leminhvuong
 
Module 8 System Hacking
Module 8   System HackingModule 8   System Hacking
Module 8 System Hacking
leminhvuong
 
Wireless security
Wireless securityWireless security
Wireless security
Arpan Pal
 

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Angler talk
Angler talkAngler talk
Angler talk
 
DDos
DDosDDos
DDos
 
Ddos
DdosDdos
Ddos
 
Network security
Network securityNetwork security
Network security
 
PacNOG 29: Routing security is more than RPKI
PacNOG 29: Routing security is more than RPKIPacNOG 29: Routing security is more than RPKI
PacNOG 29: Routing security is more than RPKI
 
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack PreventionKHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
 
Reconnaissance - For pentesting and user awareness
Reconnaissance - For pentesting and user awarenessReconnaissance - For pentesting and user awareness
Reconnaissance - For pentesting and user awareness
 
Internet censorship circumvention techniques
Internet censorship circumvention techniquesInternet censorship circumvention techniques
Internet censorship circumvention techniques
 
Module 2 Foot Printing
Module 2   Foot PrintingModule 2   Foot Printing
Module 2 Foot Printing
 
Clean dns technical_enus
Clean dns technical_enusClean dns technical_enus
Clean dns technical_enus
 
Reconnaissance
ReconnaissanceReconnaissance
Reconnaissance
 
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek JanikPLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
PLNOG14: Czy można żyć bez systemu ochrony przed atakami DDoS - Marek Janik
 
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1
Session for InfoSecGirls - New age threat management vol 1
 
DoS/DDoS
DoS/DDoSDoS/DDoS
DoS/DDoS
 
Detecting dns-tunneling-34152
Detecting dns-tunneling-34152Detecting dns-tunneling-34152
Detecting dns-tunneling-34152
 
DDoS Mitigation Tools and Techniques
DDoS Mitigation Tools and TechniquesDDoS Mitigation Tools and Techniques
DDoS Mitigation Tools and Techniques
 
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat Community
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat CommunityHoneypots - Tracking the Blackhat Community
Honeypots - Tracking the Blackhat Community
 
Module 8 System Hacking
Module 8   System HackingModule 8   System Hacking
Module 8 System Hacking
 
Wireless security
Wireless securityWireless security
Wireless security
 
Talk28oct14
Talk28oct14Talk28oct14
Talk28oct14
 

Ähnlich wie Dns protection

DNS Hijacking: What Is It And How It Can Affect You?
DNS Hijacking: What Is It And How It Can Affect You?DNS Hijacking: What Is It And How It Can Affect You?
DNS Hijacking: What Is It And How It Can Affect You?
Abraxas Market
 
Cloudshield_DNS Tips_032014
Cloudshield_DNS Tips_032014Cloudshield_DNS Tips_032014
Cloudshield_DNS Tips_032014
Laura L. Adams
 
abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-...
abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-...abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-...
abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-...
Yankmo
 

Ähnlich wie Dns protection (20)

Network security monitoring elastic webinar - 16 june 2021
Network security monitoring   elastic webinar - 16 june 2021Network security monitoring   elastic webinar - 16 june 2021
Network security monitoring elastic webinar - 16 june 2021
 
Security in network
Security in networkSecurity in network
Security in network
 
DNS Data Exfiltration Detection
DNS Data Exfiltration DetectionDNS Data Exfiltration Detection
DNS Data Exfiltration Detection
 
From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...
From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...
From liability to asset, the role you should be playing in your security arch...
 
DNS spoofing/poisoning Attack Report (Word Document)
DNS spoofing/poisoning Attack Report (Word Document)DNS spoofing/poisoning Attack Report (Word Document)
DNS spoofing/poisoning Attack Report (Word Document)
 
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
PLNOG15-DNS is the root of all evil in the network. How to become a superhero...
 
NANOG 84: DNS Openness
NANOG 84: DNS OpennessNANOG 84: DNS Openness
NANOG 84: DNS Openness
 
Infoblox - turning DNS from security target to security tool
Infoblox - turning DNS from security target to security toolInfoblox - turning DNS from security target to security tool
Infoblox - turning DNS from security target to security tool
 
DNS Advanced Attacks and Analysis
DNS Advanced Attacks and AnalysisDNS Advanced Attacks and Analysis
DNS Advanced Attacks and Analysis
 
PLNOG16: DNS – przyjaciel e-szpiegów i e-złodziei. Analityka w służbie jej DN...
PLNOG16: DNS – przyjaciel e-szpiegów i e-złodziei.Analityka w służbie jej DN...PLNOG16: DNS – przyjaciel e-szpiegów i e-złodziei.Analityka w służbie jej DN...
PLNOG16: DNS – przyjaciel e-szpiegów i e-złodziei. Analityka w służbie jej DN...
 
Monitoring for DNS Security
Monitoring for DNS SecurityMonitoring for DNS Security
Monitoring for DNS Security
 
D zone-firewall-datasheet
D zone-firewall-datasheetD zone-firewall-datasheet
D zone-firewall-datasheet
 
Types of Attack in Information and Network Security
Types of Attack in Information and Network SecurityTypes of Attack in Information and Network Security
Types of Attack in Information and Network Security
 
Reblaze Web Application Firewall
Reblaze Web Application FirewallReblaze Web Application Firewall
Reblaze Web Application Firewall
 
Denial of Service - Service Provider Overview
Denial of Service - Service Provider OverviewDenial of Service - Service Provider Overview
Denial of Service - Service Provider Overview
 
DNS Hijacking: What Is It And How It Can Affect You?
DNS Hijacking: What Is It And How It Can Affect You?DNS Hijacking: What Is It And How It Can Affect You?
DNS Hijacking: What Is It And How It Can Affect You?
 
DNSSEC for Registrars by .ORG & Afilias
DNSSEC for Registrars by .ORG & AfiliasDNSSEC for Registrars by .ORG & Afilias
DNSSEC for Registrars by .ORG & Afilias
 
Cloudshield_DNS Tips_032014
Cloudshield_DNS Tips_032014Cloudshield_DNS Tips_032014
Cloudshield_DNS Tips_032014
 
Software Supply Chain Security Meetup 21062022
Software Supply Chain Security Meetup 21062022Software Supply Chain Security Meetup 21062022
Software Supply Chain Security Meetup 21062022
 
abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-...
abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-...abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-...
abusing dns to spread malware:from router to end user(滥用dns传播恶意软件:从路由器到最终用户)-...
 

Mehr von Marcello Marchesini

Aruba utilities on mobile devices v30
Aruba utilities on mobile devices v30Aruba utilities on mobile devices v30
Aruba utilities on mobile devices v30
Marcello Marchesini
 

Mehr von Marcello Marchesini (10)

Akamai State of Internet - Q1 2014 - Infographic
Akamai State of Internet - Q1 2014 - InfographicAkamai State of Internet - Q1 2014 - Infographic
Akamai State of Internet - Q1 2014 - Infographic
 
Infographic: The Power of Enterprise PaaS
Infographic: The Power of Enterprise PaaSInfographic: The Power of Enterprise PaaS
Infographic: The Power of Enterprise PaaS
 
SAMSUNG Wireless Enterprise - Voice Optimization [White paper]
SAMSUNG Wireless Enterprise - Voice Optimization [White paper]SAMSUNG Wireless Enterprise - Voice Optimization [White paper]
SAMSUNG Wireless Enterprise - Voice Optimization [White paper]
 
Ponemon report : 'Critical Infrastructure: Security Preparedness and Maturity -
Ponemon report : 'Critical Infrastructure: Security Preparedness and Maturity -Ponemon report : 'Critical Infrastructure: Security Preparedness and Maturity -
Ponemon report : 'Critical Infrastructure: Security Preparedness and Maturity -
 
ARUBA community - WLAN design and troubleshooting
ARUBA community - WLAN design and troubleshootingARUBA community - WLAN design and troubleshooting
ARUBA community - WLAN design and troubleshooting
 
ARUBA - Remote Branch-networking-fundamentals-2014
ARUBA - Remote Branch-networking-fundamentals-2014ARUBA - Remote Branch-networking-fundamentals-2014
ARUBA - Remote Branch-networking-fundamentals-2014
 
Samsung Wireless Enterprise LAN - June 2014
Samsung Wireless Enterprise LAN  - June 2014Samsung Wireless Enterprise LAN  - June 2014
Samsung Wireless Enterprise LAN - June 2014
 
ARUBA 2014 : 802.11ac Wi-Fi fundamentals v2
ARUBA 2014 : 802.11ac Wi-Fi fundamentals v2ARUBA 2014 : 802.11ac Wi-Fi fundamentals v2
ARUBA 2014 : 802.11ac Wi-Fi fundamentals v2
 
Aruba utilities on mobile devices v30
Aruba utilities on mobile devices v30Aruba utilities on mobile devices v30
Aruba utilities on mobile devices v30
 
PALO ALTO -NETWORKS Application Usage & Threat Report 2014
PALO ALTO -NETWORKS  Application Usage & Threat Report 2014PALO ALTO -NETWORKS  Application Usage & Threat Report 2014
PALO ALTO -NETWORKS Application Usage & Threat Report 2014
 

Dns protection

  • 1. A summary of the DNS control and threat prevention mechanisms supported by the Palo Alto Networks next-generation security platform. DNS is a very necessary and ubiquitous application, as such, it is a very commonly abused protocol for command-and- control and data exfiltration. This tech brief summarizes the DNS classification, inspection and protection capabilities supported by our next-generation security platform, which includes: 1. Malformed DNS messages (symptomatic of vulnerability exploitation attack). 2. DNS responses with suspicious composition (abused query types, DNS-based denial of service attacks). 3. DNS queries for known malicious domains. Our ability to prevent threats from hiding within DNS is best highlighted by describing our overall approach to preventing threats which begins with the accurate classification of DNS (App-ID™ ) and our positive security model, and then describing the specific DNS threat prevention capabilities. Accurately Classifying DNS First off, App-ID is our traffic classification engine that uses up to four mechanisms (signatures, application and protocol decoders, heuristics) to determine the identity of the traffic. In order for DNS to traverse our device, it will be sent through the DNS decoder within App-ID to ensure that it is indeed DNS and then it can be allowed by policy. Our next-generation security platform allows you to create a policy using App-ID that allows the DNS application only over port 53. By creating a policy with that application specified in the policy, you ensure that only DNS traverses over 53, and not proprietary C2 traffic. Even if a C2 protocol piggybacks on legitimate DNS (i.e. tcp-over-dns, or any number of tools that leverage TXT records and recursive queries), these types of traffic will fall out of the DNS decoder and into another type of application, which would then be denied based on your security policy. With this positive security (whitelist) model, we need not create an IPS signature for each type of DNS abuse we see. We simply allow the known good DNS usage patterns, while blocking everything else. As a means of enforcing additional security-best practices, the firewall policy can also be configured to: • Block traffic from unauthorized source addresses to enforce that DNS traffic from clients only go to the local DNS resolver, and that the only DNS that leaves/enters the network is from/to the local DNS resolver. • Identify, alert, and block DNS traffic on a non-standard port or going to unexpected hosts. This is an integral capability of App-ID, our full stack classification engine. • Detect non-DNS traffic on port 53 by identifying and logging every session at the application layer with App-ID to determine if the traffic on port 53 is legitimate DNS, or if it is identified as something else, such as a known DNS tunneling application or even simply “unknown”. This traffic can proactively be blocked using App-ID and a positive security model, or blocked using a search-and-destroy negative model, or simply alerted in logs to bring it to the administrator’s attention. Palo Alto Networks® DNS Protection Mechanisms • Accurately identify, control and inspect DNS traffic. • Block DNS queries to malicious domains as a means of breaking the C2 channel. • Identify compromised hosts on your network through DNS sinkholing. P A L O A LT O N E T W O R K S : D N S P r o t e c t i o n M e c h a n i s m s Te c h n o l o g y B r i e f
  • 2. 4401 Great America Parkway Santa Clara, CA 95054 Main: +1.408.753.4000 Sales: +1.866.320.4788 Support: +1.866.898.9087 www.paloaltonetworks.com Copyright ©2014, Palo Alto Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Palo Alto Networks, the Palo Alto Networks Logo, PAN-OS, App-ID and Panorama are trademarks of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. All specifications are subject to change without notice. Palo Alto Networks assumes no responsibility for any inaccuracies in this document or for any obligation to update information in this document. Palo Alto Networks reserves the right to change, modify, transfer, or otherwise revise this publication without notice. PAN_TB_DNS_070914 P A L O A LT O N E T W O R K S : D N S P r o t e c t i o n M e c h a n i s m s Te c h n o l o g y B r i e f Inspecting DNS Traffic After the traffic passes the application-level allow/block decision, our threat prevention engine analyzes the traffic to look for known malicious, high risk, or suspicious content and block it based on policy. In the case of DNS, this can mean many things, such as: suspicious query types such as zone transfers or “any” queries (information leak); DNS amplification attacks from either the intermediary or the ultimate victim (DDOS); DNS cache spoofing attempts; and queries for known malicious domains determined via Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) analysis, malware sandboxing, or our global passive DNS network. Blocking Known Malicious Domains Our DNS-based threat detection allows you to block DNS queries to malicious domains as a means of breaking the command-and- control channel while also alerting the administrator of the compromised machine. The DNS intelligence we use to execute this function comes from several sources: • Reverse engineering and automatic “fast forwarding” of Domain Generation Algorithms that we see being used in malware. • Malware received by WildFire™ is dynamically analyzed in a virtual machine environment to detect domains queried for C2 purposes. The results are delivered to your device in the form of scheduled content updates. Discovering Malicious Domains with Passive DNS and WildFire The passive DNS network feature allows you to opt-in to share anonymized DNS query and response data with our global passive DNS network. The data is continuously mined to discover malicious domains that are then added to the PAN-OS DNS signature set that is delivered daily, enabling timely detection of compromised hosts within the network and the disruption of command-and-control channels that rely on name resolution. Data from the passive DNS network is used to “predict” malicious domains; rather than rely solely on direct observations of malware querying domains in a sandbox, we can see if a domain that is queried on a customer network is related to known malicious domains by any number of indicators, such as shared records, name servers, or other heuristics on the domain name itself. WildFire complements the passive DNS feature by performing malicious domain and command-and-control traffic analysis through sandbox execution of potentially malicious files to find previously undetected malware (APTs). If malware is present, a signature is delivered to all WildFire customers and additional malicious domain and C2 protection mechanisms are then delivered via scheduled device updates. Controlling Malicious DNS Traffic with DNS Sinkholing When compromised hosts on the network query DNS to resolve their command-and-control servers, you can alert, block, or sinkhole the query using the DNS sinkholing feature. Sinkholing refers to the ability of the firewall to send a forged response to temporarily pollute local DNS cache to cause the malicious domain to resolve to an IP address of your choosing. This can be used to quickly identify compromised hosts on the network using DNS data by discovering which hosts have attempted to initiate sessions to the sinkhole IP. This feature can also be used to route malicious traffic to an internal analysis environment such as a honeypot or other analysis platform to perform packet captures or interact with the compromised host to gather intelligence. Files and passive DNS monitoring Protection mechanisms delivered Activity to 10.10.10.10 logged C2 query to controlme.com Compromised endpoint Global Passive DNS Database WildFire Internal DNS Server controlme.com = 10.10.10.10